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At least 235 records · Page 13

Bottom-up and Top-Down Uncertainty Quantification for Measurements

Several recent papers address improved uncertainty quantification (UQ) for measurements used in nuclear safeguards. This paper reviews progress and presents new results for bottom-up (first principles) and top-down (empirical) UQ for safeguards, where the main quantitative measure of uncertainty is the total measurement error standard deviation (SD), which includes both random and systematic error components. The five main UQ topics addressed here include: (1) impact of making data-driven choices in SD estimation; (2) use of approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) for both bottom-up and top-down UQ; (3) computational calibration; (4) revisions to the guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement (GUM), and (5) critique of a recently-suggested “Unified Theory of Measurement Errors and Uncertainties.”

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Growth interface study of CdTeSe crystals grown by the THM technique

The Traveling Heater Method (THM) is a widely accepted technique to grow high-quality detector grade CdTe and CdZnTe ingots, especially for X-ray and gamma-ray detector applications. Unlike melt-growth techniques, the growth interface for ingots produced by the THM technique consists of two different compounds, viz. the solidified region (just below the interface) consists of the compound to be grown (e.g., CdZnTe for CdZnTe growth), while the molten zone just above the growth interface consists of Te-rich CdZnTe. Thus, optimization of the growth parameters is critical to obtain a clean growth interface with the required shape and presence of minimal Te-rich inclusions. Here, in this study, CdTeSe ingots were grown employing the THM technique to investigate the growth interface. Both macroscopic and microscopic behavior of the interface were studied. The study revealed that a microscopically smooth growth interface can be achieved by optimizing the growth parameters, which is essential for obtaining high-quality, inclusion-free ingots.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Possible impacts of molten salt reactors on the International Monitoring System

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are gaining support as many countries look for ways to increase power generation and replace aging nuclear energy production facilities. MSRs have inherently safe designs, are scalable in size, can burn transuranic wastes from traditional solid fuel nuclear reactors, can store excess heat in thermal reservoirs for water desalination, and can be used to produce medical isotopes as part of the real-time liquid-fuel recycling process. The ability to remove 135 Xe in real time from the fuel improves the power production in an MSR because 135 Xe is the most significant neutron-absorbing isotope generated by nuclear fission. Xenon-135, and other radioactive gases, are removed by sparging the fuel with an inert gas while the liquid fuel is recirculated from the reactor inner core through the heat exchangers. Without effective abatement technologies, large amounts of radioactive gas could be released during the sparging process. This work examines the potential impact of radioxenon releases on samplers used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions. Here, atmospheric transport simulations from seven hypothetical MSRs on different continents were used to evaluate the holdup time needed before release of radioxenon so IMS samplers would register few detections. Abatement technologies that retain radioxenon isotopes for at least 120 d before their release will be needed to mitigate the impacts from a molten salt breeder reactor used to replace a nuclear power plant. A holdup time of about 150 d is needed to reduce emissions to the average level of current nuclear power plants.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gas diffusion through variably-water-saturated zeolitic tuff: Implications for transport following a subsurface nuclear event

Noble gas transport through geologic media has important applications in the characterization of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). Without accurate transport models, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between xenon signatures originating from civilian nuclear facilities and UNEs. Understanding xenon transport time through the earth is a key parameter for interpreting measured xenon isotopic ratios. One of the most challenging aspects of modeling gas transport time is accounting for the effect of variable water saturation of geological media. In this study, we utilize bench-scale laboratory experiments to characterize the diffusion of krypton, xenon, and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) through intact zeolitic tuff under different saturations. Here, we demonstrate that the water in rock cores with low partial saturation dramatically affects xenon transport time compared to that of krypton and SF6 by blocking sites in zeolitic tuff that preferentially adsorb xenon. This leads to breakthrough trends that are strongly influenced by the degree of the rock saturation. Xenon is especially susceptible to this phenomenon, a finding that is crucial to incorporate in subsurface gas transport models used for nuclear event identification. We also find that the breakthrough of SF6 diverges significantly from that of noble gases within our system. When developing field scale models, it is important to understand how the behavior of xenon deviates from chemical tracers used in the field, such as SF6 (Carrigan et al., 1996). These new insights demonstrate the critical need to consider the interplay between rock saturation and fission product sorption during transport modeling, and the importance of evaluating specific interactions between geomedia and gases of interest, which may differ from geomedia interactions with chemical tracers.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski et al., 2014) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133 Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131m Xe and 133m Xe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133 Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. In conclusion, signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Logistics simulation of a remediation effort for a hypothetical radiological contamination scenario

To mitigate the effects following a large-scale nuclear or radiological material release in an urban environment and to expedite recovery, the Integrated Wash-Aid Treatment Emergency Reuse System (IWATERS) was developed. IWATERS consists of three operations: washing contaminated surfaces with an ionic wash solution, collecting, and treating the contaminated wash solution on-site to remove contaminants, and reusing the treated solution throughout operations to preserve the clean water resource. This study develops a framework to simulate the logistics of IWATERS deployment, thereby gaining an understanding of the timeline for decontamination operations. For this purpose, the Analysis of Mobility Platform and GoldSim were leveraged for a hypothetical contamination scenario covering 65,200 m 2 of an urban center. The framework reveals that remediation progress is limited by several resources, notably the availability of vermiculite, a reactive clay that is required to treat the contaminated wash solution. Further, this study also presents how the simulation approach can be used to characterize alternatives to reduce the influence of limited resources on operational progress. Overall, this work lays the foundation for evaluating different decontamination methods through detailed logistics simulation, i.e., by refining simulation assumptions and expanding the range of scenarios the simulation can depict.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Phase II testing of Xenon International on Mount Schauinsland, Germany

Station RN33 on Mount Schauinsland near Freiburg, Germany, is part of the International Monitoring System monitoring radioxenon in air ( 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe) for verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Here, we present data from phase II testing of a new system, Xenon International at RN33, July 14th, 2021 to Jan 22nd, 2022, together with SPALAX data from the same time period. Radioxenon could be detected in 473 of 719 samples, among them many multiple isotope detections. Activity concentrations of spiked and selected environmental samples were verified by laboratory reanalysis. Finally, the sensitivity of Xenon International for radioxenons is up to one order of magnitude better for the metastable isotopes than that of the SPALAX, with a shorter sampling duration of 6 h.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Simulation of radioactive plume transport in the atmosphere including dynamics of particle aggregation and breakup

Accurate prediction of the atmospheric transport of debris particles relies heavily on our knowledge of the size distribution of the particles within a debris cloud. Assuming a fixed particle size during simulations is not always viable since the size distribution of the debris can change during transport. Various microphysical processes, such as aggregation and breakup, influence debris particles and dictate any changes to the size distribution. To track those changes that can occur, a population balance model can be adopted and instituted within a model framework. Nonetheless, many of the models that simulate the transport of radioactive debris following a device-driven fission incident have historically neglected to consider these processes. As such, this work describes our effort to develop a modeling framework capable of simulating the transport and deposition of a radioactive plume generated from a fission incident with a dynamic population balance including particle aggregation and breakup. Herein the impact of aggregation and breakup, individually and collectively, on the particle size distribution is explored using the developed framework. When simulating aggregation, for example, six mechanisms, including Brownian coagulation, the convective enhancement to Brownian coagulation, van der Waals-viscous force correction for Brownian coagulation, gravitational collection, turbulent inertial motion, and turbulent shear, are considered. Brownian coagulation and its corrections have, as one would expect, a large impact on relatively small aggregates. Aggregates with a diameter that is less than or equal to 1.0 μm, for instance, comprise 50.6 vol % of all aggregates in the absence of aggregation and 31.2 vol % when Brownian coagulation and its corrections are considered. Gravitational collection and, to a much lesser extent, turbulent shear and turbulent inertial motion are, conversely, of great importance to relatively large aggregates (i.e., diameter greater than 3.0 μm). Additionally, the individual effects of atmospheric and particle parameters, such as wind speed and particle density, are examined. Of the parameters examined, turbulent energy dissipation and aggregate fractal dimension (i.e., aggregate shape with lower values representing more irregular particles) were of substantial importance since both terms directly impact aggregate stability and, by extension, the breakup rate. Large-scale transport and deposition simulations in a dry atmosphere are also presented and discussed as a proof of concept.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Nuclear explosion monitoring network design considerations

Design of an efficient monitoring network requires information on the type and size of releases to be detected, the accuracy and reliability of the measuring equipment, and the desired network performance. This work provides a scientific basis for optimizing or minimizing networks of 133 Xe samplers to achieve a desired performance level for different levels of release. The approach of this work varies the density of sampling locations to find optimal location subsets, and to explore the properties of variations of those subsets – how crucial is a specific subset; are substitutions problematic? The choice of possible station locations is arbitrary but constrained to some extent by the location of islands, land masses, difficult topography (mountains, etc.) and the places where infrastructure exists to run and support a sampler. Performance is evaluated using hypothetical releases and atmospheric transport models that cover an entire year.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Examining the potential for detecting simultaneous noble gas and aerosol samples in the international monitoring system radionuclide network

The purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) is to establish a legally binding ban on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) is developing the International Monitoring System (IMS) that includes a global network of 80 stations to monitor for airborne radionuclides upon entry into force of the CTBT. All 80 radionuclide stations will monitor for particulate radionuclides and at least half of the stations will monitor for radioxenon. The airborne radionuclide monitoring is an important verification technology both for the detection of a radionuclide release and in the determination of whether the release event originates from a nuclear explosion as opposed to an industrial use of nuclear materials. Nuclear power plants and many medical isotope production facilities release radioxenon into the atmosphere. Low levels of a few particulate isotopes, such as iodine, may also be released. Detections of multiple isotopes are useful for screening the radionuclide samples for relevance to the Treaty. This paper examines the anticipated joint detections in the IMS of noble gas and particulate isotopes from underground nuclear explosions where breaches in the underground containment vents from low levels to up to 1% of the radionuclide inventory of the resulting fission products to the atmosphere. Detection probabilities are based on 844 simulated release events spaced out at 17 release locations and one year in time. Six different release (venting) scenarios, including two fractionated scenarios, were analyzed. When ranked by detection probability, 11 particulate isotopes and one noble gas isotope ( 133 Xe) appear in the top 20 isotopes for all six release scenarios. Using the 11 particulate isotopes and the one noble gas isotope, the IMS has nearly the same detection probability as when 45 particulate and 4 noble gas isotopes are used. Thus, a limited list of relevant radionuclides may be sufficient for treaty verification purposes. The probability that at least one particulate and at least one radioxenon isotope would be detected in the IMS from the release events ranged from 0.15 to 0.86 depending on the release scenario.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Impacts of future nuclear power generation on the international monitoring system

Many countries are considering nuclear power as a means of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and the IAEA (IAEA, 2022) has forecasted nuclear power growth rates up to 224% of the 2021 level by 2050. Nuclear power plants release trace quantities of radioxenon, an inert gas that is also monitored under international agreements as a signature of nuclear weapons tests. To better understand how nuclear energy growth (and resulting Xe emissions) could affect this global nonproliferation architecture, we modeled daily releases of radioxenon isotopes used for nuclear explosion detection in the International Monitoring System (IMS) that is part of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty: 131m Xe, 133 Xe, 133m Xe, and 135 Xe to examine the change in the number of radioxenon detections as compared to the 2021 detection levels. If a 40-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 82% for the low-power scenario to 195% for the high-power scenario, compared to the detections in 2021. If an 80-station IMS network is used, the detections of 133 Xe in 2050 would range from 83% of the 2021 detection rate for the low-power scenario to 209% for the high-power scenario. Essentially no detections of 131m Xe and 133m Xe are expected. The high growth scenario could lead to a six-fold increase in 135 Xe detections, but the total number of detections is still small (on the order of 1 detection per day in the entire network).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Comparison of source-location algorithms for atmospheric samplers

Numerous algorithms have been developed to determine the source characteristics for an atmospheric release, e.g., (Bieringer et al., 2017). This study compares three models that have been applied to the data collected by the International Monitoring System operated by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Preparatory Commission to estimate source event parameters. Each model uses a different approach to estimate the parameters. A deterministic model uses a possible source region (PSR) approach (Ringbom et al., 2014) that is based on the correlation between predicted and measured sample values. An unnamed model developed at Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (herein called BAYEST) uses a Bayesian formulation (Eslinger et al., 2019; Eslinger et al., 2020; Eslinger and Schrom, 2016). The FREAR model uses a different Bayesian formulation (De Meutter and Hoffman, 2020; De Meutter et al., 2021; Pieter De Meutter, 2021). The performance of the three source-location models is evaluated with 100 synthetic release cases for the single xenon isotope, 133 Xe. The release cases resulted in detections in a fictitious network with 120 noble gas samplers. All three source-location models use the same sampling data. The two Bayesian models yield more accurate location estimates than the deterministic PSR model, with FREAR having slightly better location performance than BAYEST. Samplers with collection periods of 3, 6, 8, 12, and 24-h were used. Results from BAYEST show that location accuracy improves with each reduction in sample collection length. The BAYEST model is slightly better for estimating the start time of the release. The PSR model has about the same spread in start times as the FREAR model, but the PSR results have a better average start time. The Bayesian source-location algorithms give more accurate results than the PSR approach, and provide release magnitude estimates, while the base PSR model does not estimate the release magnitude. This investigation demonstrates that a reasonably dense sampling grid will sometimes yield poor location and time estimates regardless of the model. The poor estimates generally coincide with cases where there is a much larger distance between the release point and the first detecting sampler than the average sampler spacing.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A statistical approach to screening isotopic signatures in monitoring for underground nuclear explosions

The ability to differentiate between atmospheric radionuclide signatures from underground nuclear explosions (UNEs) and signals from other sources, such as medical isotope-production facilities and nuclear reactors, can be critical to the detection and monitoring of unannounced, low-yield nuclear events. Signatures having anomalously high amplitudes, compared to background levels, remain the best indicator in screening for a UNE. However, isotopic composition can further validate a suspected UNE signature, but separation from any atmospheric background composition is first necessary. To date, evaluating the challenges of performing this separation has typically involved comparing an observed background with a highly idealized deterministic model of radioxenon signature production by a UNE that does not consider the influence of post-detonation chemical/physical processes in the detonation cavity or the subsequent gas transport mechanisms that can also affect the isotopic composition of the detected gas signature. In addition, purely deterministic models, as previously employed, overlook the uncertainty inherent in estimating critical parameters characterizing the UNE and its detonation environment. In this paper, we create detailed, multi-parameter models of radionuclide evolution using the widely accepted England and Rider post-detonation radionuclide decay-chain network coupled to detailed models simulating physical production and transport processes affecting the gas signature. Because these models are governed by uncertain parameters including barometric fluctuations, realistic ranges of variation for each of the parameters influencing isotopic composition are then defined. A Latin-Hypercube sampling approach is used to obtain a random distribution of isotopic production and gas transport results associated with a given value of each parameter. We apply these results to background histories of two stations, one providing 4-isotope background measurements and the other providing two-isotope measurements associated with the 2013 DPRK announced UNE.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Performance of a dynamic single bubbler in single and two-phase immiscible liquids

Ensuring nonproliferation and safeguards of special nuclear materials (SNM) is a critical aspect of advancing the nuclear fuel cycle. Traditional bubbler systems used to estimate liquid levels and densities in nuclear recycling processes have limitations, particularly in harsh environments where dip-tube corrosion and buildup necessitate frequent maintenance and recalibration. This study explores the Dynamic Single Bubbler (DSB) method, which utilizes a single dip-tube attached to a linear actuator to estimate liquid properties dynamically. This approach is extended to estimate liquid-liquid interfaces in immiscible liquids and employs a linear regression method to reduce uncertainties and improve accuracy. The DSB method achieved density estimate uncertainties of less than 0.5% and surface level estimate uncertainties typically under 0.5%, across various fluids including water, acetone, methanol, mineral oil, glycerol, and aqueous salt solutions. Results indicate that the DSB method provides accurate and robust estimates of liquid density and surface levels with minimal maintenance and without the need for calibration. Additionally, the method's applicability to immiscible liquids and various dip-tube geometries was demonstrated, showing promise for widespread use in nuclear and other industrial applications.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

Voltammetry measurements in lithium chloride-lithium oxide (LiCl–Li 2 O) salt: An evaluation of working electrode materials

Instrumentation to provide process monitoring (PM) and safeguards for the oxide reduction (OR) step in the electrochemical processing of used oxide nuclear fuel is necessary to ensure equipment is operated as declared. Cyclic voltammetry (CV) has been proposed for real-time monitoring of the operation of an OR process for safeguards purposes. In this study, different materials including 316 stainless steel (SS), tantalum (Ta), molybdenum (Mo), tungsten (W), platinum (Pt), and iridium (Ir) were evaluated as potential working electrode (WE) materials based on their chemical inertness, corrosion resistance, and sensitivity in detecting Li 2 O and other chloride salts in the OR electrolyte. Of the electrodes evaluated, 316 SS, Ir, and Pt all performed reasonably well in the LiCl-Li 2 O electrolyte. Here, stainless steel was operated in the cathodic potential and had reasonable corrosion resistance and is relatively inexpensive. Iridium could be operated in both the cathodic and anodic potentials and was the most corrosion resistant of those evaluated. Platinum is limited to the anodic potential range, had reasonable corrosion resistance, and was the most sensitive to Li 2 O concentrations in the salt. In the development of a stand-alone safeguards instrumentation, our recommendation is a CV sensor fitted with both Ir and Pt WEs. The results in this study may also be helpful for anode material selection in other electrometallurgy industries, such as molten salt electrolysis.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗