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At least 235 records · Page 13

Hanford Site-Wide Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis

The site-wide probabilistic seismic hazard analysis (PSHA) of the Hanford Site (hereafter Hanford PSHA) in southeastern Washington State was undertaken by Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and its contractors for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of River Protection (ORP), DOE Richland Operations Office (RL), and Energy Northwest to provide a detailed characterization of the vibratory ground motion hazard at the Hanford Site from potential future earthquakes. The study was conducted to fulfill the requirements for DOE facilities as well as those for commercial nuclear power plants, through a collaboration and joint sponsorship between DOE and Energy Northwest. The study fulfills the requirement to develop an update to the PSHA as required by DOE Order. In addition, the study fulfills the requirement from the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that Energy Northwest conduct a PSHA using Senior Seismic Hazard Analysis Committee (SSHAC) Level 3 procedures for the Columbia Generating Station. Because the Hanford Site includes several facility sites, the PSHA has been conducted such that seismic hazard is calculated at five sites that are located across the Hanford Site.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Vision guided landing of an an autonomous helicopter in hazardous terrain

Future robotic space missions will employ a precision soft-landing capability that will enable exploration of previously inaccessible sites that have strong scientific significance. To enable this capability, a fully autonomous onboard system that identifies and avoids hazardous features such as steep slopes and large rocks is required. Such a system will also provide greater functionality in unstructured terrain to unmanned aerial vehicles. This paper describes an algorithm for landing hazard avoidance based on images from a single moving camera. The core of the algorithm is an efficient application of structure from motion to generate a dense elevation map of the landing area. Hazards are then detected in this map and a safe landing site is selected. The algorithm has been implemented on an autonomous helicopter testbed and demonstrated four times resulting in the first autonomous landing of an unmanned helicopter in unknown and hazardous terrain.

Mars Landing↗

Hydrometeorological Hazards: Monitoring, Forecasting, Risk Assessment, and Socioeconomic Responses

Hydrometeorological hazards are caused by extreme meteorological and climate events, such as floods, droughts, hurricanes,tornadoes, or landslides. They account for a dominant fraction of natural hazards and occur in all regions of the world, although the frequency and intensity of certain hazards and societies vulnerability to them differ between regions. Severe storms, strong winds, floods, and droughts develop at different spatial and temporal scales, but all can become disasters that cause significant infrastructure damage and claim hundreds of thousands of lives annually worldwide. Oftentimes, multiple hazards can occur simultaneously or trigger cascading impacts from one extreme weather event. For example, in addition to causing injuries, deaths, and material damage, a tropical storm can also result in flooding and mudslides, which can disrupt water purification and sewage disposal systems, cause overflow of toxic wastes, andincrease propagation of mosquito-borne diseases.

hydrometeorological↗

Standalone Hazard Evaluation and Refinement From Instrument Findings (S.H.E.R.I.F)

SHERIF is a novel algorithm which defines a unique, non-iterative method for the combination of LiDAR scans into a Digital Elevation Map (DEM) and the simultaneous evaluation of that DEM for Safe Site Selection (SSL) and Hazard Detection (HD). This creates a sensor independent method for a spacecraft conducting Entry Descent and Landing (EDL) operations to synthesize terrain scans and generate a more complete and evolving understanding of the landing site topography as well as the associated hazards. SHERIF aims to increase safety and mission success probability by more effectively using the data from a single sensor to increase situational awareness, knowledge of the landing site and its hazards, as well as informing a more streamlined transition from Terrain Relative Navigation (TRN) to Hazard Relative Navigation (HRN) during descent.

Hazard Detection↗

Demonstration of Integrated Hazard Analysis for Digital Reactor Trip Systems

Digital instrumentation and control (I&C) upgrades are a vital research area for nuclear industry. Despite their performance benefits, deployment of digital I&C in nuclear power plants (NPPs) has been limited. Digital I&C systems exhibit complex failure modes including common cause failures (CCFs) which can be difficult to identify. This paper describes the development of a redundancy-guided application of the Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the hazard analysis of digital I&C in advanced NPPs. The resulting Redundancy-guided System-theoretic Hazard Analysis (RESHA) is applied for the case study of a representative state-of-the-art digital reactor trip system. The analysis qualitatively and systematically identifies the most critical CCFs and other hazards of digital I&C systems. Ultimately, RESHA can help researchers make informed decisions for how, and to what degree, defensive measures such as redundancy, diversity, and defense-in-depth can be used to mitigate or eliminate the potential hazards of digital I&C systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Collaborative working is driving progress in hazard and risk reduction delivery at Sellafield - 16387

A new way of working has been adopted at the Sellafield site in the United Kingdom which is delivering benefits in terms of accelerating hazard and risk reduction safely and securely at the site. This new way of working involves a collaborative approach on crucial aspects of the plan of work for Sellafield between: - Sellafield Ltd (the site's management and operations contractor), - The Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (the site's owner and Sellafield Ltd's customer), - The Office for Nuclear Regulation (the UK's nuclear safety and security regulator), - The Environment Agency (England's environmental regulator), - The UK Government's Department of Energy and Climate Change, - The UK Government's Shareholder Executive, part of the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. The new way of working is founded upon fully aligning the individual strategies of each of these six organisations towards the common goal of accelerated risk and hazard reduction and then ensuring good communications so these strategies remain fully aligned. To this end a number of issues were identified by the six organisations which were considered to be slowing the progress of the risk and hazard reduction work, from which a set of 'strategic themes' was developed to facilitate different ways of thinking and so solve these issues. The strategic themes are: - Looking for blockers and how they can be removed, - Avoiding overly complex solutions by utilising the concept of fit for purpose, - The effective use of resources, - Prioritisation arrangements, - Incentivisation, - The appetite for risk, - Avoiding distractions and diversions, - Effective use of communications so that the more effective and efficient ways of working, and the improvements that are generated, are promulgated throughout Sellafield Ltd. These strategic themes have been applied with great effect in a number of areas delivering risk reduction benefits. For example: - The removal of ageing fuel from Sellafield's oldest pond, the Pile Fuel Storage Pond; a significant milestone in the site's hazard and risk reduction agenda. - Implementing an alternative ILW approach. - Managing stocks of Highly Active Liquor (HAL). - 'Re-purposing' existing Waste Management Facilities. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Issues Affecting the Assessment of Impacts of Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste - 18177

BIOPROTA is an international collaborative forum that seeks to address the key uncertainties in long term assessments of radionuclide and other contaminant releases into the environment arising from solid radioactive waste disposal. (see www.bioprota.org). Two workshops have been organized through the BIOPROTA forum to consider the non-radiological post-disposal impacts of radioactive waste disposal. In these workshops, it was noted that, ideally, the assessment of radionuclides and hazardous materials should be such that consistent assumptions and criteria are used in risk evaluation and that in cases where this is not possible, a clear understanding of the reasons why needs to be provided. Accordingly, a detailed review was organized through BIOPROTA to provide information to support development of a consensus on how to address this issue. The study suggests that there is a continuing need for some common measure of hazard that supports identification of risk management priorities for mixed hazardous waste. Without it, effective optimization of management of these mixed hazardous wastes will be restricted. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Review of Hazards and Accidentology of an Integrated Energy Systems to Nuclear Power Plant Safety

With the interconnectivity of industrial processes in a nuclear integrated energy system (IES) the primary issue becomes the safety of the nuclear power plant (NPP). The industrial processes being supported are assumed to have been in colocation prior to the addition of an NPP. Do the hazards from each process reach beyond the perimeter of the plant to affect the NPP? This paper reviews hazards and accident statistics from processes in an IES as a first step to answer this question. Hazards and accidentology discussed cover hydrogen, ammonia, syngas, methanol, synthetic fuels, and oil refineries. They include mainly fire, explosion, and toxicity in varying degrees. Historical accident statistics are given whenever available, and accident causes are evaluated and ranked based on their frequencies. Lessons learned from previous accidents are presented. Future work will focus on utilizing the data collected for accidentology of the industrial processes to perform Failure Modes and Effects Analysis and analyze the impacts of additional hazards on the colocated existing nuclear power plant or newly built advanced nuclear reactor. The analysis will provide the frequency and consequence of external events that can affect the NPP.

08 - HYDROGEN↗

DRAINING HAZARDOUS FLUIDS DURING BUILDING 221-1F DEACTIVATION AT THE SAVANNAH RIVER SITE

Several years ago, SRS completed a four year mission to decommission {approx}250 excess facilities. As part of that effort, SRS deactivated multiple facilities (e.g. Building 247-F, Naval Fuels Facility, and Building 211-F, Outside Facilities for F-Canyon) that contained extensive piping systems filled with hazardous material (e.g. nitric acid). Draining of hazardous materials from piping was successfully completed in all facilities without incident. In early 2009, the decommissioning program at SRS was restarted as a result of funding made available by the American Recovery & Reinvestment Act (ARRA). Under ARRA, draining of piping containing hazardous material was initiated in multiple facilities including Building 221-1F (or A-Line). This paper describes and reviews the draining of piping containing hazardous materials at A-Line, with emphasis on an incident involving the draining of nitric acid. The paper is intended to be a resource for engineers, planners, and project managers, who face similar draining challenges.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

ORNL IntelligentFreight Initiative:Enhanced End-to-End Supply Chain Visibility of Security Sensitive Hazardous Materials

In the post September 11, 2001 (9/11) world the federal government has increased its focus on the manufacturing, distributing, warehousing, and transporting of hazardous materials. In 2002, Congress mandated that the Transportation Security Agency (TSA) designate a subset of hazardous materials that could pose a threat to the American public when transported in sufficiently large quantities. This subset of hazardous materials, which could be weaponized or subjected to a nefarious terrorist act, was designated as Security Sensitive Hazardous Materials (SSHM). Radioactive materials (RAM) were of special concern because actionable intelligence had revealed that Al Qaeda desired to develop a homemade nuclear device or a dirty bomb to use against the United States (US) or its allies.1 Because of this clear and present danger, it is today a national priority to develop and deploy technologies that will provide for visibility and real-time exception notification of SSHM and Radioactive Materials in Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) in international commerce. Over the past eight years Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been developing, implementing, and deploying sensor-based technologies to enhance supply chain visibility. ORNL s research into creating a model for shipments, known as IntelligentFreight, has investigated sensors and sensor integration methods at numerous testbeds throughout the national supply chain. As a result of our research, ORNL believes that most of the information needed by supply chain partners to provide shipment visibility and exceptions-based reporting already exists but is trapped in numerous proprietary or agency-centric databases.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Comparative hazard analysis and toxicological modeling of diverse nanomaterials using the embryonic zebrafish (EZ) metric of toxicity

The integration of rapid assays, large data sets, informatics and modeling can overcome current barriers in understanding nanomaterial structure-toxicity relationships by providing a weight-of-the-evidence mechanism to generate hazard rankings for nanomaterials. Here we present the use of a rapid, low-cost assay to perform screening-level toxicity evaluations of nanomaterials in vivo. Calculated EZ Metric scores, a combined measure of morbidity and mortality, were established at realistic exposure levels and used to develop a predictive model of nanomaterial toxicity. Hazard ranking and clustering analysis of 68 diverse nanomaterials revealed distinct patterns of toxicity related to both core composition and outermost surface chemistry of nanomaterials. The resulting clusters guided the development of a predictive model of gold nanoparticle toxicity to embryonic zebrafish. In addition, our findings suggest that risk assessments based on the size and core composition of nanomaterials alone may be wholly inappropriate, especially when considering complex engineered nanomaterials. These findings reveal the need to expeditiously increase the availability of quantitative measures of nanomaterial hazard and broaden the sharing of that data and knowledge to support predictive modeling. In addition, research should continue to focus on methodologies for developing predictive models of nanomaterial hazard based on sub-lethal responses to low dose exposures.

77 NANOSCIENCE AND NANOTECHNOLOGY↗

Natural Hazards Perspectives on Integrated, Coordinated, Open, Networked (ICON) Science

This article is about the state of ICON principles Goldman et al. (2021), https://doi.org/10.1029/2021EO153180 in natural hazards and a discussion on the opportunities and challenges of adopting them. Natural hazards pose risks to society, infrastructure, and the environment. Hazard interactions and their cascading phenomena in space and time can further intensify the impacts. Natural hazards’ risks are expected to increase in the future due to environmental, demographic, and socioeconomic changes. It is important to quantify and effectively communicate risks to inform the design and implementation of risk mitigation and adaptation strategies. Multihazard multisector risk management poses several nontrivial challenges, including: (a) integrated risk assessment, (b) Earth system data-model fusion, (c) uncertainty quantification and communication, and (d) crossing traditional disciplinary boundaries. Here, we review these challenges, highlight current research and operational endeavors, and underscore diverse research opportunities. We emphasize the need for integrated approaches, coordinated processes, open science, and networked efforts (ICON) for multihazard multisector risk management.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Hydrometeorological Hazards: Monitoring, Forecasting, Risk Assessment, and Socioeconomic Responses

Hydrometeorological hazards are caused by extreme meteorological and climate events, such as floods, droughts, hurricanes, tornadoes, or landslides. They account for a dominant fraction of natural hazards and occur in all regions of the world, although the frequency and intensity of certain hazards, and society’s vulnerability to them, differs between regions. Severe storms, strong winds, floods and droughts develop at different spatial and temporal scales, but all can become disasters that cause significant infrastructure damage and claim hundreds of thousands of lives annually worldwide. Oftentimes, multiple hazards can occur simultaneously or trigger cascading impacts from one extreme weather event. For example, in addition to causing injuries, deaths and material damage, a tropical storm can also result in flooding and mudslides, which can disrupt water purification and sewage disposal systems, cause overflow of toxic wastes, and increase propagation of mosquito-borne diseases.

Wu, Huan↗

Preliminary Assessment of the Surface Fault Rupture Hazard in the Vicinity of the Biosafety Level 3 Laboratory (BSL-3)

The probability of seismic hazards, in particular fault rupture hazard under or in the close proximity to the BSL-3 structure has been considered based on earlier estimates of surface fault rupture hazard (SFRH) conducted for the CMR site. Although the CMR probabilistic fault displacement hazard assessment (PFDHA) predates the most recent LANL ground motion assessment, there are relatively simple adjustments that can made to the PFDHA so that a conservative estimate can be made for the BSL-3 structure.

42 ENGINEERING↗

2012 Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Minimization Report

Waste minimization and pollution prevention are inherent goals within all the operating procedures of Los Alamos National Security, LLC (LANS). The US Department of Energy (DOE) and LANS are required to submit an annual hazardous waste minimization report to the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) in accordance with the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit. The report was prepared pursuant to the requirements of Section 2.9 of the LANL Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, which was issued in November 2010. This report describes the hazardous waste minimization program (a component of the overall Waste Minimization/Pollution Prevention [WMin/PP] Program) administered by the Environmental Stewardship Group (ENV-ES). This report also supports the waste minimization and pollution prevention goals of the Environmental Programs Directorate (EP) organizations that are responsible for implementing remediation activities and describes its programs to incorporate waste reduction practices into remediation activities and procedures.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Los Alamos National Laboratory Hazardous Waste Facility Permit Community Relations Plan

Hazardous waste management activities are regulated by the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) pursuant to New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act (HWA; Chapter 74, Article 4 NMSA 1978) and regulations under the Act. In 1989, NMED issued the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (EPA ID Number NM0890010515- 1) that established standards for the Laboratory to manage, store, and treat hazardous wastes on-site and to undertake the closure and post closure care of permitted waste management units.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Guidance on Hazard and Safety Analyses of LPG Spills on Water

In 2004, at the request of the Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) prepared a report, "Guidance on the Risk and Safety Analysis of Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spills Over Water". That report provided a framework for assessing hazards and identifying approaches to minimize the consequences to people and property from an LNG spill over water. Because of increasing domestic U.S. supplies of natural gas and associated by products, such as liquefied propane gas (LPG), the United states Coast Guard requested that Sandia assess the general scale of possible hazards for a breach and spill of an LPG carrier. Because of the broad range of LPG carriers types -- refrigerated and pressurized, ships and barges, Sandia chose to focus this analysis on the larger LPG refrigerated systems. With cargo capacities ranging up to 100,000 m 3 , these types of ships can be expected to support potential increased LPG exports. Sandia assessed potential accidental and intentional threats, and based on LPG carrier configurations and designs, estimated potential breach sizes, spill rates and volumes, and conducted fire, vapor dispersion, and detonation hazard analyses. This report summarizes the analyses conducted, the expected range of potential hazards from an associated refrigerated LPG carrier spill over water, and risk management approaches to minimize consequences to people and property from such a spill.

03 NATURAL GAS↗

Grid-scale Energy Storage Hazard Analysis & Design Objectives for System Safety

Battery based energy storage systems are becoming a critical part of a modernized, resilient power system. However, batteries have a unique combination of hazards that can make design and engineering of battery systems difficult. This report presents a systematic hazard analysis of a hypothetical, grid scale lithium-ion battery powerplant to produce sociotechnical "design objectives" for system safety. We applied system's theoretic process analysis (STPA) for the hazard analysis which is broken into four steps: purpose definition, modeling the safety control structure, identifying unsafe control actions, and identifying loss scenarios. The purpose of the analysis was defined as to prevent event outcomes that can result in loss of battery assets due to fires and explosions, loss of health or life due to battery fires and explosions, and loss of energy storage services due to non- operational battery assets. The STPA analysis resulted in identification of six loss scenarios, and their constituent unsafe control actions, which were used to define a series of design objectives that can be applied to reduce the likelihood and severity of thermal events in battery systems. These design objectives, in all or any subset, can be utilized by utilities and other industry stakeholders as "design requirements" in their storage request for proposals (RFPs) and for evaluation of proposals. Further, these design objectives can help to protect firefighters and bring a system back to full functionality after a thermal event. We also comment on the hazards of flow battery technologies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗