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At least 235 records · Page 13

WIPP WAC Equivalence Support Measurements for Low-Level Sludge Waste at Los Alamos National Laboratory - 12242

Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) uses the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as an off-site disposal facility for low-level waste (LLW), including sludge waste. NNSS has issued a position paper that indicates that systems that are not certified by the Carlsbad Field Office (CBFO) for Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) disposal of Transuranic (TRU) waste must demonstrate equivalent practices to the CBFO certified systems in order to assign activity concentration values to assayed items without adding in the Total Measurement Uncertainty (TMU) when certifying waste for NNSS disposal. Efforts have been made to meet NNSS requirements to accept sludge waste for disposal at their facility. The LANL LLW Characterization Team uses portable high purity germanium (HPGe) detector systems for the nondestructive assay (NDA) of both debris and sludge LLW. A number of performance studies have been conducted historically by LANL to support the efficacy and quality of assay results generated by the LANL HPGe systems, and, while these detector systems are supported by these performance studies and used with LANL approved procedures and processes, they are not certified by CBFO for TRU waste disposal. Beginning in 2009, the LANL LLW Characterization Team undertook additional NDA measurements of both debris and sludge simulated waste containers to supplement existing studies and procedures to demonstrate full compliance with the NNSS position paper. Where possible, Performance Demonstration Project (PDP) drums were used for the waste matrix and PDP sources were used for the radioactive sources. Sludge drums are an example of a matrix with a uniform distribution of contaminants. When attempting to perform a gamma assay of a sludge drum, it is very important to adequately simulate this uniform distribution of radionuclides in order to accurately model the assay results. This was accomplished by using a spiral radial source tube placement in a sludge drum rather than the standard three source tubes seen in debris PDP drums. Available line sources (Eu-152) were placed in the spiral tubes to further accomplish the desired uniform distribution of radionuclides. The standard PDP drum (PDP matrix drum 005) and PDP sources were used to determine the lower limits of detection (LLD) and TMU. Analysis results for the sludge drum matrix case for two HPGe detectors were tabulated and evaluated. NNSS has accepted the methodology and results of the measurements towards demonstrating equivalence to CBFO certified systems. In conclusion, the WES-WGS and CMR-OPS gamma spectroscopy teams at LANL have defined and performed measurements that serve to establish and demonstrate equivalency with the processes used by CBFO certified NDA systems. The supplemental measurements address four key areas in Appendix A of DOE/WIPP-02-3122: Annual Calibration Confirmation and Performance Check measurements; LLD determination; and TMU definition. For these measurements the containers, matrices and activity loadings are selected to represent items being assayed in real LLW cases. The LLD and the TMU bounding measurements are to be performed one time and will not be required to be repeated in future campaigns. The annual calibration and performance check measurements were performed initially and planned to repeat in annual campaigns in order to maintain NNSS certification. PDP sources and a PDP sludge drum as well as Eu-152 line sources and a spiral sludge drum were used for the measurements. In all cases, the results for accuracy and precision (%R and %RSD, respectively) were within allowable ranges as defined by the WIPP PDP program. LLD (or MDC) results were established for all the ten WIPP reportable radionuclides and U-235, and the MDC for Pu-239 was established in all cases to be well under 100 nCi/g. Useful results for reducing estimated uncertainties were established and an interesting unexpected case of high bias was observed and will be applied toward this end. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Low-Level Waste Regulation: Putting Principles Into Practice - 13297 - The Richard S. Hodes, M.D., Honor Lecture Award

In carrying out its mission to ensure the safe use of radioactive materials for beneficial civilian purposes while protecting people and the environment, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) adheres to its Principles of Good Regulation. The Principles-Independence, Openness, Efficiency, Clarity, and Reliability-apply to the agency as a whole in its decision-making and to the individual conduct of NRC employees. This paper describes the application of the Principles in a real-life staff activity, a guidance document used in the NRC's low-level radioactive waste (LLW) program, the Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation Branch Technical Position (CA BTP). The staff's process to revise the document, as well as the final content of the document, were influenced by following the Principles. For example, consistent with the Openness Principle, the staff conducted a number of outreach activities and received many comments on three drafts of the document. Stakeholder comments affected the final staff positions in some cases. The revised CA BTP, once implemented, is expected to improve management and disposal of LLW in the United States. Its positions have an improved nexus to health and safety; are more performance-based than previously, thus providing licensees with options for how they achieve the required outcome of protecting an inadvertent human intruder into a disposal facility; and provide for disposal of more sealed radioactive sources, which are a potential threat to national security. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Removal and Decommissioning of Disused Gamma Irradiator in Minsk, Belarus

Under the scope of The Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security (ORS) Program the Belarusian company, “Isotope Technologies” (IT), in concert with assistance of “Radii” (a company based in Moscow, Russia) dismantled a disused gamma irradiator RKhM-γ-20. This project required innovation, flexibility, and prior experience. The team successfully removed the radioactive sources from the site and moved them to the local radioactive waste facility Ekores. The gamma unit had been installed at the Minsk, Belarus Research Institute of Physical Organic Chemistry in 1971. This research center is a part of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. There were 48 highly radioactive Cobalt 60 sources inside the unit. During the dismantling process it was discovered that the source retaining drum was broken. Therefore, the removal proved to be much more complicated than originally envisioned. IT and Radii were unable to remove a number of sources from the drum by means of standard removal equipment and finally needed to remove the entire unit itself along with the remaining sources. The problem was further complicated by a very short timeframe allowed for work implementation. This was because the unit was located near an elementary school requiring the team to complete the project prior to the end of summer school holidays. Moreover, the unit itself was not easily accessible. The project team developed a technical solution and accomplished the removal.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Monte Carlo Simulation of Background and Source Measurements with CSG and CAD Geometries

Detecting radioactive sources in an urban environment is difficult due to the large magnitude and variability of the background radiation. To support the search mission of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a project was undertaken to determine if first-principles modeling and simulation could be used to accurately predict the response of radiation detectors in urban environments. This study demonstrates that the simulated detector responses to photon radiation from both an isotopic source and the background compare well to benchmark-quality measurements in a large urban-like test environment. Simulation results using a traditional combinatorial solid geometry and a CAD model generated from LiDAR measurements gave very similar detector responses. With this validation, further simulations could be used to predict detector responses for various situations in real urban settings.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

SU-CD-PinS Room/Hall E-00: HAZMAT Training for the Medical Physicist - Part I

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two-year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-CD-PinS Room/Hall E-01

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two-year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

SU-G-PinS Room/Hall E-00: HAZMAT Training for the Medical Physicist - Part II

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

SU-G-PinS Room/Hall E-01

Medical Physicists are frequently involved in shipping radioactive materials or supervising those who do. Current U.S. Department of Transportation Hazardous Material Regulations, 49 CFR Parts 171 - 185, require hazmat employees to have documented training specified in 49 CFR 172 Subpart H. A hazmat employee is defined as an individual who: (1) loads, unloads or handles hazardous material; (2) manufactures, tests, reconditions, repairs, modifies, marks or otherwise represents containers, drums or packagings as qualified for use in the transportation of hazardous materials; (3) prepares hazardous materials for transportation; (4) is responsible for safety of transporting hazardous materials; or (5) operates a vehicle used to transport hazardous materials. Recurrent training is required at least once every three years. (The IATA two year training interval is not applicable and is generally misunderstood.) FAA has escalated inspection and enforcement. Facilities who ship radiopharmaceuticals to other laboratories, return radiopharmaceuticals or radioactive sources to suppliers, or otherwise ship radioactive materials have been cited for failure to provide and document the required training. The interrelationship of transportation regulations, 49 CFR, IATA, ICAO and other transportation regulations, which are frequently misunderstood, will be explained. The course will cover typical shipments by air and highway which are encountered in a medical institution. Items such as fissile materials, highway route controlled quantities, rail shipments, vessel shipments and such will be omitted; although specific questions may be addressed. A major objective of the course is to present the process of shipping radioactive material in a sequential and logical fashion. How radioactive materials for transportation purposes are defined by activity concentrations for exempt materials and activity limits for exempt consignments will be explained. Radioactive material shipments of excepted packages and Type A packages will be emphasized. The program is designed to meet the function specific DOT training requirements for shippers of medical radioactive materials. General awareness training and security awareness training can be obtained from two free DOT training CDs. Safety training and security awareness training is generally satisfied by the training required under the institution’s radioactive material license. For shippers of radioactive Yellow III labeled packages an in-depth written security plan and training are no longer required as of April 8, 2010. In general almost all shippers of medical radioactive material are now not required to have an in-depth security plan. Contents of general awareness training, security awareness training and in-depth security plans will be briefly outlined. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to ensure that each hazmat employee is properly trained. No third party can fulfill that requirement. It is the hazmat employer’s responsibility to determine the degree to which this course meets the employer’s requirements, including contents of the course and the examination. Participants will gain sufficient knowledge to prepare hazmat training programs for others in their institutions. A handout will be posted which should be printed out and brought to the course for reference during the presentation. The handout will also satisfy part of the training documentation required by DOT. A feature handout section is a composite table which provides A1, A2, RQ, Exempt Concentration, and Exempt Consignment values in a single table in both Becquerel and Curie units. Course attendance will be certified through the AAPM CEU documentation system. Learning Objectives: Understand the regulatory requirements for shipping radioactive materials. Understand the regulatory requirements for training of hazmat employees. Comprehend how to classify, package, mark, label, document, placard, and transport radioactive materials.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Simulations of Sparse Static Detector Networks for City-Scale Radiological/Nuclear Detection

Sparse static detector networks in urban environments can be used in efforts to detect illicit radioactive sources, such as stolen nuclear material or radioactive "dirty bombs." We use detailed simulations to evaluate multiple configurations of detector networks and their ability to detect sources moving through a $6\times 6$ km 2 area of downtown Chicago. A detector network's probability of detecting a source increases with detector density but can also be increased with strategic node placement. Here, we show that the ability to fuse correlated data from a source-carrying vehicle passing by multiple detectors can significantly contribute to the overall detection probability. In this article, we distinguish static sensor deployments operated as networks able to correlate signals between sensors, from deployments operated as arrays where each sensor is operated individually. In particular, we show that additional visual attributes of source-carrying vehicles, such as vehicle color and make, can greatly improve the ability of a detector network to detect illicit sources.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

SU-F-P-24: Radiological Disperse Device

Purpose: We are now living in a society of constant fear of terrorism. This topic is pertaining to give a general knowledge of what is a radiological dispersion device or RDD and in case of its detonation, what are the options open to public for a safe action in terms of reducing the exposure and knowing the proper steps. These RDD are also called dirty bombs. Methods: Compared to nuclear weapons, dirty bombs are easy to make. In order for a terrorist organization to construct and detonate a dirty bomb, it must acquire radioactive material by stealing it or buying it through legal or illegal channels. Possible RDD material could come from the millions of radioactive sources used in the industry, for medical purposes and in academic applications mainly for researches. These are, americium-{sup 241}, californium-{sup 252}, caesium-{sup 137}, cobalt-{sup 60}, iridium-{sup 192}, plutonium-{sup 238}, polonium-{sup 210}, radium-{sup 226} and strontium-{sup 90}. Results: Prompt detection of the type of radioactive material used will greatly assist advising people on the protective measures, like sheltering in place, or quickly leaving the immediate area. The effects of radiation are determined by:°the amount of radiation absorbed by body°the type of radiation °the distance from the radiation to an individual°the means of exposure absorbed by the skin, inhaled, or ingested; and length of time exposed. Conclusion: In any facility it is now much more important to keep a log list of all radioactive materials in use. In case there is a dirty bomb explosion, the chaos and economic cost could be enormous. The economic cost for the evaluation of the contamination, survey of people and surroundings and the after treatment, decontamination cost and effort will be a big challenge in any country. So awareness and preparation is the start to face this new type of challenge.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Gamma greenhouse: A chronic facility for crops improvement and agrobiotechnology

Gamma irradiation is one of the most common procedures in plant mutagenesis and agrobiotechnology activities. The procedures consist of chronic and acute gamma radiation. Generally, {sup 60}Co and {sup 137}Cs are gamma radiation sources for radiation processing with relatively high energy (half-life 5.27 years for {sup 60}Co and 30.1 years for {sup 137}Cs). The energy associated with gamma radiation is high enough to break the molecular bonds and ionize atoms without affecting structure of the atomic nucleus (avoiding induction of radioactivity). The Gamma Green House (GGH) is the only chronic irradiation facility in Malaysia, located at Malaysian Nuclear Agency (Nuclear Malaysia). GGH is used for induction of mutation in plants and other biological samples at low dose radiation over period of time depending on the nature and sensitivity of the plant species. The GGH consist of circular green house with 30 meters radius, control room and irradiator with interlock system. The irradiator produces low dose gamma radiation derived from Caesium-137 radioactive source. The biological samples can be exposed to low dose radiation in days, weeks, months or years. The current irradiation rate for GGH is 2.67 Gy/hr at 1 meter from the source. Chronic gamma irradiation produces a wider mutation spectrum and useful for minimizing radiation damages towards obtaining new improved traits for research and commercial values. The prospect of the gamma greenhouse is its uses in research, educations and services on induced mutation techniques for the improvement of plant varieties and microbes. In generating awareness and attract users to the facility, Nuclear Malaysia provides wide range of irradiation services for plant species and mutagenesis consultancies to academicians, students scientists, and plant breeders, from local universities, other research institutes, and growers. Charges for irradiation and consultancy services are at nominal rates. The utilization activities of the gamma greenhouse mainly cover Research and Development, Research Collaboration, Exchange of Information, Irradiation Services, Training Programs, Education, Exchange of Scientists and Seminars/ Conferences.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Gamma-ray camera flyby

Animation based on an actual classroom demonstration of the prototype CCI-2 gamma-ray camera's ability to image a hidden radioactive source, a cesium-137 line source, in three dimensions. For more information see http://newscenter.lbl.gov/feature-stories/2010/06/02/applied-nuclear-physics/.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Measurements with silicon photomultipliers of dose-rate effects in the radiation damage of plastic scintillator tiles in the CMS hadron endcap calorimeter

Measurements are presented of the reduction of signal output due to radiation damage for two types of plastic scintillator tiles used in the hadron endcap (HE) calorimeter of the CMS detector. The tiles were exposed to particles produced in proton-proton (pp) collisions at the CERN LHC with a center-of-mass energy of 13 TeV, corresponding to a delivered luminosity of 50 fb−1. The measurements are based on readout channels of the HE that were instrumented with silicon photomultipliers, and are derived using data from several sources: a laser calibration system, a movable radioactive source, as well as hadrons and muons produced in pp collisions. Results from several irradiation campaigns using 60Co sources are also discussed. The damage is presented as a function of dose rate. Within the range of these measurements, for a fixed dose the damage increases with decreasing dose rate.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

The ATLAS tile calorimeter performance at the LHC

The Tile Calorimeter (TileCal), the central section of the hadronic calorimeter of the ATLAS experiment, is a key detector component to detect hadrons, jets and taus and to measure the missing transverse energy. Due to the very good muon signal to noise ratio it assists the spectrometer in the identification and reconstruction of muons. TileCal is built of steel and scintillating tiles coupled to optical fibers and read out by photomultipliers. The calorimeter is equipped with systems that allow to monitor and to calibrate each stage of the read out system exploiting different signal sources: laser light, charge injection and a radioactive source. The performance of the calorimeter has been measured and monitored using calibration data, random triggered data, cosmic muons and more importantly LHC collision events. The results presented here assess the absolute energy scale calibration precision, the energy and timing uniformity and the synchronization precision. The ensemble of the results demonstrates a very good understanding of the performance of the Tile Calorimeter that is proved to be well within the design expectations. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Test Methods for Cementitious Seal Materials for Borehole Disposal - 17352

The Nuclear and Energy Research Institute (IPEN-CNEN/SP) in Sao Paulo-Brazil, is considering borehole disposal of disused sealed radioactive sources (DSRS), which were used in smoke detectors, lightning arresters, radiotherapy, industrial gauges, irradiators, and other applications. The current IPEN concept of borehole is a modified BOSS system developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It differs from the IAEA's design in that the disposal zone is below 300 m, and the DSRS are placed directly in the disposal packages constituted of stainless steel containers with 1.5 L capacity. A borehole drilled through sediment and granite, stabilized with stainless steel casing and cement grout is proposed for the conceptual model. Standard cement-material test methods and performance specific test methods, including accelerated aging methods, are needed for modeling the performance of the candidate cementitious grouts. A cross-disciplinary team from the USA Savannah River National laboratory is providing technical assistance to IPEN in this performance assessment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Real-time online monitoring of radwaste storage: A proof-of-principle test prototype

A prototype array of modular sensors for online monitoring of radioactive waste was developed at INFN-LNS. We implemented a new kind of gamma mini-sensor, based on Silicon Photomultipliers and scintillating fibers, that behaves like a cheap scintillating Geiger-Muller counter. It can be placed in shape of a fine grid around each single waste drum in a repository. After simulating the counting response of thin scintillating fibers to gamma radiation, we verified our simulation results with measurements using radioactive sources. Front-end electronics and an FPGA-based counting system were developed to handle the field data, also implementing data transmission, a graphical user interface and a data storage system. A test of four sensors in a real radwaste storage site was performed with promising results. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Data Fusion for a Vision-Radiological System for Source Tracking and Discovery

A multidisciplinary approach to allow the tracking of the movement of radioactive sources by fusing data from multiple radiological and visual sensors is under development. The goal is to improve the ability to detect, locate, track and identify nuclear/radiological threats. The key concept is that such widely available visual and depth sensors can impact radiological detection, since the intensity fall-off in the count rate can be correlated to movement in three dimensions. To enable this, we pose an important question; what is the right combination of sensing modalities and vision algorithms that can best compliment a radiological sensor, for the purpose of detection and tracking of radioactive material? Similarly what is the best radiation detection methods and unfolding algorithms suited for data fusion with tracking data? Data fusion of multi-sensor data for radiation detection have seen some interesting developments lately. Significant examples include intelligent radiation sensor systems (IRSS), which are based on larger numbers of distributed similar or identical radiation sensors coupled with position data for network capable to detect and locate radiation source. Other developments are gamma-ray imaging systems based on Compton scatter in segmented detector arrays. Similar developments using coded apertures or scatter cameras for neutrons have recently occurred. The main limitation of such systems is not so much in their capability but rather in their complexity and cost which is prohibitive for large scale deployment. Presented here is a fusion system based on simple, low-cost computer vision and radiological sensors for tracking of multiple objects and identifying potential radiological materials being transported or shipped. The main focus of this work is the development on two separate calibration algorithms for characterizing the fused sensor system. The deviation from a simple inverse square-root fall-off of radiation intensity is explored and accounted for. In particular, the computer vision system enables a map of distance-dependence of the sources being tracked. Infrared, laser or stereoscopic vision sensors are all options for computer-vision implementation depending on interior vs exterior deployment, resolution desired and other factors. Similarly the radiation sensors will be focused on gamma-ray or neutron detection due to the long travel length and ability to penetrate even moderate shielding. There is a significant difference between the vision sensors and radiation sensors in the way the 'source' or signals are generated. A vision sensor needs an external light-source to illuminate the object and then detects the re-emitted illumination (or lack thereof). However, for a radiation detector, the radioactive material is the source itself. The only exception to this is the field of active interrogations where radiation is beamed into a material to entice new/additional radiation emission beyond what the material would emit spontaneously. The aspect of the nuclear material being the source itself means that all other objects in the environment are 'illuminated' or irradiated by the source. Most radiation will readily penetrate regular material, scatter in new directions or be absorbed. Thus if a radiation source is located near a larger object that object will in turn scatter some radiation that was initially emitted in a direction other than the direction of the radiation detector, this can add to the count rate that is observed. The effect of these scatter is a deviation from the traditional distance dependence of the radiation signal and is a key challenge that needs a combined system calibration solution and algorithms. Thus both an algebraic approach as well as a statistical approach have been developed and independently evaluated to investigate the sensitivity to this deviation from the simplified radiation fall-off as a function of distance. The resulting calibrated system algorithms are used and demonstrated in various laboratory scenarios, and later in realistic tracking scenarios. The selection and testing of radiological and computer-vision sensors for the additional specific scenarios will be the subject of ongoing and future work. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Spatial calibration and synthetic diagnostic of a multi-energy hard x-ray camera at WEST tokamak

WEST (tungsten environment in steady-state tokamak) is starting operation for the first time with a water-cooled full tungsten divertor, enabling long pulse operation. Heating is provided by radiofrequency systems, including lower hybrid current drive (LHCD). In this context, a compact multi-energy hard x-ray camera has been installed for energy and space-resolved measurements of the electron temperature, the fast electron tail density produced by LHCD and runaway electrons, and the beam–target emission of tungsten at the target due to fast electron losses interacting with the divertor plates. The diagnostic is a pinhole camera based on a 2D pixel array detector (Pilatus 3 CdTe CMOS Hybrid-Pixel detector produced by DECTRIS). The novelty of this diagnostic technique is the detector’s capability of adjusting the threshold energy at pixel level. This innovation provides great flexibility in the energy configuration, allowing simultaneous space and energy-resolved x-ray measurements. This contribution details two important steps in the preparation of the diagnostic operation. First, the in-vessel spatial calibration that was carried out with a radioactive source. Second, the synthetic diagnostic is obtained by the suite of codes ALOHA/C3PO/LUKE/R5-X2, which simulates LH wave propagation and absorption, as well as the fast electron bremsstrahlung production.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗