Game approach to the problem of selecting optimal parameters of a dynamic system
Game theory for optimal parameter control of payload delivery by limited thrust engine space flight
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Game theory for optimal parameter control of payload delivery by limited thrust engine space flight
Reduction of solution of game of pursuit for survival payoff to solution of Cauchy problem for first order partial differential equation
Simulation of pursuit-evasion differential game using variational method, comparing performance of human pilot to optimal pursuer
In several critical infrastructures, the cyber and physical parts are correlated so that disruptions to one affect the other and hence the whole system. These correlations may be exploited to strategically launch components attacks, and hence must be accounted for ensuring the infrastructure resilience, specified by its survival probability. We characterize the cyber-physical interactions at two levels: (i) the failure correlation function specifies the conditional survival probability of cyber sub-infrastructure given the physical sub-infrastructure as a function of their marginal probabilities, and (ii) the individual survival probabilities of both sub-infrastructures are characterized by first-order differential conditions. We formulate a resilience problem for infrastructures composed of discrete components as a game between the provider and attacker, wherein their utility functions consist of an infrastructure survival probability term and a cost term expressed in terms of the number of components attacked and reinforced. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions and sensitivity functions that highlight the dependence of infrastructure resilience on the cost term, correlation function and sub-infrastructure survival probabilities. These results generalize earlier ones based on linear failure correlation functions and independent component failures. We apply the results to models of cloud computing infrastructures and energy grids.
In this paper we study two-person nonzero-sum games for continuous-time jump processes with the randomized history-dependent strategies under the finite-horizon payoff criterion. The state space is countable, and the transition rates and payoff functions are allowed to be unbounded from above and from below. Under the suitable conditions, we introduce a new topology for the set of all randomized Markov multi-strategies and establish its compactness and metrizability. Then by constructing the approximating sequences of the transition rates and payoff functions, we show that the optimal value function for each player is a unique solution to the corresponding optimality equation and obtain the existence of a randomized Markov Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we illustrate the applications of our main results with a controlled birth and death system.
While the general theory for the terminal-initial value problem for mean-field games (MFGs) has achieved a substantial progress, the corresponding forward–forward problem is still poorly understood—even in the one-dimensional setting. Here, we consider one-dimensional forward–forward MFGs, study the existence of solutions and their long-time convergence. First, we discuss the relation between these models and systems of conservation laws. In particular, we identify new conserved quantities and study some qualitative properties of these systems. Next, we introduce a class of wave-like equations that are equivalent to forward–forward MFGs, and we derive a novel formulation as a system of conservation laws. For first-order logarithmic forward–forward MFG, we establish the existence of a global solution. Then, we consider a class of explicit solutions and show the existence of shocks. Finally, we examine parabolic forward–forward MFGs and establish the long-time convergence of the solutions.
In recent years, demand response (DR) has been explored as a fundamental strategy for demand-side management due to its advantages in mediating intermittency of renewable energy generation, load shifting, etc. To engage customers in DR programs, several deterministic price-based DR strategies have been developed and implemented. However, the stochastic weather conditions and occupants' consumption behaviors often make the deterministic solution less robust to uncertainties. In this paper, with the consideration of the uncertainties, a stochastic Stackelberg game is proposed to model the price-demand negotiation between a distributed system operator and load aggregators, where the virtual battery constraints are extracted from the building thermostatically controlled loads (TCLs)‘ characteristics to guarantee comfortable TCLs' levels. Following the negotiation, a priority-based control method is used to allocate the optimal aggregated power DR profile at the building level and track the power signal. Several groups of experiments have demonstrated the effectiveness and robustness of the stochastic solutions.
Demand-side management is a fundamental up-to-date strategy that transforms the traditional power grid to a modern smart grid where the flexible pricing mechanisms play a critical role in its successful implementation. In this paper, the pricing-demand response between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the DSO is the price maker that adjusts its strategy based on observed responses from LAs. With the concerns of computational cost and privacy protection, two distributed solution approaches, particle swarm optimization and pattern search algorithm, are conducted and compared with the classical centralized backward induction approach. Numerical results on a small case study demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed distributed solution approaches in leveraging flexible demand response potential.
In this paper, a bilevel electricity pricing and demand response game between a distribution system operator (DSO) and load aggregators (LAs) is considered, and a robust decision model is proposed for the DSO to deal with the uncertainties from the wholesale market prices and demand consumptions of LAs. With the max-min objective at the upper level, the robust bilevel model is converted into a single level model by the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and prime-dual transformation. Several groups of experiments have been conducted based on different preferences on uncertainty gaps and peak load reductions to show its effectiveness. After-the-fact scenario analysis has indicated that the robust solution is more beneficial in reducing the risk of inaccurate predictions as compared to the risk neutral strategy.
Understanding human behavior is crucial in anticipating adversarial actions during cyberattacks. The Criminal Justice (CJ) discipline offers the necessary frameworks to unpack the complex facets of adversarial behavior and movement, and should therefore be leveraged for their possible contributions to the area of proactive cybersecurity. Yet the discipline remains weak at training current and future CJ workforce on these matters in a hands-on manner. This paper presents a cybersecurity training exercise where a power grid simulator is used to educate CJ students via experiential learning about concepts of cyberattacks and cybersecurity as well as exposing them to doing hands-on cybersecurity field research. The paper reports on Game use as an important opportunity to observe humans put under additional stress in operating conditions. The paper discusses what CJ students learn from multidisciplinary simulation-based exercises, the challenges and limitations they face, and how training this workforce could help contribute towards proactive cyberdefense of critical infrastructure.
Recently, with the spread of COVID-19 pandemic, emergency supply allocation system is drawing more and more social attention. Emergency supply allocation system is an important part of emergency governance system. It reflects social organizations’ credibility, public safety, and the modernization level of social governance. However, emergency supply allocation system still has some problems, such as information asymmetry, different desires of participants, unreasonable allocation, and so on. At present, it is widely accepted that the advantage of blockchain in co-governance could be of great help in solving above problems. And in order to distinguish the effect of blockchain to the emergency supply allocation, the paper builds a tripartite evolutionary game model among the government, social organizations, and the public to analyse the impact of blockchain platform on emergency supply allocation. The simulation analysis shows the following: (1) The strategy choices of the government have a crucial impact on the evolution and stability of social organizations’ strategies. It needs a long-term process to guide social organizations practicing active allocation, and the government should accelerate to build the blockchain platform to promote this process. (2) With the help of blockchain platform, the increment of penalty intensity of the government is conductive to increasing the probabilities that social organizations practice active allocation and the government practices strict supervision. (3) Blockchain platform has a significant impact on social organizations’ choice for active allocation in many aspects, such as the positive and negative effects of social organizations, effect’s increasing multiple, and the cost of the public informing. In the end, some suggestions are presented to improve the co-governance of emergency supply allocation.
This is a set of Unity components that use the Unity game engine's transform and collision systems to provide a reasonably representative approximation of any number of unique radiation sources and the collective dose they deliver to a user.
Trust in a microelectronics-based systems can be characterized as the level of confidence that the system is free of subversive alterations inserted by a malicious adversary during system development. Outkin et al. recently developed GPLADD, a game-theoretic framework that enables trust analysis through a set of mathematical models that represent multi-step attack graphs and contention between system attackers and defenders. This paper extends GPLADD to include detection of attacks on development processes and defender decision processes that occur in response to detection events. The paper provides mathematical details for implementing attack detection and demonstrates the models on an example system. The authors further demonstrate how optimal defender strategies vary when solution concepts and objective functions are modified.
SWESST Jeopardy is a trivia game with topics like safety, security, the environment, and LOSA, with the goal of providing activity-based learning for students and staff alike.
Wide-spread adoption of machine learning and distributed energy production has the potential to fundamentally change behaviours of energy markets. In practice, along with the benefits, previously unseen instabilities have begun emerging in markets currently embracing these technologies. In this report we study electricity markets as dynamical systems arising in smooth games, where energy consumers are modelled as gradient-based learners who interact on a graph through distributed energy producers. We give simple examples of how instabilities can arise even when the consumers’ local objectives seem reasonable and how these instabilities can be remedied. Drawing insights from these examples, we begin developing a general model of optimization-driven electricity market dynamics and give conditions for ensuring local Nash equilibria of the system are stable fixed points of the dynamics. Our results demonstrate how models of electricity market dynamics might be used for deriving formal guarantees in order to stabilize markets and enact regulatory policies in the face of market shocks.
Fundamentally and practically, quantum networks and conventional networks are inextricably tied, since the basic quantum protocols such as teleportation require both networks and the conventional network fiber is also used for the quantum network. A Recursive System of Systems (RSOS) model is developed for quantum-conventional (QC) networks by modeling the correlations at various levels based on the failure and attack modes of quantum, conventional and hybrid components and the propagative effects across QC boundaries. A game-theoretic formulation is developed to capture the cost-benefit trade-offs of the provider in defending against component attacks, using sum-form utility functions. By applying the Nash Equilibrium results, the conditions and sensitivity functions of the survivalprobabilities of a QC network at different levels are derived using the strong dependencies between quantum and conventional infrastructures. The results provide insights into the dependenciesbetween conventional and quantum networks, including cross QC boundary effects in terms of disruption impact of conventional networks on quantum networks, and vice versa.
Abstract—We consider an infrastructure consisting of a network of systems each composed of discrete components that can be reinforced at a certain cost to guard against attacks. The network provides the vital connectivity between systems, and hence plays a critical, asymmetric role in the infrastructure operations. We characterize the system-level correlations using the aggregate failure correlation function that specifies the infrastructure failure probability given the failure of an individual system or network. The survival probabilities of systems and network satisfy first-order differential conditions that capture the component-level correlations. We formulate the problem of ensuring the infrastructure survival as a game between anattacker and a provider, using the sum-form and product-form utility functions, each composed of a survival probability term and a cost term. We derive Nash Equilibrium conditions which provide expressions for individual system survival probabilities, and also the expected capacity specified by the total number of operational components. These expressions differ only in a single term for the sum-form and product-form utilities, despite their significant differences.We apply these results to simplified models of distributed cloud computing infrastructures.
Efficient processing of information is crucial for the optimization of neural resources in both biological and artificial visual systems. In this paper, we study the efficiency that may be obtained via the use of a fovea. Using biologically-motivated agents, we study visual information processing, learning, and decision making in a controlled artificial environment, namely the Atari Pong video game. We compare the resources necessary to play Pong between agents with and without a fovea. Our study shows that a fovea can significantly reduce the neural resources, in the form of number of neurons, number of synapses, and number of computations, while at the same time maintaining performance at playing Pong. To our knowledge, this is the first study in which an agent must simultaneously optimize its visual system, along with its decision making and action generation capabilities. That is, the visual system is integral to a complete agent.