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At least 235 records · Page 13

COMPONENT DEGRADATION SUSCEPTIBILITIES AS THE BASES FOR MODELING REACTOR AGING RISK

The extension of nuclear power plant operating licenses beyond 60 years in the United States will be necessary if we are to meet national energy needs while addressing the issues of carbon and climate. Characterizing the operating risks associated with aging reactors is problematic because the principal tool for risk-informed decision-making, Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA), is not ideally-suited to addressing aging systems. The components most likely to drive risk in an aging reactor - the passives - receive limited treatment in PRA, and furthermore, standard PRA methods are based on the assumption of stationary failure rates: a condition unlikely to be met in an aging system. A critical barrier to modeling passives aging on the wide scale required for a PRA is that there is seldom sufficient field data to populate parametric failure models, and nor is there the availability of practical physics models to predict out-year component reliability. The methodology described here circumvents some of these data and modeling needs by using materials degradation metrics, integrated with conventional PRA models, to produce risk importance measures for specific aging mechanisms and component types. We suggest that these measures have multiple applications, from the risk-screening of components to the prioritization of materials research.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Markov Decision Processes for Intelligent, Risk-Informed Asset-Management Decision-Making

Advanced nuclear reactors are a promising option for aiding the world in achieving its net-zero carbon emission goals, however, there are significant challenges to attaining and maintaining economic competitiveness with other sources of electricity. To improve the economic competitiveness of advanced reactor designs, a project was initiated to explore the use of Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) to guide asset-management decision-making during advanced reactor operation. MDPs are a powerful tool for optimizing decision-making in complex environments and their application to advanced reactors can aid in planning maintenance and repair activities to minimize downtime and maximize generation. The described approach expands on previous work regarding the use of MDPs for operational decision-making through the direct incorporation of real-time plant information. The integral MDP analysis includes information from online component diagnostic tools and the plant’s real-time generation risk assessment (GRA) and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which evaluate plant risk from both an economic and safety perspective. The result is an asset-management optimization framework that is based on real-time data regarding plant component status and the current best-estimate of plant risk. The paper presents an overview of the theoretical framework to incorporate the different information pathways into an integral MDP analysis, along with example analyses.

Grabaskas, David↗

Dynamic probabilistic risk assessment for electric grid cybersecurity

Electric grid cybersecurity risk has become a significant concern of industries and governments. This paper proposes a dynamic probabilistic risk assessment method for electric grid cybersecurity risk analysis. The proposed method helps reduce the reliance on expert judgment, capture a broad range of components and system dynamics, and model the interactions between various contributing entities (e.g., attacker, operator). In addition, the scenarios with multiple events, such as the occurrence of both cyberattacks and failures of physical components, the occurrence of both cyberattacks and operators’ (in)correct reactions, are considered and analyzed. Further, for each cyberattack scenario, Monte Carlo simulations are used to obtain possible sequences of the system's evolution under study and then derive risk estimates. As an application of the proposed method, the risk assessment method serves as the basis of risk-informed defense resource allocation to improve electric grid cybersecurity. The proposed method is verified using the IEEE 14-bus system by evaluating different security resource allocations for selected cyberattack scenarios.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

And the Humans Save the Day or Maybe They Ruin It: The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflights, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The purpose of this paper focuses on how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA). Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lower the risk.

DeMott, Diana↗

And the Human Saves the Day or Maybe They Ruin It, The Importance of Humans in the Loop

Flying a mission in space requires a massive commitment of resources, and without the talent and commitment of the people involved in this effort we would never leave the atmosphere of Earth as safely as we have. When we use the phrase "humans in the loop", it could apply to almost any endeavor since everything starts with humans developing a concept, completing the design process, building or implementing a product and using the product to achieve a goal or purpose. Narrowing the focus to spaceflight, there are a variety of individuals involved throughout the preparations for flight and the flight itself. All of the humans involved add value and support for program success. The paper discusses the concepts of human involvement in technological programs, how a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) accounts for the human in the loop for potential missions using a technique called Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) and the tradeoffs between having a human in the loop or not. Human actions can increase or decrease the overall risk via initiating events or mitigating them, thus removing the human from the loop doesn't always lowers the risk.

DeMott, Diana L.↗

The Publication and Endorsement of the ASME/ANS Probabilistic Risk Assessment Standard for Advanced Non-Light Water Reactor Nuclear Power Plants

Due to growing interest in non-light water reactor (NLWR) concepts, the predecessor to the American Nuclear Society (ANS)/American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Joint Committee on Nuclear Risk Management (JCNRM) initiated development of a NLWR probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) standard in 2006. The developed standard, released for trial use in 2013, was the first integral PRA standard created by the JCNRM, containing requirements ranging from the development of initiating events to the analysis of offsite radiological consequence. Based on feedback from pilot applications of the trial standard, a revised version of the standard was developed and balloted in 2020, with unanimous passage by the JCNRM and formal publication as an American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard in 2021. The paper provides an overview of the standard and its development process. In addition, the paper reviews the latest status of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission endorsement efforts through Regulatory Guide 1.247.

Fleming, K.↗

ROBUSTNESS OF DECISION INSIGHTS UNDER ALTERNATIVE ALEATORY/EPISTEMIC UNCERTAINTY CLASSIFICATIONS

The Risk-Informed Safety Margin Characterization (RISMC) pathway is a set of activities defined under the U.S. Department of Energy Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program. The overarching objective of RISMC is to support plant life-extension decision-making by providing a state-of-knowledge characterization of safety margins in key systems, structures, and components (SSCs). A key technical challenge is to establish the conceptual and technical feasibility of analyzing safety margin in a risk-informed way, which, unlike conventionally defined deterministic margin analysis, would be founded on probabilistic characterizations of SSC performance. Evaluation of probabilistic safety margins will in general entail the uncertainty characterization both of the prospective challenge to the performance of an SSC ("load") and of its "capacity" to withstand that challenge. The RISMC framework contrasts sharply with the traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) structure in that the underlying models are not inherently aleatory. Rather, they are largely deterministic physical/engineering models with ambiguities about the appropriate uncertainty classification of many model parameters. The current analysis demonstrates that if the distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainties is to be preserved in a RISMC-like modeling environment, then it is unlikely that analysis insights supporting decision-making will in general be robust under recategorization of input uncertainties. If it is believed there is a true conceptual distinction between epistemic and aleatory uncertainty (as opposed to the distinction being primarily a legacy of the PRA paradigm) then a consistent and defensible basis must be established by which to categorize input uncertainties.

probabilistic risk assessment↗

External Events Analysis for LWRS/RISMC Project: Methodology Development and Early Demonstration

The ultimate scope of Industrial Application no.2 (IA) of the LWRS/RISMC project is a realistic simulation of natural external hazards that impose threat to a NPP. This scope requires the development of a methodology and of a qualified set of tools able to perform advanced risk-informed safety analysis. In particular the methodology should be able to combine results from seismic, flooding and thermal-hydraulic (TH) deterministic calculations with dynamic PRA. A so-called Risk Informed Margin Management (RIMM) approach is being used to represent meaningful (i.e., realistic facility representation and simulation) event scenarios and consequences by linking probabilistic simulations to external events physics. Calculations performed so far demonstrated the capabilities of the proposed methodology in analyzing multi-hazards generated by External Events. The sample application described in this paper allowed identifying the main issues (code interfaces, computational and human resources needed, simplifications) connected to such kind of advanced analysis. The next steps will be the risk-informed earthquakes and flooding analysis of a system of a generic PWR.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Advanced SAPHIRE 8 Modeling Methods for Probabilistic Risk Assessment via the Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE) Software P-202

1.1. Overview of the Advanced SAPHIRE Material The Advanced SAPHIRE course material is intended to both (1) provide guidance for learning advanced SAPHIRE features during the class and (2) become a stand-alone reference document after finishing the class. Thus, the format for the class material is a combination of the traditional “overhead-type” of presentation information with a structured, reference-type document. Major topics that are covered in the Advanced SAPHIRE class include: Advanced data base concepts such as Model Type (e.g., random, seismic, fire, flood). Definition of house events and how they are used on a sequence-by-sequence basis to manipulate individual fault tree logic using sequence flag sets or fault tree flag sets. ? Basic event templates, compound basic event equation editors, and human error worksheets. A rule-based event tree top event substitution feature (called the Link Event Tree Rule Editor) which allows for top event substitutions. A rule-based cut set post-processing feature (called the Recovery Rules) which allows cut set manipulation. Cut set analysis based upon rule-based end state categories (called End State Analysis). Cut set generation options for both fault trees and event tree sequences. The large event tree methodology and how SAPHIRE can be used to generate sequence cut sets for this method. The transfer of data between SAPHIRE data bases and between other PRA codes (MAR-D).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

INCORPORATING DYNAMIC 3D SIMULATION INTO PRA

Through continued advancement in computational resources, development that was previously done by trial and error production is now performed through computer simulation. These virtual physical representations have the potential to provide accurate and valid modeling results and are being used in many different technical fields. Risk assessment now has the opportunity to use 3D simulation to improve analysis results and insights, especially for external event analysis. By using simulations, the modeler only has to determine the likelihood of an event without having to also predict the results of that event. The 3D simulation automatically determines not only the outcome of the event, but when those failures occur. How can we effectively incorporate 3D simulation into traditional PRA? Most PRA plant modeling is made up of components with different failure modes, probabilities, and rates. Typically, these components are grouped into various systems and then are modeled together (in different combinations) as a “system” with logic structures to form fault trees. Applicable fault trees are combined through scenarios, typically represented by event tree models. Though this method gives us failure results for a given model, it has limitations when it comes to time-based dependencies or dependencies that are coupled to physical processes which may themselves be space- or time-dependent. Since, failures from a 3D simulation are naturally time related, they should be used in that manner. In our simulation approach, traditional static models are converted into an equivalent state diagram representation with start states, probabilistic driven movements between states and terminal states. As the state model is run repeatedly, it converges to the same results as the PRA model in cases where time-related factors are not important. In cases where timing considerations are important (e.g., when events are dependent upon each other), then the simulation approach will typically provide superior results and insights. We also couple the state model with the dynamic 3D simulation analysis representing events (such as flooding) to determine which (if any) components fail. Not only does the simulation take into account any failed items from the state model, but any failures caused by the simulation are incorporated back into the state model and factored into the overall results. Using this method we incorporate accurate 3D simulation results, eliminate static-based PRA issues, and have time ordered failure information.

3D Simulation↗

Methodology for the Incorporation of Passive Component Aging Modeling into the RAVEN/ RELAP-7 Environment

Passive system, structure and components (SSCs) will degrade over their operation life and this degradation may cause to reduction in the safety margins of a nuclear power plant. In traditional probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) using the event-tree/fault-tree methodology, passive SSC failure rates are generally based on generic plant failure data and the true state of a specific plant is not reflected realistically. To address aging effects of passive SSCs in the traditional PRA methodology [1] does consider physics based models that account for the operating conditions in the plant, however, [1] does not include effects of surveillance/inspection. This paper represents an overall methodology for the incorporation of aging modeling of passive components into the RAVEN/RELAP-7 environment which provides a framework for performing dynamic PRA. Dynamic PRA allows consideration of both epistemic and aleatory uncertainties (including those associated with maintenance activities) in a consistent phenomenological and probabilistic framework and is often needed when there is complex process/hardware/software/firmware/ human interaction [2]. Dynamic PRA has gained attention recently due to difficulties in the traditional PRA modeling of aging effects of passive components using physics based models and also in the modeling of digital instrumentation and control systems. RAVEN (Reactor Analysis and Virtual control Environment) [3] is a software package under development at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL) as an online control logic driver and post-processing tool. It is coupled to the plant transient code RELAP-7 (Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program) also currently under development at INL [3], as well as RELAP 5 [4]. The overall methodology aims to: • Address multiple aging mechanisms involving large number of components in a computational feasible manner where sequencing of events is conditioned on the physical conditions predicted in a simulation environment such as RELAP-7. • Identify the risk-significant passive components, their failure modes and anticipated rates of degradation • Incorporate surveillance and maintenance activities and their effects into the plant state and into component aging progress. • Asses aging affects in a dynamic simulation environment 1. C. L. SMITH, V. N. SHAH, T. KAO, G. APOSTOLAKIS, “Incorporating Ageing Effects into Probabilistic Risk Assessment –A Feasibility Study Utilizing Reliability Physics Models,” NUREG/CR-5632, USNRC, (2001). 2. T. ALDEMIR, “A Survey of Dynamic Methodologies for Probabilistic Safety Assessment of Nuclear Power Plants, Annals of Nuclear Energy, 52, 113-124, (2013). 3. C. RABITI, A. ALFONSI, J. COGLIATI, D. MANDELLI and R. KINOSHITA “Reactor Analysis and Virtual Control Environment (RAVEN) FY12 Report,” INL/EXT-12-27351, (2012). 4. D. ANDERS et.al, "RELAP-7 Level 2 Milestone Report: Demonstration of a Steady State Single Phase PWR Simulation with RELAP-7," INL/EXT-12-25924, (2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Probabilistic Risk Assessment of Flexible Power Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant

Nuclear power plants (NPPs) are becoming cost prohibitive to operate. This is due to historically low natural gas prices and wind and solar prices often being less than the marginal cost of operating baseload coal and NPPs, which sometimes forces NPPs to pay for the electricity they create. Thus, the feasibility of using part of the heat from an NPP to create other commodities such as hydrogen is being evaluated; operating in this way is called flexible power operation (FPO). To change the NPP design and operation, a license review must happen. Part of the review is the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) which proves the safety of the design and operation by identifying sequences of events that result in plant failure and estimating their likelihood of occurrence. A Level 1 PRA model that evaluates the risk of removing heat from the secondary side of NPP was created. The model was developed using Systems Analysis Program for Hands-On Integrated Reliability Evaluations (SAPHIRE 8) software to calculate core damage frequency (CDF). It is a fault tree that represents the possible pathways that could lead to a loss of steam inventory in the secondary loop. A loss of steam inventory can induce steam generator tube rupture or other events that activates response systems to avoid core damage. This is the main concern for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the group in the United States that licenses NPPs. This model will calculate a total CDF of any of these pathways occurring which will be compared to the baseline CDF in a generic NPP PRA for licensing support.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Evaluation of the Benefits of ATF, FLEX, and Passive Cooling System for an Enhanced Resilient PWR Model

This report, along with report INL/EXT-19-53556, documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during the fiscal year (FY) 2019 for the DOE Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk-Informed System Analysis (RISA) Pathway, Enhanced Resilient Plant (ERP) Systems research. This report includes additional accident scenarios for risk-informed ATF analysis, and examines the risk impacts of FLEX and passive cooling system on nuclear power plants (NPPs) from additional perspectives. The same analysis process, risk analysis approaches, and analysis tools as in FY 2018 were used for near-term ATF cladding (i.e., Iron-Chromium-Aluminum [FeCrAl] cladding and Chromium [Cr]-coated cladding) designs under the small break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA) scenarios, two types of general transient scenarios (locked rotor and turbine trip), and main steam line break (MSLB) scenarios. Benchmark calculations for ATF analysis using RELAP5-3D and MELCOR are also presented. In addition, based on the generic probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model, the risk impacts of FLEX and the dynamic natural convection (DNC) system on NPPs are evaluated through a risk-informed decision-making process, i.e., significance determination process (SDP).

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

A Reliable Earth Return System for Safe Recovery of Mars Samples

The objective of a Mars sample return mission is to bring selected Mars surface materials to Earth. Numerous approaches for the Earth-return segment have been analyzed including propulsive or aerocapture return to low-Earth orbit followed by Space Shuttle rendezvous and direct entry. Of these approaches, ballistic entry of a small capsule terminating in a ground landing has been shown to be the lowest risk strategy. Over the past two years, significant work has been performed towards development of a robust direct entry vehicle for Mars sample return. In June 1999, the NASA Planetary Protection Officer provided initial guidance to the former Mars Sample Return Project. The sample return phase of the mission was assigned a restricted Earth return planetary protection classification. The draft mission requirement states that the total mean probability of release of unsterilized Mars material into the Earth;s biosphere must be less than 1.0E-06 (1 in a million). This strict requirement drives the approach and design of the Earth return system. To meet this requirement, selection of the Earth return strategy and development of the Earth return system must be guided by risk, not performance, based decisions. An initial Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed to address the direct entry Earth return system containment assurance reliability and to identify high-risk elements of this system. The results of this PRA identified risk elements that include thermal protection system performance during entry, spin-eject orientation and aerodynamic stability during entry, structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and tracking/recovery of this system. This initial probabilistic risk quantification demonstrates that, with the proper development program, a prototypical direct entry design can satisfy the containment assurance reliability requirement. Through the current Mars Sample Return Advanced Technology Development effort, an extensive design, analysis, and test program is presently proceeding with the aim of reducing the containment assurance risk of this system. This technology development effort, guided by a continuing PRA, focuses on key risk areas of a direct entry Earth return system including: the thermal protection system, impact dynamics, structural performance, aerodynamic stability, and ground recovery. This development program will culminate in a system validation flight test, 1-2 years prior to launch of the flight system. This flight test would include the launch, entry, and recovery of a full-scale Earth return system, as a scientific validation of the key risk elements to verify nominal design performance. The results of the initial PRA suggested several dominant failure sequences that can be validated in a flight test. These include: demonstrating the thermal protection system reliability and performance during entry, demonstrating the spin-eject orientation and aero-dynamic stability during entry, demonstrating the structural integrity under atmospheric deceleration and impact loads, and demonstrating tracking and recovery of the Earth return system. This single test will directly address over 50% of the total containment assurance risk elements. This presentation will begin by presenting the relative risk of various Earth return strategies. The results of the initial probabilistic risk assessment will be presented followed by a discussion of the development accomplishments and plans for demonstration of a highly reliable direct entry Earth return system.

Braun, R.↗

CHP-PRA Proof-of-Concept [Simulation] Sensitivity Assessment

An effort is underway to establish a Crew Health and Performance system (CHP) tradespace tool using a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) modeling and simulation system. The goal of the CHP-PRA effort is to provide a means of quantifying the integrated influence of CHP functions and capabilities on risk outcome metrics associated with health, performance, and long-term health. These metrics can then be used to establish potential risk-based trades on CHP system designed functionality and capabilities. Previously, our team demonstrated a proof-of-concept PRA approach that estimated the integrated influence of exercise countermeasures on 8 human system risks (Figure 1a) with outcomes associated with health and medical risk metrics. We reported that the change in the integrated relative health risk was small (Figure 1b) and that the small change in overall risk resulted from compounding and competing contribution levels of the individual risks. This interesting observation illustrates the emergent complexity of even straightforward representations of the human health and performance risk space and the ability of PRA models to capture this balance of global risk concerns. A key question that is not addressed in the initial analysis is “even though the global risk is relatively nominal, do any of the local risks become unacceptable?” In essence, we seek to determine what relative change in the human system risks are contributing to the relatively muted sensitivity of the proof-of-concept model combined risk assessments. Evaluations at the component risk level should elucidate if any individual risk reaches a high level that is subsequentially balanced by reductions in other areas. To further understand the relative changes in the component risks in the proof-of-concept model, and to elucidate how future refinements can be targeted, a means of establishing the contributions of the robustness of the proof-of-concept approach will be demonstrated.

astronaut health↗

Ares I-X First Flight Loss of Vehicle Probability Analysis

As part of the Constellation (Cx) Program development effort, several test flights were planned to prove concepts and operational capabilities of the new vehicles being developed. The first test, involving the Eastern Test Range, is the Ares I-X launched in 2009. As part of this test, the risk to the general public was addressed to ensure it is within Air Force requirements. This paper describes the methodology used to develop first flight estimates of overall loss of vehicle (LOV) failure probability, specifically for the Ares I-X. The method described in this report starts with the Air Force s generic failure probability estimate for first flight and adjusts the value based on the complexity of the vehicle as compared to the complexity of a generic vehicle. The results estimate a 1 in 9 probability of failure. The paper also describes traditional PRA methods used in this assessment, which were then combined with the updated first flight risk methodology to generate inputs required by the malfunction turn analysis to support estimate of casualty (Ec) calculations as part of the Final Flight Data Package (FFDP) delivered to the Eastern Range for Final Flight Plan Approval.

Bigler, Mark A.↗

Review of Quantitative Software Reliability Methods

The current U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing process for digital systems rests on deterministic engineering criteria. In its 1995 probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) policy statement, the Commission encouraged the use of PRA technology in all regulatory matters to the extent supported by the state-of-the-art in PRA methods and data. Although many activities have been completed in the area of risk-informed regulation, the risk-informed analysis process for digital systems has not yet been satisfactorily developed. Since digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems are expected to play an increasingly important role in nuclear power plant (NPP) safety, the NRC established a digital system research plan that defines a coherent set of research programs to support its regulatory needs. One of the research programs included in the NRC's digital system research plan addresses risk assessment methods and data for digital systems. Digital I&C systems have some unique characteristics, such as using software, and may have different failure causes and/or modes than analog I&C systems; hence, their incorporation into NPP PRAs entails special challenges. The objective of the NRC's digital system risk research is to identify and develop methods, analytical tools, and regulatory guidance for (1) including models of digital systems into NPP PRAs, and (2) using information on the risks of digital systems to support the NRC's risk-informed licensing and oversight activities. For several years, Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) has worked on NRC projects to investigate methods and tools for the probabilistic modeling of digital systems, as documented mainly in NUREG/CR-6962 and NUREG/CR-6997. However, the scope of this research principally focused on hardware failures, with limited reviews of software failure experience and software reliability methods. NRC also sponsored research at the Ohio State University investigating the modeling of digital systems using dynamic PRA methods. These efforts, documented in NUREG/CR-6901, NUREG/CR-6942, and NUREG/CR-6985, included a functional representation of the system's software but did not explicitly address failure modes caused by software defects or by inadequate design requirements. An important identified research need is to establish a commonly accepted basis for incorporating the behavior of software into digital I&C system reliability models for use in PRAs. To address this need, BNL is exploring the inclusion of software failures into the reliability models of digital I&C systems, such that their contribution to the risk of the associated NPP can be assessed.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗