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At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

ALARA on the radioactive waste management activities at NPP in Korea - 15189

This study examined and analyzed on-site experience to investigate the effect of the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) principle on the level of radiation exposure management during NPPs' radioactive waste management activities. In particular, the ALARA principle was observed by various activities of radioactive waste management. According to 2012 data, workers' radiation exposure due to radioactive waste management activities in one light water reactor (LWR) unit amounted to a collective dose of 14.8 man-mSv, and this value corresponded to approximately 3.5% of the radiation exposure due to the NPP's total activities. The present study is expected to contribute to the reduction of workers' radiation exposure by analyzing and synthesizing field experience from the perspective of the ALARA principle during radioactive waste management, and transmitting the results to other NPPs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2015

Design and performance testing of a novel far field Gamma system to assay radioactive waste in 400 and 200 litre drums - 15339

A Far Field Gamma ray Measurement system has been developed for measuring and assaying both 400 and 200 litre waste drums with a wide range of activity at nuclear power stations. These include radioactive waste drums with surface dose-rates of less than 2 mSv/h (200 mrem/h) and, at the higher range of activity, 400 litre drums with surface dose-rates of up to 50 mSv/h (5 rem/h). The assay system incorporates an electro-mechanically cooled high purity Germanium profile detector and advanced digital spectroscopic analysis electronics. A novel optimised conical-trapezoidal collimator has been incorporated to reduce the effect of the radioactive background in addition to the conventional detector lead shield with tin and copper graded lining to reduce the effect of lead X-rays. Two features have been incorporated to reduce detector dead time and maintain detector resolution when measuring high activity drums. The first is the inclusion of two automated tungsten filters of different thickness as an integral part of the detector collimator. The filters are used in conjunction with an automated rail system on which the detector platform is mounted. The detector can be positioned at different distances from the drum surface in order to reduce detector dead time. The deployment of the filters and the adjustment of the drum - detector position are automatically controlled based on a user defined dose-rate limit table. The data is provided by two Geiger-Muller dose-rate detectors, which are used to measure the drum surface dose-rate. This data is subsequently used to adjust the detector position and in cases of higher dose-rate deploy one or other of the tungsten filters. The drum rotation platform incorporates a load cell to determine drum weight and hence the drum density. This information is used to calculate an attenuation correction based on the assumption of uniform drum density and uniform distribution of activity within the drum. Where the waste drums have a more complicated and known regular internal structure, such as a small radioactive region surrounded by an annulus of shielding material, the analysis algorithms incorporated into the far field geometry and attenuation correction spectroscopic data analysis code are able to make a more accurate determination of drum activity than would be possible assuming a completely uniform drum. The detector energy and efficiency calibration is achieved using a point source with multiple gamma ray energy peaks. The response of the high purity Germanium detector is also modelled using the Monte Carlo Neutron Photon code and the model is benchmarked using the measured point source calibration data. The performance of the instrument has been determined for a range of uniform density matrix drums containing a set of Eu-152 line or rod sources located in re-entrant tubes positioned on an equal volume basis. When rotated, the test drums with volume distributed line sources simulate waste drums of different density each with a uniformly distributed radioactive source. The measurements have been validated using Monte Carlo simulations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2016

The Approach of the Environmental Consequences and Impacts during Transport of Radioactive Materials (RAM)-A Safety Case - 16420

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) works, together with Member States (MS), to provide a strong, sustainable and visible global nuclear safety and security framework, protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. In the announcement of this IAEA Conference it is underlined that 'nuclear safety and security are to a great extent scientific in nature, a regulatory body with responsibilities for nuclear facilities and other licensed activities involving radioactive material needs to have permanent access to supporting expertise'. This can be provided internally to the regulatory body or through an external entity such as a TSO in order to provide a competent and timely response to regulatory needs, and the development and maintenance of an appropriate knowledge base and associated tools and services, including training and tutoring services, are the main areas on which the conference will focus. This paper presents certain results obtained during carrying out the IAEA-Romanian Scientific Research Contract entitled: 'Romanian Contribution to the Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime (Risk and Radiological Consequences)' where the author served as CSI (Chief Scientific Investigator) a part of the IAEA CRP-(Coordinated Research Project) on the: 'Development of Methodology for Risk Assessment and State Management of Nuclear Security Regime'. Also, potential risks and their possible radiological consequences to peoples and environment must not be underestimated. However, the assessment of risk must be realistic and quantified, and the requirements placed on the appropriate. The IAEA regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, 2012 Edition, Specific Safety Requirements, SSR-6, are applicable to the national and international carriage of radioactive material by all modes of transport- by road, by rail, by air, by sea or by inland waters. The Radioactive Material to be transported must be categorized on the basis of its activity concentration, total activity, fissile characteristics (if any) and other relevant subsidiary characteristics. Packaging and package requirements are then specified on the basis of the hazard of the contents and range from normal commercial packaging (for low hazard contents) to strict design and performance requirements (for higher hazard contents). (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2019

Control of Radioactive Methyl Iodide Gases by Mesoporous Hybrid Adsorbents at High Humid Condition - 19329

During the operation of nuclear facility as well as decommissioning stage, various radioactive gaseous wastes are generated. It is generally recognized that radioiodine is potentially one of the most hazardous gas on the human body and environment. Iodine-131 release in the gaseous effluents at the nuclear facilities had been a critical environmental concern. Reducing iodine release is a critical issue in radioactive waste system evaluation, especially in their adherence to the 'as low as reasonably achievable' (ALARA) criteria because radioiodine among these gaseous wastes has radiological harm. Therefore, numerous studies for the removal of radioiodine from the off-gas stream of nuclear facilities have been performed with formation processes and chemical structure. There has been some concern regarding the use of TEDA-impregnated activated carbon as an adsorbent for radioiodine removal, because of the low ignition point of TEDA and the possible release of TEDA from the charcoal in continuously flowing air streams. Therefore, the TEDA-impregnated activated carbon cannot use to trap radioiodine generated from high humid condition, due to the rapid drop of the removal efficiency. It is obvious that high humid can be expected during design basis event such as loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA). Therefore, investigation on the retention of organic radioiodine (CH3I131) by various activated carbons at high humid condition has extensively been performed so far. But there are no good results on the adsorption of methyl iodide at high humid condition up to now. As a result, the promising approach to the problem of iodine removal under high humid conditions is to use organic-inorganic hybrid adsorbents in which are enough retention characteristics from hydrophobic property. In order to develop the best removal efficiency for the control of radioiodine gas generated from a high humid process, a hydrophobic adsorbents was developed and the performance test of adsorbent using radioactive methyl iodide tracer was also performed. Demonstration test of adsorbent using radioactive methyl iodide tracer was performed at high humid conditions up to 97% relative humidity. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Influence of surface potential on the adhesive force of radioactive gold surfaces

Radioactive particles may acquire surface potential through self-charging, and thus can behave differently from natural aerosols in atmospheric systems with respect to aggregation, deposition, resuspension, and transport to areas surrounding a radioactive source. Here, this work focuses on the adhesive force between radioactive particles and metallic surfaces, which relates to the deposition and resuspension of particles on surrounding surfaces. Scanning surface potential microscopy was employed to measure the surface potential of radioactive gold foil. Atomic force microscopy was used to investigate the adhesive force for gold that acquired surface charge either by irradiation or by application of an equivalent electrical bias. Overall, the adhesive force increases with increasing surface potential or relative humidity. However, a behavior that does not follow the general trend was observed for the irradiated gold at a high decay rate. A comparison between experimental measurements and calculated values revealed that the surface potential promotes adhesion. The contribution of the electrostatic force at high levels of relative humidity was lower than the one found using theoretical calculations due to the effects caused by enhanced adsorption rate of water molecules under a high surface charge density. Lastly, the results of this study can be used to provide a better understanding of the behavior of radioactive particles in atmospheric systems.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2013

WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE RISING LIGHT CURVES OF RADIOACTIVELY POWERED SUPERNOVAE?

The light curve of the explosion of a star with a radius {approx}< 10-100 R{sub Sun} is powered mostly by radioactive decay. Observationally, such events are dominated by hydrogen-deficient progenitors and classified as Type I supernovae (SNe I), i.e., white dwarf thermonuclear explosions (Type Ia), and core collapses of hydrogen-stripped massive stars (Type Ib/c). Current transient surveys are finding SNe I in increasing numbers and at earlier times, allowing their early emission to be studied in unprecedented detail. Motivated by these developments, we summarize the physics that produces their rising light curves and discuss ways in which observations can be utilized to study these exploding stars. The early radioactive-powered light curves probe the shallowest deposits of {sup 56}Ni. If the amount of {sup 56}Ni mixing in the outermost layers of the star can be deduced, then it places important constraints on the progenitor and properties of the explosive burning. In practice, we find that it is difficult to determine the level of mixing because it is hard to disentangle whether the explosion occurred recently and one is seeing radioactive heating near the surface or whether the explosion began in the past and the radioactive heating is deeper in the ejecta. In the latter case, there is a ''dark phase'' between the moment of explosion and the first observed light emitted once the shallowest layers of {sup 56}Ni are exposed. Because of this, simply extrapolating a light curve from radioactive heating back in time is not a reliable method for estimating the explosion time. The best solution is to directly identify the moment of explosion, either through observing shock breakout (in X-ray/UV) or the cooling of the shock-heated surface (in UV/optical), so that the depth being probed by the rising light curve is known. However, since this is typically not available, we identify and discuss a number of other diagnostics that are helpful for deciphering how recently an explosion occurred. As an example, we apply these arguments to the recent SN Ic PTF 10vgv. We demonstrate that just a single measurement of the photospheric velocity and temperature during the rise places interesting constraints on its explosion time, radius, and level of {sup 56}Ni mixing.

79 ASTRONOMY AND ASTROPHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Colloid Facilitated Transport of Radioactive Cations in the Vadose Zone (Final Report)

The overarching goal of this study was to improve understanding of colloid-facilitated transport of radioactive cations through unsaturated soils and sediments. We conducted a suite of laboratory experiments and field experiments on the vadose-zone transport of colloids, organic matter, and associated contaminants of interest to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). The laboratory and field experiments, together with transport modeling, were designed to accomplish the following detailed objectives: 1. Evaluation of the relative importance of inorganic colloids and organic matter to the facilitation of radioactive cation transport in the vadose zone; 2. Assessment of the role of adsorption and desorption kinetics in the facilitated transport of radioactive cations in the vadose zone; 3. Examination of the effects of rainfall and infiltration dynamics and in the facilitated transport of radioactive cations through the vadose zone; 4. Exploration of the role of soil heterogeneity and preferential flow paths (e.g., macropores) on the facilitated transport of radioactive cations in the vadose zone; 5. Development of a mathematical model of facilitated transport of contaminants in the vadose zone that accurately incorporates pore-scale and column-scale processes with the practicality of predicting transport with readily available parameters.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

RCT Module 2.12: Shipment and Receipt of Radioactive Material [Slides]

The basis of regulations governing the packaging and shipping of radioactive material is to keep radioactive material from affecting the environment during transportation and to keep the environment from affecting the integrity of the radioactive material. The package itself is to be designed and constructed to be the effective barrier between the environment and the radioactive material; thus, most of the regulatory restrictions apply to the package and the method of shipment used to transport the package. To reduce any potential hazard, the regulatory requirements become more restrictive as the quantity, concentration, and potential hazard of the radioactive material increase.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
NASA NTRS2004

The Mean Life Squared Relationship for Abundances of Extinct Radioactivities

We discovered that the abundances of now extinct radioactivities (relative to stable reference isotopes) in meteorites vary as a function of their mean lifetimes squared. This relationship applies to chondrites, achondrites, and irons but to calcium-aluminum inclusions (CAIs). Certain meteorites contain excesses in isotopic abundances from the decay of radioactive isotopes with half-lives much less than the age of the solar system. These short-lived radioactivities are now extinct, but they were alive when meteorites assembled in the early solar system. The origin of these radioactivities and the processes which control their abundances in the solar nebula are still not well understood. Some clues may come from our finding that the meteoritic abundances of now extinct radioactivities (relative to stable reference isotopes) vary as a function of their mean lifetimes squared. This relationship applies to chondrites, achondrites, and irons, but not to CAIs. This points to at least two different processes establishing the abundances of short-lived isotopes found in the meteoritic record.

Lodders, K.↗
DOE OSTI2015

Methods of capturing and immobilizing radioactive nuclei with metal fluorite-based inorganic materials

Methods of capturing and immobilizing radioactive nuclei with metal fluorite-based inorganic materials are described. For example, a method of capturing and immobilizing radioactive nuclei includes flowing a gas stream through an exhaust apparatus. The exhaust apparatus includes a metal fluorite-based inorganic material. The gas stream includes a radioactive species. The radioactive species is removed from the gas stream by adsorbing the radioactive species to the metal fluorite-based inorganic material of the exhaust apparatus.

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗
DOE OSTI2018

Integrated Decision Methodology for Final Disposal of Radioactive Sources

Radioactive sources are used throughout the world, and their beneficial uses are many. Sources are at the core of many applications in different branches of industry, medicine, agriculture and research. Sources are present in a very wide range of equipment that is used for, inter alia, cancer treatment, killing bacteria in food, sterilizing medical supplies, measuring instruments such as gauges used to measure soil moisture and soil density and many other components, irradiating seeds for enhancing food production, protecting buildings from lightning strikes, mapping underground sources of water, prospecting for oil and gas reserves, measuring density of soil for construction projects, or even detecting smoke. At their “cradle” and when in use, radioactive sources are usually properly managed and controlled. It is when a source has reached the end of its useful life when they are at a higher risk of being under inadequate control, poorly managed, or even becoming orphan. Sources that have reached the end of their useful life must be carefully and safely managed. The “grave” of disused sources needs a proper disposal process to prevent them from posing a potential threat to people or the environment. To protect the public and the environment from the potential hazards of ionizing radiation, and to prevent disused sources from becoming orphan, a “cradle-to-grave” control of radioactive sources is essential, as promoted by the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. This approach requires a national policy and strategy, an adequate legal and regulatory framework, and adequate resources and infrastructure. Many IAEAMember States have expressed the need for effective solutions to this challenge. There is also a gap related to the life cycle costs of potential disposal practices. This paper proposes a multi-attribute decision making methodology to compare disposal options using both economic and non-economic criteria leading to a preferred option for disposal and a strategy for final disposal of disused radioactive sources that is specific and optimized for each IAEA Member State.

Beatty, Randy↗
DOE OSTI2019

Radioactive Decay Computation with a Graph Approach for Solving a Linear Dynamic System

ABSTRACT: This article gives two graph-based algorithms for radioactive decay computation. The first algorithm identifies the connected components of the graph induced from the given radioactive decay dynamics to reduce the size of the problem. The solutions are derived over the precalculated connected components, respectively and independently. The second algorithm utilizes acyclic structure of radioactive decay dynamics. The algorithm evaluates the reachable vertices of the induced system graph from the initially activated vertices and finds the minimal set of starting vertices populating the entire reachable vertices. Then, the decay calculations are performed over the reachable vertices from the identified minimal starting vertices, respectively, with the partitioned initial value over the reachable vertices. A formal argument is given to show that the proposed graph inspired divide and conquer calculation methods perform the intended radioactive decay calculation. Empirical efforts comparing the proposed radioactive decay calculation algorithms are presented.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2019

MULTI-MODAL CHALLENGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT OF NUCLEAR AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS (THE ONLY INTERESTING PARTS OF A SYSTEM ARE THE INTERFACES.)

Transportation of nuclear and radioactive material exposes these materials to the most risk for malicious acts. Unlike physical facilities, securing radioactive and nuclear materials during transport requires that many different organizations including operators, regulatory agencies, and security agencies work together to ensure the security of the cargo. A major security challenge for international movement of nuclear and radioactive material is the need to use multiple transport modes. Ensuring security of these cargos as they move through intermodal facilities, some of which may take multiple hours, or days, depending on operational constraints at the yards, ports, or other facilities, is a major operational and regulatory challenge. Especially in the international context, ensuring the security of material in transport through in-transit countries and coordinating transport activities across jurisdictions can lead to challenges as to whose security plan controls, whose transport regulations are to be followed, and how might plans need to be adjusted to adapt to in-transit conditions and ultimately how to ensure cargo security. This paper introduces and highlights selected challenges in the multi-modal movement of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. While the paper will address selected challenges in coordination of stakeholders and resources, activities at intermodal facilities, and other selected issues, this does not address all the challenges, rather it brings issues forward and suggests solutions and strategies for enhancing the security of nuclear and radioactive material transported internationally.

Singley, Paul↗
DOE OSTI2019

Systems and methods for assaying a radioactive gas, and related scintillation cells

A radioactive gas assay system comprises a scintillation cell production assembly, a detector assembly, a computer assembly, and a scintillation cell destruction assembly. The scintillation cell production assembly is configured to produce a scintillation cell comprising a glass scintillator shell containing a volume of radioactive gas. The detector assembly is configured to receive the scintillation cell and to detect photons emitted thereby. The computer assembly is configured to receive data from the detector assembly to automatically calculate an absolute activity of the volume of radioactive gas of the scintillation cell and radiation detection efficiencies of the detector assembly. The scintillation cell destruction assembly is configured to receive the scintillation cell and to rupture the substantially non-porous glass scintillator shell to release the volume of radioactive gas. A method of assaying a radioactive gas, and a scintillation cell are also described.

Robinson, Troy A.↗
DOE OSTI2019

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗
DOE OSTI2020

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗
DOE OSTI2020

International Symposium on Transport Security of Nuclear and other Radioactive Material; Tokyo, Japan, November 2019

As an outcome of the Fourth Nuclear Security Summit of 2016, held in Washington D.C., the Governments of Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Spain, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States reaffirmed, through INFCIRC/909, their will to further improve the overall security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials. With this goal in mind, each expressed their commitment to further exchange national practices with other countries through the IAEA and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). They also committed to actively support the IAEA as the central organization for coordinating activities and developing guidance documents and to support the GICNT and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction in developing and implementing its nuclear transport security activities. Both of these organizations address the commitments regarding nuclear transport security as outcomes of the Nuclear Security Summit 2016. In an effort to continue the momentum from the Nuclear Security Summit, the Government of Japan, in cooperation with the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (ISCN/JAEA), hosted the International Transport Security Symposium in November 2019. With over fifty countries invited to attend, the event exchanged and promoted good practices in several topical area sessions related to the security of nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Topical sessions included Laws and Regulatory Framework, Physical Protection Systems, Response Actions, and Insider/Information Security. The Symposium built support for transport security and encouraged IAEA Member States to actively work regionally and internationally with the IAEA’s transport security programme through the practical implementation and incorporation of IAEA Nuclear Security Series recommendations and guidance into their national frameworks for transport security. From these sessions, to the host detailed a recommended path forward for future engagements in the security of nuclear and radioactive material in transport. The paper will discuss the Symposium’s outcomes and highlight the forward momentum made by both signatories and non-signatories for the strengthening of all the critical elements of a State’s transport security regime, including physical protection systems, insider threats to the nuclear and radioactive material supply chains, planning and capabilities for law enforcement response to malicious transport security events, and employment of technology to address critical vulnerabilities to the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials.

Holt, Katherine↗
DOE OSTI2019

Trends and Patterns in the Evolving Threat to Radioactive and Nuclear Material Transportation

Roughly 20 million shipments of radioactive material are transported worldwide each year via commercial transportation vectors. Many of these can be considered a significant movement of risk-significant quantities of radioactive and nuclear material. A strong argument can be made to support the idea that transportation presents the greatest vulnerability in radioactive sealed source and nuclear material life-cycles. Historical and current information strongly suggests adversarial interest in obtaining radiological and nuclear materials with the intent of malicious use. In this context, it is necessary to understand the current trends and patterns in transportation threats as they apply to these materials in order to better understand security needs and current adversarial methods and mind-set.The authors propose to summarize current threats posed to radiological and nuclear materials during the transportation phase of the lifecycle. The paper and ensuing presentation will focus on a review of historical events where the adversarial intent was to disrupt the transportation phase of nuclear and radioactive material with malicious intent, as reported in open source literature. Its purpose is to better understand the nature of current and past transportation incidents involving these materials in order to clarify the evolving nature of the threats and vulnerabilities they reveal. Relevant incidents involving transportation of these materials will be discussed as well as the historical trends associated with these events. A regional perspective based on an analysis of transportation incidents involving these materials will be discussed. While not necessarily predictive of the types of malicious disruptions that might occur in the future, this study will provide a rich information source from which lessons can be gleaned pertinent to the potential security and public safety threats posed by the transportation of commercial radioactive and nuclear material.

Shannon, Michael↗