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At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

A distributed voltage inference framework for cyber-physical attacks detection and localization in active distribution grids

The transition to active distribution grids with real-time monitoring and control depends on the proliferation of advanced communication networks and devices. This paradigm shift towards a cyber-physical architecture also introduces new vulnerabilities for adversaries to exploit and launch sophisticated cyber-physical attacks targeting grid observability. Current research highlights the challenges in distinguishing attacks on voltage phasor or nodal injection measurements and isolating multi-source attack locations in a multiphase distribution grid. The attack detection and localization methods in literature face accuracy issues, applications across diverse attack scenarios, or scalability limits. Here, to bridge these gaps, this paper proposes a distributed Voltage Inference framework for real-time detection and localization of cyber-physical attacks, addressing scalability, adaptability, and accuracy challenges in state-of-the-art methods. The proposed methodology leverages the distributed nature of the Voltage Inference framework through a two-step process of prediction and correction, together with a tractable graph partitioning approach, providing a reliable solution to identify compromised measurement sources and facilitate isolation. Extensive testing on IEEE 13 and 123-node distribution feeders underscores the algorithm’s efficacy, enhancing the security and resilience of active distribution grids against evolving cyber threats. Additionally, Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL) implementation validates the proposed strategy’s practical applicability in real-world scenarios.

active distribution grids↗
DOE OSTI2022

Introduction to the special section on learning and security for multi-agent systems

This report features six articles that provide an overview of the emerging research topics at the intersection learning, security, and multi-agent systems. Recent years have witnessed a surge in the number of works at their intersections, and they have appeared in system and control communities as well as many other communities in artificial intelligence, cyber–physical systems, and economics. The articles in this special section give accessible and comprehensive tutorials and surveys for a broad systems and control audience, covering topics including adversarial machine learning, multi-agent reinforcement learning, cyber resilience, resilient control systems, and game design. It is hopeful that this special section will spawn future interest and cross-disciplinary collaborations in this emerging transdisciplinary research area.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

EVALUATING NUCLEAR SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF THE SPLINTERNET

The internet, which for years has been viewed as a global online commons with standardized protocols but few regulations is, according to some experts, starting to mirror the contentious political and commercial contours of the physical world. Contributing to this is the rise in data breaches, cyber-enabled attacks on critical infrastructure, government surveillance operations, theft of intellectual property, manipulation of electoral processes, and perceived erosion of privacy, all of which are resulting in a growing skepticism that an open internet will naturally serve the best interests of users, communities, countries, and the global economy. In addition, the rapidly emerging and increasingly lucrative power of data has global superpowers scrambling to protect their informational sovereignty as an urgent matter of national security. Underscoring this urgency is the fact that, despite its global reach and cosmopolitan contributor base, internet infrastructure and governance of the World Wide Web remain largely under U.S. corporate auspices, which reinforces the perception of U.S. control. Whether fragmentation is politically, economically, or socially motivated, there appears to be a growing appetite for an internet that is partitioned and controlled at the national level. From “the Great Firewall of China” to the “Halal” internet of Iran, the trend towards a “Splinternet” has courts and governments embarking on what some call a "legal arms race" to impose a maze of national or regional rules, often conflicting, in the digital realm. The paper explores the emerging Splinternet phenomenon, analyses the implications of this trend on nuclear security, and identifies questions that present opportunities for future research.

Internet, Data Security, Cyber Security, Nuclear S↗
DOE OSTI2020

ModuleOT: A Hardware Security Module for Operational Technology: Preprint

With increasing penetration levels of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the distribution grid, as well as new technological advancements in the cyber space, new cyberattack vectors are being introduced, and the available attack surface is constantly increasing. Despite this increasing risk, the standard IEEE 1547-2018 does not yet recommend cybersecurity measures for DERs. To address this and to better protect data on the distribution grid - from the standpoints information security as well as operational security - ModuleOT has been developed. The module aims to significantly reduce cyberattack vectors by improving data privacy for user applications. This is accomplished by performing the core functions of encryption, authentication, authorization, certificate management, and user access control. The module integrates a custom security application with hardware cryptographic acceleration. The application secures all communications using Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). These include the three most commonly used communications protocols for power systems information exchange: Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), and Smart Energy Profile 2.0 (SEP2.0). These three protocols are also supported by IEEE 1547-2018 for all DER devices. This paper tests the data encryption/decryption feature on a physical networking test bed with emulated Modbus devices reporting grid data and presents the results.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Hands-On, Heads-Up: Blending Cyber T&E with Data Science-Driven Training in Jupyter Notebooks

In an era of increasingly sophisticated threats to critical infrastructure, cybersecurity professionals must be more than just aware; they must be immersed, agile, and equipped to operate in environments where failure is not an option. Nowhere is this truer than in the nuclear sector, where cyber-physical systems, regulatory scrutiny, and insider threat potential demand a new generation of hands-on, technically fluent defenders. This paper presents a unified training approach that integrates Cybersecurity Test and Evaluation (T&E) with data science techniques using Jupyter Notebooks as the interactive lab environment. The program centers on a modular, scenario-driven curriculum designed to build not just knowledge but practical capability in the assessment and defense of radiation detection systems, firmware interfaces, and operational security postures.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2024

Trust-Based Detection and Mitigation of Cyber Attacks in Distributed Cooperative Control of Islanded AC Microgrids

In this study, we address the challenge of detecting and mitigating cyber attacks in the distributed cooperative control of islanded AC microgrids, with a particular focus on detecting False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs), a significant threat to the Smart Grid (SG). The SG integrates traditional power systems with communication networks, creating a complex system with numerous vulnerable links, making it a prime target for cyber attacks. These attacks can lead to the disclosure of private data, control network failures, and even blackouts. Unlike machine learning-based approaches that require extensive datasets and mathematical models dependent on accurate system modeling, our method is free from such dependencies. To enhance the microgrid’s resilience against these threats, we propose a resilient control algorithm by introducing a novel trustworthiness parameter into the traditional cooperative control algorithm. Our method evaluates the trustworthiness of distributed energy resources (DERs) based on their voltage measurements and exchanged information, using Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to dynamically adjust control actions. We validated our approach through simulations on both the IEEE-34 bus feeder system with eight DERs and a larger microgrid with twenty-two DERs. The results demonstrated a detection accuracy of around 100%, with millisecond range mitigation time, ensuring rapid system recovery. Additionally, our method improved system stability by up to almost 100% under attack scenarios, showcasing its effectiveness in promptly detecting attacks and maintaining system resilience. These findings highlight the potential of our approach to enhance the security and stability of microgrid systems in the face of cyber threats.

Computer Science↗
DOE OSTI2024

National Security Programs - Cyber: MMAREJBLIGE – Modular Multi Agent Grid Emulation for Joined Breakdowns in Linked Generative Emulations - 23-0644

Modular Multi Agent Grid Emulations for Joined Breakdowns in Linked Generative Emulations (MMAREJBLIGE) introduces an agent-based modeling framework into real-time cyber-physical emulation to achieve a context-aware environment that introduces operator/attacker/external-condition variability to improve emulation fidelity and testing rigor. We detail our agent framework design, internal communication via message passing, and time synchronization, as well as the individual components of the system. We include a brief analysis of several scenarios run on a real-time, hardware-in-the-loop, Industrial Control Systems (ICS) test-bed which include normal operation, physical disruption, disruption with mitigation, and disruption with mitigation during a cyber denial-of-service (DOS) attack.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2026

Engineering Controls Database

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) – Engineered Controls Database and Use

Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) addresses the reality that cyber-attacks on engineered systems can have consequences far beyond data loss or disruption of digital networks. When control systems are compromised, safety, reliability, and performance of the physical process itself may be threatened. This database is meant to establish clear examples and guidance for defining and applying engineered controls in CIE. It explains what engineered controls are, how they differ from information security measures, and how they are integrated into system design. The goal is to ensure that resilience is engineered into systems from the outset. Unlike cybersecurity protections that defend the digital layer, engineered controls act directly at the physical and algorithmic levels to guarantee that unacceptable consequences are prevented or limited. CIE keeps the consequences of a cyber attack from impacting the safety, reliability, and performance of engineered systems.

42 - ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Optimal PMU Restoration for Power System Observability Recovery After Massive Attacks

Cyber-physically resilient power system operation requires rapid recovery of situational awareness after disastrous scenarios such as massive cyber attacks. In this article, the concept of optimal sequential restoration of Phasor Measurement Units is introduced, aiming at rapid recovery of power system observability in post-attack scenarios. Additionally, the observability recovery problem is formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming problem to maximize the cumulative observability level gained over time during the restoration process. Three alternative objective functions-maximizing the number of observable buses, the number of observable branches, and the total amount of observable power flow-are considered. The effectiveness of the proposed optimal strategy is verified by comparing it with heuristic approaches on the IEEE 57-bus system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Securing Inverter Communication: Proactive Intrusion Detection and Mitigation System to Tap, Analyze, and Act

The electric grid has undergone rapid, revolutionary changes in recent years; from the addition of advanced smart technologies to the growing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs) to increased interconnectivity and communications. However, these added communications, access interfaces, and third-party software to enable autonomous control schemes and interconnectivity also expand the attack surface of the grid. To address the gap of DER cybersecurity and secure the grid-edge to motivate a holistic, defense-in-depth approach, a proactive intrusion detection and mitigation system (PIDMS) device was developed to secure PV smart inverter communications. The PIDMS was developed as a distributed, flexible bump-in-the-wire (BITW) solution for protecting PV smart inverter communications. Both cyber (network traffic) and physical (power system measurements) are processed using network intrusion monitoring tools and custom machinelearning algorithms for deep packet analysis and cyber-physical event correlation. The PIDMS not only detects abnormal events but also deploys mitigations to limit or eliminate system impact; the PIDMS communicates with peer PIDMSs at different locations using the MQTT protocol for increased situational awareness and alerting. The details of the PIDMS methodology and prototype development are detailed in this report as well as the evaluation results within a cyber-physical emulation environment and subsequent industry feedback.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Research on Integrated Energy Systems Cyber Range

As digital technologies expand to meet the needs of a more autonomous, interconnected, and advanced power system, new cybersecurity complexities and vulnerabilities arise. The ARIES Cyber Range enables the energy sector to evaluate these evolutions and validate cybersecurity solutions without impacting live systems. Combining power grid-scale hardware with emulation and simulation approaches, the ARIES Cyber Range can faithfully replicate modern energy systems - from grid physics to communication networks, and everything in between - with real-world fidelity. At NLR, researchers and partners are answering complex power system cybersecurity questions, examining emerging threats to the electric sector, and de risking new security technologies, all at a mission-relevant speed that keeps pace with rapidly evolving systems and hazards.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

AURORA-SETO_VirginiaTech_ Power & Energy Center

This is a presentation. The outline of the presentation is : Overview multiple grid resiliency projects at Siemens Corporate Technology Introduce AURORA project(AUtonomous and Resilient Operation of energy systems with RenewaAbles) Dive into physics and cyber situation awareness Discuss challenges encountered at building a more resilient distribution grid

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Epistemology of voltage control in DER-rich power system

Despite the recent development of several scalable, robust, and resilient control approaches with superior convergence properties considering an increasing penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), cognitive oversights often simplify several aspects of the cyber–physical power system in the controller development. Here, following the identification of the limitations of classical controller definitions, we justify alternative definitions of voltage control approaches classifiers considering three inter-disciplinary domains: (i) power system, (ii) optimization and decision-making, and (iii) networking and cyber-security, to develop a taxonomy for helping in real-world comparative performance analysis and deployability of these controllers. We observe that classical and introduced domain-based definitions together can better classify the control algorithms.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance: Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS), Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Modeling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system performance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example usecases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance, Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) Model Advancements for Resilience Analysis (Version 3, July 2023)

Agile Co-simulation for Cyber Energy System Security (ACCESS) is a co-simulation platform developed by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The primary high-level use-case for ACCESS is to study existing or new cyber-physical critical infrastructure systems, with a heavy emphasis on 1) systems that utilize communication networks, and 2) studies that seek to understand cyber-related system impacts. ACCESS is currently used for several energy system resilience projects at LLNL. In the Energy Resilience for Mission Assurance (ERMA) project, ACCESS is used in the Mod eling for Metric Calculation task (specifically, subtask 4.3, Communications and Cyber Modeling) to model and simulate the cyber and communication system aspects of Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure (DCEI) systems, with a focus on computing specific communication system metrics that can impact system resilience and mission performance. Simulated communication system per formance will be fed back to other ERMA system components so that mission performance can be evaluated holistically. This report describes several enhancements to the ACCESS platform that were implemented during the execution of the ERMA project in support of reslience analysis. This includes the addition of new models and subsystems, enhancements to existing models, and integration with external systems. The remainder of this report is structured as follows. In Section 2, a brief background description of the ACCESS platform is provided, including an outline of ACCESS components, example use cases, and a set of communication network resilience metrics that can be computed with ACCESS. Section 3 describes the ACCESS model enhancements for ERMA in detail. Finally, Section 4 briefly outlines future integration opportunities between ACCESS and project participant capabilities identified during the progression of the project.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗