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DOE OSTI2023

Q-BEEP: Quantum Bayesian Error Mitigation Employing Poisson Modeling over the Hamming Spectrum

Quantum computing technology has grown rapidly in recent years, with new technologies being explored, error rates being reduced, and quantum processor’s qubit capacity growing. However, near-term quantum algorithms are still unable to be induced without compounding consequential levels of noise, leading to non-trivial erroneous results. Quantum Error Correction (in-situ error mitigation) and Quantum Error Mitigation (post-induction error mitigation) are promising fields of research within the quantum algorithm scene, aiming to alleviate quantum errors, increasing the overall fidelity and hence the overall quality of circuit induction. Earlier this year, a pioneering work, namely HAMMER, published in ASPLOS-22 demonstrated the existence of a latent structure regarding post-circuit induction errors when mapping to the Hamming spectrum. However, they intuitively assumed that errors occur in local clusters, and that at higher average Hamming distances this structure falls away. In this work, we show that such a correlation structure is not only local but extends certain non-local clustering patterns which can be precisely described by a Poisson distribution model taking the input circuit, the device run time status (i.e., calibration statistics) and qubit topology into consideration. Using this quantum error characterizing model, we developed an iterative algorithm over the generated Bayesian network state-graph for post-induction error mitigation. Thanks to more precise modeling of the error distribution latent structure and the new iterative method, our Q-Beep approach provides state of the art performance and can boost circuit execution fidelity by up to 234.6% on Bernstein-Vazirani circuits and on average 71.0% on QAOA solution quality, using 16 practical IBMQ quantum processors. For other benchmarks such as those in QASMBench, the fidelity improvement is up to 17.8%. Q-Beep is a light-weight post-processing technique that can be performed offline and remotely, making it a useful tool for quantum vendors to integrate and provide more reliable circuit induction results.

Stein, Samuel A.↗

DOE OSTI2015

Fiscal Year 2013 Trails Management Program Mitigation Action Plan Annual Report, October 2013

This Trails Management Program Mitigation Action Plan Annual Report (Trails MAPAR) has been prepared for the Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) as part of implementing the 2003 Final Environmental Assessment for the Proposed Los Alamos National Laboratory Trails Management Program (DOE 2003). The Trails Mitigation Action Plan (MAP) is now a part of the Site-Wide Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of Los Alamos National Laboratory (DOE/EIS 0380) Mitigation Action Plan (2008 SWEIS MAP) (DOE 2008). The MAP provides guidance for the continued implementation of the Trails Management Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and integration of future mitigation actions into the 2008 SWEIS MAP to decrease impacts associated with recreational trails use at LANL. This eighth MAPAR includes a summary of Trails Management Program activities and actions during Fiscal Year (FY) 2013, from October 2012 through September 2013.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2016

Induced seismicity and carbon storage: Risk assessment and mitigation strategies

Geologic carbon storage (GCS) is widely recognized as an important strategy to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions. Like all technologies, however, sequestration projects create a number of potential environmental and safety hazards that must be addressed. These include earthquakes—from microseismicity to large, damaging events—that can be triggered by altering pore-pressure conditions in the subsurface. To date, measured seismicity due to CO 2 injection has been limited to a few modest events, but the hazard exists and must be considered. There are important similarities between CO 2 injection and fluid injection from other applications that have induced significant events—e.g. geothermal systems, waste-fluid injection, hydrocarbon extraction, and others. There are also important distinctions among these technologies that should be considered in a discussion of seismic hazard. This report focuses on strategies for assessing and mitigating risk during each phase of a CO 2 storage project. Four key risks related to fault reactivation and induced seismicity were considered. Induced slip on faults could potentially lead to: (1) infrastructure damage, (2) a public nuisance, (3) brine-contaminated drinking water, and (4) CO 2 -contaminated drinking water. These scenarios lead to different types of damage—to property, to drinking water quality, or to the public welfare. Given these four risks, this report focuses on strategies for assessing (and altering) their likelihoods of occurrence and the damage that may result. This report begins with an overview of the basic physical mechanisms behind induced seismicity. This science basis—and its gaps—is crucial because it forms the foundation for risk assessment and mitigation. Available techniques for characterizing and monitoring seismic behavior are also described. Again, this technical basis—and its limitations—must be factored into the risk assessment and mitigation approach. A phased approach to risk management is then introduced. The basic goal of the phased approach is to constantly adapt site operations to current conditions and available characterization data. The remainder of the report then focuses in detail on different components of the monitoring, risk assessment, and mitigation strategies. Issues in current seismic risk assessment methods that must be modified to address induce seismicity are highlighted. The report then concludes with several specific recommendations for operators and regulatory authorities to consider when selecting, permitting, and operating a storage project.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2018

Simulation Center for Runaway Electron Avoidance and Mitigation. Final report

We stand in preparation for ITER with the revelation of a critical need for predictive modeling of runaway electron avoidance and mitigation. It is now widely accepted that a disruption during high current operation could generate multi-MeV runaway electrons which damage the device severely, and threaten the viability of experimental operations. The risk to the mission of ITER is so great, that this predictive capability must be developed via theory and simulation in advance of experimental operations with a thorough validation against present day experiments. The United States is responsible for the design and implementation of the disruption mitigation system on ITER, and in July 2016 the Simulation Center for Runaway Electron Avoidance and Mitigation (SCREAM) was launched by the Department of Energy (DOE), in a joint Fusion Energy Sciences (FES) and Advanced Scientific Computing Research (ASCR) collaboration, to address this need. It is now critical for the U.S. fusion program to continue support for this dedicated center that is establishing the qualitative and quantitative bases for safe operational scenarios and viable mitigation techniques.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

DOE OSTI2023

In-Situ Applied Coatings for Mitigating Gas Hydrate Deposition in Deepwater Operations (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The Project objectives of this work were focused on the need to develop, investigate, and validate for field and commercial deployment robust pipeline surface treatments to prevent / minimize hydrate and other flow assurance solids deposition in subsea oil flowlines. A robust pipeline treatment that can prevent hydrate and wax/asphaltene adhesion/deposition will be a major fundamental breakthrough in hydrate and flow assurance science and engineering, and to critical Deepwater field operations. The project addressed the current major outstanding issue of mitigating gas hydrate and other solids deposition in different pipeline conditions, a major outstanding issue that has not been solved to-date, despite previous attempts/studies. The major goal of this project was to develop and investigate for deployment robust pipeline coatings to mitigate gas hydrate deposition in Deepwater oil flowlines, which will be critical in offshore leak and spill prevention. As oil and gas production wells mature, the water content and oil composition can change and increase the risk of gas hydrate, wax, and asphaltene deposition and blockages in flowlines, with the cost of complete inhibition becoming prohibitive. The ability to mitigate flow assurance risks in maturing flowlines can extend the life of the field, significantly reduce operational costs from inhibitor injection and prevent potential safety hazards to personnel and equipment and can prevent potential environmental hazards leading to catastrophic hydrocarbon emissions. This research allows for a novel, cost-effective method of mitigating gas hydrate and other pipeline solids deposition/blockages in flowlines, extending the life of the field while being minimally disruptive to normal flowline operation. The omniphobic surface treatment developed in this work can significantly improve the economics of energy transport by providing flow assurance and limiting catastrophic blowouts.

02 PETROLEUM↗

DOE OSTI2024

Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at International Nuclear Power Plant

With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs is increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed the “Insider Threat Mitigation Program: Facility Implementation Handbook” to assist organizations to be better positioned to minimize the risks posed by malicious insiders. The handbook identified eight elements that contribute to the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs. This report outlines the development of a capability building progression of an insider threat mitigation program at international nuclear power plants. This information can be stand-alone or be accompanied by a technical exchange with subject matter experts to support development and implementation of programs with interested international partners.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of the foundation of building 25-3113/3113a, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish the foundation of Building 25-3113/3113A and the adjoining test pad at Test Cell A in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). The foundation of Building 25-3113/3113A (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B2443) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B2443↗

DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-3124,equipment testing laboratory, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-3124 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-3124 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19009) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19009↗

DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-3153, fire station, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-3153 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-3153 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19004) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19004↗

DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-4314, radiation services, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-4314 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-4314 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19016) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19016↗

DOE OSTI2025

Mitigation for the demolition of building 25-4838, vehicle maintenance shop, area 25, Nevada national security site, NYE county, Nevada

The purpose of this letter report is to document the mitigation of adverse effects of a proposed undertaking that would demolish Building 25-4838 in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) in compliance with the terms of the 2024 Programmatic Agreement among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (NNSS PA). Building 25-4838 (State Historic Preservation Office [SHPO] Resource # B19019) is a contributing element to the Nuclear Rocket Development Station (NRDS) Historic District (SHPO Resource # D424), which has been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP) under Criteria A, B, C, and D (Reno et al. 2023). The proposed demolition constitutes an adverse effect. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) consulted with the SHPO on an adverse effect finding for the undertaking and notified the SHPO of its intent to use the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA on December 11, 2024 (Julian to Reed). The SHPO concurred on December 30, 2024 (Reed to Julian). Therefore, NNSA/NFO has prepared mitigation pursuant to the standard mitigation in the NNSS PA Appendix D.I.A for contributing elements to recorded, NRHP-eligible districts.

#B19019↗

DOE OSTI2025

Improving the efficiency of learning-based error mitigation

Error mitigation will play an important role in practical applications of near-term noisy quantum computers. Current error mitigation methods typically concentrate on correction quality at the expense of frugality (as measured by the number of additional calls to quantum hardware). To fill the need for highly accurate, yet inexpensive techniques, we introduce an error mitigation scheme that builds on Clifford data regression (CDR). The scheme improves the frugality by carefully choosing the training data and exploiting the symmetries of the problem. We test our approach by correcting long range correlators of the ground state of XY Hamiltonian on IBM Toronto quantum computer. We find that our method is an order of magnitude cheaper while maintaining the same accuracy as the original CDR approach. The efficiency gain enables us to obtain a factor of 10 improvement on the unmitigated results with the total budget as small as 2 ⋅ 10 5 shots. Furthermore, we demonstrate orders of magnitude improvements in frugality for mitigation of energy of the LiH ground state simulated with IBM's Ourense-derived noise model.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2025

Peening Techniques for Mitigating Chlorine-Induced Stress Corrosion Cracking of Dry Storage Canisters for Nuclear Applications

Fusion-welded austenitic stainless steel (ASS) was predominantly employed to manufacture dry storage canisters (DSCs) for the storage applications of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). However, the ASS weld joints are prone to chloride-induced stress corrosion cracking (CISCC), a critical safety issue in the nuclear industry. DSCs were exposed to a chloride-rich environment during storage, creating CISCC precursors. The CISCC failure leads to nuclear radiation leakage. Therefore, there is a critical need to enhance the CISCC resistance of DSC weld joints using promising repair techniques. This review article encapsulates the current state-of-the-art of peening techniques for mitigating the CISCC in DSCs. More specifically, conventional shot peening (CSP), ultrasonic impact peening (UIP), and laser shock peening (LSP) were elucidated with a focus on CISCC mitigation. The underlying mechanism of CISCC mitigation in each process was summarized. Finally, this review provides recent advances in surface modification techniques, repair techniques, and developments in welding techniques for CISCC mitigation in DSCs.

Chemistry↗

DOE OSTI2025

Evaluating Short-warning Mitigation via Intentional Robust Disruption of a Hypothetical Impact of Asteroid 2023 NT1

We investigate various short-warning mitigation scenarios via fragmentation for a hypothetical impact of asteroid 2023 NT1, a near-Earth object (NEO) that was discovered on 2023 July 15, two days after its closest approach to Earth on July 13. The asteroid passed by Earth within ∼0.25 lunar distances, with a closest approach of ∼1 × 10 5 km and a velocity of 11.27 km s −1 . Its size remains largely uncertain, with an estimated diameter range of 26–58 m and a most probable estimate of 34 m (JPL Sentry, 2023 September 15; weighted by the NEO size frequency distribution). If 2023 NT1 had collided with Earth, it could have caused significant local damage. Assuming a spherical asteroid with a diameter of 34 m, uniform density of 2.6 g cm −3 , and impact velocity of 15.59 km s −1 , a collision would have yielded an estimated impact energy of ∼1.5 Mt, approximately 3 times the energy of the Chelyabinsk airburst in 2013. We analyze the effectiveness of mitigation via intentional robust disruption for objects similar to 2023 NT1. We utilize Pulverize It (PI), a NASA Innovative Advanced Concepts study of planetary defense via fragmentation, to model potential mitigation scenarios through simulations of hypervelocity asteroid disruption and atmospheric ground effects in the case of a terminal defense mode. Simulations suggest that PI is an effective multimodal approach for planetary defense that can operate in extremely short interdiction modes, in addition to long interdiction timescales with extended warning. Our simulations support the proposition that threats like 2023 NT1 can be effectively mitigated with intercepts of 1 day (or less) prior to impact, yielding minimal to no ground damage.

Asteroids↗

NASA NTRS2004

Identifying, Assessing, and Mitigating Risk of Single-Point Inspections on the Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor

In the production of each Space Shuttle Reusable Solid Rocket Motor (RSRM), over 100,000 inspections are performed. ATK Thiokol Inc. reviewed these inspections to ensure a robust inspection system is maintained. The principal effort within this endeavor was the systematic identification and evaluation of inspections considered to be single-point. Single-point inspections are those accomplished on components, materials, and tooling by only one person, involving no other check. The purpose was to more accurately characterize risk and ultimately address and/or mitigate risk associated with single-point inspections. After the initial review of all inspections and identification/assessment of single-point inspections, review teams applied risk prioritization methodology similar to that used in a Process Failure Modes Effects Analysis to derive a Risk Prioritization Number for each single-point inspection. After the prioritization of risk, all single-point inspection points determined to have significant risk were provided either with risk-mitigating actions or rationale for acceptance. This effort gave confidence to the RSRM program that the correct inspections are being accomplished, that there is appropriate justification for those that remain as single-point inspections, and that risk mitigation was applied to further reduce risk of higher risk single-point inspections. This paper examines the process, results, and lessons learned in identifying, assessing, and mitigating risk associated with single-point inspections accomplished in the production of the Space Shuttle RSRM.

Greenhalgh, Phillip O.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Near Earth Object (NEO) Mitigation Options Using Exploration Technologies

This work documents the advancements in MSFC threat modeling and mitigation technology research completed since our last major publication in this field. Most of the work enclosed here are refinements of our work documented in NASA TP-2004-213089. Very long development times from start of funding (10-20 years) can be expected for any mitigation system which suggests that delaying consideration of mitigation technologies could leave the Earth in an unprotected state for a significant period of time. Fortunately there is the potential for strong synergy between architecture requirements for some threat mitigators and crewed deep space exploration. Thus planetary defense has the potential to be integrated into the current U.S. space exploration effort. The number of possible options available for protection against the NEO threat was too numerous for them to all be addressed within the study; instead, a representative selection were modeled and evaluated. A summary of the major lessons learned during this study is presented, as are recommendations for future work.

Arnold William↗

NASA NTRS2006

Pilot Navigation Errors on the Airport Surface: Identifying Contributing Factors and Mitigating Solutions

A taxonomy of navigation errors (pilot deviations) during taxi operations was developed that defines 3 classes of errors: planning, decision, and execution errors. This taxonomy was applied to error data from 2 full-mission simulation studies that included trials that replicated current-day operations and trials with advanced cockpit technologies including datalink, electronic moving maps (EMM), and head-up displays (HUDs). Pilots committed navigation errors on 17% of current-day operations trials (in low-visibility and night), distributed roughly equally across the 3 error classes. Each error class was associated with a unique set of contributing factor s and mitigating solutions. Planning errors were mitigated by technologies that provided an unambiguous record of the clearance (datalink and the EMM, which possessed a text-based clearance). Decision errors were mitigated by technologies that provided both local and global awareness including information about the distance to and direction of the next turn, current township location, and a graphical depiction of the route (as provided by the EMM and HUD together). Execution errors were best mitigated by the HUD, which disambiguated the environment and depicted the clear ed taxi route. Implications for technology design and integration are provided.

Hooey, Becky L.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Lunar Dust: Characterization and Mitigation

Lunar dust is a ubiquitous phenomenon which must be explicitly addressed during upcoming human lunar exploration missions. Near term plans to revisit the moon as a stepping stone for further exploration of Mars, and beyond, places a primary emphasis on characterization and mitigation of lunar dust. Comprised of regolith particles ranging in size from tens of nanometers to microns, lunar dust is a manifestation of the complex interaction of the lunar soil with multiple mechanical, electrical, and gravitational effects. The environmental and anthropogenic factors effecting the perturbation, transport, and deposition of lunar dust must be studied in order to mitigate it's potentially harmful effects on exploration systems. The same hold true for assessing the risk it may pose for toxicological health problems if inhaled. This paper presents the current perspective and implementation of dust knowledge management and integration, and mitigation technology development activities within NASA's Exploration Technology Development Program. This work is presented within the context of the Constellation Program's Integrated Lunar Dust Management Strategy. This work further outlines the scientific basis for lunar dust behavior, it's characteristics and potential effects, and surveys several potential strategies for its control and mitigation both for lunar surface operations and within the working volumes of a lunar outpost. The paper also presents a perspective on lessons learned from Apollo and forensics engineering studies of Apollo hardware.

Hyatt. Mark J.↗