SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Risk Management Space Projects”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

SourceResearch connectionFrom yearThrough year

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 235 records · Page 13

All sources NASA NTRS DOE OSTI

NASA NTRS2022

NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Handbook

This handbook is the companion document to NPR 7120.5F, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements. It represents the accumulation of knowledge on managing program and projects derived from NASA’s human, robotic, and scientific missions. It incorporates the “corporate knowledge” for existing and future NASA space flight programs and projects, including NASA’s Artemis missions to establish a sustainable human presence on the Moon through collaboration with commercial and international partners, NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) mission, and NASA’s robotic missions on Mars. The practices discussed have evolved as a function of NASA’s core values of safety, integrity, teamwork, excellence, and inclusion, and may also prove a resource for other agencies, the private sector, and academia. The knowledge gained from the Agency’s victories and defeats, including the checks and balances and initiatives to better control cost and risk, provides a foundation for continuing an exciting and healthy space program. This handbook provides implementation guidance for NPR 7120.5F and includes the changes and updates to key procedural requirements in NPR 7120.5F since NPR 7120.5E. The goal of the NPR requirements is to ensure programs and projects are developed and successfully executed in the most cost-effective and efficient manner possible. This handbook provides context, rationale, and explanation to facilitate the application of requirements and to pass on some of the hard-won best practices and lessons learned.

Tracy L Osborne↗

NASA NTRS2022

Assurance of Electronic Parts for Aerospace System Reliability: Past, Present, and Future

Over the last two to three decades, the balance of influence within the electronics industry has shifted decisively towards the consumer electronics and information technology products, away from the defense or aerospace markets. This shift towards the commercial markets has changed certain ground rules in the electronics industry. Reliance of the aerospace industry, in particular, on components from supply chains dedicated to other products, or cross-vertical product integration, creates a supply web and introduces significant risks that are not necessarily present for volume-driven electronic products. Many of the unique risks in the aerospace industry emanate from the key characteristics of this industry. Although selection and usage of commercial electronics in NASA flight hardware is possible at a comparable (and in many cases lower) level of risk to that of employing parts that are screened to military or NASA specifications, for a large majority of flight projects it is difficult to distinguish the difference in on-orbit performance or reliability for parts screened at any level, or commercial parts that have no additional screening performed by the government. This paper identifies several bases for establishing context and developing unique or alternative approaches for successful parts selection and application within NASA and across the commercial space community.

electronic parts↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Assessment of the State of Communication Delay Research in Preparation for Missions Beyond Low Earth Orbit

NASA’s mission-operations paradigm, established during Project Mercury and minimally evolving through the Apollo Program, Space Shuttle Program, and ISS missions, has primarily depended on real-time support from a ground team of experts. This ground team has served as the safety net for crewed spaceflight missions over the past 60 years, managing the combined state of the mission, vehicle, and crew. However, this operational paradigm, which has seen little change in its Human-Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA), will face challenges during long-duration exploration missions beyond low Earth orbit. Lunar missions may experience one-way communication latencies ranging from 3 to 14 seconds, while Mars missions will encounter up to a 44-minute round-trip latency at a maximum distance from Earth. Communication delays negatively impact the behavioral health and performance of individuals and crews operating across the multi-team space-to-ground system. Previous research indicates that increased isolation and the challenges posed by delayed communication lead to heightened stress, frustration, adverse behavioral symptoms, and reduced individual performance. NASA has investigated the nature and effectiveness of managing this shift in complex operations since early 2000, but additional research is necessary to assess the issues associated with communication latencies and identify effective countermeasures. This work aimed to examine the evidence from 20 years of research on comm delays. We systematically reviewed the past 20 years of communication delay literature, focusing on how this research aligns with relevant, high-priority needs in the HSIA, Team, and BMed Risks. This type of panoramic review has not been done since 2013; a current, aggregated picture of what has been studied and how is needed to inform additional studies and mitigation development. Additional perspectives were gained from interviews with the research participants, operations experts, and communication delay researchers. Results from this effort will help characterize the risk posed by communication latency for upcoming Artemis missions and point toward potential mitigations. The final results will be presented. For the literature review, we formed a search term seed set drawing from languages used in two papers representative of the previous state of knowledge and supplemented it with additional search terms. We conducted literature searches on Google Scholar, PubMed, and Web of Science and searched NASA project archives for output from NASA-sponsored research. This search yielded 150 papers, of which 48 were relevant. SME interviews provided perspective on key communication delay issues and concerns and what is being worked on to mitigate those issues. Preliminary results of the literature review have been presented. Final results to be presented include the results of the literature review and findings from the interviews.

literature review↗

NASA NTRS2007

The Application of NASA Remote Sensing Technology to Human Health

With the help of satellites, the Earth's environment can be monitored from a distance. Earth observing satellites and sensors collect data and survey patterns that supply important information about the environment relating to its affect on human health. Combined with ground data, such patterns and remote sensing data can be essential to public health applications. Remote sensing technology is providing information that can help predict factors that affect human health, such as disease, drought, famine, and floods. A number of public health concerns that affect Earth's human population are part of the current National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Earth Science Applications Plan to provide remotely gathered data to public health decision-makers to aid in forming and implementing policy to protect human health and preserve well-being. These areas of concern are: air quality; water quality; weather and climate change; infectious, zoonotic, and vector-borne disease; sunshine; food resource security; and health risks associated with the built environment. Collaborations within the Earth Science Applications Plan join local, state, national, or global organizations and agencies as partners. These partnerships engage in projects that strive to understand the connection between the environment and health. The important outcome is to put this understanding to use through enhancement of decision support tools that aid policy and management decisions on environmental health risks. Future plans will further employ developed models in formats that are compatible and accessible to all public health organizations.

Watts, C. T.↗

NASA NTRS2010

Managing Fault Management Development

As the complexity of space missions grows, development of Fault Management (FM) capabilities is an increasingly common driver for significant cost overruns late in the development cycle. FM issues and the resulting cost overruns are rarely caused by a lack of technology, but rather by a lack of planning and emphasis by project management. A recent NASA FM Workshop brought together FM practitioners from a broad spectrum of institutions, mission types, and functional roles to identify the drivers underlying FM overruns and recommend solutions. They identified a number of areas in which increased program and project management focus can be used to control FM development cost growth. These include up-front planning for FM as a distinct engineering discipline; managing different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; ensuring the necessary resources for a disciplined, coordinated approach to end-to-end fault management engineering; and monitoring FM coordination across all mission systems.

McDougal, John M.↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA's Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA's planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective's NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientific consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle.Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientific consensus, and to identify and fill in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine's Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

Planetary Protection↗

NASA NTRS2010

Ares I-X Flight Test Development Challenges and Success Factors

The NASA Constellation Program's Ares I-X rocket launched successfully on October 28, 2009 collecting valuable data and providing risk reduction for the Ares I project. The Ares I-X mission was formulated and implemented in less than four years commencing with the Exploration Systems Architecture Study in 2005. The test configuration was founded upon assets and processes from other rocket programs including Space Shuttle, Atlas, and Peacekeeper. For example, the test vehicle's propulsion element was a Shuttle Solid Rocket Motor. The Ares I-X rocket comprised a motor assembly, mass and outer mold line simulators of the Ares I Upper Stage, Orion Spacecraft and Launch Abort System, a roll control system, avionics, and other miscellaneous components. The vehicle was 327 feet tall and weighed approximately 1,800,000 pounds. During flight the rocket reached a maximum speed of Mach 4.8 and an altitude of 150,000 feet. The vehicle demonstrated staging at 130,000 feet, tested parachutes for recovery of the motor, and utilized approximately 900 sensors for data collection. Developing a new launch system and preparing for a safe flight presented many challenges. Specific challenges included designing a system to withstand the environments, manufacturing large structures, and re-qualifying heritage hardware. These and other challenges, if not mitigated, may have resulted in test cancellation. Ares I-X succeeded because the mission was founded on carefully derived objectives, led by decisive and flexible management, implemented by an exceptionally talented and dedicated workforce, and supported by a thorough independent review team. Other major success factors include the use of proven heritage hardware, a robust System Integration Laboratory, multi-NASA center and contractor team, concurrent operations, efficient vehicle assembly, effective risk management, and decentralized element development with a centralized control board. Ares I-X was a technically complex test that required creative thinking, risk taking, and a passion to succeed.

Askins, Bruce↗

NASA NTRS2016

Green Propellant Landing Demonstration at U.S. Range

The Green Propellant Loading Demonstration (GPLD) was conducted December 2015 at Wallops Flight Facility (WFF), leveraging work performed over recent years to bring lower toxicity hydrazine replacement green propellants to flight missions. The objective of this collaboration between NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), WFF, the Swedish National Space Board (SNSB), and Ecological Advanced Propulsion Systems (ECAPS) was to successfully accept LMP-103S propellant at a U.S. Range, store the propellant, and perform a simulated flight vehicle propellant loading. NASA GSFC Propulsion (Code 597) managed all aspects of the operation, handling logistics, preparing the procedures, and implementing the demonstration. In addition to the partnership described above, Moog Inc. developed an LMP-103S propellant-compatible titanium rolling diaphragm flight development tank and loaned it to GSFC to act as the GPLD flight vessel. The flight development tank offered the GPLD an additional level of flight-like propellant handling process and procedures. Moog Inc. also provided a compatible latching isolation valve for remote propellant expulsion. The GPLD operation, in concert with Moog Inc. executed a flight development tank expulsion efficiency performance test using LMP-103S propellant. As part of the demonstration work, GSFC and WFF documented Range safety analyses and practices including all elements of shipping, storage, handling, operations, decontamination, and disposal. LMP-103S has not been previously handled at a U.S. Launch Range. Requisite for this activity was an LMP-103S Risk Analysis Report and Ground Safety Plan. GSFC and WFF safety offices jointly developed safety documentation for application into the GPLD operation. The GPLD along with the GSFC Propulsion historical hydrazine loading experiences offer direct comparison between handling green propellant versus safety intensive, highly toxic hydrazine propellant. These described motives initiated the GPLD operation in order to investigate the handling and process safety variances in project resources between LMP-103S and typical in-space propellants. The GPLD risk reduction operation proved successful for many reasons including handling the green propellant at a U.S. Range, loading and pressurizing a flight-like tank, expelling the propellant, measuring the tank expulsion efficiency, and most significantly, GSFC propulsion personnel's new insight into the LMP-103S propellant handling details.

Propellant↗

NASA NTRS2016

Green Propellant Loading Demonstration at U.S. Range

Green Propellant↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

NASA’s Planetary Protection Program to Assure Mission Safety and Success

NASA’s planetary protection program seeks to understand and control harmful contamination of solar systems targets of exploration by terrestrial contamination and prevent harmful biological contamination of the Earth-Moon system by extraterrestrial life, should it exist. To accomplish these objective’s NASA has developed a balanced safety and mission assurance strategy that leverages COSPAR Policy guidelines, workshops, scientiﬁc consensus, partnerships and international working groups to develop policy and implementation guidelines. Upcoming crewed missions to the Moon and Mars, as well as robotic missions to small solar system bodies, Europa, Titan and Mars are some of the driving activities of astrobiological interest that continue to emphasize the importance of planetary protection throughout the project life cycle. Development of a responsive and updated agency planetary protection policy has been a focus area in supporting upcoming mission opportunities for exploration to include Mars sample return and crewed mission concepts. An extensive update of this policy is underway which encompasses crewed and robotic procedural polices, a general technical requirements standard, and an implementation handbook. During this timeframe NASA has been working with the international community to develop scientiﬁc consensus, and to identify and ﬁll in knowledge gaps for developing balanced policy guidelines, incorporation of risk informed decision making and quantitative technical standards. NASA has developed a planetary protection roadmap as a technology management strategy to track and monitor the development of each knowledge gaps. The Committee of Space Research (COSPAR) Policy on Planetary Protection and the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine’s Committee of Planetary Protection are used to inform updates to the planetary protection polices and guidelines. This integrated strategy for planetary protection seeks to provide a transparent, structured approach for enabling missions, providing guidance for NASA and NASA partnered missions, and being responsive to the increased interest and activities in space exploration whilst maintaining an understanding and control of harmful contamination.

James Benardini↗

NASA NTRS2015

Risky Business

During my internship I worked on two major projects, recommending improvements for the Center's Risk Management Workshop and helping with the strategic planning efforts for Safety and Mission Assurance (S&MA). The risk management improvements is the key project I worked on this semester through my internship, while the strategic planning is the secondary assignment. S&MA Business Office covers both aspects in its delegation, getting both spans some of the work done in the office. A risk is a future event with a negative consequence that has some probability of occurring. Safety and Mission Assurance identifies, analyzes, plans, and tracks risk. The directorate offers the Center a Risk Management Workshop, and part of the ongoing efforts of S&MA is to make continuous improvements to the RM Workshop. By using the Project Management Institute's (PMI) Standard for Risk Management, I performed a gap analysis to make improvements for our materials. I benchmarked the PMI's Risk Management Standard, compared our Risk Management Workshop materials to PMI's standard, and identified any gaps in our material. My major findings were presented to the Business Office of S&MA for a decision on whether or not to incorporate the improvements. These suggestions were made by attending JSC working group meetings, Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) panel reviews and various risk review meetings. The improvements provide better understanding of risk management processes and enhanced risk tracking knowledge and skills. Risk management is an integral part of any engineering discipline, getting exposed to this section of engineering will greatly help shape my career in the future. Johnson Space Center is a world leader in risk management processes; learning risk management here gives me a huge advantage over my peers, as well as understanding decision making in the context of risk management will help me to be a well-rounded engineer. Strategic planning is an area I had not previously studied. Helping with the strategic planning efforts in S&MA has taught me how organizations think and function as a whole. S&MA is adopting a balanced scorecard approach to strategic planning. As part of this planning method strategic themes, objectives, and initiatives are formed. I attended strategic theme team workshops that formed the strategy map for the directorate and gave shape to the plan. Also during these workshops the objectives were discussed and built. Learning the process for strategic planning has helped me better understand how organizations and businesses function, which also helps me to be a more effective employee. Other assignments I had during my internship included completing the Safety and Mission Assurance Technical Excellent Program (STEP) Level 1, as well as doing a two week rotation through the Space Exploration division in S&MA, specifically working with a thermal protection systems (TPS) engineer. While working there, I learned about the Orion capsule and the SpaceX Dragon cargo capsule. I attended meetings to prepare the engineers for the upcoming Critical Design Reviews for both capsules and reviewed test data. Learning risk management, strategic planning, and working in the Space Exploration division has taught me about many aspects of S&MA. My internship at NASA has given me new experiences and taught me numerous subjects that I would have otherwise not learned. This opportunity has expanded my educational horizons and is helping me to become a more useful engineer and employee.

Yarbrough, Katherine↗

NASA NTRS2003

Enough Is Enough

The spacecraft was nearly integrated and had passed some of its early mechanical and electrical testing. One of its instruments, the Proportional Counter Array (PCA), had a gas leak in one of the five proportional counter modules that made up the array. The science division where the instrument was being developed wanted a gas replenishment system added to assure the PCA would last for the entire mission. Adding a gas replenishment system would mean interrupting spacecraft integration and testing; developing a new subsystem and integrating it onto the spacecraft; modifying all the PCA modules; including a complex integration of the instrument onto the spacecraft; and implementing a more complex performance and environmental test process. It was the wrong answer because it made a simple design more complex and added little value to the mission at a major cost in time and dollars. Our mission couldn't afford the additional budget and schedule risks. XTE was the latest of a long line of projects being managed by my Explorer Program Office, but it was unique in being the first project we had agreed to do for a fixed price. NASA HQ agreed, in return, to provide us with the funding profile we needed to make it happen. We were both trying to break the unhealthy spiral in the Explorer program that saw current missions overrunning and pushing subsequent missions downstream to the point where their science was becoming marginal. The science community was upset and wanted better performance from NASA. I summarized my arguments to the director. The Engineering Directorate had taken responsibility for the spacecraft development when we established XTE as an in-house project at Goddard Space Flight Center, and also was supporting the PCA development. "It adds complexity," I reiterated. "It's a significant cost impact for only a marginal reliability increase". His response was music to my ears, "Jim, I won't stand in your way, but you'll have to convince the scientists and engineers."

Barrowman, James↗

NASA NTRS2007

All Source Solution Decision Support Products Created for Stennis Space Center in Response to Hurricane Katrina

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and in response to the needs of SSC (Stennis Space Center), NASA required the generation of decision support products with a broad range of geospatial inputs. Applying a systems engineering approach, the NASA ARTPO (Applied Research and Technology Project Office) at SSC evaluated the Center's requirements and source data quality. ARTPO identified data and information products that had the potential to meet decision-making requirements; included were remotely sensed data ranging from high-spatial-resolution aerial images through high-temporal-resolution MODIS (Moderate Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer) products. Geospatial products, such as FEMA's (Federal Emergency Management Agency's) Advisory Base Flood Elevations, were also relevant. Where possible, ARTPO applied SSC calibration/validation expertise to both clarify the quality of various data source options and to validate that the inputs that were finally chosen met SSC requirements. ARTPO integrated various information sources into multiple decision support products, including two maps: Hurricane Katrina Inundation Effects at Stennis Space Center (highlighting surge risk posture) and Vegetation Change In and Around Stennis Space Center: Katrina and Beyond (highlighting fire risk posture).

Ross, Kenton W.↗

NASA NTRS2017

The Integrated Medical Model: Outcomes from Independent Review

In 2016, the Integrated Medical Model (IMM) v4.0 underwent an extensive external review in preparation for transition to an operational status. In order to insure impartiality of the review process, the Exploration Medical Capabilities Element of NASA's Human Research Program convened the review through the Systems Review Office at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC). The review board convened by GSFC consisted of persons from both NASA and academia with expertise in the fields of statistics, epidemiology, modeling, software development, aerospace medicine, and project management (see Figure 1). The board reviewed software and code standards, as well as evidence pedigree associated with both the input and outcomes information. The board also assesses the models verification, validation, sensitivity to parameters and ability to answer operational questions. This talk will discuss the processes for designing the review, how the review progressed and the findings from the board, as well as summarize the IMM project responses to those findings. Overall, the board found that the IMM is scientifically sound, represents a necessary, comprehensive approach to identifying medical and environmental risks facing astronauts in long duration missions and is an excellent tool for communication between engineers and physicians. The board also found IMM and its customer(s) should convene an additional review of the IMM data sources and to develop a sustainable approach to augment, peer review, and maintain the information utilized in the IMM. The board found this is critically important because medical knowledge continues to evolve. Delivery of IMM v4.0 to the Crew Health and Safety (CHS) Program will occur in the 2017. Once delivered for operational decision support, IMM v4.0 will provide CHS with additional quantitative capability in to assess astronaut medical risks and required medical capabilities to help drive down overall mission risks.

medical equipment↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Application of Lean Thinking Principles and Kaizen Practices for the Successful Development and Implementation of the Ares I-X Flight Test Rocket and Mission

On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. Positive lessons learned from Ares I-X were that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices are effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by the success of Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.

Askins, B. R.↗

NASA NTRS2016

TAT-C: A Trade-Space Analysis Tool for Constellations

Under a changing technological and economic environment, there is growing interest in implementing future NASA Earth Science missions as Distributed Spacecraft Missions (DSM). The objective of our project is to provide a framework that facilitates DSM Pre-Phase A investigations and optimizes DSM designs with respect to a-priori Science goals. In this first version of our Trade-space Analysis Tool for Constellations (TAT-C), we are investigating questions such as: Which type of constellations should be chosen? How many spacecraft should be included in the constellation? Which design has the best costrisk value? This paper describes the overall architecture of TAT-C including: a User Interface (UI) interacting with multiple users - scientists, missions designers or program managers; an Executive Driver gathering requirements from UI and formulating Trade-space Search Requests for the Trade-space Search Iterator, which in collaboration with the Orbit Coverage, Reduction Metrics, and Cost Risk modules generates multiple potential architectures and their associated characteristics. UI will include Graphical, Command Line and Application Programmer Interfaces to respond to the demands of various levels of users expertise. Science inputs are grouped into various mission concepts, satellite specifications, and payload specifications, while science outputs are grouped into several types of metrics - spatial, temporal, angular and radiometric. Orbit Coverage leverages the use of the Goddard Mission Analysis Tool (GMAT) to compute coverage and ancillary data that are passed to Reduction Metrics. Then, for each architecture design, Cost Risk will provide estimates of the cost and life cycle cost as well as technical and cost risk of the proposed mission. Additionally, the Knowledge Base module is a centralized store of structured data readable by humans and machines. It will support both TAT-C analysis when composing new mission concepts from existing model inputs, and TAT-C exploration when discovering new mission concepts by querying previous results.

Science Data Processing↗

NASA NTRS2013

Practical Application of PRA as an Integrated Design Tool for Space Systems

This paper presents the application of the first comprehensive Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) during the design phase of a joint NASA/NOAA weather satellite program, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite Series R (GOES-R). GOES-R is the next generation weather satellite primarily to help understand the weather and help save human lives. PRA has been used at NASA for Human Space Flight for many years. PRA was initially adopted and implemented in the operational phase of manned space flight programs and more recently for the next generation human space systems. Since its first use at NASA, PRA has become recognized throughout the Agency as a method of assessing complex mission risks as part of an overall approach to assuring safety and mission success throughout project lifecycles. PRA is now included as a requirement during the design phase of both NASA next generation manned space vehicles as well as for high priority robotic missions. The influence of PRA on GOES-R design and operation concepts are discussed in detail. The GOES-R PRA is unique at NASA for its early implementation. It also represents a pioneering effort to integrate risks from both Spacecraft (SC) and Ground Segment (GS) to fully assess the probability of achieving mission objectives. PRA analysts were actively involved in system engineering and design engineering to ensure that a comprehensive set of technical risks were correctly identified and properly understood from a design and operations perspective. The analysis included an assessment of SC hardware and software, SC fault management system, GS hardware and software, common cause failures, human error, natural hazards, solar weather and infrastructure (such as network and telecommunications failures, fire). PRA findings directly resulted in design changes to reduce SC risk from micro-meteoroids. PRA results also led to design changes in several SC subsystems, e.g. propulsion, guidance, navigation and control (GNC), communications, mechanisms, and command and data handling (C&DH). The fault tree approach assisted in the development of the fault management system design. Human error analysis, which examined human response to failure, indicated areas where automation could reduce the overall probability of gaps in operation by half. In addition, the PRA brought to light many potential root causes of system disruptions, including earthquakes, inclement weather, solar storms, blackouts and other extreme conditions not considered in the typical reliability and availability analyses. Ultimately the PRA served to identify potential failures that, when mitigated, resulted in a more robust design, as well as to influence the program's concept of operations. The early and active integration of PRA with system and design engineering provided a well-managed approach for risk assessment that increased reliability and availability, optimized lifecyc1e costs, and unified the SC and GS developments.

Kalia, Prince↗

NASA NTRS2011

The Application of Lean Thinking Principles and Kaizen Practices for the Successful Development and Implementation of the Ares I-X Flight Test Rocket and Mission

On October 28, 2009 the Ares I-X flight test rocket launched from Kennedy Space Center and flew its suborbital trajectory as designed. The mission was successfully completed as data from the test, and associated development activities were analyzed, transferred to stakeholders, and well documented. A positive lesson learned from Ares I-X was that the application of lean thinking principles and kaizen practices was very effective in streamlining development activities. Ares I-X, like other historical rocket development projects, was hampered by technical, cost, and schedule challenges and if not addressed boldly could have resulted in cancellation of the test. The mission management team conducted nine major meetings, referred to as lean events, across its elements to assess plans, procedures, processes, requirements, controls, culture, organization, use of resources, and anything that could be changed to optimize schedule or reduce risk. The preeminent aspect of the lean events was the focus on value added activities and the removal or at least reduction in non-value added activities. Trained Lean Six Sigma facilitators assisted the Ares I-X developers in conducting the lean events. They indirectly helped formulate the mission s own unique methodology for assessing schedule. A core team was selected to lead the events and report to the mission manager. Each activity leveraged specialized participants to analyze the subject matter and its related processes and then recommended alternatives and solutions. Stakeholders were the event champions. They empowered and encouraged the team to succeed. The keys to success were thorough preparation, honest dialog, small groups, adherence to the Ares I-X ground rules, and accountability through disciplined reporting and tracking of actions. This lean event formula was game-changing as demonstrated by Ares I-X. It is highly recommended as a management tool to help develop other complex systems efficiently. The key benefits for Ares I-X were obtaining unambiguous schedule margin, defining enabling options for risk reduction, and most importantly a stronger more unified team.

Askins, B. R.↗