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The potential for errors in engineering judgement arguably present the highest level of risk when applied to interplanetary spaceflight. JPL has been refining its lessons learned process to optimize the collection and transfer of critical success factors applicable to current and future spaceflight projects.
ABSTRACT In this study, we consider three different machine‐learning methods—a three‐hidden‐layer neural network, support vector regression, and Gaussian process regression—and compare how well they can learn from a synthetic data set for proton acceleration in the Target Normal Sheath Acceleration regime. The synthetic data set was generated from a previously published theoretical model by Fuchs et al. 2005 that we modified. Once trained, these machine‐learning methods can assist with efforts to maximize the peak proton energy, or with the more general problem of configuring the laser system to produce a proton energy spectrum with desired characteristics. In our study, we focus on both the accuracy of the machine‐learning methods and the performance on one GPU including memory consumption. Although it is arguably the least sophisticated machine‐learning model we considered, support vector regression performed very well in our tests.
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These are science and mission design and operations lessons learned from the Stardust Mission, which returned grains from comet Wild-2 and fresh interstellar dust to Earth in 2006 [1]. Science Lessons: Major discoveries of the Stardust Wild-2 samples include the presence of numerous chondrules and CAI in a comet, which requires a much more dynamic early solar system than many had envisaged, and verified predictions made by models requiring outward flow of early solar system solids before the early nebular gas had dissipated [1-3]. No evidence has been found for the presence of live Al-26 in the comet, suggesting late accretion [4]. Carbonates and unusual sulfides were found which potentially require activity of liquid water within the comet, but to only a minor degree at best [5-6]. The presence of abundant thermally-metamorphosed silicates in Wild-2 appears to require assembly from an earlier generation of bodies [7]. The abundance of presolar grains in the Wild-2 samples appears to be below what has been found in most chondritic IDPs and primitive chondrites [1]. The bulk mineralogy of Wild-2 grains does not match the mineralogy from any single other known astromaterial [7], and is also strikingly unlike that inferred from Spitzer Telescope spectra of Comet Temple 1 dust [8]. Amino acids and other fragile organics have been detected among the Wild-2 samples [9], which highlights the critical importance of further developing techniques for organic analysis in small samples, and cleaning outbound spacecraft.
When performing Inertial Navigation System (INS) testing at the Marshall Space Flight Center's (MSFC) Contact Dynamics Simulation Laboratory (CDSL) early in 2017, a Leica Geosystems AT901 Laser Tracker system (LLT) measured the twist & sway trajectories as generated by the 6 Degree Of Freedom (6DOF) Table in the CDSL. These LLT measured trajectories were used in the INS software model validation effort. Several challenges were identified and overcome during the preparation for the INS testing, as well as numerous lessons learned. These challenges included determining the position and attitude of the LLT with respect to an INS-shared coordinate frame using surveyed monument locations in the CDSL and the accompanying mathematical transformation, accurately measuring the spatial relationship between the INS and a 6DOF tracking probe due to lack of INS visibility from the LLT location, obtaining the data from the LLT during a test, determining how to process the results for comparison with INS data in time and frequency domains, and using a sensitivity analysis of the results to verify the quality of the results. While many of these challenges were identified and overcome before or during testing, a significant lesson on test set-up was not learned until later in the data analysis process. It was found that a combination of trajectory-dependent gimbal locking and environmental noise introduced non-negligible noise in the angular measurements of the LLT that spanned the evaluated frequency spectrum. The lessons learned in this experiment may be useful for others performing INS testing in similar testing facilities.
Artificial intelligence is it tool that has existed for many years. Recent developments in generative AI has rapidly expanded the applications for this tool across many domains such as writing, analyzing, summarizing, creating videos, creating graphics and others. Charts in this presentation will prompt attendees to discuss the pros and cons, and potential validation methodology for imbedding artificial intelligence tools in the NASA lessons learned knowledge sharing environment.
The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for over 10 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The analysis lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.
Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.
Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.
As part of the Discovery Program's continuous improvement effort, a Discovery Program Lessons-Learned workshop was designed to review how well the Discovery Program is moving toward its goal of providing low-cost research opportunities to the planetary science community while ensuring continued U.S. leadership in solar system exploration. The principal focus of the workshop was on the recently completed Announcement of Opportunity (AO) cycle, but the program direction and program management were also open to comment. The objective of the workshop was to identify both the strengths and weaknesses of the process up to this point, with the goal of improving the process for the next AO cycle. The process for initializing the workshop was to solicit comments from the communities involved in the program and to use the feedback as the basis for establishing the workshop agenda. The following four sessions were developed after reviewing and synthesizing both the formal feedback received and informal feedback obtained during discussions with various participants: (1) Science and Return on Investment; (2) Technology vs. Risk; Mission Success and Other Factors; (3) Cost; and (4) AO.AO Process Changes and Program Management.
A sub-par container packaging instance was evaluated and lessons learned shared.
The objectives of this presentation are: (1) Share lessons learned from a recent exercise in CFD validation of protuberance heating (2) Impact of experimental data reduction assumptions and techniques on validation activity (3) Advanced data reduction techniques may provide useful data from non-typical test methods (4) Significance of the recovery factor for high-speed flows (5) Show typical results of the Lag turbulence model on protuberances (6) Introduce and inform the listener of a protuberance heating dataset which will soon be available for comparison
The Earth Observing System (EOS) Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) is a complex instrument with a front end computer and 32 subsystem computers. MLS is one of four instruments on NASA's EOS Aura spacecraft With almost 8 years in orbit, MLS has a few lessons learned which can be applied during the design phase of future instruments to effect better longevity, more robust operations and a significant cost benefit during operations phase.
Programmatic, applicatory, developmental, and operational aspects of sounding rocket utilization for materials processing studies are discussed. Lessons learned through the experience of 10 sounding rocket missions are described. Particular attention is given to missions from the SPAR, Consort, and Joust programs. Successful experiments on Consort include the study of polymer membranes and resins, biological processes, demixing of immiscible liquids, and electrodeposition.
This presentation has shown the accomplishments of the PASS project over three decades and highlighted the lessons learned. Over the entire time, our goal has been to continuously improve our process, implement automation for both quality and increased productivity, and identify and remove all defects due to prior execution of a flawed process in addition to improving our processes following identification of significant process escapes. Morale and workforce instability have been issues, most significantly during 1993 to 1998 (period of consolidation in aerospace industry). The PASS project has also consulted with others, including the Software Engineering Institute, so as to be an early evaluator, adopter, and adapter of state-of-the-art software engineering innovations.
The Themal InfraRed Sensor (TIRS) instrument, set to launch on the Landsat Data Continuity Mission in 2013, features a passively cooled telescope and IR detectors which are actively cooled by a two stage cryocooler. In order to proceed to the instrument level test campaign, at least one full functional test was required, necessitating a thermal vacuum test to sufficiently cool the detectors and demonstrate performance. This was fairly unique in that this test occurred before the Pre Environmental Review, but yielded significant knowledge gains before the planned instrument level test. During the pre-PER test, numerous discrepancies were found between the model and the actual hardware, which were revealed by poor correlation between model predictions and test data. With the inclusion of pseudo-balance points, the test also provided an opportunity to perform a pre-correlation to test data prior to the instrument level test campaign. Various lessons were learned during this test related to modeling and design of both the flight hardware and the Ground Support Equipment and test setup. The lessons learned in the pre-PER test resulted in a better test setup for the nstrument level test and the completion of the final instrument model correlation in a shorter period of time. Upon completion of the correlation, the flight predictions were generated including the full suite of off-nominal cases, including some new cases defined by the spacecraft. For some of these ·new cases, some components now revealed limit exceedances, in particular for a portion of the hardware that could not be tested due to its size and chamber limitations.. Further lessons were learned during the completion of flight predictions. With a correlated detalled instrument model, significant efforts were made to generate a reduced model suitable for observatory level analyses. This proved a major effort both to generate an appropriate network as well as to convert to the final model to the required format and yielded additional lessons learned. In spite of all the challenges encountered by TIRS, the instrument was successfully delivered to the spacecraft and will soon be tested at observatory level in preparation for a successful mission launch.
A brief historical review of accidents was made to examine lessons learned in flight testing with major emphasis on human factors limitations. The results of this survey show undeniably that new aircraft and new pilots are not immune to old problems. Of three related human factors limitations, pilot skill frequently showed up as the primary factor responsible for accidents due to inadequate training (or proficiency) to handle an unexpected situation. A primary contributing factor was unsatisfactory aircraft handling qualities which increased pilot work load and therefore were less forgiving to 'pilot error,' particularly when flown in a stressful situation at the extremes of the flight envelope. Historically, pilot induced oscillation (PIO) has persisted as a major control problem particularly in first-flight operation. Deliberate errors involving a conscious decision to 'take a chance' by flying an aircraft with known deficiencies occurred more frequently in early times. Finally, inadvertent errors involving forgetfulness, indecision, and confusion are occurring more frequently with the current trend toward automated computerized controlled cockpits.
The present investigation is concerned with an evaluation of the lessons learned in connection with the flights of the Shuttle orbiters Columbia, Challenger, and Discovery. A description is provided of several general and specific lessons related to the processing of free-flying and attached payloads. John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), as the prime launch and landing site, is responsible for managing all payload-to-payload, payload-to-simulated orbiter, and payload-to-orbiter operations. For each payload, a KSC Launch Site Support Manager (LSSM) is named as the primary point of contact for the customer. Attention is given to aspects of planning interaction, payload types, and problems of ground processing. The discussed lessons are partly related to the value of early contact between customers and KSC representatives, the primary point of contact, the launch site support plan, and the importance of customer participation.