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At least 235 records · Page 13

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DOE OSTI2022

2022 MB3a Infrasound Sensor Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated an updated version of the MB3a infrasound sensor, designed by CEA and manufactured by SeismoWave. The purpose of this infrasound sensor evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, response, passband, sensitivity variation due to changes in barometric pressure and temperature, and sensitivity to acceleration. The MB3a infrasound sensors are being evaluated for use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Preparatory Commission to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2022

2022 Chaparral 64S Infrasound Sensor Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated a new version of the Chaparral 64S infrasound sensor, designed and manufactured by Chaparral Physics. The purpose of this infrasound sensor evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, response, passband, sensitivity variation due to changes in barometric pressure and temperature, and sensitivity to acceleration. The Chaparral 64S infrasound sensors are being evaluated for use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Preparatory Commission to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

DOE OSTI2020

2019 Hyperion 5313A and 5119A Infrasound Sensor Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated two variations of a new model of infrasound sensor, the Hyperion 5313A and 5119A. The purpose of this infrasound sensor evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, response, passband, sensitivity variation due to changes in static pressure and temperature, and sensitivity to vertical acceleration. The Hyperion infrasound sensors are being evaluated for potential use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO).

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

DOE OSTI2022

Nuclear Power Plant Physical Protection Recommendation Document

This document is aimed at providing guidance to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of International Nuclear Security’s (INS) country and regional teams for implementing effective physical protection systems (PPSs) for nuclear power plants (NPPs) to prevent the radiological consequences of sabotage. This recommendation document includes input from the Physical Protection Functional Team (PPFT), the Response Functional Team (RFT), and the Sabotage Functional Team (SFT) under INS. Specifically, this document provides insights into increasing and sustaining physical protection capabilities at INS partner countries’ NPP sites. Nuclear power plants should consider that the intent of this document is to provide a historical context as well as technologies and methodologies that may be applied to improve physical protection capabilities. It also refers to relevant guidance from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

DOE OSTI2024

2023 Reftek Wrangler Digitizer Type Approval Evaluation

Sandia National Laboratories has tested and evaluated the Reftek Wrangler digitizer. The Wrangler digitizers are intended to record sensor output for seismic and infrasound monitoring applications. The purpose of this digitizer evaluation is to measure the performance characteristics in such areas as power consumption, input impedance, sensitivity, full scale, self-noise, dynamic range, system noise, response, passband, and timing. The Wrangler digitizers are being evaluated for potential use in the International Monitoring System (IMS) and On-site Inspection (OSI) components of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2023

NDA Tech: Multimodal Data Fusion with 3D Gamma-Ray Imaging for Safeguards

The ultimate project goal is to improve quantitative results obtained by the IAEA with the H420 gamma ray imager. Distribution to the IAEA will be through incorporation of project results into the software provided with the device by our commercial partner, H3D, Inc. Toward achieving that goal, we have started discussions with H3D to identify the requisite software components and how they will mesh with their own internally developed contextual data systems and other extant software components. We have identified the coded-aperture response data cube as a key structure. Discussions on contextual imaging were informative but somewhat inconclusive as the project lead on contextual data (LBNL) has not been available.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Cyber Resiliency and the Implementation of a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System in an Urban Air Mobility Environment

With the growth in urban air mobility systems and the increasing reliance on interconnected technologies, ensuring the security of these complex infrastructures has become critical. As cities evolve into smart urban centers, the vulnerability to cyber threats escalates, possibly endangering citizens’ safety and the efficiency of transportation networks. In response to these challenges, this paper presents a study on implementing a Host-Based Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) tailored explicitly to urban mobility environments’ unique demands. This study explores the design, development, and deployment of the proposed HIDS, focusing on its adaptability to monitor the hybrid nature of the urban mobility environment. Leveraging machine learning algorithms and anomaly detection techniques, the HIDS is equipped to continuously monitor and analyze the behavior of individual host systems, vehicles, and devices, thereby providing a proactive approach to threat detection. Implementing a HIDS is a pivotal strategy for enhancing cyber resiliency, as it gives an organization granular visibility into internal system activities, enables rapid detection and response to anomalous behavior and cyber threats, and fortifies the organization’s overall cybersecurity posture. In conclusion, this paper highlights the significance of host-based intrusion detection in urban mobility environments and underscores the necessity of tailored security solutions to safeguard against emerging cyber threats.

UAM↗

DOE OSTI2020

The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law

During the 63rd regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, as part of Norway's statement to the General Conference, Mr. Auden Halvorsen, State Secretary for Norway, made the following statement about transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs): "Deployment of transportable nuclear power plants—TNPPs—demands our attention. The Agency must intensify its conversations of all aspects of the safety and security of such facilities. . . . The scope and applicability of existing requirements and instruments need to be clarified and developed including dialogue with the International Maritime Organization [IMO]." Ensuring the security of TNPPs is essential for their deployment and implementation. TNPPs may be floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), which bring together elements of nuclear security related to the nuclear power plant with elements of maritime security. Insofar as an FNPP weds the principles of nuclear and maritime security, it also weds the two domains, the ancient traditions and contemporary practices of maritime law with the contemporary practices of nuclear law. Fundamentally, this raises the question, what are the legal requirements for the security of a FNPP? Although both maritime law and nuclear law have established regimes for security through various legal instruments, does an FNPP expose gaps between the current international legal instruments? The previous question of whether international legal regimes define requirements for the security of FNPPs, but a threshold question remains: what is an FNPP? For purposes of nuclear and maritime security, is an FNPP a facility, is an FNPP a vessel and therefore a transport, or does an FNPP change its status based upon temporal and spatial considerations such as when it is docked at a port generating power or in transit to its destination? This set of questions, and others addressed later in this article, highlights that the issue is not merely a question about security but intersects elements of safety whether an FNPP is in uncharted waters of the international regime for both nuclear and maritime law. Here, this paper addresses many of the questions posed above related to the security regulations for an FNPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

DOE OSTI2020

Analysis of Nuclear Materials on Both Sides of Regulatory Control: from IAEA Safeguards to Global Counter-Nuclear Smuggling

Global nuclear security is dependent upon the sustained and verifiable control of radiological and nuclear (R/N) materials within nuclear facilities, under the administrative purview of national governments. It is the responsibility of each country to account for their R/N materials holdings and to ensure that they do not escape regulatory control and fall into the wrong hands. The Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence (NSDD) is tasked with providing support to foreign partners in developing the tools and expertise to detect, disrupt, and investigate R/N materials encountered out of regulatory control, in such circumstances as at border crossings and other checkpoints, or in the course of routine policework. Thankfully, such incidents are infrequent, and NSDD continues to work bilaterally with partner countries to strengthen their capabilities to combat nuclear smuggling and trafficking incidents in their countries. For the vast majority of R/N materials that remain under regulatory control, however, it is critical that their safe storage and use be independently verified. Even a single loss incident of R/N materials, particularly of special nuclear materials (highly-enriched uranium and plutonium) has the potential to cause a catastrophe. How can the international community be assured that R/N materials currently under national regulatory control remain there?

38 RADIATION CHEMISTRY, RADIOCHEMISTRY, AND NUCLEA↗

DOE OSTI2020

Applying Waveform Correlation to Mining Blasts Using a Global Sparse Network

Agencies that monitor for underground nuclear tests are interested in techniques that automatically characterize mining blasts to reduce the human analyst effort required to produce high-quality event bulletins. Waveform correlation is effective in finding similar waveforms from repeating seismic events, including mining blasts. We report the results of an experiment that uses waveform templates recorded by multiple International Monitoring System stations of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty for up to 10 years prior to detect and identify mining blasts that occur during single weeks of study. We discuss approaches for template selection, threshold setting, and event detection that are specialized for mining blasts and a sparse, global network. We apply the approaches to two different weeks of study for each of two geographic regions, Wyoming and Scandinavia, to evaluate the potential for establishing a set of standards for waveform correlation processing of mining blasts that can be effective for operational monitoring systems with a sparse network. We compare candidate events detected with our processing methods to the Reviewed Event Bulletin of the International Data Centre to develop an intuition about potential reduction in analyst workload.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

DOE OSTI2020

Sandia Nuclear Cartridge Concept

Nuclear power offers the promise of long-term electrical power for remote areas. Recent advances in passive safety and long-life cores make a reactor that can be operated autonomously for 20 years or more a real possibility. This white paper discusses a reactor concept that offers the potential for further development, resulting in a permanently hermetically-sealed "nuclear cartridge." The term "nuclear cartridge" is meant to imply a nuclear energy source that can be inserted into a site and operated autonomously until its energy has been depleted, then withdrawn and replaced by another cartridge. The concept can be scaled for various sizes, ranging from about 1 megawatt-electric (MWe) to about 100 MWe. The paper also discusses the concept of Integrated Safety, Operations, Security, and Safeguards (ISOSS) by design as it applies to this reactor design. Finally, a discussion of smart grids and how they can benefit the transfer of power to the end user is included. The Nuclear Cartridge concept has been developed with the following characteristics in mind: highly reliable autonomous operation coupled with international monitoring, requiring minimal on-site operations personnel; walkaway passively safe design; cartridge replacement cycle on the order of 20 years; load following capability; physical security by design requiring minimal security personnel during operations; and proliferation resistance by design. As illustrated in figure 1, integrating the reactor with advanced power conversion, smart grids, and other sources of energy results in a resilient and sustainable energy source.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Non-invasive Pipe Pressure Monitoring for Safeguards

Our project explores a new solution to complement current safeguards toolbox by independently, and noninvasively, determining the pressure inside uranium hexafluoride (UF 6 )-carrying Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GCEP) pipes. Proof-of-principle, non-invasive pipe pressure monitoring tests were conducted through measurements of hoop and axial strain using an optical-interference dilatometry technique based on fiber Bragg gratings (FBGs) inscribed in the core of telecommunication-type 125 µm diameter optical fibers. The fibers were affixed to commercial stainless steel and aluminum tubes and pipes of the type expected to be found at GCEP’s, each measuring four inches in diameter. When the internal air pressure in the pipes changes their external diameter and length follow, and the pitch in the FBG shrinks and/or expands accordingly. In turn, these changes result in a shift of the light wavelength reflected by the FBGs. Several FBGs physically attached to the pipe, as well as control FBGs not attached, were interrogated during the process using state-of-the-art commercial interrogators that operate on swept-wavelength laser technology. Strains measured were contrasted against calculations based on the known elastic and mechanical properties of the pipes. Good agreement is found, and strategies are proposed for further improvement of the experimental resolution as well as future implementation of this novel approach for GCEP safeguards.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2025

Xenith Scalable Security Economics

These slides present a high level overview of an ongoing project sponsored by NNSA. The project is focused on economic analysis of physical security design of micro reactors. The slides will be presented to NNSA's office of International Nuclear Security (INS) at a program update meeting on May 28th, 2025.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗

DOE OSTI2022

Vision 0.3.2 Users Guide: Revision 0

Vision is a research software application developed by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that incorporates the scientific and operational expertise for reviewing data from treaty monitoring radionuclide stations. These stations are part of a worldwide network to monitor for nuclear explosions, and the data they produce are critical to make the determination of whether a sample is from a nuclear explosion or some other source (i.e., nuclear reactor or medical isotope production facility). Stations deliver their measurements and system status to the International Monitoring System (IMS), which forwards it via email to all subscribers. Vision provides tools for viewing and analyzing these stations’ state of health data.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

DOE OSTI2021

Material Accountancy Performance Indicator Toolkit

The MAPIT - Material Accountancy Performance Indicator Toolkit includes statistical tests and calculations based on open literature that calculate safeguards metrics. The tool can be used with user supplied datasets or with the several included datasets which are generated from models that are maintained at Sandia National Laboratories. The models are not included with the software. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525. SAND2021-0467 O

Shoman, Nathan↗

DOE OSTI2021

2020 Annual Site Environmental Report for Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico

Sandia National Laboratories, hereinafter referred to as Sandia, is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration. This Annual Site Environmental Report was prepared in accordance with and as required by DOE O 231.1B, Admin Change 1, Environment, Safety and Health Reporting , and is approved for public release. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its management and operating contractor for Sandia are committed to safeguarding the environment, continually assessing sustainability practices, and ensuring the validity and accuracy of the monitoring data presented here. This report summarizes the environmental protection, restoration, and monitoring programs in place for Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico (SNL/NM), during calendar year 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

DOE OSTI2024

An Assessment of the Safeguards Implications of Particle and Alloy Formation in MSRs

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) present unique challenges for applying safeguards measures and differ significantly from traditional nuclear reactors. Although the special fissionable materials within MSRs principally exist as dissolved species within the fuel salt, key actinides of interest may also be converted to solid phases including alloys and precipitated oxides via chemical and electrochemical reactions. These solid-phase components will complicate the nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC) approaches that have, so far, primarily targeted measurements of the liquid salt itself. For example, most of the proposed monitoring and characterization methods for MSRs are reliant on homogeneity of the salt and the ability to maintain accountable materials in solution. Solid deposits and particulates could invalidate the assumption of homogeneity and necessitate the use of new models and measurement tools to permit a full accounting of all nuclear material in an MSR. To address this, the likelihood of solids formation in MSRs, estimated the rate at which these solids could form, and assessed the monitoring tools that are available to account for the presence of these materials were examined. Specifically, three solid forming mechanisms were investigated, including (1) the accumulation of actinides within the MSR’s structural materials due to alloying, (2) the accumulation of actinides within noble metal fission product particulates, and (3) the generation of actinide oxides from interactions with salt impurities. These modeling-informed studies were completed with considerations to both fluoride- and chloride-containing salts. It was determined that, although measurable amounts of special fissionable material were expected to alloy with the structural elements and fission products, the predicted amounts were below levels considered as significant quantities (SQ) by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, it was determined that sufficiently large oxygen concentrations could potentially lead to significant quantities of special fissionable material being converted to solid oxide phases. As such, a comparative study of technologies that are commercially available to assist in monitoring and accountancy of this material was presented. Policy implications, design recommendations, and suggestions for follow-on experimental work were also presented to further assist reactor vendors in designing and controlling the fuel salt chemistry to address potential safeguards considerations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

DOE OSTI2020

2020 LLNL Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program

The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) Nuclear Science and Security Summer Internship Program (NS 3 IP) is designed to give graduate students an opportunity to come to LLNL for 8–10 weeks of hands-on research. Students conduct research under the supervision of a staff scientist, attend a weekly lecture series, interact with other students, and present their work in poster format at the end of the program. Students also have the opportunity to meet staff scientists one-on-one, participate in LLNL facility tours (e.g., the National Ignition Facility and Center for Accelerator Mass Spectrometry), and gain a better understanding of the various science programs at LLNL. Due to the travel and access restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 NS 3 IP was organized as an “all-virtual” internship program. With LLNL’s extensive institutional support, students accessed the laboratory’s cyberinfrastructure through a secure virtual desktop environment and all seminars, mentor interactions, summer presentations, and laboratory tours were performed remotely. While this virtual internship format did not allow for hands-on laboratory research projects, both the interns and their mentors constructed creative research projects that maximized student exposure to nuclear science research that is relevant to DTRA and LLNL interests in nuclear security.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗