Results for “RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL” — Page 13

DOE OSTI2015

MO-AB-201-02: The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2015

MO-AB-201-03: The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2026

Statistical Uncertainty of Inhalation Dose Coefficients: Impact of Particle Deposition in ICRP 66 Human Respiratory Tract Model

Inhaled radioactive materials can pose a long-term health concern, as the material can be incorporated into the body’s metabolic pathways and remain in organs and tissues for extended durations. During the retention period, the radioactive material may localize in a source organ and irradiate adjacent target organs and tissues. Distribution of these materials changes over time, requiring biokinetic modeling to evaluate their movement through various tissues and organs. The evolving distribution depends on multiple inputs characterizing the inhaled material, such as particle size and size distribution, particle density, aspect ratio, specific radionuclide, the chemical form, and solubility. In addition, biological parameters such as breathing rate, breathing type (nasal or nasal/oral), respiratory system morphometry, tidal volume, functional residual capacity, and anatomical dead space all influence material transport. These aerosol properties and physiological characteristics of the respiratory tract jointly define a range of initial conditions that influence the time-dependent distribution of radioactive material. To evaluate both uncertainty in the initial conditions of inhalation exposure and the final output (committed effective dose) from biokinetic models, a Python-based software tool, Radiological Exposure Dose Calculator (REDCAL), was developed to propagate uncertainty within the human respiratory tract model. Focusing on deposition fraction uncertainty, the primary objective was to characterize the initial activity distribution across respiratory regions as a function of anticipated particle sizes and distributions. The impact of the deposition fraction uncertainty was propagated to committed effective dose coefficients for selected radionuclides in a companion publication. For each particle size, a lognormal distribution, characterized by its geometric mean as defined within ICRP Publication 66, serves as the basis for introducing uncertainty into the physical processes governing deposition in various lung regions. Finally, this study addresses the deposition process and examines how uncertainty in deposition mechanisms affects activity distribution in the airways, ultimately presenting the expected range and standard deviation of deposited activity as a function of particle size.

International Commission on Radiological Protectio↗

DOE OSTI2023

Assessment of Potential Dose and Environmental Impacts from Proposed Testing at the INL National Security Test Range

This assessment uses screening-level models to calculate potential environmental impacts from proposed tests at two locations at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) National Security Test Range (NSTR) site. Proposed tests could be conducted using 11 different radioactive material types that include K 2 O, LaBr 3 , KBr, Cu, Zr, F, Ga, Ga 2 O 3 , NaNO 2 , Ga-68, and Tc-99m. The tests could potentially release radioactive material to the atmosphere and radionuclides and other contaminants to the soil, which could leach into the unsaturated zone and migrate to the aquifer. Atmospheric transport of radionuclides to potential human receptors and time-integrated air concentrations were calculated with a Gaussian plume model and three years of hourly meteorological data. Potential surface-soil impacts were calculated with the computer program mixing-cell model (MCM). Groundwater impacts were calculated with the computer programs MCM and GWSCREEN. Radiological doses from potential atmospheric releases were calculated for public receptors off the INL Site and for workers at nearby INL facilities. Results were compared to regulatory dose limits. Maximum potential groundwater concentrations were estimated in the aquifer below the NSTR site and compared to drinking water standards or risk-based screening levels for resident tap water. Soil concentrations were calculated and compared to risk-based screening levels for workers and potential future residents. All impacts were estimated based on the assumption that 12 tests are conducted annually using all 11 material types for 15 years. This document provides the resources to enable a subject matter expert in the field of environmental assessments to replicate the modeling and calculations. The methodology and parameters are presented in the text. All electronic files, including computer-code input, output, executable files, batch files, scripts, and spreadsheet files, are contained in a zip file that can be accessed by selecting “Additional Information” (select Native File) in the INL Electronic Document Management System (EDMS). It is highly unlikely the test scenarios evaluated in this ECAR will adversely impact human health based on comparisons of calculated dose and concentration against regulatory standards and risk-based screening levels. Conservative estimates of dose to workers and the public from atmospheric transport of possible radionuclide releases are far below federal radiation protection standards. Conservative estimates of potential contaminant concentrations in groundwater are less than federal drinking water standards or screening levels. Predicted radionuclide concentrations in surface soils are below risk-based screening levels, except for Ge-68 (material Ga-68) for the worker. The Ge-68 soil concentration can be made less than the worker PRG, if the number of annual tests using Ga-68 is reduced from 12 to 6. However, the sum of ratios still exceeds one because of the high K-40 ratio. If the EF of the worker (number of days the worker is in the contaminated testing area) is reduced from 225 days/yr (default value for full time worker) to 112 days/yr, the Ge-68 ratio is less than one and the sum of ratios is less than one. Actual radiation doses and groundwater and surface-soil concentrations are likely to be much less than those calculated because of the conservative assumptions and parameters employed in the modeling. For example, atmospheric-transport calculations assume the entire inventory of each material type is readily released to the atmosphere and no plume deposition, depletion, or radioactive decay occurs during transport. The calculations also assume the same meteorological conditions (e.g., wind velocity, wind direction, stability class) that produce the maximum 95th percentile concentration (i.e., concentration representing the 95th percentile of a distribution of concentrations derived from 3 years of hourly meteorological data) at each receptor location are the same for all 12 tests during the year, and each receptor is assumed to be present during all 12 tests. The surface-soil assessment assumes the entire inventory of each test is deposited in the top 5 cm of soil. No atmospheric dispersal is assumed, and the radionuclides are subject only to leaching and radioactive decay. The groundwater-pathway modeling is conservative in that it is one-dimensional in the unsaturated zone (no lateral spreading/dilution) and assumes the entire inventory of contaminants infiltrates into the ground at the same location for every test. This is especially conservative for particulate radionuclides because they would have to dissolve or corrode first and some would be dispersed into the atmosphere. The groundwater receptor is also assumed to consume water directly from a hypothetical well positioned in the location of maximum concentration. In addition, conservative degradation rates were used, and volatilization was not considered for the nonradradioactive chemicals modeled. And finally, the calculations assume all 12 tests will be performed at the same place at both locations, and all 11 radioactive material types will be used for each test. This is conservative because it is anticipated that no more than two material types will be used per test.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

DOE OSTI2013

Handling of Highly Radioactive Radiation Sources in a Hot Cell Using a Mechanically Driven Cell Crane - 13452

In 2010, Siempelkamp Nukleartechnik GmbH was awarded the contract for design and erection of a Hot Cell for handling and storage of highly radioactive radiation sources. This Hot Cell is part of a new hot cell laboratory, constructed for the NHZ (Neues Handhabungszentrum = New Handling Center) of the Nuclear Engineering Seibersdorf GmbH (NES). All incurring radioactive materials from Austria are collected in the NHZ, where they are safely conditioned and stored temporarily until their final storage. The main tasks of the NES include, apart from the collection, conditioning and storage of radioactive waste, also the reprocessing and the decontamination of facilities and laboratories originating from 45 years of research and development at the Seibersdorf site as well as the operation of the Hot Cell Laboratory [1]. The new Hot Cell Laboratory inside the NHZ consists of the following room areas: - One hot cell, placed in the center, for remote controlled, radiation protected handling of radioactive materials, including an integrated floor storage for the long-term temporary storage of highly radioactive radiation sources; - An anteroom for the loading and unloading of the hot cell; - One control room for the remote controlling of the hot cell equipment; - One floor storage, placed laterally to the hot cell, for burial, interim storage and removal of fissionable radioactive material in leak-proof packed units in 100 l drums. The specific design activity of the hot cell of 1.85 Pbq relating to 1-Me-Radiator including the integrated floor storage influences realization and design of the components used in the cell significantly. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2020

Impact of boundary layer simulation on predicting radioactive pollutant dispersion: a case study for HANARO Research Reactor using the WRF-MMIF-CALPUFF modeling system

Wind plays an important role in cases of unexpected radioactive pollutant dispersion, deciding distribution and concentration of the leaked substance. The accurate prediction of wind has been challenging in numerical weather prediction models, especially near the surface because of the complex interaction between turbulent flow and topographic effect. As such, in this study, we investigated the characteristics of atmospheric dispersion of radioactive material (i.e. 137 Cs) according to the simulated boundary layer around the HANARO research nuclear reactor in Korea using the Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF)-Mesoscale Model Interface (MMIF)-California Puff (CALPUFF) model system. We examined the impacts of orographic drag on wind field, stability calculation methods, and planetary boundary layer parameterizations on the dispersion of radioactive material under a radioactive leaking scenario. We found that inclusion of the orographic drag effect in the WRF model improved the wind prediction most significantly over the complex terrain area, leading the model system to estimate the radioactive concentration near the reactor more conservatively. We also emphasized the importance of the stability calculation method and employing the skillful boundary layer parameterization to ensure more accurate low atmospheric conditions, in order to simulate more feasible spatial distribution of the radioactive dispersion in leaking scenarios.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2017

Development of a New Clearance Monitor for Exemption of NPP Radioactive Wastes and its Performance Test - 17200

In nuclear power plants, it is common practice to clear radioactive wastes for free release by using clearance monitor with plastic scintillation detectors so as to reduce disposal costs. These monitors are possible in part thanks to the excellent detection levels achievable with high energy and high yield photons emitted from contaminants such as Cs-137 and Co-60. However, it is difficult for the monitors to separate Naturally Occurring Radioactive Materials (NORM) from the radioactive wastes because the plastic scintillation detectors have poor resolution compared to NaI or HPGe detectors. KHNP has developed a new clearance monitor for determining whether or not the radioactivity level of metal scraps satisfies regulatory criteria. The monitor is composed of 12 large area plastic scintillation detectors and 3 NaI scintillation detectors. The measuring chamber is surrounded by a 5 cm-thick lead shield with chamber dimensions of 1.5 m x 1.0 m x 1.0 m. Its algorithm has a function of measuring total gamma activity while analyzing gamma nuclides and identifying 27 hotspots in radioactive wastes. The detection limit of this system, according to the MCNP simulation, was determined to be about 45 Bq for Co-60 and 78 Bq for Cs-137 with the condition of an empty chamber and measuring time of 1 minute. We evaluated the self - shielding effect of waste for background correction factor and waste height (volume in the chamber) correction factor. We also tested its MDA, location determination of hot-spots, temperature compensation function and convenience of operation. In the future, we will plan to install it at a nuclear site for more tests including evaluating its durability. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2019

Trends and Patterns in the Evolving Threat to Radioactive and Nuclear Material Transportation

Roughly 20 million shipments of radioactive material are transported worldwide each year via commercial transportation vectors. Many of these can be considered a significant movement of risk-significant quantities of radioactive and nuclear material. A strong argument can be made to support the idea that transportation presents the greatest vulnerability in radioactive sealed source and nuclear material life-cycles. Historical and current information strongly suggests adversarial interest in obtaining radiological and nuclear materials with the intent of malicious use. In this context, it is necessary to understand the current trends and patterns in transportation threats as they apply to these materials in order to better understand security needs and current adversarial methods and mind-set.The authors propose to summarize current threats posed to radiological and nuclear materials during the transportation phase of the lifecycle. The paper and ensuing presentation will focus on a review of historical events where the adversarial intent was to disrupt the transportation phase of nuclear and radioactive material with malicious intent, as reported in open source literature. Its purpose is to better understand the nature of current and past transportation incidents involving these materials in order to clarify the evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities they reveal. Relevant incidents involving transportation of these materials will be discussed as well as the historical trends associated with these events. A regional perspective based on an analysis of transportation incidents involving these materials will be discussed. While not necessarily predictive of the types of malicious disruptions that might occur in the future, this study will provide a rich information source from which lessons can be gleaned pertinent to the potential security and public safety threats posed by the transportation of commercial radioactive and nuclear material.

Shannon, Michael↗

DOE OSTI2022

Scintillators

As concerns about the illicit movement of radioactive materials across international borders increase, so too has the need for increased protection of those borders both foreign and domestic. The challenge is not only to detect hidden radioactive materials, but also to distinguish them from legitimate radionuclides such as radio-pharmaceuticals that are often transported across borders and shipped throughout a country. With more than 600 U.S. border sites to protect, screening imported radioactive material requires a careful balance of high throughput and high search efficiency. However, these requirements are difficult to meet as rapid screening operations leave less time for radiation detectors to efficiently evaluate materials. In support of border security, Sandia developed organic glass scintillators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2013

A methodology to quantify the release of spent nuclear fuel from dry casks during security-related scenarios

Assessing the risk to the public and the environment from a release of radioactive material produced by accidental or purposeful forces/environments is an important aspect of the regulatory process in many facets of the nuclear industry. In particular, the transport and storage of radioactive materials is of particular concern to the public, especially with regard to potential sabotage acts that might be undertaken by terror groups to cause injuries, panic, and/or economic consequences to a nation. For many such postulated attacks, no breach in the robust cask or storage module containment is expected to occur. However, there exists evidence that some hypothetical attack modes can penetrate and cause a release of radioactive material. This report is intended as an unclassified overview of the methodology for release estimation as well as a guide to useful resource data from unclassified sources and relevant analysis methods for the estimation process.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

DOE OSTI2018

National and International Assistance in the Technical Assessment of Nuclear and other Radiological Materials out of Regulatory Control

Considerable resources are dedicated worldwide to detect illicit materials of all types amid the concern of their potential use in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. Of particular concern are illicit nuclear and radiological materials as they have potential to cause serious harm to the general public if not maintained under regulatory control. As such, the international community has developed recommendations and guidance for States and their Competent Authorities to establish, implement, maintain, and strengthen their nuclear security regimes. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides recommendations for the security of nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control through the publication Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, Nuclear Security Series No.15. Based on this guidance and national/international practical experience and best practices, the international community has made considerable advances in the detection, interdiction, and adjudication of nuclear and other radiological materials out of regulatory control. The United States Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA), Office of Nuclear Incident Policy and Cooperation has national/international experience to share on providing emergency responders and front line officers assistance in the technical assessment of interdicted nuclear and other radioactive Materials Out of Regulatory Control (MORC).

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

DOE OSTI2015

Radiation Anomaly Detection Algorithms for Field-Acquired Gamma Energy Spectra

The Remote Sensing Laboratory (RSL) is developing a tactical, networked radiation detection system that will be agile, reconfigurable, and capable of rapid threat assessment with a high degree of fidelity and certainty. Our design is driven by the needs of users such as law enforcement personnel who must make decisions by evaluating threat signatures in urban settings. The most efficient tool available to identify the nature of the threat object is real-time gamma spectroscopic analysis, as it is fast and has a very low probability of producing false positive alarm conditions. Urban radiological searches are inherently challenged by the rapid and large spatial variation of background gamma radiation, the presence of benign radioactive materials in terms of the normally occurring radioactive materials (NORM), and shielded and/or masked threat sources. Multiple spectral anomaly detection algorithms have been developed by national laboratories and commercial vendors. For example, the Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) a one-dimensional deterministic radiation transport software capable of calculating gamma ray spectra using physics-based detector response functions, was developed at Sandia National Laboratories. The nuisance-rejection spectral comparison ratio anomaly detection algorithm (or N-SCRAD), developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, uses spectral comparison ratios to detect deviation from benign medical and NORM radiation source and can work in spite of strong presence of NORM and or medical sources. RSL has developed its own wavelet-based gamma energy spectral anomaly detection algorithm called WAVRAD. Test results and relative merits of these different algorithms will be discussed and demonstrated.

networked sensor, gamma spectroscopy, false alarm ↗

DOE OSTI2013

Investigation of Shielding Material in Radioactive Waste Management - 13009

In this study, various waste packages have been prepared by using different materials. Experimental work has been performed on radiation shielding for gamma and neutron radiation. Various materials were evaluated (e.g. concrete, boron, etc.) related to different application areas in radioactive waste management. Effects of addition boric compound mixtures on shielding properties of concrete have been investigated for neutron radiation. The effect of the mixture addition on the shielding properties of concrete was investigated. The results show that negative effects of boric compounds on the strength of concrete decreasing by increasing boric amounts. Shielding efficiency of prepared mixture added concrete up to 80% better than ordinary concretes for neutron radiation. The attenuation was determined theoretically by calculation and practically by using neutron dose rate measurements. In addition of dose rate measurements, strength tests were applied on test shielding materials. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2025

ILLICIT TRANSIT INTERDICTION GLOBAL ANALYSIS

This study aims to enhance the security of radioactive materials during transport by analyzing commonalities in cargo thefts conducted by non-state groups such as thieves and terrorists. This research focuses on identifying patterns and trends in the methods used to steal high-value cargo, with the goal of applying these insights to improve transport security of radioactive materials. Key questions addressed include the frequency of specific tools, techniques, and insider involvement in thefts, as well as the use of weapons, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized tools. Findings will inform security design improvements and industry practices to mitigate vulnerabilities. The study involves a comprehensive review of literature and case studies, utilizing data sources from 2018 to 2023. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to thefts of valuable cargo in transit, with a focus on incidents involving non-state actors. The methodology will include statistical and inferential analysis to identify trends, with results visualized through pie charts, frequency analyses, and terrain maps. The discussion will highlight the implications of findings and provide actionable recommendations for strengthening security measures. Limitations such as data availability and reporting inconsistencies will be acknowledged. Suggestions for future improvements will be constructed using existing case studies and expert feedback. The study’s outcomes aim to raise awareness within the industry, inform policy decisions, and enhance security protocols for radioactive material transport. Metrics for impact include the potential publication of findings, presentations at conferences to raise awareness, and the subsequent actions taken by stakeholders based on the research. By identifying trends and vulnerabilities and suggesting improvements, this research contributes to preventing the illicit use of nuclear and radiological materials.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

DOE OSTI2015

MO-AB-201-00: Radiation Safety Officer Update

The role of the Radiation Safety Officer at a medical facility can be complicated. The complexity of the position is based on the breadth of services provided at the institution and the nature of the radioactive materials license. Medical practices are constantly changing and the use of ionizing radiation continues to rise in this area. Some of the newer medical applications involving radiation have unique regulatory and safety issues that must be addressed. Oversight of the uses of radiation start at the local level (radiation safety officer, radiation safety committee) and are heavily impacted by outside agencies (i.e. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, State Radiologic Health, The Joint Commission (TJC), etc). This session will provide both an overview of regulatory oversight and essential compliance practices as well as practical ways to assess and introduce some of the new applications utilizing radioactive materials into your medical facility. Learning Objectives: Regulatory Compliance and Safety with New Radiotherapies: Spheres and Ra-223 (Lance Phillips) Understand the radioactive materials license amendment process to add new radiotherapies (i.e., SIR-Spheres, Therasphere, Xofigo). Understand the AU approval process for microspheres and Xofigo. Examine the training and handling requirements for new procedures. Understand the process involved with protocol development, SOP in order to define roles and responsibilities. The RSO and The RSC: Challenges and Opportunities (Colin Dimock) Understand how to form an effective Committee. Examine what the Committee does for the Program and the RSO. Understand the importance of Committee engagement. Discuss the balance of the complimentary roles of the RSO and the Committee. The Alphabet Soup of Regulatory Compliance: Being Prepared for Inspections (Linda Kroger) Recognize the various regulatory bodies and organizations with oversight or impact in Nuclear Medicine, Radiology and Radiation Oncology. Examine 10CFR35 requirements as they relate to the everyday practice of Nuclear Medicine and Radiation Oncology. Understand the nature of available guidance documents (e.g., NUREG 1556). Examine the commonalities between TJC and CMS preparedness.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2017

Preliminary Study on Recycling and Reuse of Metals from Decommissioning in Construction of Disposal Vaults in Slovakia - 17217

The decommissioning of nuclear installations represents a complex process resulting in the generation of large amounts of various waste materials. Majority of them are non-contaminated, however some of them may be hazardous as well (e.g. chemicals, asbestos, oil products, etc.). During decommissioning of NPP, significant quantities of materials with various levels of radionuclides concentration arise as well. All of these materials should be managed appropriately keeping in mind safety principles, legislative requirements, lessons learned and other relevant factors. Therefore, selection of an appropriate strategy for management of the materials arising from decommissioning is crucial and strongly influences the overall effectiveness of decommissioning process. In line with international incentives for optimization of radioactive material management, concepts of recycling and reuse of slightly radioactive materials are widely discussed and applications of these concepts are analyzed. Therefore, the paper is devoted to the preliminary study of potential for recycling of re-melted metals from decommissioning in form of reinforcement bars or mesh used in the construction of ferro-concrete disposal vaults within the near surface repository. The paper presents the preliminary results and discusses the technical and non-technical aspects related to the recycling scenario. Moreover, comparison of various scenarios related to the scrap metal clearance and recycling within nuclear industry is included. Key findings and lessons learned from study may be useful for the international community dealing with waste management optimization and in particular with recycling of materials within nuclear industry. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2017

Antarctica Radiological Source Removals (Final Report)

On 18 May 2015, the research vessel Akademik Fedorov of the Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) delivered four radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs) from Antarctica to the port of St. Petersburg, Russia. The RTGs had been previously used in the work program of the former Soviet Antarctic Expedition (SAE). From the mid-1970s, RTGs have been used to provide autonomous power at geophysical and meteorological stations located in remote regions of Antarctica. The research was completed in the early 1990s, but not all the generators had been removed when the stations were decommissioned. The remaining four unsecured RTGs, with their strontium-90 ( 90 Sr) radiological material and a combined total activity of 80,000 curies (Ci), still posed a potential risk as they could be used for nefarious purposes. Therefore, a plan of action for the removal of the RTGs from Antarctica was developed. This was done within the framework of the international program for the disposal of Russian RTGs. Financial support and technical oversight was provided by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), while logistical support was provided by the Russian Antarctic Expedition (RAE) of the Arctic and Antarctic Research Institute (AARI) and by subsidiaries of the Russian Federation’s Rosatom State Corporation. Recovering and repatriating the RTGs from the continent of Antarctica to the Russian Federation proved to be a very difficult task, including satisfying all the legal aspects within a very tight timeframe. This involved indemnification issues, adhering to new laws enacted after the Soviet Union era, and obtaining all the necessary permits and certifications for transport of the RTGs by air, sea, and land. It was an international, collaborative effort involving the cooperation of multiple organizations to complete the legal work and preparation of necessary documents. In addition, AARI needed to create a separate structure within its organization to manage the process, including the provision of special medical screenings, training, and certifications of its institute personnel. This was done so AARI could fulfill its obligation for the safe handling of radioactive materials while in the field. Recovery of the RTGs required overcoming several logistical hurdles. The Akademik Fedorov, which transported the RTGs back to the Russian Federation, required retrofits to accommodate the RTGs for safe and secure transport of radioactive material. The United States Project Team (USPT) inspected the vessel while it was in dry dock in Turku, Finland, being retrofitted with their design. Special sleds had to be designed to transport RTGs, as well as equipment for identifying crevasses in the glaciers, over the Antarctic packed snow and ice. Provision of adequate fuel supplies for the long trek to the interior of Antarctica to recover one of the RTGs also had to be addressed. With the successful recovery, repatriation, and disassembly of the RTGs, the Radioactive Heat Sources (RHSs) were extracted and dispositioned, thus eliminating any risk of these radioactive sources being used for terrorist purposes. Successful completion of the project also fulfilled the requirements of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty concerning the need to remove unused radioactive materials.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

DOE OSTI2018

Incorporation of 40 CFR 192 as an ARAR when Implementing MARSSIM (USACE Input to the MARSSIM Committee for MARSSIM Revision 2) - 18526

One example special case for Final Status Surveys (FSSs) occurs at Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act of 1978 (UMTRCA) sites at which the radioactive materials are from the processing of uranium or thorium ores for their source material content. At these sites, EPA's Health and Environmental Protection Standards for Uranium and Thorium Mill Tailings, in 40 CFR 192, are applicable. Also, 40 CFR 192 may be invoked at non-UMTRCA sites through the CERCLA as an Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Requirement (ARAR) due to the presence of radium (Ra)-226 or Ra-228, even though the source of residual radioactive material was not a uranium or thorium mill tailings facility. However, the regulatory requirements in these standards infringe on some of the recommendations in the Multi-Agency Radiation Survey and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM). Specifically, the soil cleanup standards for Ra-226 or Ra-228 are specified as averages over an area of 100 square meters (m{sup 2}). Note that in the 40 CFR 192 rulemaking, an averaging area of 100 m{sup 2} was used as a reasonable footprint for a home. One goal of the 40 CFR 192 standards was to protect future homes from indoor radon, and the specified averaging area was a component implemented for the protection of health. In addition, 40 CFR 192 is silent regarding elevated measurement criteria (EMC)-type requirements for smaller areas of elevated radioactive material within the 100-m{sup 2} footprint. At UMTRCA sites and CERCLA sites where UMTRCA is an ARAR, the following approach for FSSs is acceptable: - Survey units (SUs) may be classified, as appropriate, and survey activities may be adjusted accordingly for Class 1, Class 2, or Class 3 SUs. - Class 1 soil SUs should provide for evaluation of portions that are no greater than 100 m{sup 2} in size, consistent with the 40 CFR 192 standards. - Class 2 and 3 soil SUs are not expected to exceed the 40 CFR 192 soil cleanup standard, so they do not require evaluation of portions that are no greater than 100 m{sup 2} in size. - Compliance with 40 CFR 192 can be demonstrated through analysis of soil samples or composite soil samples from each SU, in conjunction with gamma radiation scanning or in situ gamma radiation measurements of each SU. When appropriate, these gamma radiation scans or in situ measurements correlated to soil sampling may be used in place of soil sampling. - By demonstrating that the average over 100 m{sup 2} meets the 40 CFR 192 soil cleanup standard, the EMC criteria for small elevated areas of activity are not required for the purposes of MARSSIM, but may be developed. These minor modifications to the standard MARSSIM radiological survey approach are acceptable for UMTRCA sites or CERCLA sites where UMTRCA is an ARAR. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗