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At least 235 records · Page 13

Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation

Achieving nuclear disarmament, stopping nuclear proliferation, and preventing nuclear terrorism are among the most critical challenges facing the world today. Unmaking the Bomb proposes a new approach to reaching these long-held goals. Rather than considering them as separate issues, the authors—physicists and experts on nuclear security—argue that all three of these goals can be understood and realized together if we focus on the production, stockpiling, and disposal of plutonium and highly enriched uranium—the fissile materials that are the key ingredients used to make nuclear weapons. The authors describe the history, production, national stockpiles, and current military and civilian uses of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and propose policies aimed at reducing and eventually eliminating these fissile materials worldwide. These include an end to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for weapons, an end to their use as reactor fuels, and the verified elimination of all national stockpiles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗

National and International Assistance in the Technical Assessment of Nuclear and other Radiological Materials out of Regulatory Control

Considerable resources are dedicated worldwide to detect illicit materials of all types amid the concern of their potential use in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Of particular concern are illicit nuclear and radiological materials as they have potential to cause serious harm to the general public if not maintained under regulatory control. As such, the international community has developed recommendations and guidance for States and their Competent Authorities to establish, implement, maintain, and strengthen their nuclear security regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control through the publication Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Nuclear Security Series No.15. Based on this guidance and national/international practical experience and best practices, the international community has made considerable advances in the detection, interdiction, and adjudication of nuclear and other radiological materials out of regulatory control. The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation has national/international experience to share on providing emergency responders and front line officers assistance in the technical assessment of interdicted nuclear and other radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Data-Driven Template Discovery Using Graph Convolutional Neural Networks

Modeling adversarial activities is a critical component of developing high-con?dence indicators of efforts to acquire, fabricate, proliferate, and/or deploy weapons of mass terror (WMTs). Current approaches to generating representative patterns of interest (a.k.a templates) from the real-world domains involve a Subject Matter Expert (SME)-guided manual process. The goal of Data-Driven Template Discovery (DDTD) is to use a (potentially small) set of SME generated templates to discover other previously unknown and interesting templates in an attributed graph. A template is an activity pattern describing a set of interactions among a group of nodes in the graph. The motivation behind DDTD is to expand the original set of templates, without having SMEs craft all the templates by hand. DDTD also provides seed templates to SMEs, to help them construct larger, high-?delity, and scenario-oriented templates. In these cases, obtaining a larger set of templates that are related (contain similar signals) to the original set is of great value. In this work, we propose to use Graph Convolutional Neural Networks (GCNs) to discover new templates that are heavily related to the original set. GCNs are a family of Neural Network (NN) architectures especially designed to work directly on graphs. In contrast to the traditional NNs, that require considerable amounts of labeled data, GCNs do not require a big labeled training set because they can directly leverage the graph structure instead. This property makes GCNs the perfect tool for creating activity templates.

Joaristi, Mikel↗

Blast mitigation foam concentrates and foams made therefrom

The present disclosure is directed to highly concentrated foam formulations for blast suppression and dispersion mitigation. for use in responding to a terrorism incident involving a blast dispersion device. The foam formulation is more concentrated and more stable than current blast suppression foams, which reduces the logistics burden on the user.

Burton, Patrick D.↗

Stakeholder Transportation Scorecard: Reviewing Nevada's Recommendations for Enhancing the Safety and Security of Nuclear Waste Shipments - 13518

As a primary stakeholder in the Yucca Mountain program, the state of Nevada has spent three decades examining and considering national policy regarding spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste transportation. During this time, Nevada has identified 10 issues it believes are critical to ensuring the safety and security of any spent nuclear fuel transportation program, and achieving public acceptance. These recommendations are: 1) Ship the oldest fuel first; 2) Ship mostly by rail; 3) Use dual-purpose (transportable storage) casks; 4) Use dedicated trains for rail shipments; 5) Implement a full-scale cask testing program; 6) Utilize a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process for the selection of a new rail spur to the proposed repository site; 7) Implement the Western Interstate Energy Board (WIEB) 'straw man' process for route selection; 8) Implement Section 180C assistance to affected States, Tribes and localities through rulemaking; 9) Adopt safety and security regulatory enhancements proposed states; and 10) Address stakeholder concerns about terrorism and sabotage. This paper describes Nevada's proposals in detail and examines their current status. The paper describes the various forums and methods by which Nevada has presented its arguments and sought to influence national policy. As of 2012, most of Nevada's recommendations have been adopted in one form or another, although not yet implemented. If implemented in a future nuclear waste program, the State of Nevada believes these recommendations would form the basis for a successful national transportation plan for shipments to a geologic repository and/or centralized interim storage facility. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Response of the REWARD detection system to the presence of a Radiological Dispersal Device

In recent years an increased international concern has emerged about the radiological and nuclear (RN) threats associated with the illicit trafficking of nuclear and radioactive materials that could be potentially used for terrorist attacks. The objective of the REWARD (Real Time Wide Area Radiation Surveillance System) project, co-funded by the European Union 7. Framework Programme Security, consisted in building a mobile system for real time, wide area radiation surveillance, using a CdZnTe detector for gamma radiation and a neutron detector based on novel silicon technologies. The sensing unit includes a GPS system and a wireless communication interface to send the data remotely to a monitoring base station, where it will be analyzed in real time and correlated with historical data from the tag location, in order to generate an alarm when an abnormal situation is detected. Due to its portability and accuracy, the system will be extremely useful in many different scenarios such as nuclear terrorism, lost radioactive sources, radioactive contamination or nuclear accidents. This paper shortly introduces the REWARD detection system, depicts some terrorist threat scenarios involving radioactive sources and special nuclear materials and summarizes the simulation work undertaken during the past three years in the framework of the REWARD project. The main objective consisted in making predictions regarding the behavior of the REWARD system in the presence of a Radiological Dispersion Device (RDD), one of the reference scenarios foreseen for REWARD, using the Monte Carlo simulation program MCNP6. The reference scenario is characterized in detail, from the i) radiological protection, ii) radiation detection requirements and iii) communications points of view. Experimental tests were performed at the Fire Brigades Facilities in Rome and at the Naples Fire Brigades, and the results, which validate the simulation work, are presented and analyzed. The response of the REWARD detection system to the presence of an RDD is predicted and discussed. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Safety and security of radioactive sources in industrial radiography in Bangladesh

Malicious use of radioactive sources can involve dispersal of that material through an explosive device. There has been recognition of the threat posed by the potential malicious misuse of NDT radioactive source by terrorists. The dispersal of radioactive material using conventional explosives, referred to as a 'dirty bomb', could create considerable panic, disruption and area access denial in an urban environment. However, as it is still a relatively new topic among regulators, users, and transport and storage operators worldwide, international assistance and cooperation in developing the necessary regulatory and security infrastructure is required. The most important action in reducing the risk of radiological terrorism is to increase the security of radioactive sources. This paper presents safety and security considerations for the transport and site storage of the industrial radiography sources as per national regulations entitled 'Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Rules-1997'.The main emphasis was put on the stages of some safety and security actions in order to prevent theft, sabotage or other malicious acts during the transport of the packages. As a conclusion it must be mentioned that both safety and security considerations are very important aspects that must be taking in account for the transport and site storage of radioactive sources used in the practice of industrial radiography. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program: Integrated Program Plan

Nuclear power has safely, reliably, and economically contributed almost 20% of electrical generation in the United States over the past two decades. It remains the single largest contributor (more than 60%) of non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power generation in the United States. Domestic demand for electrical energy is expected to grow by about 24% from 2013 to 2040 . At the same time, most of the currently operating nuclear power plants will begin reaching the end of their initial 20-year extension to their original 40-year operating license, for a total of 60 years of operation (the oldest commercial plants in the United States reached their 40th anniversary in 2009). Figure E-1 shows projected nuclear energy contribution to the domestic generating capacity for 40- and 60-year license periods. If current operating nuclear power plants do not operate beyond 60 years (and new nuclear plants are not built quickly enough to replace them), the total fraction of generated electrical energy from nuclear power will rapidly decline. That decline will be accelerated if plants are shut down before 60 years of operation. Decisions on extended operation ultimately rely on economic factors; however, economics can often be improved through technical advancements. The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy's 2010 Research and Development Roadmap (2010 Nuclear Energy Roadmap) organizes its activities around four objectives that ensure nuclear energy remains a compelling and viable energy option for the United States. The four objectives are as follows: 1. Develop technologies and other solutions that can improve the reliability, sustain the safety, and extend the life of the current reactors; 2. Develop improvements in the affordability of new reactors to enable nuclear energy to help meet the Administration's energy security and climate change goals; 3. Develop sustainable nuclear fuel cycles; and 4. Understand and minimize the risks of nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program is the primary programmatic activity that addresses Objective 1. This document summarizes the LWRS Program's plans. For the LWRS Program, sustainability is defined as the ability to maintain safe and economic operation of the existing fleet of nuclear power plants for a longer-than-initially-licensed lifetime. It has two facets with respect to long-term operations: (1) manage the aging of plant systems, structures, and components so that nuclear power plant lifetimes can be extended and the plants can continue to operate safely, efficiently, and economically; and (2) provide science-based solutions to the industry to implement technology to exceed the performance of the current labor-intensive business model.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

System impacts of accelerated transfer of used nuclear fuel to dry storage - 15220

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, and again after the March 11, 2011, accident at the Fukushima Dai-Ichi station from the Great East Japan Earthquake/tsunami, concern was expressed regarding security of current spent fuel storage practices in the United States. An approach recurrently proposed to reduce the potential for fire and the release of radionuclides in an accident or sabotage scenario is to reduce the loading of the reactor fuel pools, which are frequently maintained near their full capacity at many reactor sites in the U.S. We assess the impact on the waste management system of different scenarios for accelerating the schedule of used nuclear fuel (UNF) transfer from reactor pools to dry storage casks. We consider scenarios where the spent fuel pools are drawn down to 50% or 25% of full capacity over 5- or 10-year schedules. The scenarios include status quo, where UNF continues to remain in dry storage at the reactor sites, as well as scenarios with UNF transfer to interim storage and eventually to a mined geologic repository. The primary purpose is to evaluate how the different scenarios for accelerating the transfer of UNF to at-reactor dry storage would affect the performance of the entire UNF management system. Areas that were considered include an estimate of the additional system costs that could be incurred and where the existing infrastructure at the reactor sites would come under stress from the transfer demands. This study considered only the fuel-handling logistics and rough-order-of-magnitude cost at reactor sites, interim storage facility, and operations to package UNF into disposal canisters. The effects of minimum fuel age that could be transferred and the accelerated transfer starting date are also examined, but found to have relatively little effect. Impacts on safety and worker dose are not evaluated quantitatively, although effects can be inferred from increases in handling operations, etc. from the scenarios considered. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Decontamination Experiments and Simulations Supporting Recovery After Widespread Contamination - 18685

Clean-up after an uncontrolled nuclear material release differs from common decontamination practices in the nuclear industry and military combat scenarios. Uncontrolled releases, particularly acts of terror, require specific protective actions guides (PAGs) to optimize short and long-term repercussions. Ideally, non-destructive decontamination methods would be employed. To help fulfill this need, the IWATERS (Integrated Wash Aid Treatment Emergency Reuse System) was proposed in 2014 for remediation outside the immediate blast area. 'Wash-Aid' is hosed onto affected areas, and the used wash solution is collected and recycled through sand/clay beds. To help characterize the IWATERS technology, the below was completed: - Decontamination experiments with a pressurized wash solution using Cs-137, Sr- 85, and Eu-152 contaminants on porous urban materials. - Sensitivity analyses on recycling bed variables using GoldSim{sup TM} CT. - A proposed framework that expands the recycling bed model to include probabilistic simulation of immediate recovery efforts. Removal efficacy of tap water and 0.5 M KCl were compared for Cs, Sr, and Eu across asphalt, brick, and concrete. The 0.5 M KCl solution significantly outperformed tap water in every case except for Eu on concrete and Cs on brick. Trends in the high-pressure decontamination with salt additive compared to low pressure decontamination show evidence of physical and chemical removal. Variations in cleaning rate yielded no significant trend. Pressure changes (by adjusting nozzle-to-coupon distance) were only significant for the highest pressure. Hypothetical Contamination Scenario: To tie the decontamination experiments and recycling bed model together, a small contamination scenario was created. Imagine the sides of a small concrete building uniformly contaminated with Cs-137. Power washing the building with 0.5 M KCl solution would result in 857 L of contaminated solution generated in 185 minutes. Two sand clay beds were designed to clean the used solution. With a sand mass fraction of 0.9, a 10 ft{sup 2} bed 4 ft tall could recycle the solution in 1.05 hrs. Changing the sand mass fraction to 0.5 yielded a 2.5 ft{sup 2} bed 4 ft tall (∼55-gallon drum) that recycled the solution in 7.43 hrs. This exercise showed how the sand/clay bed design can easily change to match the primary remediation goals. The second sand/clay bed would reduce the waste generation while the first bed reduces the remediation time. Conclusions: Variations on speed and nozzle distance (pressure) yielded insignificant differences in efficacy except for the closest distance. High-pressure washing showed increased decontamination efficacy with KCl additive in the majority of cases. Except for bed composition, key recycling bed parameters can be varied on-the-fly. This allows for optimization of, for example, time and waste generation. The hypothetical contamination scenario showed pairing decontamination experiment results with modeling tools can lead to increased preparedness for a large-scale contamination event. With collaboration and time, an expanded recovery/remediation model could aid in development of effective protective action guides.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

EPA's Suite of Tools for Managing Waste Following a Large-Scale Incident - 19420

Large-scale disasters have the potential to generate a significant amount of waste. For example, Hurricane Katrina and the Joplin Missouri tornado resulted in 100 million and 1.5 million cubic yards of waste respectfully. Man-made chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) incidents either by way of terrorism, war, or accidents have the potential to generate as much or more hazardous waste. Recovery is profoundly impacted by waste management issues. The quantification, segregation, transportation, and storage of waste can be an arduous and costly undertaking. Furthermore, these processes are intricately linked with decisions made throughout the recovery timeline. Therefore, the remediation, including waste management, must be holistically considered. Understanding these complex interactions can be facilitated by using models and tools that adhere to the 'system-of-systems' approach. To better understand and predict waste management issues the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) Homeland Security Research Program (HSRP) is developing a suite of tools and resources for planning and recovery purposes. The waste management suite consists of four tools: - Incident Waste Decision Support Tool (I-WASTE): characterizes and produces order-of-magnitude estimates for the weight and volume of waste materials that may require management and/or disposal, as well as identifies and locates potential treatment and disposal facilities. - Waste Estimation Support Tool (WEST): estimates waste generated from remediation and cleanup activities following a wide-area radiological or biological incident; - Waste Storage and Staging Tool: identifies and prioritizes potential locations for staging and storing waste; - Waste Logistics Tool: estimates optimal routes with consideration to cost, time, and logistical requirements (e.g., resource demand, transportation type, access limitations, etc.) associated with transporting large volumes of waste from disaster-stricken areas to intermediate waste staging/temporary storage/on-site processing sites to off-site waste management facilities; and This paper will present EPA's waste management suite of tools, their purpose and application to large-scale incidents, and a case study demonstrating their use in a hypothetical scenario. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Occurrence of Radiological Contamination in Urban Parks Established over Former Landfill Sites - 19433

In 2005, the National Park Service was notified that elevated radiation levels were detected at Great Kills Park during a baseline radiological mapping effort conducted by the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Energy. Great Kills Park is in the Staten Island Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. A records search determined that approximately 1.1 x 10{sup 6} square meters (280 acres) of the park was established over an area in which the New York City Department of Sanitation placed approximately 1.2 x 10{sup 7} cubic meters (15.1 million cubic yards) of waste fill from 1944 to 1948. Since 2005, a series of response actions and investigations were conducted on behalf of the National Park Service to mitigate risk to human health and the environment and to determine the nature of radiological contamination at Great Kills Park. The findings support that radiological contamination is related to certain components of waste fill, including incinerator residue from both on and offsite incinerators, coal ash from the historical use of coal-fired boilers for heating, and incidental radiological artifacts in the waste fill due to their historical use and subsequent disposal. A majority of the radiological artifacts were determined to contain Ra-226 and included radioluminescent markers, radium buttons, radium paint containers, and brachytherapy devices. The National Park Service is currently performing a Remedial Investigation for the waste-filled area of Great Kills Park under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act. Several other Parks in Gateway National Recreation Area were established in areas with a similar history to Great Kills Park, and overlie waste fill historically placed during landfilling operations. Recently, radiological surveys were performed over limited portions of Spring Creek Park in the Jamaica Bay Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. These surveys identified several locations with gamma radiation levels above the ambient level, several of which were attributable to radiological artifacts similar in nature to those recovered at Great Kills Park. Ongoing investigations at Great Kills Park and the recent findings at Spring Creek Park suggest that radiological contamination may be associated with historical landfilling practices that were common prior to the regulation and control of radioactive materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Expedited Walkdowns and Preparation of Cost Estimates for Decontamination and Demolition of Excess Facilities - 20335

Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC (LLNS) is the prime contractor responsible for managing and operating Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The mission of the LLNL is to strengthen security of the United States through development and application of world-class science and technology to enhance the nation's defense, reduce the global threat from terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, and respond with vision, quality, integrity, and technical excellence to scientific issues of national importance. To accomplish its mission, LLNL must plan and manage its campus space and facilities to optimize use of its relatively small one-square-mile footprint. LLNL currently has numerous excess facilities that require decontamination and demolition (D and D). The LLNL Legacy Facility Program is responsible for stewardship and risk reduction programs to effectively manage these excess assets at LLNL. The Legacy Facility Program identified 10 excess facilities at LLNL that were candidates for demolition based on risks from further degradation of the facilities, potential exposure to hazardous materials, or need for removal to make way for new program facilities. The buildings range from a structure built in 1943 to serve as a US Navy drill hall during World War II, to a facility that provided neutrons to study material properties for the fusion energy program. The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appropriated FY19 funding for the development of Class 3 estimates for these 10 excess facilities that would be used to develop a Program Management Plan for funding consideration. Class 3 estimates are not conceptual, nor overly detailed, but adequate to be used for budget and appropriation purposes. Using existing strategic sourcing agreements, LLNL was able to organize a team of senior subject matter experts (SMEs) with diverse technical backgrounds across the Department of Energy (DOE) Complex to complete extensive process knowledge (PK) reviews and walk-downs of each excess facility and to deliver accurate and complete estimates under an expedited schedule (i.e., within eight weeks). To facilitate the expedited schedule, LLNL was fully prepared for the arrival of the JGMS team, which consisted of the following companies: J.G. Management Systems, Inc. (JGMS); Strata-G, LLC; and Michael Baker International. LLNL provided background and PK information on the excess facilities, pictures, supporting historical documentation, and radiological survey history as well as escorted access to the facilities. The JGMS team has previous experience supporting Program Management Plans for excess facilities at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The team mobilized to LLNL and performed the facility walk-downs from January 22-25, 2019. Using a methodical evaluation process, expertise, and experience, the team was able to deliver walk-down draft reports and estimates to LLNL before their February 8, 2019 deadline. LLNL then in turn reviewed, completed the estimates by adding waste management costs and other LLNL costs, and delivered the estimates to NNSA by February 15, 2019. The completed final reports, including draft D and D estimates, were delivered to LLNL before their March 6, 2019 deadline. The work was successfully completed ahead of the expedited schedule required by LLNL, resulting in a commendation from the client. This paper describes how the partnership and collaboration as a fully integrated team comprised of the prime contractor, LLNS, and the JGMS team successfully met the needs of the US government, resulting in the performance of expedited site walk-downs, the development of summary evaluation reports, and the preparation of draft Class 3 estimates and preliminary schedules for the D and D of 10 excess facilities at LLNL. The efforts of the team will enable the D and D of the first excess facility in the 2020-2021 time frame. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Investigation of Radiological Contamination at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area - 20350

In 2005, the National Park Service was notified that elevated radiation levels were detected at Great Kills Park during a baseline radiological mapping effort conducted by the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department and the United States Department of Energy. Great Kills Park is in the Staten Island Unit of the Gateway National Recreation Area. A records search determined that approximately 280 acres of the park was established over an area in which the New York City Department of Sanitation placed approximately 15.1 million cubic yards of waste fill from 1944 to 1948. Since 2005, a series of response actions and investigations were conducted on behalf of the National Park Service to mitigate risk to human health and the environment and to determine the nature of radiological contamination at Great Kills Park. The findings support that radiological contamination is related to certain components of waste fill, including incinerator residue from both on and offsite incinerators, coal ash from the historical use of coal-fired boilers for heating, and incidental radiological artifacts in the waste fill due to their historical use and subsequent disposal. A majority of the radiological artifacts were determined to contain radium-226 and included radioluminescent markers, radium impregnated switch board buttons, radium paint containers, and brachytherapy devices. The National Park Service has several other Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area that were established in areas with a similar history to Great Kills Park, and overlie waste fill historically placed during landfilling operations, including Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay. Over the last year, the National Park Service has performed additional radiological investigations at Great Kills Park as part of the ongoing Remedial Investigation under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. In addition, preliminary radiological investigations were performed at Spring Creek Park and Dead Horse Bay Park in the Jamaica Bay Unit of Gateway National Recreation Area. These investigation activities identified gamma radiation levels above the ambient level, several of which were attributable to radiological artifacts similar in nature to those recovered at Great Kills Park. Ongoing investigations at Parks in the Gateway National Recreation Area support an association between radiological contamination and historical landfilling practices that were common prior to the regulation and control of radioactive materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Feasibility of Applying a Human Bio-signals Monitoring to Minimize Insider Threats

With the on-going global war on terror, a potential terrorist attack on a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is getting a lot of attention. In particular, the potential threat of an insider is a major concern as it could lead to the loss of a nationally critical asset and thus deserves serious consideration. The current approach to preventing an insider threat is the Insider Mitigation Program (IMP) based on periodic self-assessment or peer and manager review of specific employees. These are potentially biased and subjective assessments and are unreliable. Also, as the approach is reactive-based, identifying a problem employee could be too late to protect NPP assets (i.e., confidential information and nuclear materials). Thus, a new approach for detecting and predicting an insider is necessary. We propose a proactive approach based on using bio-signals as an alternative. To address the vulnerability of current insider detection systems, our studies investigated the possibility of insider detection and prediction by using biosignals (electroencephalogram (EEG), electrocardiogram (ECG), and galvanic skin response (GSR)). But one main question remained in the previous studies was: Is the method using key EEG indicators specific enough to discern the difference between a normal worker's motivation level change and being ready to commit a crime? This study examined the answer to the question.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

A Comprehensive Assessment of the Viability of Small Modular Reactors in Africa: A Nuclear Security and Nonproliferation Perspective

In response to escalating global energy demands driven by industrialization and the pressing need for decarbonization, this paper explores the potential of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs) as a sustainable energy solution in Africa. Focusing on nuclear security and non-proliferation concerns, the study assesses Africa's energy landscape, emphasizing the need for diverse and reliable power sources. While highlighting the scalability and cost-effectiveness of SMRs, the analysis acknowledges potential challenges associated with their introduction, particularly concerning nuclear security and non-proliferation. Given the recommendation to use High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) in some SMRs, it is important to critically consider the security implications of transporting nuclear materials, the proximity of the public to the plant, and the time taken to respond to planned assaults. The possibility of using HALEU makes the nuclear material more prone to adversaries such as sabotage, theft, and terrorism. Utilizing PESTLE analysis, this research seeks to outline the detailed political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal readiness of Africa to embrace the first-of-a-kind technology (SMR) while fulfilling its mandate to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Examining regulatory frameworks, international cooperation, and safety protocols, the study underscores the importance of regional collaboration to prevent the misuse of nuclear technology for military and malicious intent. Drawing insights from successful case studies, the paper concludes by synthesizing key findings and proposing recommendations for policymakers and stakeholders. These recommendations encompass regulatory enhancement, capacity building, technology transfer, and diplomatic efforts to strengthen nuclear security, non-proliferation, and safeguards in Africa.

Prah, Christina↗

SURVEILLANCE DETECTION FOR TRANSPORTATION OPERATIONS PERSONNEL TO PREVENT HIJACKING, THEFT, SABOTAGE, AND MALICIOUS SECURITY EVENTS DURING TRANSPORTING NUCLEAR MATERIAL

The secure transportation of high-consequence materials, including nuclear and radiological assets, is a critical global priority in the face of escalating terrorism, security threats, and violent protests targeting these operations. Effective surveillance detection—the ability to identify, assess, and respond to potential threats across a continuum of scenarios—is paramount in addressing these challenges. This paper outlines a phased, multi-tiered training program designed to strengthen the surveillance detection capabilities of organizations responsible for nuclear material transport. The proposed training program adopts a progressive approach, gradually increasing in technical complexity to provide participants with comprehensive knowledge and tools for implementing robust security strategies. It targets a wide spectrum of stakeholders, including competent authorities, regulators, inspectors, shippers, carriers, law enforcement, and emergency response personnel, equipping them to plan, evaluate, and safeguard nuclear material transportation effectively. Each phase of the program emphasizes distinct elements of the surveillance detection continuum and transport security, focusing on critical topics such as threat identification, adversary task timelines, protective methodologies, and attack mitigation strategies. The training framework is anchored in technical exchanges and scenario-driven courses that reflect real-world complexities and challenges. By addressing the surveillance detection continuum comprehensively—from early threat assessment to active countermeasures—the program reinforces global efforts to secure nuclear assets. It aligns with international security objectives and fosters a strong security culture within participating organizations, ensuring personnel are prepared to counter potential threats and maintain the safe, secure movement of these materials. Ultimately, this initiative aims to enhance preparedness, security, and response capabilities, supporting the global mission to safeguard high-consequence materials against evolving threats.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗