SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “STORAGE FACILITIES”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 235 records · Page 13

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

DOE OSTI2020

Planning for the storm: Considering renewable energy for critical infrastructure resilience

This study uses the renewable energy optimization model to assess three critical facilities in North Carolina. Techno-economic results were then compared to analyses completed for critical facilities in California and New York to assess energy system cost effectiveness. Though solar photovoltaic (PV) arrays are cost-effective across each of the three North Carolina facilities, adopting battery storage to enable PV to operate with existing diesel generators in a hybrid energy system reduces the economic value of the system. This is in contrast to more economically viable systems in California and New York. All of these systems also offer unquantified resilience benefits by extending operation from hours to weeks across the facilities. If decision makers were able to value the resilience benefits offered by each system or utility rate structures were changed to incentivize battery storage during normal operations, it would impact these assessments. Even so, this analysis provides decision makers a key set of cost benchmarks when considering how they might improve resilience at their critical operations.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of the Impact of Additional Manganese from the Recycle Collection Tank (RCT) Glycolate Destruction Process on Glass Properties

The Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) is planning to implement glycolic acid as a reductant within the waste processing flowsheet. An assessment of the glycolic acid flowsheet has revealed the potential for thermolytic production of hydrogen in the Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) from glycolate entrained in the DWPF recycle stream. To mitigate this potential scenario, a glycolate destruction process utilizing sodium permanganate (NaMnO 4 ) is being developed for use in the DWPF Recycle Collection Tank (RCT). The RCT is fed by the Slurry Mix Evaporator Condensate Tank (SMECT) and the Off-Gas Condensate Tank (OGCT). The SMECT could receive glycolate via a foamover from the Sludge Receipt and Adjustment Tank (SRAT) or the Slurry Mix Evaporator (SME), and the OGCT could receive glycolate via carryover of sludge particles in the purge from the melter during surge conditions. The use of NaMnO 4 additions in the RCT will result in additional manganese (Mn) in the waste stream and needs to be evaluated.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

H-Canyon Flowsheet for the Neutralization of Dissolved Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) Fuel

The H-Canyon facility will be dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel in HNO3 and neutralizing the resulting solution with 50 wt% NaOH with no recovery operations prior to transfer to the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF). There are two types of FCA fuel, including a Pu-Al metal alloy and a mixed U and Pu oxide. H-Canyon anticipates dissolving 16 batches of the metal fuel and two batches of the oxide fuel. Potassium fluoride will be added to the dissolver solution at 0.05 M to promote dissolution. Gadolinium will be added after the dissolution as a thermal neutron poison for criticality control. H-Canyon requested that SRNL evaluate Gd:239Pu equivalent (239PuEq) ratios of 1:1 and 10:1. The neutralization process precipitates metals including actinides, Gd, and cladding components resulting in a slurry. Caustic neutralization is a routine H-Canyon operation, but the FCA dissolver solution will be unique relative to solutions that are typically processed due to the stainless-steel components, high HNO3 concentration of ~8.5 M, and an initial Pu concentration of up to 4 g/L. Previous neutralization studies have been performed for Pu containing solutions but at less than half the initial Pu concentration and much lower initial HNO3 concentrations. Experimental neutralizations targeted a final free hydroxide (OH-) concentration of 0.6 M as this was anticipated to be the final endpoint, but H-Canyon now expects the endpoint to be 1.2 M OH-. The purpose of this study was to characterize the distribution of the actinide, Gd, and cladding components between the precipitate and supernate, determine if the slurry will back up in the header during the transfer to the CSTF, and determine if solids will settle in the pipeline during the transfer.

Mills, Matthew S.↗

DOE OSTI2022

Exceedance Response Action (ERA) Level 2 (Technical Report)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

Exceedance Response Action (ERA) Level 2 Technical Report Update

The Sandia National Laboratories, California (SNL/CA) site comprises approximately 410 acres and is located in the eastern portion of Livermore, Alameda County, California. The property is owned by the United States Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) and is being managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC (NTESS). Operations at the SNL/CA facility consist of DOE statutory responsibilities for nuclear weapon research and design, development of energy technologies, and basic scientific research. Specific industrial activities occur in discrete buildings and include electroplating or anodizing, machine shop, permitted hazardous waste treatment, storage and disposal facility (TSDF), and a scrap yard. This report provides an update to the ERA Level 2 Technical Report Update previously submitted in June 2022 (2022 ERA L2 Technical Report Update) for iron, aluminum, and pH. In accordance with the California’s General Permit for Discharges of Storm Water Associated with Industrial Activities (IGP) Section XII.D.3.c, an ERA Level 2 Technical Report update is to be submitted with the annual report when a facility utilizing an Industrial Activity Best Management Practice (BMP) Demonstration (IABMPD) experiences additional exceedances of the numeric action levels.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2025

Literature Review Investigating Historical Plutonium Solubility in SRS Tank Waste

The Savannah River Site (SRS) has designed the Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program to accelerate the de-inventory of L-Basin and accelerate the Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) disposition mission. Similarly, the H-Canyon facility at SRS is reestablishing the 6.3D electrolytic dissolver for dissolving unirradiated stainless-steel (SS) clad Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) fuel. In both discard types (ABD and FCA), plutonium is present and its complex solubility when composited to Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facility (CSTF) sludge is being investigated as it may have downstream impacts to the liquid waste (LW) organization. This literature review aims to highlight and compile the existing literature on plutonium solubility in waste streams relevant to ABD and FCA discards, as well as discuss some considerations in analyzing solubility data of plutonium. This review serves to help define the analysis methods for future experiments involving plutonium (and other actinides) and in designing appropriate testing conditions surrounding these studies. This review is broken up into five parts and will discuss: (i) The possible effects of testing hold time and temperature on plutonium solubility, (ii) the influence of neutralization rate and particle size of freshly precipitated discards, (iii) the coprecipitation of plutonium with iron and uranium, (iv) predictive solubility modeling and the influence of supernate anions on solubility, and (v) the speciation of plutonium in solutionas a result of supernate anions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2021

Examining Thermolytic Production of Hydrogen from Lubrication Oil

Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was requested by Savannah River Remediation (SRR) to conduct testing via Technical Task Request (HR) to determine the thermolytic HGR of Mobil SHC™ 630, a lubrication oil. Currently, 35 gallons of contaminated Mobil SHC 630 is proposed for release into the recycle stream from the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) to Tank 22 and then to the 242-16H (2H) Evaporator system. Inhibited recycle waste in the Recycle Collection Tank (RCT) is transferred to Recycle Pump Tank (RPT) in the Low Point Pump Pit (LPPP) and then to the Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) H-area. The lubrication oil would be added directly to the RPT, bypassing the RCT. The current DWPF waste compliance plan for liquid transfers from the RCT to the CSTF limits the concentration of Mobil SHC 630 to <1,100 ppm which is equal to <9.3 gallons of Mobil SHC 630 when considering a 7,500 gal RCT batch with an initial Mobil SHC 630 concentration of 42 mg/L. Mobil SHC 630 is expected to be largely immiscible in the caustic aqueous waste stream. It is a blend of base oils including polyalphaolefin (PAO) base oil and additives such as triphenylphosphate and cresyl diphenyl phosphate at various concentrations (<0.25 wt%). While the base oils are expected to be largely unreactive in CSTF waste, the triarylphosphates additives would be expected to hydrolyze in the caustic waste, forming diarylphosphates and phenol. The tests described herein were governed by a single Run Plan and will determine thermolytic HGR from the caustic aqueous solution, as well as from any organic phases present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2022

Tank Waste LDR Organics Data Summary for Sample-and-Send (Rev.1A)

The presence of organic chemicals regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) adds complexity to treating and disposing of the low activity fraction of Hanford tank waste if a low temperature treatment method such as grouting is used (SRNL-STI-2020-00228). The complexity arises from the fact that the baseline vitrification method is considered by the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) as providing adequate thermal treatment for organics; a status not automatically extended to a lowtemperature process, such as solidifying the waste in a cementitious waste form. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) LDR program is intended to ensure that wastes are properly treated prior to disposal. Proper treatment makes hazardous waste less harmful to groundwater by reducing the mobility and/or toxicity of the hazardous constituents in the waste. EPA guidance indicates that stabilization/solidification of waste for organics could be considered impermissible dilution under the LDR dilution prohibition. In addition, waste storage activities at Hanford have required transferring and blending waste within the tank system and these activities have potentially altered the concentrations of the hazardous constituents. The LDR dilution prohibition found in 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.3 states that “… no generator, transporter, handler, or owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal facility shall in any way dilute a restricted waste or the residual from treatment of a restricted waste as a substitute for adequate treatment …”. Hence, if LAW is to be treated using low temperature stabilization (such as cementation), then it is important to demonstrate both how past storage activities have contributed to the removal (by vacuum evaporation), or destruction (by in situ decomposition) of the LDR organics and how future retrieval and waste feed preparation will contribute to their removal (by filtration and ion exchange). Demonstrating these processes helps validate that cementation without additional organic treatment does not necessarily represent impermissible dilution. To aid in implementing cementitious solidification of Low Activity Waste (LAW), WRPS has been developing a regulatory and processing LDR treatment variance strategy termed “Sampleand-Send” that relies, in part, on demonstrating that in situ decomposition reactions along with historic evaporation of tank waste has destroyed or removed most of the LDR organics possibly associated with Hanford Tank Waste (SRNL-STI-2020-00582, SRNL-STI-2021-00453, SRNL-STI-2022-00391). Under the Sample-and-Send concept, Hanford tank waste would be retrieved, processed through a Tank-Side Cesium Removal-like system, and staged as a candidate feed that would then be sampled to confirm the waste acceptance criteria is met for solidification in an LAW cementitious treatment facility. If it can be shown that LDR organics are at concentrations below the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) for cementitious stabilization and have been sufficiently removed (by historic evaporation or by filtration and ion exchange during Cs removal), destroyed (by historic in situ decomposition), or are not soluble in LAW above the WAC then additional organic treatment is not needed prior to creating a cementitious final waste form and the concept of Sample-and-Send would be proposed to establish a non-rulemaking site-specific treatment variance using the specified method of treatment “STABL” to remove sampling requirements of the waste form after treatment. Waste not meeting the WAC could either be routed to the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant for LAW vitrification, or further processed by evaporation or chemical oxidation before solidifying in a cementitious waste form. A key component in implementing the Sample-and-Send strategy is identifying which of the 207 LDR organic compounds associated with the RCRA Part A permit application waste codes for the Double Shell Tanks (DSTs) and Single Shell Tanks (SSTs) and any applicable Underlying Hazardous Constituents (UHCs) from 40 CFR 268.48 should be considered as potentially present and thus subject to regulation. In addition, it is also necessary to understand the solubility volatility, and reactivity of these compounds in LAW to identify which of the potentially present LDR organic compounds are not soluble above regulatory levels or are likely to have been removed by historic evaporation or destroyed by in situ decomposition reactions. If there are potentially present LDR organic compounds that have not been removed or destroyed and are soluble above regulatorily significant concentrations then a treatability variance may be needed for these species to eliminate any concerns pertaining to impermissible dilution. The spreadsheet accompanying this calculation report contains the data and logic computations needed to screen the list of 207 LDR organics associated with Hanford tank waste to identify those potentially present and to indicate which compounds may need to be included in a treatability variance.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Plan for a Data Base Approach to Evaluating LWR Plant Integration with Hydrogen and Industrial Facilities

The purpose of this report is to provide an outline and scope of a database tool that could be used to identify the most beneficial locations to site a hydrogen, chemical facility or other industrial facility that would be powered by nuclear energy. This energy may be in the form of electricity produced by the plant, heat in the form of steam or both. In addition, this siting tool should consider factors such as economics, geography, industries, residences, geological hydrogen storage, and key infrastructure. The infrastructure to be considered could include pipelines or other storage and transportation facilities to carry the created products from the production facility to the end user. Also considered should be infrastructure that could deliver needed chemicals or gasses to allow the production of desired products such as ammonia or biofuels. This data base tool should allow a screening study of all U.S. nuclear plants to identify opportunities and barriers to creating hydrogen hubs around nuclear power plants. For this effort, it has been decided that the Siting Tool for Advanced Nuclear Development (STAND) would be used to conduct this screening study which is a follow-on research project to this present effort. Currently, plans are being developed to modify the STAND tool to provide the capability necessary to perform screening of each US commercial nuclear plant to identify the best locations to site hydrogen or chemical production facilities. Many features of the current STAND tool will be employed to meet this objective, but additional infrastructure data (such as the location of pipelines) may need to be added to allow these locations to be fully vetted. In addition, new analysis capabilities may need to be added so economic considerations can be understood

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2023

Expansion of Hazards and Probabilistic Risk Assessments of a Light-Water Reactor Coupled with Electrolysis Hydrogen Production Plants

This report builds upon the body of work sponsored by the Department of Energy (DOE) Light-Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Flexible Power Operation and Generation (FPOG) program that presented generic probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for the addition of a heat extraction system (HES) to light-water reactors to support the co-location of a high temperature hydrogen electrolysis facility (HTEF). Probabilistic and deterministic hazards assessments and risk analyses are leveraged throughout this report. Several improvements and new analyses are included in this report. First, higher amounts of detail in the specifications of the generic HTEFs are used to produce scaled results for a 100, 500, and 1000 MW nominal hydrogen production facility. An additional hazard assessment of 1000 kg of hydrogen storage is performed. The facility hazards and footprint are assessed to determine the safe distance required for placement near the nuclear power plant (NPP). Second, specific designs for corresponding HESs for the different levels of support required by the HTEFs are analyzed in the PRA model. Third, a hazards analysis of the specified HTEFs leads not only to effects of the quantified risk assessment for the NPP, but also qualitative hazards assessment for the community. Finally, a seismic analysis and a high winds analysis have each been added to the PRA. The results investigate the applicability of the potential licensing approaches which do not require a full United States (U.S.) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing review. The PRAs are generic and include listed assumptions. The HTEF design built for this project has further eliminated many conservative assumptions from the prior PRAs in this series. The PRA results indicate that the 10 CFR 50.59 licensing approach is justified due to the minimal increase in initiating event frequencies for all design basis accidents, with none exceeding 7.7%. The PRA results for core damage frequency and large early release frequency support the use of NRC Regulation Guide 1.174 as further risk information that supports a change without a full licensing amendment review. The hazard analyses and PRA confirm the need for engineered blast barriers of storage tanks and the common production header leaving the HTEF. The hazards analyses and PRA also confirm with high confidence that using the assumptions of design in this report that the safety case for licensing an HES addition and an HTEF sited with its unprotected high-pressure stage components 187 meters from the NPP’s transmission towers (the most fragile structure, system, and component) is strong.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2022

INL Site ARG-US Implementation – FY22 Activities and FY23 Plans

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management program at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US provides necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance, and has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming Department of Energy (DOE) Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in INL’s Nuclear Science and Technology (NS&T) directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend INL site processes or facilities in which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversight representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management personnel to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified the following high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. As a result, INL suggests three program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “Tank Farm,” and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions for completing the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Oxidation of Glycolate in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) Recycle Collection Tank - 20305

The Savannah River Site's Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) operations are being upgraded with the introduction of the Nitric-Glycolic Flowsheet. Glycolic acid has been shown superior to formic acid as the reducing acid used during chemical processing. The new flowsheet improves or maintains necessary parameters such as 1) reduction of mercury, 2) adjustment of feed rheology and 3) adjustment of melter oxidation/reduction potential. Further, the potential for catalytic hydrogen generation in DWPF processing is virtually eliminated. DWPF process condensates are collected and returned to the SRS Concentration, Storage and Transfer Facilities (CSTF). The Recycle Collection Tank (RCT) collects off-gas condensate during chemical processing, vitrification, and other unit operations performed in DWPF and is the singular return vessel delivering recycle effluent back to CSTF. Each batch of recycle may contain a small amount of glycolate from chemical processing and melter off-gas condensates. To avoid potential flammability issues due to thermolysis of glycolate in the CSTF, chemical oxidation within the RCT has been investigated as an option for mitigating the transfer of glycolate. Sodium permanganate has been down-selected as the best option for oxidation of glycolate. Testing was performed using both 2-L and 22-L reactors (16,800:1 and 1,530:1 scale by volume) with non-radioactive waste simulants to approximate the expected RCT compositions. RCT simulants were evaluated at various process pH and temperature conditions. Also, RCT operations, namely the sequence of addition of corrosion inhibitors (NaOH and NaNO{sub 2}) versus a permanganate strike, were evaluated. Glycolate was introduced via a sludge simulant to mimic both expected entrainment and abnormal process foam-over conditions - the range being between 68 and 5100 mg/kg glycolate. Glycolate destruction was monitored by ion chromatography (IC). The corresponding manganese behavior was monitored in real-time using in situ ultraviolet-visible (UV-Vis) spectroscopy. RCT glycolate content can be reduced to below the IC detection limit within 90 minutes for all concentrations investigated. Ion Chromatography analysis revealed that under alkaline conditions, glycolate is primarily oxidized to oxalate with no significant formation of CO{sub 2} or carbonate, and nitrite is not oxidized to nitrate. Initially, complete oxidation of organics species and nitrite was assumed. Determination of the mechanistic chemical reaction has allowed the required amount of permanganate to be more accurately predicted and the total addition to be significantly reduced. UV-Vis measurements reveal that permanganate (Mn{sup 7+}) is reduced to manganate (Mn{sup 6+}) in the RCT. The oxidant stoichiometry is defined by using the initial permanganate to glycolate (P/G) molar ratio. At low initial glycolate concentration (68 and 140 mg/kg), the minimum required initial permanganate to glycolate (P/G) molar ratio was found to be 5-6. With high initial glycolate concentrations (5100 mg/kg) a lower (P/G) molar ratio of ∼2.5 was needed. The final portion of this effort supporting the nitric/glycolic flowsheet will be to test actual (fully radioactive) RCT samples as per the above simulant tests. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems are becoming more widely deployed throughout the country, and as their presence continues to grow, it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity, and to the company that owns the facility. The two main mechanisms malicious actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when facility managers conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks applicable to a wide variety of hydrogen storage systems by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2022

Investigation of INL Site Implementation of ARG-US

The Packaging Certification and Life Cycle Management department at Argonne National Laboratory (ANL) developed a suite of monitoring systems collectively referred to here as ARG-US. ARG-US is used to provide necessary data for nuclear facility and system operation and maintenance. ARG-US has been previously demonstrated in hot cells, radioactive material (RAM) storage areas, and RAM shipment trucks. It has also been installed directly on RAM storage and shipment containers. ARG-US offers some unique advantages over other commercially available systems by using wireless data connections, battery power supplies, and customizable monitoring methods. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has been tasked with investigating applications for ARG-US at INL site facilities, which are operated by several different contractors. The initial investigation scope centered on CPP-603 Wet & Dry Fuel Storage Facility in relation to the upcoming DOE Spent (SNF) Packaging Demonstration. The investigation has been led by the Used Fuel Management Department in the Nuclear Science and Technology Directorate. This investigation is expected to recommend processes or facilities at the INL site at which to implement ARG-US systems. INL has engaged local site technical and oversite representatives, security, nuclear safeguards, and program management to identify good candidates for ARG-US test implementations. INL has identified high-level goals for any INL site implementation of ARG-US: provide unique testing environments, prompt development of new monitoring methods/techniques for the ARG-US suite, and acquire useful monitoring for the user facility. To these ends, INL suggests 3 program areas for further investigation: CPP-603 Fuel Handling Cave (FHC), legacy mixed waste storage systems at Idaho Nuclear Technology & Engineering Center (INTEC) known as the “tank farm”, and periodic and emergency environmental monitoring. This progress report relates activities undertaken in this investigation, describes the preliminary areas of interest for limited scope ARG-US testing or implementation, and relays expected actions needed to complete the task scope. This report offers an opportunity to the program sponsor, technical leads at ANL, and INL site representatives to give feedback on the initial assessment and make recommendations on the forthcoming activities.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2024

Large-Scale Hydrogen Storage Cyber Risk Assessment

Hydrogen storage systems may become more widely deployed throughout the country, and so it is possible that individual and interconnected systems will be exposed to cyber-attacks. These events can cause physical and financial harm to employees, people in the vicinity of the facility, and the company that owns the facility. The two main ways bad actors may access information or control from a hydrogen storage facility are through information technology and operations technology devices, the former of which refers to data and information from networked devices and the latter of which refers to onsite controls for the physical system. Both types of entryways into the system should be considered when companies conduct cyber risk assessments and when regulators develop or revise relevant codes and standards. This report analyzes cybersecurity risks associated with a generic hydrogen storage system by outlining the system's purpose and the importance of its cybersecurity. The hydrogen storage system architecture and communication protocols are provided to understand potential cyber vulnerabilities. Later, an event tree analysis is performed on hydrogen operation to identify system weaknesses by outlining potential attack scenarios. This report also identifies critical cyber assets related to different hydrogen operations followed by an examination of potential threats, and the impact of cyber assets on those operational assets.

08 HYDROGEN↗

DOE OSTI2021

Proton Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (H NMR) of Glycolate in Real Waste: Developing and Testing Analytical Methods for the Savannah River Site Liquid Waste System

In preparation for implementing the NG acid flowsheet for the SRS LWS, analytical methods for determining glycolate at low concentration are desired to support system management and safety. Previous work documented that the IC method performed well for samples with low to moderate ionic strength. That work also included a scoping effort to determine if an alternate analytical strategy using H NMR would complement and extend the capabilities of the IC method. The H NMR scoping results indicated that the method had the potential to expand glycolate analysis in LWS samples to higher ionic strength tanks/solutions. The scope of this work is to develop innovative proton NMR techniques, including demonstrating ion exchange decontamination protocols needed for application of the technique to real waste samples. Part of radioactive waste processing at SRS uses formic acid to reduce oxidized (Hg 2+ ) to more volatile elemental Hg for steam striping, collecting, and disposal. Under acidic conditions found in the Chemical Processing Cell (CPC) at the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), formic acid has a much higher hydrogen generation rate than an alternative reductant, glycolic acid. Thus, an NG acid flowsheet has been developed utilizing glycolic acid with the benefit of easing the need for headspace monitoring requirements for hydrogen and ammonia at DWPF. Low concentrations of glycolate are conservatively assumed to be in the recycle stream, which will collect in the Recycle Collection Tank (RCT). The DWPF recycle stream collected in the RCT has a distinct pathway to the LWS waste tanks that feed the 2H and 3H Evaporator. This route involves transfer of the DWPF recycle to Tank 22 in the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities (CSTF) followed by transfer to the LWS tank farm/evaporators.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2023

Technical Evaluation of Accelerated Basin De-Inventory Material Addition to Sludge Batch 11 (Rev. 1)

The Accelerated Basin De-inventory (ABD) program involves discarding spent nuclear fuel that is currently stored in L-Basin to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) for vitrification. The first ABD discards will occur during the preparation of Sludge Batch (SB) 11. Savannah River Mission Completion has requested that the Savannah River National Laboratory assess the technical gaps related to the increased gadolinium poisoning requirement and the impacts of performing the Low Temperature Aluminum Dissolution (LTAD) process in Tank 51 with H-Canyon discards present. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of increasing the quantity of gadolinium (and related topics) from what was previously evaluated in the SRNL studies of gadolinium-poisoned ABD material solubility, the overall ABD flowsheet review, and increasing the fissile mass loading in glass: 1) Based on literature surveys, there is no indication that organic interactions with gadolinium will be significant at the high pH (typically >13) conditions of the Concentration, Storage, and Transfer Facilities. Any interactions of gadolinium with organics in DWPF are not expected to adversely impact DWPF or downstream facilities. Thus, there is little-to-no residual risk from organic interactions with gadolinium [Gap closed]; 2) Adding depleted uranium to ABD material, targeting 235 U enrichment of 4.90% within each transfer window, will mitigate potential impacts from an increase in soluble 235 U enrichment during sludge washing and LTAD. The plan to take advantage of previous transfers and allow 235 U enrichment of >5% during the final transfer window carries a risk that Tank 51 supernate will have a 235 U enrichment of >5%, which should be evaluated for acceptance; 3) Increasing the gadolinium mass ratio to 3.0:1 Gd: 235 U(eq SLU ) should lead to the same or higher partitioning of gadolinium into the solid phase within the DWPF Chemical Process Cell, resulting in both liquid and solid phases with expected partitioning of Gd consistent with the prior solubility study [Gap closed for SB11]; 4) There are no expected impacts on DWPF melt temperature and melter operations due to the minimal ~0.2 weight percent (wt%) increase in Gd concentration relative to previous sludge batches [Gap closed for SB11]; 5) As observed previously, Gd is expected to enter the off-gas system via physical entrainment, but at a slightly higher concentration than what was observed for SB9 melter off-gas pluggage deposits (0.07 wt%) [Gap closed for SB11] ; 6) There are no expected impacts on DWPF recycle or the Recycle Collection Tank glycolate destruction process. [Gap closed for SB11]; 7) Gd is projected to be a trace component in the SB11 glass (<0.5 wt%) and can be ignored for process control. Trace components do not significantly impact glass durability, thus the conclusions of the previous Product Consistency Test evaluation at a fissile mass loading of 2,500 g fissile/m3 glass still applies to SB11. The ~0.1 wt% increase in Gd2O3 concentration relative to the previous study will not impact the predictability of SB11 glass with the DWPF Product Composition Control System (PCCS) models for durability or the acceptability of glass according to the Waste Acceptance Product Specifications (WAPS) criterion for product consistency [Gap closed for SB11]; 8) No additional Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure testing is necessary for SB11 and the hazardous waste specification of the SB11 DWPF waste form is unchanged after the addition of the ABD stream [Gap closed for SB11]. The following summarizes the evaluation of the impacts of adding two-thirds of the ABD material to Tank 51 prior to LTAD: 1) The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall aluminum mass from 1.39×10 4 kg to 1.64×10 4 kg (15.5% ABD Al). The form of the insoluble portion of the Al resulting from ABD addition should be the more readily dissolved Al(OH) 3 and amorphous forms. The portion of the ABD aluminum that is processed by LTAD is expected to be completely soluble, thus requiring that less of the boehmite in the sludge be dissolved to reach the same Al target in the SB. [Gap closed for SB11]; The expected LTAD impact on other components, as related primarily to the components in ABD, are discussed. Gd is expected to remain insoluble during LTAD and not impact the solubility of other components. [Gap closed for SB11]; The addition of two-thirds of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 13,100 kg (63% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 89.5 kg (3.9% ABD Pu). The addition of all of the ABD increases overall projected SB11 uranium mass from 4,740 kg to 16,100 kg (70% ABD U) and the projected plutonium mass from 86.0 kg to 90.4 kg (5.3% ABD Pu). The 235 U enrichment will be ≤5%. The fissile uranium will be adequately poisoned by Gd and the fissile Pu will be adequately poisoned by Fe from the sludge. [Gap closed for SB11]; There is a low risk that ABD addition will impact the rheology or pumpability of the slurry. There is a low but higher risk of ABD addition prior to LTAD impacting the settling rate; Based on the evaluation of adding two-thirds of the ABD material and all of the ABD material prior to the LTAD process, there is no volume or mass limit that would need to be imposed on ABD additions prior to LTAD. [Gap closed for SB11]. Revision 1 of this report addresses a variation on the ABD additions and LTAD strategy where sodium hydroxide additions for LTAD may be performed intermittently or concurrently with an ABD addition window. The proposed change does not alter the conclusions of this evaluation.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

591 MHz SRF Cavity Design for the EIC ESR

The Electron-Ion Collider (EIC) is a next generation particle accelerator to be built at Brookhaven National Laboratory, in partnership with Thomas Jefferson National Accelerator Facility. The Electron Storage Ring (ESR) of RIC requires a 10 MW RF storage system to restore beam power lost by a 2.5 A electron beam. The RF system will use 18 single-cell 591 MHz Superconducting RF (SRF) cavities. Effective damping of higher-order-modes (HOMs) is critical to ensure beam stability. This paper presents the design of the single-cell 591 MHz cavity, including cavity geometry optimization, multipacting evaluation, and HOM damping analysis.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗