SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Results for “Containers”
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
Containers are good for more than serving cat pictures!? Lightweight HPC containers with Charliecloud
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Remote Repair of Sealed Containers or Dry Storage Casks Containing Used Nuclear Fuel
Explore the source record for details and available documents.
Integral Reactor Containment Condensation Model and Experimental Validation
This NEUP funded project, NEUP 12-3630, is for experimental, numerical and analytical studies on high-pressure steam condensation phenomena in a steel containment vessel connected to a water cooling tank, carried out at Oregon State University (OrSU) and the University of Wisconsin at Madison (UW-Madison). In the three years of investigation duration, following the original proposal, the planned tasks have been completed: (1) Performed a scaling study for the full pressure test facility applicable to the reference design for the condensation heat transfer process during design basis accidents (DBAs), modified the existing test facility to route the steady-state secondary steam flow into the high pressure containment for controllable condensation tests, and extended the operations at negative gage pressure conditions (OrSU). (2) Conducted a series of DBA and quasi-steady experiments using the full pressure test facility to provide a reliable high pressure condensation database (OrSU). (3) Analyzed experimental data and evaluated condensation model for the experimental conditions, and predicted the prototypic containment performance under accidental conditions (UW-Madison). A film flow model was developed for the scaling analysis, and the results suggest that the 1/3 scaled test facility covers large portion of laminar film flow, leading to a lower average heat transfer coefficient comparing to the prototypic value. Although it is conservative in reactor safety analysis, the significant reduction of heat transfer coefficient (50%) could under estimate the prototypic condensation heat transfer rate, resulting in inaccurate prediction of the decay heat removal capability. Further investigation is thus needed to quantify the scaling distortion for safety analysis code validation. Experimental investigations were performed in the existing MASLWR test facility at OrST with minor modifications. A total of 13 containment condensation tests were conducted for pressure ranging from 4 to 21 bar with three different static inventories of non-condensable gas. Condensation and heat transfer rates were evaluated employing several methods, notably from measured temperature gradients in the HTP as well as measured condensate formation rates. A detailed mass and energy accounting was used to assess the various measurement methods and to support simplifying assumptions required for the analysis. Condensation heat fluxes and heat transfer coefficients are calculated and presented as a function of pressure to satisfy the objectives of this investigation. The major conclusions for those tests are summarized below: (1) In the steam blow-down tests, the initial condensation heat transfer process involves the heating-up of the containment heat transfer plate. An inverse heat conduction model was developed to capture the rapid transient transfer characteristics, and the analysis method is applicable to SMR safety analysis. (2) The average condensation heat transfer coefficients for different pressure conditions and non-condensable gas mass fractions were obtained from the integral test facility, through the measurements of the heat conduction rate across the containment heat transfer plate, and from the water condensation rates measurement based on the total energy balance equation. 15 (3) The test results using the measured HTP wall temperatures are considerably lower than popular condensation models would predict mainly due to the side wall conduction effects in the existing MASLWR integral test facility. The data revealed the detailed heat transfer characteristics of the model containment, important to the SMR safety analysis and the validation of associated evaluation model. However this approach, unlike separate effect tests, cannot isolate the condensation heat transfer coefficient over the containment wall, and therefore is not suitable for the assessment of the condensation heat transfer coefficient against system pressure and noncondensable gas mass fraction. (4) The average condensation heat transfer coefficients measured from the water condensation rates through energy balance analysis are appropriate, however, with considerable uncertainties due to the heat loss and temperature distribution on the containment wall. With the consideration of the side wall conduction effects, the results indicate that the measured heat transfer coefficients in the tests is about 20% lower than the prediction of Dehbi’s correlation, mainly due to the side wall conduction effects. The investigation also indicates an increase in the condensation heat transfer coefficient at high containment pressure conditions, but the uncertainties invoked with this method appear to be substantial. (5) Non-condensable gas in the tests has little effects on the condensation heat transfer at high elevation measurement ports. It does affect the bottom measurements near the water level position. The results suggest that the heavier non-condensable gas is accumulated in the lower portion of the containment due to stratification in the narrow containment space. The overall effects of the non-condensable gas on the heat transfer process should thus be negligible for tall containments of narrow condensation spaces in most SMR designs. Therefore, the previous correlations with noncondensable gas effects are not appropriate to those small SMR containments due to the very poor mixing of steam and non-condensable gas. The MELCOR simulation results agree with the experimental data reasonably well. However, it is observed that the MELCOR overpredicts the heat flux for all analyzed tests. The MELCOR predicts that the heat fluxes for CCT’s approximately range from 30 to 45 kW/m2 whereas the experimental data (averaged) ranges from about 25 to 40 kW/m2. This may be due to the limited availability of liquid film models included in MELCOR. Also, it is believed that due to complex test geometry, measured temperature gradients across the heat transfer plate may have been underestimated and thus the heat flux had been underestimated. The MELCOR model predicts a film thickness on the order of 100 microns, which agrees very well with film flow model developed in this study for scaling analysis. However, the expected differences in film thicknesses for near vacuum and near atmospheric test conditions are not significant. Further study on the behavior of condensate film is expected to refine the simulation results. Possible refinements include but are not limited to, the followings: CFD simulation focusing on the liquid film behavior and benchmarking with experimental analyses for simpler geometries. 16 1 INTRODUCTION This NEUP funded project, NEUP 12-3630, is for experimental, numerical and analytical studies on high-pressure steam condensation phenomena in a steel containment vessel connected to a water cooling tank, carried out at Oregon State University (OrSU) and the University of Wisconsin at Madison (UW-Madison). The experimental results are employed to validate the containment condensation model in reactor containment system safety analysis code for integral SMRs. Such a containment condensation model is important to demonstrate the adequate cooling. In the three years of investigation, following the original proposal, the following planned tasks have been completed: (1) Performed a scaling study for the full pressure test facility applicable to the reference design for the condensation heat transfer process during design basis accidents (DBAs), modified the existing test facility to route the steady-state secondary steam flow into the high pressure containment for controllable condensation tests, and extended the operations at negative gage pressure conditions (OrSU). (2) Conducted a series of DBA and quasi-steady experiments using the full pressure test facility to provide a reliable high pressure condensation database (OrSU). (3) Analyzed experimental data and evaluated condensation model for the experimental conditions, and predicted the prototypic containment performance under accidental conditions (UW-Madison). The results are applicable to integral Small Modular Reactor (SMR) designs, including NuScale, mPower, Westinghouse SMR, Holtec-160 and other integral reactors with small containments of relatively high pressures under accidental conditions. Testing has been conducted at the OrSU laboratory in the existing MASLWR (Multi-Application Small Light Water Reactor) integral test facility sponsored by the US Department of Energy. Its highpressure stainless steel containment model (~2 MPa) is scaled to the NuScale SMR currently under development at NuScale Power, Inc.. Minor modifications to the model containment have been made to control the non-condensable gas fraction and to utilize the secondary loop stable steam flow for condensation testing. UW-Madison has developed a containment condensation model, which leveraged previous validated containment heat transfer work carried out at UW-Madison, and extended the range of applicability of the model to integral SMR designs that utilize containment vessels of high heat transfer efficiencies. In this final report, the research background and literature survey are presented in Chapter 2 and 3, respectively. The test facility description and modifications are summarized in Chapter 4, and the scaling analysis is introduced in Chapter 5. The tests description, procedures, and data analysis are presented in Chapter 6, while the numerical modeling is presented in Chapter 7, followed by a conclusion section in Chapter 8.
Development of disposal container designs for disposal of high level waste and legacy spent fuel in the UK - 15471
Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM), a fully owned subsidiary of the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), is responsible for the implementation of geological disposal in the UK. Three illustrative concepts of a geological disposal facility (GDF), corresponding to three generic geological environments - higher strength rock, lower strength sedimentary rock and evaporite rock - have been developed to demonstrate the viability of geological disposal of intermediate level waste, high level waste and spent fuel. It is envisaged that HLW which has been encapsulated in Waste Vitrification Plant (WVP) canisters, advanced gas-cooled reactor (AGR) SF which has been stripped of their spacers and packaged into slotted fuel cans, and PWR SF will be packaged into disposal containers for disposal. A set of schematic designs of these disposal containers was developed in the late 2000's. The design concept for the higher strength rock environment was based on the joint Posiva/SKB disposal container design, and the design concept for the lower strength sedimentary rock and evaporate rock illustrative environments was based on the disposal container concept from Switzerland's National Cooperative for the Disposal of Radioactive Waste (Nagra). The size, mass and dimensions of the disposal containers in the scheme designs vary significantly. The construction method and the lid closing method also vary between the disposal containers for the different waste contents. A design study has indicated that optimization of the number of HLW WVP canisters and the number of AGR slotted fuel cans in the disposal containers, standardizing construction method and closure arrangement across the containers for each geology type, providing handling features at both ends of the disposal container, and balancing of shielding around the containers, could bring significant advantage to the overall GDF programme by reducing the number of disposal containers, reducing GDF footprint, and reducing the extent of excavations, spoil generated and materials that are required for construction. A project to develop the scheme designs to conceptual level was carried in 2011 to 2013. In this project, the above changes were taken into account, technical underpinning of the designs was carried out and manufacturing method was considered. Two disposal container variants for different host rock environments have been developed: - Variant 1, for compatibility with the higher strength rock illustrative disposal system design. This is constructed from copper, with a cast iron insert and is based on the joint Posiva/SKB disposal container design. - Variant 2, for compatibility with the lower strength sedimentary rock and evaporite rock illustrative disposal system designs. This is a steel container based on the NAGRA disposal container design. Each variant has three internal configurations to accommodate 3 HLW vitrified canisters, 16 consolidated cans of AGR SF and 4 PWR spent fuel assemblies. These designs have been shown to bring significant benefit to the GDF designs, bringing a significant reduction to the operating programme and GDF programme cost, including reducing the number of disposal containers by 33% for HLW, 50% for AGR SF and reducing the size of the GDF footprint by 25%. (authors)
Processes to Open the Container and the Sample Catcher of the Hayabusa Returned Capsule in the Planetary Material Sample Curation Facility of JAXA
Japanese spacecraft Hayabusa, which returned from near-Earth-asteroid Itokawa, successfully returned its reentry capsule to the Earth, the Woomera Prohibited Area in Australia in Jun 13th, 2010, as detailed in another paper [1]. The capsule introduced into the Planetary Material Sample Curation Facility in the Sagamihara campus of JAXA in the early morning of June 18th. Hereafter, we describe a series of processes for the returned capsule and the container to recover gas and materials in there. A transportation box of the recovered capsule was cleaned up on its outer surface beforehand and introduced into the class 10,000 clean room of the facility. Then, the capsule was extracted from the box and its plastic bag was opened and checked and photographed the outer surface of the capsule. The capsule was composed of the container, a backside ablator, a side ablator, an electronic box and a supporting frame. The container consists of an outer lid, an inner lid, a frame for latches, a container and a sample catcher, which is composed of room A and B and a rotational cylinder. After the first check, the capsule was packed in a plastic bag with N2 again, and transferred to the Chofu campus in JAXA, where the X-ray CT instrument is situated. The first X-ray CT analysis was performed on the whole returned capsule for confirming the conditions of latches and O-ring seal of the container. The analysis showed that the latches of the container should have worked normally, and that the double Orings of the container seemed to be sealed its sample catcher with no problem. After the first X-ray CT, the capsule was sent back to Sagamihara and introduced in the clean room to exclude the electronic box and the side ablator from the container by hand tools. Then the container with the backside ablator was set firmly to special jigs to fix the lid of container tightly to the container and set to a milling machine. The backside ablator was drilled by the machine to expose heads of bolts, which combined the ablator to the outer lid of the container, and after the drilling had been finished, all the bolts were unscrewed and the backside ablator was removed from the container. Then, the container was sent to the Chofu X-ray facility again to examine in detail by a micro X-ray CT instrument in order to reconfirm that the condition of the latches of the lid of container was normal and that its double O-ring seemed to have been sealed after the last X-ray CT analysis.
Qualification of Pre-existing Containers According to the Acceptance Criteria of the Repository Konrad - 17204
As well as working in the field of waste management, Kerntechnische Entsorgung Karlsruhe GmbH (KBE) is, for historical reasons, one of Germany's three constructors of repository containers for the repository Konrad. The focus of this container production is merely on the side of requalification of the existing legacy containers, which are partly already loaded and grouted. To a smaller extend, KTE also produces new containers for its own use because the containers exactly match the waste properties present on the Karlsruhe site. There are three major container types in the process of requalification: - The Type-IV-Drum-Steel-Container FSC-IV-D was successfully licensed in 2014 and regularly produced thereafter. At the same time, the pre-existing containers of this type are re-qualified on the basis of this license by proof of the compliance with this license. - The Type-IV-Product-Container PSC-I-D is identical to the FSC-VI-D in terms of steel construction but also contains a liner of concrete for shielding and protection of the steel construction. This container is designed for large components and demolition waste. After a successful drop test, it is currently in the advanced process of licensing. - Type I cylindrical concrete containers are simple single drum shieldings which were produced in large numbers in the 1970's and 1980's. KTE owns 7,000 of those containers, thus making requalification and licensing cheaper than retreatment of the waste after demolition of the containers. (authors)
Testing and Versatility of the SAVY 4000 Nuclear Material Container - 15634
The SAVY 4000 container was designed by Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to meet DOE M441.1-1 requirements for safe storage of nuclear material, and it is currently being used at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Livermore National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and Nevada National Security Site. The 316L stainless steel container can be manufactured in a range of sizes from 1 quart to 10 gallon capacity, it can be opened and closed easily by hand, it is sealed with a Viton{sup R} O-ring, and the filter retains particulates and resists liquid water entry while allowing hydrogen gas to escape. This innovative design has proven to provide benefits and uses beyond its original intent. For example, the container was tested in a simulated facility design basis accident involving high temperatures, fuel fire, and subsequent drop, and the damage ratio was measured. This has allowed the LANL plutonium facility to take credit for a material-at-risk reduction of approximately two orders of magnitude for material stored in the SAVY 4000 container. In addition, the water resistant filter allows the nuclear facility to credit the container as a safety feature to mitigate the risk of a criticality accident in the event of facility sprinkler system activation. The container has also been approved to transfer small quantities of solid nuclear material by hand carry between Los Alamos facilities, and it has been approved and used as a waste container for transuranic waste destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. The 1 quart capacity container and the future 2 quart design both fit inside the 9977 shipping container, and this has facilitated the transport of nuclear material from Idaho National Laboratory to Nevada Nuclear Security Site, obviated the need for repackaging the material for storage upon arrival. Finally, Los Alamos has recently contracted with Nuclear Filter Technology, Inc. to perform testing to certify the SAVY 4000 container as a DOT Type A liquid transport container. This paper will provide an overview of the various testing regimes and describe the resulting versatility of the container for nuclear material containment. (authors)
Effects of Laser Etching on the Corrosion Susceptibility of SAVY 4000 and Hagan Containers
Since the late 1990’s, the Hagan container was used as the primary container for packaging of plutonium-bearing materials. The Hagan design consisted of a threaded closure, a Viton® ORing, a carbon-carbon filter, and a 304L stainless steel (SS) body. Over the years, Hagans have shown vulnerability in their design [1]. In 2008, The Department of Energy (DOE) issued DOE M 441.1-1, Nuclear Material Packaging Manual, which detailed an approach to obtain highconfidence in containers by including specific design requirements, material contents and an approach to determine life span from said contents, and surveillance techniques [2]. In response to both the vulnerability issues with the Hagan and DOE M 441.1-1, the SAVY 4000 container with its twist style closure, Viton® O-Ring, Fiberfrax-Gortex filter, and annealed 316L SS body, was designed as the replacement for Hagan containers, but only for a short term lifespan of 5 years [1]. However, both the Hagan and SAVY 4000 are being pushed to maintain a lifespan of 40 years. Therefore, proper confidence must be placed on each component of each container to last a minimum of 40 years. So far, the biggest concern found during surveillance of these containers is corrosion and the potential for failure by corrosion. One concern is that the containers fail due to stress corrosion cracking (SCC), especially around the weld between the collar and the body as welds leave residual stresses. One advantage the SAVY 4000 has is that the body is annealed, but its weld is still susceptible as it was welded after annealing [3, 4]. Moreover, 316L SS is known to have a higher pitting resistance (pits are a precursor to SCC and can also lead to extensive failure of the material), than 304L SS [4]. During recent surveillance activities, two SAVY 4000’s containing Solution Assay Instrument (SAI) solutions were opened. The SAI SAVY 4000’s contained plutonium (Pu) in 3M HCl solution in plastic volumetric flasks placed inside of polyethylene bags. Historically, a SAVY 4000 containing an SAI solution is packaged for 3 weeks, however, these particular containers were not reopened until 14 months later. When opened, brown-red corrosion product was found all over the inside of the container as shown in Figure 1.
ILAW Container Cost Reduction and Optimization Study
This study, performed on behalf of Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), examines the potential for making cost savings for the Immobilized Low Active Waste (ILAW) containers over the mission life of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). it builds on earlier study assessments 24590-LAW-RPT-M-01-001 Rev 0 ILAW Product Container Specifications Optimization Study and DOE/ORP-2013-02 Rev 0 Decision Analysis of Low-Active Waste Container Finishing Handling System Alternatives. The WTP design and installed equipment has evolved over an extended period ~20 years. Consequently, some of the existing requirements relating the ILAW containers may no longer be applicable under current mission plans where the glass filled containers are placed into the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) rather than stacked in an engineered purpose-built ventilated store as originally envisioned. The study team reviewed available WTP project reference documents to establish the functions the container must perform and assign requirements against each of these functions. With the assumptions that some of the existing WTP contract restrictions would not necessarily apply to the subsequent facility operations contract the container requirements were reviewed to identify those which were ‘hard constraints‘, imposed by regulatory requirements. Initially each of these hard constraints were reviewed, evaluated and documented to see if they precluded the use of an alternate less expensive material of construction, carbon steel, to the existing 304 L stainless steel in the current container specification. That review did not generate any fatal flaws for a change in material of construction to carbon steel allowing the study team to examine the impacts of material cost savings, potential changes to the design and requirements and impacts on interfaces of the containers with the existing WTP process equipment from container receipt, transfers, glass filling, cooling and export. In addition, a change in container target fill level was evaluated and qualitative, and quantitative where feasible, impacts to the container fabrication process assessed. Lastly, additional follow on development or testing activities to support the use of carbon steel were assessed and a recommended path forward with a ROM cost and timescale developed.
Methods of Using a Magnetic Field Response Sensor Within Closed, Electrically Conductive Containers
Magnetic field response sensors are a class of sensors that are powered via oscillating magnetic fields, and when electrically active, respond with their own magnetic fields with attributes dependent upon the magnitude of the physical quantity being measured. A magnetic field response recorder powers and interrogates the magnetic sensors [see Magnetic-Field-Response Measurement- Acquisition System, NASA Tech Briefs Vol. 30, No, 6 (June 2006, page 28)]. Electrically conductive containers have low transmissivity for radio frequency (RF) energy and thus present problems for magnetic field response sensors. It is necessary in some applications to have a magnetic field response sensor s capacitor placed in these containers. Proximity to conductive surfaces alters the inductance and capacitance of the sensors. As the sensor gets closer to a conductive surface, the electric field and magnetic field energy of the sensor is reduced due to eddy currents being induced in the conductive surface. Therefore, the capacitors and inductors cannot be affixed to a conductive surface or embedded in a conductive material. It is necessary to have a fixed separation away from the conductive material. The minimum distance for separation is determined by the desired sensor response signal to noise ratio. Although the inductance is less than what it would be if it were not in proximity to the conductive surface, the inductance is fixed. As long as the inductance is fixed, all variations of the magnetic field response are due to capacitance changes. Numerous variations of inductor mounting can be utilized, such as providing a housing that provides separation from the conductive material as well as protection from impact damage. The sensor can be on the same flexible substrate with a narrow throat portion of the sensor between the inductor and the capacitor, Figure 1. The throat is of sufficient length to allow the capacitor to be appropriately placed within the container and the inductor placed outside the container. The throat is fed through the orifice in the container wall (e.g., fuel tank opening) and connects to the inductor and capacitor via electrical leads to form a closed circuit, Figure 2. Another embodiment is to have the inductor and capacitor fabricated as separate units. In this embodiment, the inductor is mounted external to the container, and the capacitor is mounted internal to the container, Figure 1. Electrical leads are fed through the orifice to connect the inductor and capacitor, Figure 2. When a container holding multiple sensors is made of a conductive material, an antenna can be placed internal to the container. An internal antenna allows all components of the sensors to reside inside the container. The antenna must be separated from the container wall s conductive surface. Additionally, the inductors must be maintained in a fixed position relative to and separated from the container
Measuring 3D Profilometry of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers: Novacam TubeInspect Capabilities Report
The SAVY-4000 container series is a general-purpose interim storage container for nuclear materials, developed and maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It is the first vented, general-use nuclear material container to be demonstrated as meeting the requirements outlined in DOE M 441.1-1, the Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. Due to the challenging radiation, thermal, and corrosive storage conditions that the SAVY containers must endure, continuous surveillance techniques are employed to ensure the containers meet all safety standards and specifications. These inspections are typically performed by human operators, who check for issues such as corrosion, O-ring deterioration, corrosion, filter integrity, and potential manufacturing defects. However, human inspections alone are not sufficient, and automated inspection technologies, such as the ATIS system, as well as other automated systems are also utilized. The MicroCam TubeInspect, developed by Novacam Technologies Inc., is designed to address the challenges of understanding how manufacturing variations in the SAVY-4000 container series may affect performance. It is a 3D profilometry measurement system that enables detailed analysis of surface features, including defects, surface roughness, and manufacturing variations. This advanced tool significantly enhances rapid surveillance techniques for both pristine and used containers. In this study, container properties such as surface roughness, thickness, and geometric attributes like circularity are measured for SAVY-4000 containers. Artificially corroded or dented containers are examined to demonstrate the MicroCam's ability to quantify defects. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted, comparing the MicroCam results to those obtained using more precise instruments such as confocal microscopy. This comparison aims to provide valuable insights into container quality, durability, and potential improvements in manufacturing processes.
Sample Return Container Opening Process Concept for Potential Mars Sample Return
Proposed Mars Sample Return (MSR) missions would require a pristine and secure opening method to ensure sample Contamination Control and backward Planetary Protection. In order to reach the samples, a series of five containers would need to be opened inside of a Mars Returned Sample Handling (MRSH) facility. The process would include opening the Containment Assurance Module (CAM) aboard the Earth Entry Vehicle (EEV), the Secondary Containment Vessel (SCV), Primary Containment Vessel (PCV), and the Orbiting Sample (OS) container, and finally removing and opening the Returned Sample Tube Assemblies (RSTA). Some of these containers can be opened by reversing the mechanical assembly process while others would require destructive means. Several containers are still in a conceptual design phase while others are en route to Mars aboard the M2020 rover. In order to inform the design of the containers that are still in the conceptual stages, a study was performed at each level of the containment assembly. The studies were used to determine the least destructive and most robust methods to disassemble and open the containers while minimizing risk to the samples or the personnel. In addition to the envisioned disassembly and breaching method, contingency plans were made for completing the disassembly if damage to the vehicle and containment system occurred.
Towards Improving Container Security by Preventing Runtime Escapes
Container escapes enable the adversary to execute code on the host from inside an isolated container. Notably, these high severity escape vulnerabilities originate from three sources: (1) container profile misconfigurations, (2) Linux kernel bugs, and (3) container runtime vulnerabilities. While the first two cases have been studied in the literature, no works have investigated the impact of container runtime vulnerabilities. In this paper, to fill this gap, we study 59 CVEs for 11 different container runtimes. As a result of our study, we found that five of the 11 runtimes had nine publicly available PoC container escape exploits covering 13 CVEs. Our further analysis revealed all nine exploits are the result of a host component leaked into the container. Here, we apply a user namespace container defense to prevent the adversary from leveraging leaked host components and demonstrate that the defense stops seven of the nine container escape exploits.
Development of a multi-purpose container system for the storage, transport and disposal of PWR spent fuel in the UK - 15466
Radioactive Waste Management Limited (RWM) is a wholly owned subsidiary of UK's Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, and is responsible for implementing UK Government policy on geological disposal of higher activity radioactive waste. An aspect of the generic work programme that underpins the current generic disposal concepts includes the development of the associated disposal containers. To date RWM has focused on the development of a range of disposal container designs that fulfil the requirements for transport and disposal in a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF) for legacy high heat generating wastes, one of which includes legacy Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) spent nuclear fuel (SF). In line with a number of European countries exploring deep geological disposal, the conceptual disposal container solution developed for this waste type has a capacity of 4 PWR fuel assemblies. Since 2013, the feasibility of developing an alternative higher capacity disposal container design based around the Multi-Purpose Container (MPC) concept has been explored. In general terms, MPCs are containers that are designed to meet requirements for safe containment of radioactive waste during storage, transport and disposal. The fundamental design philosophy of the MPC is that once the waste is packaged in an MPC, it would not need to be handled again. That is, after a period of initial cooling in a fuel pond, the SF could be packaged for long term dry storage and would not require direct handling for its eventual transport to, and disposal in, a GDF. The novel feature of the MPC system design considered is the inclusion of an additional overpack specifically for the final deep geological disposal phase. The conceptual MPC and its associated storage, transfer, transport and thick walled carbon steel disposal overpack have been developed to a conceptual level of design detail to demonstrate concept feasibility, with the final design solution confirming a MPC system with a capacity of 12 PWR SF assembles. This represents the highest capacity PWR MPC system that complies with the mass and rail gauge limits of the UK W6a rail gauge. Such a capacity realises a contents loading three times that of the standard PWR disposal container and presented technical challenges from both a structural performance and thermal perspective; necessitating the need for the inclusion of features to enhance heat transfer from the central fuel assemblies within the MPC and novel lid features on the transport container overpack to maintain structural integrity and containment during the hypothetical accident conditions of transport tests. In developing the MPC system conceptual design it is recognised that, depending upon the safety functions of the MPC disposal overpack, the choice of carbon steel material may not be suitable for all geological environments. Consequently, the MPC system design and its materials of construction will require further evaluation once detailed knowledge of the disposal concept to be implemented, its safety functions and geological environment are known. (authors)
The SD-20K, a large Type B(U)F Package for Waste Containers - 18181
The type B(U)F package SD-20K, currently being developed by DAHER Nuclear Technologies GmbH (DNT), will facilitate the transport of legacy waste from interim storage facilities to the German final repository Konrad. The package SD-20K could also be used in other cases where legacy packages are not fit for a final repository and/or for transport but could be easily conditioned into a suitable package. Since the 1990's German utilities, reactor operators and service providers conditioned waste according to the requirements of the preliminary acceptance criteria for the final repository Konrad. Some of this waste was conditioned in containers which were at that time licensed as type B packages but for which the license expired due to various reasons. Other waste was reclassified so that the used package type does no longer comply with the content. In recent times Konrad containers of type IP-2 are loaded with e. g. core components in compliance with the Konrad acceptance criteria but overloaded with respect to the transport regulations. DAHER Nuclear Technologies GmbH (DNT) in cooperation with Siemens AG investigated possible solutions in a general approach. The result of the evaluation was that the best solution for the transport problem was to develop a versatile type B(U)F package large enough to accommodate all containers and packages accepted for the final repository Konrad. Possible solutions like repacking (high costs and high dose exposure) or requalification (high costs and risk of failure to achieve the goal) were not considered to be generally applicable. The SD-20K packaging is currently designed to accommodate Konrad Containers type III, IV and VI; however, the dimensions of its cavity are sufficient to accommodate any container and package that meets the acceptance criteria for the final repository Konrad. The SD-20K packaging consists of an inner container which constitutes the containment, surrounded by a rather large shock absorbing structure which also contains the thermal protection system. The outer shape of the SD-20K resembles a 20' ISO container. A special feature of the SD-20K is the automatic unloading system to minimize dose exposure of the personnel in the final repository. After arrival in the repository the shock absorbing structure as well as the door of the containment system are opened automatically and the content is moved out of the SD-20K by a remote-controlled carrier system. (authors)
Destructive Examination Protocol for 3013-Container-Package Storing Plutonium-Bearing Materials
The 3013-container-package consists of a convenience, inner and outer container and is used for long-term storage of plutonium-bearing materials. A destructive examination (DE) protocol has been developed to examine the container package visually and with microscopic aid to find any corrosion conditions that could result in the loss of the integrity of the container package over its lifetime. The DE protocol contains three main steps: initial container examination, helium (He) leak testing, and detailed imaging and analysis of the inner container closure weld region (ICCWR). The ICCWR has been determined to be bounding, defined as exhibiting worst case conditions for stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of the inner container. To assess SCC in the ICCWR, the inner container lid is cut into quarters and the weld and He-leak testing gasket are removed. Then a citric acid wash is performed to remove adherent chlorides from the ICCWR. The wash is then sent for analysis to determine the concentration of chlorides in the ICCWR. While the analysis for chloride concentration is being performed, the quarter sections are further sectioned into 1/8th subsections by cutting each section in half. These subsections are washed using nitric acid to remove corrosion products. Then each subsection is imaged using a Wide Angle 3-D Measurement System (WAMS). After analysis of microscope images for potential SCC, additional imaging can be performed, including subsurface imaging. After review, a determination is made of whether the container integrity may potentially affect the safe storage of the material.
Characterization of Mechanical and Thermal Factors Related to Glovebox Container Water Ingress (Final Report)
This report summarizes tests conducted to quantify water ingress into nuclear material containers when damaged. The damage inflicted is meant to replicate realistic worst-case seismic/fire scenario at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Four types (SAVY, Hagan, K-flange, and ROCK) of three-quart containers were subject to drop and then furnace testing. At each stage (as-delivered, post-drop, and post-furnace), water ingress potential was tested by subjecting the containers to a static water column. Key results of these experiments include: • LANL provided two water ingress testing criteria. The first, and most stringent, was a 24 inAq column for a period of one week. These parameters were used for baseline testing on as-delivered containers. The second was a 6 inAq column for a period of two hours. These parameters were used to test containers after impact and furnace testing. • Under the more severe criteria for as-delivered containers, the measured water ingress was: SAVY 7–14 g; Hagan 168–493 g; K-flange 4–5 g; and ROCK 24–280 g of water ingress. • Under the less severe criteria and after drop testing, all containers permitted less than 50 g of water ingress with one exception a ROCK container that had one of three latches release during impact. • Finally, after furnace testing (500°C, 45 minutes), which destroyed the o-ring/gasket materials, and under the same 6 inAq, 2 hr column test, the measured water ingress exceeded 50 g for all but one K-flange and one ROCK container.