A Moving Target Defense for Securing Cyber-Physical Systems
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Automation & Control Systems↗
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A full-scope, high-fidelity simulator-based hardware-in-the-loop testbed for comprehensive nuclear power plant cybersecurity research
Nuclear power plant (NPP) cybersecurity research often relies on hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbeds that integrate real hardware components into simulated environments. These testbeds allow researchers to identify vulnerabilities, evaluate attack impacts, and test security measures in a controlled setting. Furthermore, previous HIL testbeds lacked fidelity to accurately represent real nuclear systems, limiting the scope of cybersecurity analysis. This study presents the creation of a HIL testbed, devised upon a full-scope, high-fidelity NPP simulator, to facilitate realistic and comprehensive cybersecurity research. To demonstrate its capabilities, the control logic for the steam generator water level was migrated from the simulator to an external programmable logic controller. As a practical application of the developed testbed, supply chain attack scenarios were simulated by injecting malicious code into the controller logic, and the effects of manipulating sensor inputs and control commands were observed. While this HIL testbed provides more detailed simulations, enhanced realism, and wider applicability compared to other options utilizing a less complex simulator, it is also more intricate and costly. For this reason, we include a detailed comparison with some alternative architectures to aid fellow researchers and practitioners in the selection of a suitable HIL architecture based on specific research objectives.
47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗
On the Cyber-Physical Needs of DER-Based Voltage Control/Optimization Algorithms in Active Distribution Network
Not Available
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Nomenclatural issues concerning cultured yeasts and other fungi: why it is important to avoid unneeded name changes
The unambiguous application of fungal names is important to communicate scientific findings. Names are critical for (clinical) diagnostics, legal compliance, and regulatory controls, such as biosafety, food security, quarantine regulations, and industrial applications. Consequently, the stability of the taxonomic system and the traceability of nomenclatural changes is crucial for a broad range of users and taxonomists. The unambiguous application of names is assured by the preservation of nomenclatural history and the physical organisms representing a name. Fungi are extremely diverse in terms of ecology, lifestyle, and methods of study. Predominantly unicellular fungi known as yeasts are usually investigated as living cultures. Methods to characterize yeasts include physiological (growth) tests and experiments to induce a sexual morph; both methods require viable cultures. Thus, the preservation and availability of viable reference cultures are important, and cultures representing reference material are cited in species descriptions. Historical surveys revealed drawbacks and inconsistencies between past practices and modern requirements as stated in the International Code of Nomenclature for Algae, Fungi, and Plants (ICNafp). Improper typification of yeasts is a common problem, resulting in a large number invalid yeast species names. With this opinion letter, we address the problem that culturable microorganisms, notably some fungi and algae, require specific provisions under the ICNafp. We use yeasts as a prominent example of fungi known from cultures. But viable type material is important not only for yeasts, but also for other cultivable Fungi that are characterized by particular morphological structures (a specific type of spores), growth properties, and secondary metabolites. We summarize potential proposals which, in our opinion, will improve the stability of fungal names, in particular by protecting those names for which the reference material can be traced back to the original isolate.
59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
Cybersecurity of Wide Area Monitoring, Protection and Control Systems for HVDC Applications
The flexibility provided by High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) systems can be further extended by Wide Area Monitoring, Protection, and Control (WAMAPC) systems. WAMPAC systems enable many HVDC applications and, on the other hand, inevitably introduce cybersecurity concerns that need to be addressed. In this work, a security domain layer and decision framework is reported to detect and mitigate the impact of false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting HVDC stations. Specifically, a rule-based cyber-attack detection method is introduced and implemented on Raspberry Pi and tested on the real-time HVDC simulation facility on the real-time digital simulator (RTDS) platform at ABB U.S. Corporate Research Center.
cybersecurity↗
Autonomous Tools for Attack Surface Reduction (Final Report)
The electric power grid is a complex critical infrastructure that forms the lifeline of modern society, and its secure and reliable operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic wellbeing. However, recent findings documented in authoritative sources indicate the threat of cyber-based attacks growing in numbers and sophistication. However, securing the grid against stealthy cyberattacks is a challenging task due to legacy nature of the infrastructure coupled with dynamic nature of threat landscape and ever-growing sophistication of the adversaries. Additionally, the grid’s attack surface continues to grow with the increased dependence on digital communications and control that now extends to each consumer through smart meters and distributed energy resources. Unfortunately, this expansive surface increases the grid’s vulnerability and further exposes critical control systems in both substations and control centers. To respond to this emerging need, we had successfully assembled an interdisciplinary team with academic- industry partnership to successfully conduct research, development, evaluation, demonstration, and commercialization of attack surface reduction tools, whose goal was to significantly reduce the cyber attack surface in the North American power grid. Our proposed project was a synergistic collaborative effort leveraging the synergistic expertise of the team members across power systems, cyber security and CPS security, testbeds, field deployments and demonstration, and successful commercialization. The following are the specific tasks that have been successfully completed two phases (2016-2020). Phase I: Task 1: Developed and implemented a robust Project Management and Data Management Plan, coupled with a well thought out Risk Mitigation Plan. Task 2.1: Developed a comprehensive framework that continually assesses and autonomously reduces the attack surface for the power grid control environment spanning across substations, control center and the SCADA network to significantly reduce the risks of cyber attacks. Task 2.2: Developed attack surface analysis techniques, metrics, and tools that assess the attack surface at multiple levels including the control center, substations, and the SCADA network. Task 2.3: Developed attack surface reduction techniques and tools that dynamically reduce attack surface and hence increase attacker’s cost without interfering in the critical functions of the system. Task 2.4: Prototyped, implemented, and quantitatively evaluated/validated the techniques and tools on a realistic industrial CPS security testbed environment by leveraging the unique resources of the team. Task 3: Developed Commercialization plan to transition the developed tools into power system industry stakeholders for a broader adoption by leveraging the expertise of our industrial members. Phase II: Task 4: Successfully completed field demonstration, verification, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the attack surface analysis and reduction techniques on a realistic utility testbed environment. This also involved the development of realistic scenarios, sound metrics, data sets, evaluation criteria, and documentation. Technology integration & Field demonstration: The project had significantly advanced the state-of-the-art research and practice in improving the cybersecurity of our nation’s power grid infrastructure against cyber threats. In particular, the proposed, designed, and deployed attack surface analysis and reduction algorithms and tools have contributed to significantly reducing the exposure and risk of the devices, substations, and the integrated SCADA/EMS/ DMS grid environment to cyber threat. Strong demonstration and evaluation techniques have verified the feasibility of the developed techniques on realistic cyber-physical testbeds and utility partner's real grid environment, and collaborative research and evaluation of attack surface reduction techniques (for wide-are monitoring and control) within a vendor (GE) EMS platform. The Attack Host Analyzer (AHA) tool that was developed through this project was made available through GitHub.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control Project: Characterization of 316L Stainless Steel after Solid Phase Processing using Ultrasonic NDE Method
The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory undertook the Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control Laboratory Directed Research and Development Project to advance understanding of nuclear material processing and enable multifold acceleration in the development and qualification of new material systems produced via advanced manufacturing methods, such as solid phase processing, for use in national security and advanced energy applications (Smith 2021). A motivation of the Materials Characterization, Prediction, and Control Project was to demonstrate ultrasonic testing as a nondestructive evaluation method to complement traditional destructive methods for characterizing material microstructure with emphasis on grain size determination using a method that may have future applications for real-time inline process monitoring. The objective of the work described in this report is to establish the process and an analysis method for measuring grain sizes of polycrystalline metals with ultrafine grains using ultrasonic shear wave backscattering, building on prior studies on coarser-grained material. The work involves five tasks: Measured ultrasonic backscattering experimentally for a series of 316L stainless steel specimens with various grain sizes made by friction stir processing. Calculated ultrasonic backscattering coefficients from experimental data based on a physical measurement model. Measured ground truth grain sizes of the specimens from electron backscatter diffraction grain boundary images using a generalization of the ASTM E112 (ASTM 2021) intercept method. Built a curve of ultrasonic backscattering coefficients versus the ground truth intercept-based grain sizes to determine the correlation between mean grain sizes and ultrasonic measurements. Demonstrated the ability of using the correlation curve to deduce grain sizes with measured ultrasonic backscattering coefficients for a few 316L stainless steel specimens whose grain sizes were unknown beforehand but were targeted to be an extrapolation to larger grain sizes than used to formulate the correlation curves. Experimental procedures and computational algorithms are developed and validated for these tasks. This work establishes an ultrasonic technique for characterizing material microstructure with ultrafine grains that are often resulted by solid-phase processing. The technique is nondestructive, and it has the potential to be used for real time inline process monitoring. This work successfully demonstrates the viability of an ultrasonic nondestructive evaluation method for microstructural characterization of material having ultrafine grain structure (as small as 1?mm) and produced by an advanced manufacturing method. This includes a demonstration of the method to extrapolate to other conditions. While not demonstrated here, the method is expected to be viable for in-line, or near-inline, process monitoring in advanced manufacturing applications with suitable consideration for access of instrumentation to the material being manufactured.
316 L Stainless Steel↗
Enhancing Time Synchronization in Smart Grid With White Rabbit: Theory, Architecture, and Challenges
The smart grid aims to provide economically efficient and sustainable power to consumers with high quality and security. However, the increasing integration of distributed renewable energy sources presents challenges for smart grid protection and control systems. Here, to enhance smart grid operations, this article introduces White Rabbit (WR) as a more precise and accurate time synchronization technique. To explore White Rabbit’s potential applications in the smart grid, this study first explains existing time synchronization techniques and their limitations, followed by an analysis of the role and importance of time synchronization in smart grids. A comprehensive survey is then conducted, covering the theories, principles, implementations, performances, and existing application cases of White Rabbit. The findings suggest that White Rabbit is a promising technique for smart grid deployment. However, several challenges remain on the path to large-scale implementation. These challenges are analyzed in detail, highlighting key areas for future research.
Liu, Yu [University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN (U↗
GridSTIX
SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem
Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗
Evaluation of Digital Twin Modeling and Simulation
A digital twin has intelligent modules that continuously monitor the condition of the individual components and the whole of a system. Digital twins can provide nuclear power plants (NPP) operators an unprecedented level of monitoring, control, supervision, and security by contributing a greater volume of data for more comprehensive data analysis and increased accuracy of insights and predictions for decision making throughout the entire NPP lifecycle. NPP operators and managers have historically relied on limited, second hand or incomplete data. With proper implementation, digital twins can provide a central hub of all intel that allows for a multidisciplinary view of an NPP. This equips operators and managers with the ability to have more information, context, and intel that can be used for greater granularity during planning and decision making. Digital twins can be used in many activities as the technology has many different concepts surrounding it. From the various definitions of a digital twin within the industry, digital twins can be differentiated by levels of integration/automation. The three main models include digital model, digital shadow, and digital twin. Digital twins offer many potential advancements to the nuclear industry that could reduce costs, improve designs, provide safer operation, and improve their overall security.
22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
Cyber-Physical Power Systems Protection: The Byzantine Cybersecurity Framework
Cybersecurity of smart grids have been topic of much interest in recent years. As this critical infrastructure operation increases dependency on automated processes and controls, exposure to cyber-physical threats become inevitable. Considering cyber-physical security of the grid, much focus of attention has been made towards smart grids real-time monitoring solutions, including the state estimation process. Analyzing the relevant literature, one can note though that seldom research has been done on cyber-physical security of smart grids protection systems. Protection systems have intangible value towards grid reliability. This paper presents a cybersecurity framework for smart grids protection systems. A physics-based inspired machine learning solution is at the core process of the framework. Processed relay inputs and outputs are used by a deep predictive coding network. Formal models, a quasi-static state estimator, provides an oracle when low confidence decision is reached. Evolving knowledge is derived through reinforcement learning. Implementation aspects considering the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory Electricity Infrastructure Operations Center are presented. Built as an extra control layer to protection systems, without hard-to-derive parameters, highlights potential aspects towards real-life applications.
Bretas, Arturo Suman↗
Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures
One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.
42 ENGINEERING↗
A Solar-assisted Voltage Optimization Method for Transmission Solar Network Power System
This paper proposes a new formulation and solution algorithm that uses transmission level solar inverters to address the security-constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) problem. The goal is to stabilize voltage fluctuations in transmission networks in base case and contingency scenarios, by using bulk solar power plant with a minimal number of post-contingency corrections. To achieve this goal, a two-stage volt/var optimization method is proposed to first correct all voltage violations with the volt-var alternating current optimal power flow (ACOPF) algorithm for a base case. Then a linearized SCOPF volt-var control algorithm is proposed to identify the corrective actions for all potential voltage violations in all contingency scenarios. The proposed method was tested and validated on a modified IEEE 118-bus system with solar photovoltaic (PV) data.
Photovoltaic, Volt/Var Control↗
Advanced Sources and Detectors (ASD): U1a Operational Systems Concepts [PowerPoint]
Outline: (1) Introduction and Purpose; (2) Document Development Process; (3) U1a Activities Overview; (4) U1a Hazards and Controls; (5) U1a Security; (6) Underground and Surface Execution; and (7) Plan for next six months.
46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
Cybersecurity Methods for Grid-Connected Power Electronics
The present work shows a secure-by-design process, defense-in-depth method, and security techniques for a secure distributed energy resource. The distributed energy resource is a cybersecure, solar inverter and battery energy storage system prototype, collectively called the Cybersecure Power Router. Consideration is given to the use of the Smart Green Power Node for a foundation of the present work. Metrics for controller security are investigated to evaluate firmware security techniques. The prototype's ability to mitigate, respond to, and recover from firmware integrity degradation is examined. The prototype shows many working security techniques within the context of a grid-connected, distributed energy resource. Further work is expected in the Cybersecure Power Router project. Consideration is also provided for the migration of the present research and the Smart Green Power Node to realize a pre-production prototype.
Moquin, Stephen Joe↗
Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices
Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).
97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
ModuleOT: A Hardware Security Module for Operational Technology: Preprint
With increasing penetration levels of distributed energy resources (DERs) on the distribution grid, as well as new technological advancements in the cyber space, new cyberattack vectors are being introduced, and the available attack surface is constantly increasing. Despite this increasing risk, the standard IEEE 1547-2018 does not yet recommend cybersecurity measures for DERs. To address this and to better protect data on the distribution grid - from the standpoints information security as well as operational security - ModuleOT has been developed. The module aims to significantly reduce cyberattack vectors by improving data privacy for user applications. This is accomplished by performing the core functions of encryption, authentication, authorization, certificate management, and user access control. The module integrates a custom security application with hardware cryptographic acceleration. The application secures all communications using Transmission Control Protocol over Internet Protocol (TCP/IP). These include the three most commonly used communications protocols for power systems information exchange: Modbus, Distributed Network Protocol 3 (DNP3), and Smart Energy Profile 2.0 (SEP2.0). These three protocols are also supported by IEEE 1547-2018 for all DER devices. This paper tests the data encryption/decryption feature on a physical networking test bed with emulated Modbus devices reporting grid data and presents the results.
24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
Cybersecurity Considerations for Grid-Connected Batteries with Hardware Demonstrations
The share of renewable and distributed energy resources (DERs), like wind turbines, solar photovoltaics and grid-connected batteries, interconnected to the electric grid is rapidly increasing due to reduced costs, rising efficiency, and regulatory requirements aimed at incentivizing a lower-carbon electricity system. These distributed energy resources differ from traditional generation in many ways including the use of many smaller devices connected primarily (but not exclusively) to the distribution network, rather than few larger devices connected to the transmission network. DERs being installed today often include modern communication hardware like cellular modems and WiFi connectivity and, in addition, the inverters used to connect these resources to the grid are gaining increasingly complex capabilities, like providing voltage and frequency support or supporting microgrids. To perform these new functions safely, communications to the device and more complex controls are required. The distributed nature of DER devices combined with their network connectivity and complex controls interfaces present a larger potential attack surface for adversaries looking to create instability in power systems. To address this area of concern, the steps of a cyberattack on DERs have been studied, including the security of industrial protocols, the misuse of the DER interface, and the physical impacts. These different steps have not previously been tied together in practice and not specifically studied for grid-connected storage devices. In this work, we focus on grid-connected batteries. We explore the potential impacts of a cyberattack on a battery to power system stability, to the battery hardware, and on economics for various stakeholders. We then use real hardware to demonstrate end-to-end attack paths exist when security features are disabled or misconfigured. Our experimental focus is on control interface security and protocol security, with the initial assumption that an adversary has gained access to the network to which the device is connected. We provide real examples of the effectiveness of certain defenses. This work can be used to help utilities and other grid-connected battery owners and operators evaluate the severity of different threats and the effectiveness of defense strategies so they can effectively deploy and protect grid-connected storage devices.
25 ENERGY STORAGE↗