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Mini Report: Jailbreaking Attacks and Defenses

Overall, jailbreaking defenses are unreliable, and no defenses proposed thus far can completely stop such attacks in any verifiable way. Even manual attacks can trivially bypass some claimed ‘defenses’, and over the course of 2023 automated attacks on prior models have been adapted to work on LLMs while other attacks draw on ideas such as fuzz testing. At best, some defenses can make jailbreaks more difficult, but with the developing landscape of attacks existing papers have not robustly evaluated how effective they are against all these methods. However, our opinion is that given the way these large generative models are trained and ‘aligned’ to stated goals of safety via fine tuning, it will be exceedingly difficult if not impossible to eliminate the possibility of jailbreaking attacks. A major barrier is that the feature space of LLMs is not sufficiently understood in a way where guarantees can be made about the outputs. Barring major changes, the expectation around jailbreaking defenses should be that they can mitigate misuse, but not verifiably prevent it. However, one defense we believe merits further investigation depends on the fact as automated attacks produce text, they need an automated way to identify a successful jailbreak - a judgment model. We have seen some attempts to repurpose models like these to defend against jailbreaks, but the evaluations are small scale and not robust.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Virtual Reality for Shoot/No-Shoot Decision Training in Law Enforcement: A Literature Review and Research Agenda

Virtual reality (VR) can materially improve “shoot / no-shoot” (SNS) training by giving officers realistic, repeatable practice making high-stakes decisions under pressure. Traditional tools—live-fire ranges and video simulators—build basics, but they cannot adapt to each officer in real time or fully mirror the complexity of the field. VR closes that gap by creating immersive scenarios that are safer, more flexible, easier to scale across units, and able to capture objective performance data. SNS decisions are not just about marksmanship; they rely on perception, judgment, memory, and the ability to hold fire when a threat is uncertain. Effective training therefore needs realism, decision complexity, and branching outcomes that reflect the true consequences of choices. These elements strengthen recognition of hostile intent while reducing false positives and building the self-control required in ambiguous situations. VR brings specific advantages: dynamic environments, full-body interaction, and the ability to measure performance with precision—enabling targeted feedback and better transfer of learning to the street. At the same time, responsible deployment must address scenario quality (credible environments and behaviors), lawful decision models, and user wellbeing (appropriate stress levels, comfort, and safety). Sandia’s VIPER Lab is positioned to lead this work. The team combines human-performance science, AI/ML, and VR/AR development with a deep equipment bench (e.g., omnidirectional treadmill, eye-tracking, haptics, multiple HMDs). This ecosystem supports building and validating next-generation SNS training that is immersive, measurable, and trustworthy. Bottom line: Investment in VR-enabled SNS training that blends evidence-based design with careful validation and legal safeguards is expected to pay off in safer, more consistent decision-making and improved community trust, delivered through training that is practical to deploy at scale.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Assessing and Enabling Trustworthy Predictions for High-Consequence Decisions

Predictions from physics-based computational models provide critical information to inform high consequence decisions, e.g., engineering design decisions. The ability to assess the reliability of such predictions is therefore critical. However, to date, reliability assessment rely heavily on expert judgment and qualitative arguments. This report details the efforts of LDRD 233072 to develop quantitative methods to assess reliability of model predictions, especially in the context of simplifying assumptions that can impact their reliability.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Web-Based Tools for Data-Informed Remedy Optimization: Software Theory and User Guide

This report documents the development and application of two web-based decision-support tools for pump-and-treat (P&T) groundwater remediation systems: PTOLEMY (Pump-and-Treat Optimized Location Evaluation to Maximize Yields) and OPTIMA (Optimization for Pump-and-Treat Implementation, Management, & Assessment). These tools enhance remedy design and management by leveraging advanced computational methods – specifically deep learning and multi-objective optimization – within a user-friendly platform. By integrating data-driven models with established hydrogeological knowledge, PTOLEMY and OPTIMA enable more efficient evaluation of well placement and operational strategies, helping site managers balance multiple remediation objectives under complex conditions. Both tools are implemented as modules within the SOCRATES (Suite Of Comprehensive Rapid Analysis Tools for Environmental Sites) web platform, which provides data access, visualization, and analytics to support remedy optimization across sites in the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Environmental Management complex. PTOLEMY is a rapid screening module designed to identify promising locations for new extraction wells. It employs a multi-channel three-dimensional convolutional neural network (MC3D-CNN) trained on high-fidelity simulation data to predict the relative performance (in terms of contaminant mass recovery) of potential well sites. Through an interactive web interface, PTOLEMY visualizes the probability of high performance across a site, highlighting areas where an extraction well is likely to yield above-threshold contaminant removal over a multi-year period. PTOLEMY’s map-based displays and exportable results support transparent communication of screening analyses. By focusing attention on the most favorable candidate locations, the tool augments traditional engineering judgment and physics-based modeling, providing a data informed basis for subsequent detailed evaluations. OPTIMA is a multi objective optimization module designed to find wellfield layouts and operating schedules that meet various cleanup goals. It quickly evaluates thousands of candidate setups – combinations of well locations, timing, and rates – and returns a small set of best trade-off options for comparison. At its core, OPTIMA uses a U-Net-based surrogate model – a deep-learning emulator of a groundwater flow and transport simulator – to dramatically accelerate scenario evaluations. Coupling this fast surrogate with the NSGA-II (Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II) evolutionary algorithm, OPTIMA explores a wide decision space of well locations and schedules to identify Pareto-optimal solutions that trade off key objectives (e.g., minimizing cleanup time, maximizing contaminant mass removal, and minimizing plume extent). The tool outputs a family of optimal configurations and visualizes their trade-offs (Pareto frontiers of cleanup metrics and maps of optimized well placements). Site managers can use these results to understand the range of viable strategies and to select candidate designs for more detailed verification. OPTIMA is currently under active development and not yet fully released; this guide provides early documentation to support planning and gather user feedback.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Battery Life Prediction Using Reduced-Order Physics Models and Machine Learning (CRADA Final Report)

Phase 1 (Original CRADA, plus no-cost extension modifications #1-3, 6/1/2017 to 3/13/2021): The Australian Department of Defence (AUDoD) is performing accelerated aging tests of Li-ion batteries to benchmark their reliability and degradation characteristics. Using its previously developed battery lifetime predictive model framework, the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) will develop analytical models based the AUDoD data to predict lifetime of the multiple Li-ion battery chemistries under real-world use scenarios of interest to AUDoD. The NLR model is based on physical degradation mechanisms encountered by Li-ion batteries and has been previously validated. Phase 2 (CRADA modification #4, plus no-cost extension modification #5, 2/22/2021 to 3/30/2025): Train and support Australian Department of Defence personnel to use NLR software for model-based estimation of Li-ion battery lifetime using accelerated battery aging data collected by the Australian Department of Defence. Under separate DOE funding from 2019 to 2021, NLR enhanced its battery life-prediction software using machine learning algorithms to automate portions of the model-fitting process, requiring significantly less labor and expert judgment and also adding uncertainty quantification, increasing statistical rigor. Under Phase 2, NLR will customize NLR Software and provide it to AuDoD. NLR will enhance its NLR Model to capture aging modes of AuDoD's multi-cell modules, including cell-balancing effects. NLR will develop example single-cell and multi-cell models based on one AuDoD battery aging dataset. NLR will train AuDoD personnel on NLR Software. By the conclusion of the project, NLR will have provided AuDoD the training materials, a user manual and software needed to perform their own analysis of additional and/or future battery aging datasets.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Application of Nuclear Technology to Art Identification Problems: First Annual Report

Throughout the centuries, as man has become increasingly affluent, his interest in antiquities and objects of art, and the price he has been willing to pay for them, has increased. Inevitably, one result has been to attract the unscrupulous to the production and sale of counterfeit paintings, sculptures, and other works of art. The skill of forgers varies but often is highly sophisticated. However, dealers, museum curators, and other experts have also become more skillful in the detection of forgeries. Scientific tools of increasing sensitivity and sophistication have gradually been applied to the examination of the materials of art and archaeology. Such tools frequently support and render more reliable the judgment of the experts. The quality of forgeries may improve further as their makers become acquainted with the new methods of detection and in turn learn to circumvent or confound the methods. Therefore, the development of still more advanced methods of examination has great utility in the art world. This is particularly true if the ultimate effect is to make circumvention of the methods of examination so costly that the economic incentives for producing forgeries may be substantially reduced, if not eliminated.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Report on the Depth Requirements for a Massive Detector at Homestake

This report provides the technical justification for locating a large detector underground in a US based Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory. A large detector with a fiducial mass greater than 100 kTon will most likely be a multipurpose facility. The main physics justification for such a device is detection of accelerator generated neutrinos, nucleon decay, and natural sources of neutrinos such as solar, atmospheric and supernova neutrinos. The requirement on the depth of this detector will be guided by the rate of signals from these sources and the rate of backgrounds from cosmic rays over a very wide range of energies (from solar neutrino energies of 5 MeV to high energies in the range of tens of GeV). For the present report, we have examined the depth requirement for a large water Cherenkov detector and a liquid argon time projection chamber. There has been extensive previous experience with underground water Cherenkov detectors such as IMB, Kamioka, and most recently, Super-Kamiokande which has a fiducial mass of 22 kTon and a total mass of 50 kTon at a depth of 2700 meters-water-equivalent. Projections for signal and background capability for a larger and deeper (or shallower) detectors of this type can be scaled from these previous detectors. The liquid argon time projection chamber has the advantage of being a very fine-grained tracking detector, which provides enhanced capability for background rejection. In the current work we have taken the approach that the depth should be sufficient to suppress the cosmogenic background below predicted signal rates for either of the above two technologies. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the underground facility that we are examining must have a long life and will most likely be used either for future novel uses of the currently planned detectors or new technologies. Therefore the depth requirement also needs to be made on the basis of sound judgment regarding possible future use. In particular, the depth should be sufficient for any possible future use of these cavities or the level which will be developed for these large structures. Along with these physics justifications there are practical issues regarding the existing infrastructure at Homestake and also the stress characteristics of the Homestake rock formations. In this report we will examine the various depth choices at Homestake from the point of view of the particle and nuclear physics signatures of interest. We also have sufficient information about the existing infrastructure and the rock characteristics to narrow the choice of levels for the development of large cavities with long lifetimes. We make general remarks on desirable ground conditions for such large cavities and then make recommendations on how to start examining these levels to make a final choice. In the appendix we have outlined the initial requirements for the detectors. These requirements will undergo refinement during the course of the design. Finally, we strongly recommend that the geotechnical studies be commenced at the 4850 ft level, which we find to be the most suitable, in a timely manner.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Report on the Depth Requirements for a Massive Detector at Homestake

This report provides the technical justification for locating a large detector underground in a US based Deep Underground Science and Engineering Laboratory. A large detector with a fiducial mass greater than 100 kTon will most likely be a multipurpose facility. The main physics justification for such a device is detection of accelerator generated neutrinos, nucleon decay, and natural sources of neutrinos such as solar, atmospheric and supernova neutrinos. The requirement on the depth of this detector will be guided by the rate of signals from these sources and the rate of backgrounds from cosmic rays over a very wide range of energies (from solar neutrino energies of 5 MeV to high energies in the range of hundreds of GeV). For the present report, we have examined the depth requirement for a large water Cherenkov detector and a liquid argon time projection chamber. There has been extensive previous experience with underground water Cherenkov detectors such as IMB, Kamioka, and most recently, Super-Kamiokande which has a fiducial mass of 22 kTon and a total mass of 50 kTon at a depth of 2700 meters-water-equivalent in a mountain. Projections for signal and background capability for a larger and deeper(or shallower) detectors of this type can be scaled from these previous detectors. The liquid argon time projection chamber has the advantage of being a very fine-grained tracking detector, which should provide enhanced capability for background rejection. We have based background rejection on reasonable estimates of track and energy resolution, and in some cases scaled background rates from measurements in water. In the current work we have taken the approach that the depth should be sufficient to suppress the cosmogenic background below predicted signal rates for either of the above two technologies. Nevertheless, it is also clear that the underground facility that we are examining must have a long life and will most likely be used either for future novel uses of the currently planned detectors or new technologies. Therefore the depth requirement also needs to be made on the basis of sound judgment regarding possible future use. In particular, the depth should be sufficient for any possible future use of these cavities or the level which will be developed for these large structures.Along with these physics justifications there are practical issues regarding the existing infrastructure at Homestake and also the stress characteristics of the Homestake rock formations. In this report we will examine the various depth choices at Homestake from the point of view of the particle and nuclear physics signatures of interest. We also have sufficient information about the existing infrastructure and the rock characteristics to narrow the choice of levels for the development of large cavities with long lifetimes. We make general remarks on desirable ground conditions for such large cavities and then make recommendations on how to start examining these levels to make a final choice. In the appendix we have outlined the initial requirements for the detectors. These requirements will undergo refinement during the course of the design. Finally, we strongly recommend that the geotechnical studies be commenced at the 4850 ft level, which we find to be the most suitable, in a timely manner.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Uncertainty and Sensitivity of Contaminant Travel Times from the Upgradient Nevada Test Site to the Yucca Mountain Area

Yucca Mountain (YM), Nevada, has been proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy as the nation’s first permanent geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel and highlevel radioactive waste. In this study, the potential for groundwater advective pathways from underground nuclear testing areas on the Nevada Test Site (NTS) to intercept the subsurface of the proposed land withdrawal area for the repository is investigated. The timeframe for advective travel and its uncertainty for possible radionuclide movement along these flow pathways is estimated as a result of effective-porosity value uncertainty for the hydrogeologic units (HGUs) along the flow paths. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis is conducted to determine the most influential HGUs on the advective radionuclide travel times from the NTS to the YM area. Groundwater pathways are obtained using the particle tracking package MODPATH and flow results from the Death Valley regional groundwater flow system (DVRFS) model developed by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS). Effectiveporosity values for HGUs along these pathways are one of several parameters that determine possible radionuclide travel times between the NTS and proposed YM withdrawal areas. Values and uncertainties of HGU porosities are quantified through evaluation of existing site effective-porosity data and expert professional judgment and are incorporated in the model through Monte Carlo simulations to estimate mean travel times and uncertainties. The simulations are based on two steady-state flow scenarios, the pre-pumping (the initial stress period of the DVRFS model), and the 1998 pumping (assuming steady-state conditions resulting from pumping in the last stress period of the DVRFS model) scenarios for the purpose of long-term prediction and monitoring. The pumping scenario accounts for groundwater withdrawal activities in the Amargosa Desert and other areas downgradient of YM. Considering each detonation in a clustered region around Pahute Mesa (in the NTS operational areas 18, 19, 20, and 30) under the water table as a particle, those particles from the saturated zone detonations were tracked forward using MODPATH to identify hydraulically downgradient groundwater discharge zones and to determine the particles from which detonations will intercept the proposed YM withdrawal area. Out of the 71 detonations in the saturated zone, the flowpaths from 23 of the 71 detonations will intercept the proposed YM withdrawal area under the pre-pumping scenario. For the 1998 pumping scenario, the flowpaths from 55 of the 71 detonations will intercept the proposed YM withdrawal area. Three different effective-porosity data sets compiled in support of regional models of groundwater flow and contaminant transport developed for the NTS and the proposed YM repository are used. The results illustrate that mean minimum travel time from underground nuclear testing areas on the NTS to the proposed YM repository area can vary from just over 700 to nearly 700,000 years, depending on the locations of the underground detonations, the pumping scenarios considered, and the effective-porosity value distributions used. Groundwater pumping scenarios are found to significantly impact minimum particle travel time from the NTS to the YM area by altering flowpath geometry. Pumping also attracts many more additional groundwater flowpaths from the NTS to the YM area. The sensitivity analysis further illustrates that for both the pre-pumping and 1998 pumping scenarios, the uncertainties in effective-porosity values for five of the 27 HGUs considered account for well over 90 percent of the effective-porosity-related travel time uncertainties for the flowpaths having the shortest mean travel times to YM.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Selection of 3013 containers for field surveillance: LA-14310, Revision 1

This document is the fifth in a series of reports that document the binning, statistical sampling, and sample selection of 3013 containers for field surveillance. 1,2,3,39 Revisions to binning assignments documented in this report are primarily a result of new prompt gamma data. This report also documents changes to the random sample specification resulting from these binning changes and identifies and provides the rationale for the engineering judgment sample items for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 and 2009. This revision also updates the changes to the previous surveillance sample resulting from changes to the order that specific containers undergo surveillance. This report will continue to be reviewed regularly and revised as needed to meet the requirements of the surveillance program.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Audit Report "Department of Energy Efforts to Manage Information Technology Resources in an Energy-Efficient and Environmentally Responsible Manner"

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 emphasizes energy efficiency and conservation as critical to the Nation's economic vitality; its goal of reducing dependence on foreign energy sources; and, related efforts to improve the environment. The Act highlights the significant use of various forms of energy in the Federal sector and promotes efforts to improve the energy efficiency of Federal operations. One specific area of interest is the increasing demand for Federal sector computing resources and the corresponding increase in energy use, with both cost and environmental implications. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency reported that, without aggressive conservation measures, data center energy consumption alone is expected to double over the next five years. In our report on Management of the Department's Data Centers at Contractor Sites (DOE/IG-0803, October 2008) we concluded that the Department of Energy had not always improved the efficiency of its contractor data centers even when such modifications were possible and practical. Despite its recognized energy conservation leadership role, the Department had not always taken advantage of opportunities to reduce energy consumption associated with its information technology resources. Nor, had it ensured that resources were managed in a way that minimized impact on the environment. In particular: (1) The seven Federal and contractor sites included in our review had not fully reduced energy consumption through implementation of power management settings on their desktop and laptop computers; and, as a consequence, spent $1.6 million more on energy costs than necessary in Fiscal Year 2008; (2) None of the sites reviewed had taken advantage of opportunities to reduce energy consumption, enhance cyber security, and reduce costs available through the use of techniques, such as 'thin-client computing' in their unclassified environments; and, (3) Sites had not always taken the necessary steps to reduce energy consumption and resource usage of their data centers, such as identifying and monitoring the amount of energy used at their facilities. We concluded that Headquarters programs offices (which are part of the Department of Energy's Common Operating Environment) as well as field sites had not developed and/or implemented policies and procedures necessary to ensure that information technology equipment and supporting infrastructure was operated in an energy-efficient manner and in a way that minimized impact on the environment. For example, although required by the Department, sites had not enabled computer equipment power management features designed to reduce energy consumption. In addition, officials within Headquarters programs and at the sites reviewed had not effectively monitored performance or taken steps to fully evaluate available reductions in energy usage at their facilities. Without improvements, the Department will not be able to take advantage of opportunities to reduce energy consumption and realize cost savings of nearly $23 million over the next five years at just the seven sites reviewed. We noted that the potential for reduced energy consumption at these sites alone was equivalent to the annual power requirements of over 2,400 homes or, alternatively, removing about 3,000 cars from the road each year. Many of the available energy reduction strategies, such as fully utilizing energy-efficient settings on the many computers used by the Department and its contractors, are 'low hanging fruit' in that they will provide immediate tangible energy savings at little or no cost. Others, such as a shift to thin-client computing, an environment that transfers the processing capabilities from an individual's desk to a shared server environment, will require some level of investment which can, based on available literature, be successfully recovered through reduced acquisition and support costs. In our judgment, given its highly visible leadership in energy issues, aggressive action should be taken to make the Department's information technology operations as energy efficient as possible so that it can serve as a role model for both the Federal and private sector. To its credit, the Department had increased the number of energy-efficient computers purchased in recent years. In addition, the Office of the Chief Information Officer implemented an automated computer shutdown program at Headquarters that was estimated to save up to nearly $400,000 per year. Furthermore, we found that certain sites had initiated actions to review a potential transition to unclassified thin-client computing; however, implementation had not yet been completed. These are positive steps, but additional action is required, and our report contains several recommendations to this end.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Selection and Traceability of Parameters To Support Hanford-Specific RESRAD Analyses -- Fiscal Year 2008 Status Report

In fiscal years 2007 and 2008, the Hanford Site Groundwater Remediation Project, formerly managed by Fluor Hanford, Inc., requested the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to support the development and initial implementation of a strategy to establish and maintain, under configuration control, a set of Hanford-specific flow and transport parameter estimates that can be used to support Hanford Site assessments. This document provides a summary of those efforts, culminating in a set of best-estimate Hanford-specific parameters for use in place of the default parameters used in the RESRAD code. The RESRAD code is a computer model designed to estimate radiation doses and risks from RESidual RADioactive materials. The long-term goals of the PNNL work are to improve the consistency, defensibility, and traceability of parameters and their ranges of variability, and to ensure a sound basis for assigning parameters for flow and transport models in the code. The strategy was to start by identifying the existing parameter data sets most recently used in site assessments, documenting these parameter data sets and the raw data sets on which they were based, and using the existing parameter sets to define best-estimate parameters for use in the RESRAD code. The Hanford-specific assessment parameters compiled for use in RESRAD are traceable back to the professional judgment of the authors of published documents. Within the references, parameters are often not directly traceable back to the raw data and analytical approaches used to derive the assessment parameters. Future activities will work to continuously improve the defensibility and traceability of the parameter data sets and to address limitations and technical issues associated with the existing assessment parameter data sets.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Audit Report on "The Department's Management of Nuclear Materials Provided to Domestic Licensees"

The objective if to determine whether the Department of Energy (Department) was adequately managing its nuclear materials provided to domestic licensees. The audit was performed from February 2007 to September 2008 at Department Headquarters in Washington, DC, and Germantown, MD; the Oak Ridge Office and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Oak Ridge, TN. In addition, we visited or obtained data from 40 different non-Departmental facilities in various states. To accomplish the audit objective, we: (1) Reviewed Departmental and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requirements for the control and accountability of nuclear materials; (2) Analyzed a Nuclear Materials Management and Safeguards System (NMMSS) report with ending inventory balances for Department-owned nuclear materials dated September 30, 2007, to determine the amount and types of nuclear materials located at non-Department domestic facilities; (3) Held discussions with Department and NRC personnel that used NMMSS information to determine their roles and responsibilities related to the control and accountability over nuclear materials; (4) Selected a judgmental sample of 40 non-Department domestic facilities; (5) Met with licensee officials and sent confirmations to determine whether their actual inventories of Department-owned nuclear materials were consistent with inventories reported in the NMMSS; and, (6) Analyzed historical information related to the 2004 NMMSS inventory rebaselining initiative to determine the quantity of Department-owned nuclear materials that were written off from the domestic licensees inventory balances. This performance audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. The audit included tests of controls and compliance with laws and regulations related to managing the Department-owned nuclear materials provided to non-Departmental domestic licensees. Because our review was limited it would not necessarily have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of our audit. We examined the establishment of performance measures in accordance with Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, as they related to the audit objective. We found that the Department had established performance measures related to removing or disposing of nuclear materials and radiological sources around the world. We utilized computer generated data during our audit and performed procedures to validate the reliability of the information as necessary to satisfy our audit objective. As noted in the report, we questioned the reliability of the NMMSS data.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Audit Report on "Work for Others Performed by the Department of Energy for the Department of Defense"

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Economy Act of 1932, the Department of Energy and its semi-autonomous National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) provide research and technical assistance to other Federal agencies on a reimbursable, full cost recovery basis through the Work for Others (WFO) program. For the vast majority of WFO technical projects, Department Federal officials furnish administrative project oversight while the actual detailed scientific or technical work is completed by the Department's 'management and operating' contractors. These contractors are awarded a special contract type specifically created under the Federal Acquisition Regulation to manage and operate Department sites and facilities, including sophisticated laboratories and technical centers, on a government-owned, contractor-operated basis. With annual expenditures exceeding $1 billion, the Department of Defense (DoD) is one of the Department's largest WFO customers. Work performed for DoD at the Department's national laboratories and other facilities includes highly technical research in areas such as nuclear weapons systems, counter-terrorism, and in-theater troop support. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009, required the Inspectors General of the DoD and the Department to review procurement methods to determine whether the Department complied with DoD procurement requirements and/or whether alternative procurement policies were in place. In response, we focused our review on projects performed by NNSA because it completes the vast majority (approximately $900 million in FY 2008) of the Department's work for DoD. As part of this effort, and, at the specific request of the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG), we identified the universe of WFO technical projects that received new funding in the fourth quarter of FY 2008 at NNSA sites. We independently reviewed a judgmental sample of 11 projects selected by the DoD OIG to meet the objectives of this audit. Our review revealed that NNSA managed DoD WFO technical projects in a manner consistent with requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the Department's implementing guidance, the Department of Energy Acquisition Regulation. Because of the very nature of the Department's management and operating contracting model, WFO projects may not be technically compliant with DoD procurement regulations in certain instances. We found that NNSA did not let new contracts or task orders for the DoD WFO technical projects we reviewed and instead managed them under its existing internal control process as part of its management and operating contract structure. In one instance, we noted that the Department had, at DoD's request, supplemented its control structure to incorporate specific DoD procurement requirements. Senior Department of Energy procurement officials acknowledged that neither the Department nor NNSA modified their existing prime contracts to incorporate specific defense procurement requirements because such modifications would be inappropriate, costly, and inefficient. In short, they informed us that the Department had developed and implemented a series of controls designed to monitor overall contractor performance, including WFO technical projects. Department and NNSA officials noted, however, that they were willing to incorporate DoD specific requirements into work orders should DoD request and fund such efforts. Additional details regarding management of WFO technical projects are discussed in the body of this report.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Evaluation Report on "The Department's Unclassified Cyber Security Program"

Industry experts report that security challenges and threats are continually evolving as malicious activity has become more web-based and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack methods. In addition, the number of data breaches continues to rise. In an effort to mitigate and address threats and protect valuable information, the Department of Energy anticipated spending about $275 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 to implement cyber security measures necessary to protect its information technology resources. These systems and data are designed to support the Department's mission and business lines of energy security, nuclear security, scientific discovery and innovation, and environmental responsibility. The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) provides direction to agencies on the management and oversight of information security risks, including design and implementation of controls to protect Federal information and systems. As required by FISMA, the Office of Inspector General conducts an annual independent evaluation to determine whether the Department's unclassified cyber security program adequately protects its information systems and data. This memorandum and the attached report present the results of our evaluation for FY 2009. The Department continued to make incremental improvements in its unclassified cyber security program. Our evaluation disclosed that most sites had taken action to address weaknesses previously identified in our FY 2008 evaluation report. They improved certification and accreditation of systems; strengthened configuration management of networks and systems; performed independent assessments; and, developed and/or refined certain policies and procedures. In addition, the Department instituted a centralized incident response organization designed to eliminate duplicative efforts throughout the Department. As we have noted in previous reports, the Department continued to maintain strong network perimeter defenses against malicious intruders and other externals threats. These are positive accomplishments. However, in our judgment, additional action is required to further enhance the Department's unclassified cyber security program and help reduce risks to its systems and data. For example, our current review identified opportunities for improvements in areas such as security planning and testing, systems inventory, access controls, and configuration management. In particular, we issued a number of findings at sites managed by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). We also identified weaknesses across various Department program elements. Issues that warrant further attention include: (1) Weaknesses such as outdated security plans and not completing annual security control self-assessments were identified at several sites; (2) The Department had not yet resolved systems inventory issues and had yet to deploy a complex-wide automated asset management tool to help track information technology resources and identify interfaces between systems or networks; (3) Although certain improvements had been made to enhance access controls, we noted deficiencies such as a lack of periodic account reviews and inadequate password management at a number of sites; and (4) Previously identified weaknesses in configuration management had been corrected, however, we found problems related to weak administrator account settings and failure to install software patches, as well as incomplete implementation of the Federal Desktop Core Configuration. These internal control weaknesses existed, at least in part, because certain cyber security roles and responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Program officials also had not effectively performed monitoring and review activities essential for evaluating the adequacy of cyber security performance. In some cases, officials had not ensured that weaknesses discovered during audits and other evaluations were recorded and tracked to resolution in the organizations' Plans of Action and Milestones. Our testing disclosed that about 39 percent of existing corrective action milestones had missed estimated remediation dates, with many exceeding planned completion dates by at least one year. As a consequence, the risk of compromise to the Department's information and systems remained higher than necessary. To assist the continuing efforts to improve, we made several recommendations designed to help the Department's managers to strengthen the unclassified cyber security program and, thereby, protect its computer resources from unauthorized modification, loss, or disclosure of information. Due to security considerations, information on specific vulnerabilities and locations has been omitted from this report. Management officials at the sites evaluated were provided with detailed information regarding identified vulnerabilities, and, in many instances, initiated corrective actions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Inspection Report on "Employment Verification at Savannah River Site"

We conducted a review at the Savannah River Site to determine if Site subcontractors verified the employment status of all employees in accordance with Federal requirements and, if unauthorized individuals accessed the site. During our field work, we reviewed 600 I-9 Forms from 21 subcontractors to verify whether Site subcontractors were using the I-9 Forms; and if the forms were accurate and complete. We also conducted a judgmental sample of individuals who accessed the Site during a six-month period to determine if there were any documentation anomalies.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Worker Environment Beryllium Characterization Study

This report summarizes the conclusion of regular monitoring of occupied buildings at the Nevada Test Site and North Las Vegas facility to determine the extent of beryllium (Be) contamination in accordance with Judgment of Needs 6 of the August 14, 2003, “Minnema Report.”

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

SLUDGE TREATMENT PROJECT KOP DISPOSITION - THERMAL AND GAS ANALYSIS FOR THE COLD VACUUM DRYING FACILITY

The purpose of this document is to present conceptual design phase thermal process calculations that support the process design and process safety basis for the cold vacuum drying of K Basin KOP material. This document is intended to demonstrate that the conceptual approach: (1) Represents a workable process design that is suitable for development in preliminary design; and (2) Will support formal safety documentation to be prepared during the definitive design phase to establish an acceptable safety basis. The Sludge Treatment Project (STP) is responsible for the disposition of Knock Out Pot (KOP) sludge within the 105-K West (KW) Basin. KOP sludge consists of size segregated material (primarily canister particulate) from the fuel and scrap cleaning process used in the Spent Nuclear Fuel process at K Basin. The KOP sludge will be pre-treated to remove fines and some of the constituents containing chemically bound water, after which it is referred to as KOP material. The KOP material will then be loaded into a Multi-Canister Overpack (MCO), dried at the Cold Vacuum Drying Facility (CVDF) and stored in the Canister Storage Building (CSB). This process is patterned after the successful drying of 2100 metric tons of spent fuel, and uses the same facilities and much of the same equipment that was used for drying fuel and scrap. Table ES-l present similarities and differences between KOP material and fuel and between MCOs loaded with these materials. The potential content of bound water bearing constituents limits the mass ofKOP material in an MCO load to a fraction of that in an MCO containing fuel and scrap; however, the small particle size of the KOP material causes the surface area to be significantly higher. This relatively large reactive surface area represents an input to the KOP thermal calculations that is significantly different from the calculations for fuel MCOs. The conceptual design provides for a copper insert block that limits the volume available to receive KOP material, enhances heat conduction, and functions as a heat source and sink during drying operations. This use of the copper insert represents a significant change to the thermal model compared to that used for the fuel calculations. A number of cases were run representing a spectrum of normal and upset conditions for the drying process. Dozens of cases have been run on cold vacuum drying of fuel MCOs. Analysis of these previous calculations identified four cases that provide a solid basis for judgments on the behavior of MCO in drying operations. These four cases are: (1) Normal Process; (2) Degraded vacuum pumping; (3) Open MCO with loss of annulus water; and (4) Cool down after vacuum drying. The four cases were run for two sets of input parameters for KOP MCOs: (1) a set of parameters drawn from safety basis values from the technical data book and (2) a sensitivity set using parameters selected to evaluate the impact of lower void volume and smaller particle size on MCO behavior. Results of the calculations for the drying phase cases are shown in Table ES-2. Cases using data book safety basis values showed dry out in 9.7 hours and heat rejection sufficient to hold temperature rise to less than 25 C. Sensitivity cases which included unrealistically small particle sizes and corresponding high reactive surface area showed higher temperature increases that were limited by water consumption. In this document and in the attachment (Apthorpe, R. and M.G. Plys, 2010) cases using Technical Databook safety basis values are referred to as nominal cases. In future calculations such cases will be called safety basis cases. Also in these documents cases using parameters that are less favorable to acceptable performance than databook safety values are referred to as safety cases. In future calculations such cases will be called sensitivity cases or sensitivity evaluations Calculations to be performed in support of the detailed design and formal safety basis documentation will expand the calculations presented in this document to include: additional features of the drying cycle, more realistic treatment of uranium metal consumption during oxidation, larger water inventory, longer time scales, and graphing of results of hydrogen gas concentration.

08 HYDROGEN↗