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At least 235 records · Page 13

TRUPACT-III Program Guidance (Rev. 0)

The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model IIl (TRUPACT-IlI) and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-lII Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) No. 9305.

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Overall Reactor System Description of Prototype Gen-IV Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor

A fast reactor system has been recognized as one of the most promising options for transmutation of the radioactive wastes discharged from spent nuclear fuel of light water reactors (LWRs). That is owing to the intrinsic features of a fast reactor, i.e., high neutron energy and abundant excessive neutrons in the core. In this context, the Korea Atomic Energy Commission (KAEC) authorized the R and D action plan for the advanced sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) connected with the pyro-process to provide a consistent direction to long-term R and D activities in December 2008. The long term plan was updated in November 2011 in order to refine the plan and to consider the available budget for SFR. The revised milestones include the completion of a specific design of a prototype Gen IV sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) by 2017, specific design approval by 2020, and construction by 2028. The R and D activities on SFR had been concentrated on the basic and strategic key technology developments before 2012 and went to engineering project for licensing and construction of PGSFR from 2012. The development of PGSFR is now in the first design phase and will go toward to the second design phase in 2016. All the high level design concepts of systems, structures and components (SSCs) are determined and incorporated into the preliminary safety information document (PSID), which includes basic design requirements and descriptions and the results of safety analysis for the representative accident scenarios. The PSID will be a base material for a pre-review of the PGSFR safety. (authors)

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Draft Feasibility Assessment for Use of AI in Preparing Transportation Safety Analysis Reports

Preparing transportation safety analysis reports for microreactors is time and labor intensive, requiring extensive cross referencing to Federal regulations, previously approved documents, and expert review comments across structural, thermal, criticality, shielding, containment, and security. These burdens are magnified by the novelty of microreactor technologies and the evolving regulatory landscape, as well as current workforce constraints. Generative AI and supporting machine learning tools present an opportunity to accelerate drafting timelines, lift generalized writing burdens, and systematically enforce regulatory adherence through retrieval augmented generation and other knowledge retrieval and mapping methods. This draft report presents a preliminary feasibility assessment of the use of AI to expedite the preparation of microreactor transportation safety analysis reports and proposes an initial methodology for doing so.

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Retrospectively Documenting Satisfaction of the Overarching Properties: An Exploratory Prototype

Software-intensive aviation systems are typically developed in accordance with recognized development process, safety analysis, and software development standards such as SAE ARP4754A, SAE ARP4761, and RTCA DO-178C. Efforts to streamline assurance processes and make them flexible enough to handle future assurance challenges have produced the Overarching Properties (OPs) for airworthiness approval. Each of the three OPs is a property systems must possess to be certifiable. There is no mandated means of documenting possession of the OPs. To explore possible means, we have prepared retrospective documentation showing that a specimen software system possesses the OPs. The specimen system, Safeguard, enforces geofencing restrictions on unmanned aerial vehicles. Our OP-possession case for its airborne component comprises eight arguments in the Goal Structuring Notation (GSN): a main argument for each OP and five cross-cutting auxiliary arguments. We present this argument as an example for discussion and further research, e.g., into means of assessing OP possession.

safety case↗

FUEL CASK IMPACT LIMITER VULNERABILITIES

Cylindrical fuel casks often have impact limiters surrounding just the ends of the cask shaft in a typical 'dumbbell' arrangement. The primary purpose of these impact limiters is to absorb energy to reduce loads on the cask structure during impacts associated with a severe accident. Impact limiters are also credited in many packages with protecting closure seals and maintaining lower peak temperatures during fire events. For this credit to be taken in safety analyses, the impact limiter attachment system must be shown to retain the impact limiter following Normal Conditions of Transport (NCT) and Hypothetical Accident Conditions (HAC) impacts. Large casks are often certified by analysis only because of the costs associated with testing. Therefore, some cask impact limiter attachment systems have not been tested in real impacts. A recent structural analysis of the T-3 Spent Fuel Containment Cask found problems with the design of the impact limiter attachment system. Assumptions in the original Safety Analysis for Packaging (SARP) concerning the loading in the attachment bolts were found to be inaccurate in certain drop orientations. This paper documents the lessons learned and their applicability to impact limiter attachment system designs.

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Human Error Analysis for Human-Rated Space Systems

Humans bring unique capabilities to space systems and contribute to mission success in a manner that cannot be matched by machines. Nevertheless, from time to time, human error can present a threat to system performance, and system designers must anticipate and manage this risk. NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems call for program managers to conduct a human error analysis (HEA) during system development but does not specify how to do this. In 2018, NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center asked the authors to develop a guidance document on HEA. The resulting position paper outlines a suggested method for HEA and makes it clear that error analysis is about identifying and mitigating problems at a system level, and not about finding fault with individuals. Error management strategies must be directed at error-producing conditions, thereby reducing the likelihood of human error, while retaining the positive contribution that humans make to system operations.

human error human-rated space↗

Technical Review Report for the Justification for 9975 Gram Based Content Envelopes, C.10 and C.11

The Department of Energy (DOE) desires to ship Model 9975-85 and Model 9975-96 Packages loaded with Pu/U metal and Pu/U oxide materials as identified in new Content Envelopes C.10 and C.11. The new Content Envelopes C.10 and C.11 consist of radioisotopes and impurities that are similar to the existing C.3, Pu/U metal, and C.4, Pu/U oxide, Content Envelopes but that list the radioisotopes as gram values in lieu of the existing weight percent of radioactive material mass values listed for the C.3 and C.4 Content Envelopes. Authorization for shipment requires acceptance of this report by the DOE-Headquarters (HQ) Certifying Official (EM-10/EM-2) as an Addendum to WSRC-SA-2002-00008, Revision 0, S-SARA-G-00001, Addendum 1, Revision 0, and S-SARA-G-00002 Addendum 2, Revision 1, of the Model 9975-85 Package Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP). This Addendum also applies to S-SARP-G-00003, Revision 0, of the Model 9975-96 Package SARP. These documents are collectively referred to as the existing Model 9975 Package SARP. The safety basis described addresses specific supplements to the currently approved safety basis. Justification is made for shipping the new Content Envelopes C.10 and C.11 under this Addendum. Following acceptance of this Addendum by EM-10/EM-2 and subsequent revision to the current Certificates of Compliance (CoCs), the new contents will be authorized for shipment in the Model 9975 Package. The new Content Envelopes will be incorporated into the next revision to the Model 9975-85 and Model 9975-96 Package SARPs.

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Designing for human presence in space: An introduction to environmental control and life support systems

Human exploration and utilization of space requires habitats to provide appropriate conditions for working and living. These conditions are provided by environmental control and life support systems (ECLSS) that ensure appropriate atmosphere composition, pressure, and temperature; manage and distribute water, process waste matter, provide fire detection and suppression; and other functions as necessary. The functions that are performed by ECLSS are described and basic information necessary to design an ECLSS is provided. Technical and programmatic aspects of designing and developing ECLSS for space habitats are described including descriptions of technologies, analysis methods, test requirements, program organization, documentation requirements, and the requirements imposed by medical, mission, safety, and system needs. The design and development process is described from initial trade studies through system-level analyses to support operation. ECLSS needs for future space habitats are also described. Extensive listings of references and related works provide sources for more detailed information on each aspect of ECLSS design and development.

Wieland, Paul↗

External Tank Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) Prepress Regression Analysis Independent Review Technical Consultation Report

The request to conduct an independent review of regression models, developed for determining the expected Launch Commit Criteria (LCC) External Tank (ET)-04 cycle count for the Space Shuttle ET tanking process, was submitted to the NASA Engineering and Safety Center NESC on September 20, 2005. The NESC team performed an independent review of regression models documented in Prepress Regression Analysis, Tom Clark and Angela Krenn, 10/27/05. This consultation consisted of a peer review by statistical experts of the proposed regression models provided in the Prepress Regression Analysis. This document is the consultation's final report.

Parsons, Vickie s.↗

Application Agreement and Integration Services

Application agreement and integration services are required by distributed, fault-tolerant, safety critical systems to assure required performance. An analysis of distributed and hierarchical agreement strategies are developed against the backdrop of observed agreement failures in fielded systems. The documented work was performed under NASA Task Order NNL10AB32T, Validation And Verification of Safety-Critical Integrated Distributed Systems Area 2. This document is intended to satisfy the requirements for deliverable 5.2.11 under Task 4.2.2.3. This report discusses the challenges of maintaining application agreement and integration services. A literature search is presented that documents previous work in the area of replica determinism. Sources of non-deterministic behavior are identified and examples are presented where system level agreement failed to be achieved. We then explore how TTEthernet services can be extended to supply some interesting application agreement frameworks. This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the TTEthernet protocol. The reader is advised to read the TTEthernet protocol standard [1] before reading this document. This document does not re-iterate the content of the standard.

Driscoll, Kevin R.↗

Experiment Design and Analysis Guide - Neutronics & Physics

The purpose of this guide is to provide a consistent, standardized approach to performing neutronics/physics analysis for experiments inserted into the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). This document provides neutronics/physics analysis guidance to support experiment design and analysis needs for experiments irradiated in the ATR. This guide addresses neutronics/physics analysis in support of experiment design, experiment safety, and experiment program objectives and goals. The intent of this guide is to provide a standardized approach for performing typical neutronics/physics analyses. Deviation from this guide is allowed provided that neutronics/physics analysis details are properly documented in an analysis report.

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Avco Lycoming emission and flight test results

The Avco Lycoming flight test program for reduced emissions was conducted to determine and document the lean fuel schedule limits for current production aircraft based on flight safety. Based on analysis of the emissions profile, Avco Lycoming proposed to evaluate the effect of leaner schedules in the idle/taxi, climb, and approach modes. These modes were selected as areas where it was felt that possible improvements could be made with the greatest improvement in cyclic emissions reduction. The fuel systems to produce these leaner stepped fuel schedules were tailored specifically for the flight test.

Duke, L. C.↗

Advanced Reactor Technology -- Regulatory Technology Development Plan (RTDP)

This DOE-NE Advanced Small Modular Reactor (AdvSMR) regulatory technology development plan (RTDP) will link critical DOE nuclear reactor technology development programs to important regulatory and policy-related issues likely to impact a “critical path” for establishing a viable commercial AdvSMR presence in the domestic energy market. Accordingly, the regulatory considerations that are set forth in the AdvSMR RTDP will not be limited to any one particular type or subset of advanced reactor technology(s) but rather broadly consider potential regulatory approaches and the licensing implications that accompany all DOE-sponsored research and technology development activity that deal with commercial non-light water reactors. However, it is also important to remember that certain “minimum” levels of design and safety approach knowledge concerning these technology(s) must be defined and available to an extent that supports appropriate pre-licensing regulatory analysis within the RTDP. Final resolution to advanced reactor licensing issues is most often predicated on the detailed design information and specific safety approach as documented in a facility license application and submitted for licensing review. Because the AdvSMR RTDP is focused on identifying and assessing the potential regulatory implications of DOE-sponsored reactor technology research very early in the pre-license application development phase, the information necessary to support a comprehensive regulatory analysis of a new reactor technology, and the resolution of resulting issues, will generally not be available. As such, the regulatory considerations documented in the RTDP should be considered an initial “first step” in the licensing process which will continue until a license is issued to build and operate the said nuclear facility. Because a facility license application relies heavily on the data and information generated by technology development studies, the anticipated regulatory importance of key DOE reactor research initiatives should be assessed early in the technology development process. Quality assurance requirements supportive of later licensing activities must also be attached to important research activities to ensure resulting data is usable in that context. Early regulatory analysis and licensing approach planning thus provides a significant benefit to the formulation of research plans and also enables the planning and development of a compatible AdvSMR licensing framework, should significant modification be required.

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Ascent/Descent Software

The Ascent/Descent Software Suite has been used to support a variety of NASA Shuttle Program mission planning and analysis activities, such as range safety, on the Integrated Planning System (IPS) platform. The Ascent/Descent Software Suite, containing Ascent Flight Design (ASC)/Descent Flight Design (DESC) Configuration items (Cis), lifecycle documents, and data files used for shuttle ascent and entry modeling analysis and mission design, resides on IPS/Linux workstations. A list of tools in Navigation (NAV)/Prop Software Suite represents tool versions established during or after the IPS Equipment Rehost-3 project.

Brown, Charles↗

Integrated Data Collection Analysis (IDCA) Program - RDX Type II Class 5 Standard, Data Set 1

This document describes the results of the first reference sample material—RDX Type II Class 5—examined in the proficiency study for small-scale safety and thermal (SSST) testing of explosive materials for the Integrated Data Collection Analysis (IDCA) Program. The IDCA program is conducting proficiency testing on homemade explosives (HMEs). The reference sample materials are being studied to establish the accuracy of traditional explosives safety testing for each performing laboratory. These results will be used for comparison to results from testing HMEs. This effort, funded by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), ultimately will put the issues of safe handling of these materials in perspective with standard military explosives. The results of the study will add SSST testing results for a broad suite of different HMEs to the literature, potentially suggest new guidelines and methods for HME testing, and possibly establish what are the needed accuracies in SSST testing to develop safe handling practices. Described here are the results for impact, friction, electrostatic discharge, and scanning calorimetry analysis of a reference sample of RDX Type II Class 5. The results from each participating testing laboratory are compared using identical test material and preparation methods wherever possible. Note, however, the test procedures differ among the laboratories. These results are then compared to historical data from various sources. The performers involved are Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Air Force Research Laboratory/ RXQL (AFRL), Indian Head Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center, (IHD-NSWC), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). These tests are conducted as a proficiency study in order to establish some consistency in test protocols, procedures, and experiments and to understand how to compare results when test protocols are not identical.

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Worldwide Spacecraft Crew Hatch History

The JSC Flight Safety Office has developed this compilation of historical information on spacecraft crew hatches to assist the Safety Tech Authority in the evaluation and analysis of worldwide spacecraft crew hatch design and performance. The document is prepared by SAIC s Gary Johnson, former NASA JSC S&MA Associate Director for Technical. Mr. Johnson s previous experience brings expert knowledge to assess the relevancy of data presented. He has experience with six (6) of the NASA spacecraft programs that are covered in this document: Apollo; Skylab; Apollo Soyuz Test Project (ASTP), Space Shuttle, ISS and the Shuttle/Mir Program. Mr. Johnson is also intimately familiar with the JSC Design and Procedures Standard, JPR 8080.5, having been one of its original developers. The observations and findings are presented first by country and organized within each country section by program in chronological order of emergence. A host of reference sources used to augment the personal observations and comments of the author are named within the text and/or listed in the reference section of this document. Careful attention to the selection and inclusion of photos, drawings and diagrams is used to give visual association and clarity to the topic areas examined.

Johnson, Gary↗

Thermal Model for Horizontal In-Water and In-Air Mini-Plate Experiments in the Advanced Test Reactor

Mini-Plate (MP) irradiation tests are a fueled experiment designed for irradiation in multiple test locations in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). MP experiments are considered a non-instrumented drop-in test where small aluminum-clad fuel plate samples are cooled directly by the ATR Primary Coolant System (PCS) water. These fueled experiments contain aluminum-clad fuel mini plates consisting of monolithic U-10Mo. Previous thermal analyses have been documented concerning oxide growth[1] and thermal safety margin[2] for the MP-2 experiment. A thermal analysis has been performed on the MP-2 experiment using a new technique for calculating the necessary time after the experiment has been irradiated and reactor shutdown necessary to not exceed the 95% lower bound blister threshold temperature for the fuel in a horizontal in air configuration. A horizontal in water model has also been analyzed and will be discussed. After the experiment is irradiated in the ATR, it is necessary to calculate the fuel meat temperatures at 12 hours after shutdown. This is done to assure that at the 12 hour mark, if this experiment is removed from the reactor and accidentally dropped onto the working tray and is in the most severe geometrical configuration of horizontal (minimum heat transfer) that fission products will not be released. The blister threshold temperature is considered this safety limit. The horizontal in air analysis is also performed considering that the experiment is horizontal in a drained canal and filled with air and natural convection heat transfer with air on the outside. The initial mini-plate testing campaign known as MP-1 [3] has been irradiated and its purpose was to form the base fuel specimens fabricated by various processes so that a single process can be down-selected for qualification. MP-2 will then serve to populate a comprehensive fuel performance data set for the down-selected fabrication process. The MP-2 experiment will be irradiated in several locations of the ATR as shown in Figure 1. The fuel plate thickness and geometry is identical to the MP-1 experiment [3], with the only variable being the fuel meat thickness. This model of the B-12 position is treated as encompassing the I-21, I-24, and B-9 positions since it has more fuel and higher total heat than the other positions. Since the blister threshold temperature is a function of fission density, a series of fission densities is calculated for the B-12 position to cover the other three positions. The B 12 position specifically uses fuel meat that is 0.016 in thick by 3.25 in long and 0.75 in tall. The total plate thickness is 0.050 in. Aluminum cladding forms the barrier between the PCS and the fuel meat. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate this new technique developed to calculate the necessary decay time after shutdown for a series of fission densities using the ABAQUS [4] finite element and heat transfer code.

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Realization of the National Disposal Facility for Radioactive Waste in Bulgaria - 16611

Radioactive waste is generated in the Republic of Bulgaria from the operation and decommissioning of the country's nuclear power plants and from other sources in research, medical applications, and the industry. The need for building a National Disposal Facility (NDF) is recognized by the Bulgarian government and described and justified in its Environment Impact Assessment Decision. The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is endeavoring to build a near-surface repository for short-lived low- and intermediate-level radioactive waste (SL-LILW) to discharge its statutory responsibilities in waste management is. The European Union (EU) finances the establishment of the NDF through the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund (KIDSF). After an international tendering procedure, SERAW placed a contract for the development of the design of the NDF to the Consortium of Westinghouse Electric Spain S.A.R and DBE Technology GmbH of Germany, with ENRESA, the Spanish National Waste Management Agency providing technical review and support. Two Bulgarian companies participate also in the project as subcontractors - EQE Bulgaria and to a lesser extent KK-Project. The repository project official name is 'Technical Design and ISAR Preparation for the National Disposal Facility at Bulgaria', usually abbreviated as 'R-Project 5'. After obtaining SERAW's approval for the preferred repository conceptual design variant, the R Project 5 focused on developing the Technical Design on the one hand, and on preparing the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report (ISAR) to demonstrate the safety and suitability of the proposed NDF design on the other. These documents were handed over to the Bulgarian Nuclear Regulatory Authority (BNRA) as well as to the different authorities involved in the comprehensive licensing process required for nuclear facilities in the country. The corresponding permits have mostly been received or are expected for early 2016. In the last quarter of 2015 the procurement procedure for repository construction as turn-key project was started with the pre-qualification of possible constructors for the Phase I repository realization on a lump sum contract basis. Repository construction is now expected to start in 2016, with the start of waste disposal now scheduled for around 2020. With the realization of the Bulgarian National Disposal Facility an important milestone for waste disposal in the European Union is about to be achieved. This paper is a sequel of previously presented papers on the NDF construction, now including details of the complex licensing process that this disposal facility underwent, now in its final stages. (authors)

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