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At least 235 records · Page 13

Risk Characterization Research for Artemis II: Human Factors and Behavioral Performance

BACKGROUND Artemis II will be the first time NASA astronauts go beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) since the Apollo era, and the first astronauts heading into space in the Orion vehicle. As such, it provides a critical opportunity to refine our understanding of the likelihood and consequences associated with the Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Human System Integration Architecture (HSIA), and Sleep Risks, and prepare for future Moon and Mars missions. However, Artemis II research efforts are uniquely shaped by in-mission data collection constraints. There is currently no in-mission crew time available to complete measures. In-mission data will need to be collected unobtrusively from available data streams (e.g., audiovisual, existing records such as schedules, and actigraphy). Accordingly, the overarching goal of our research is to utilize Artemis II data to further define the likelihood and consequences of these risks, and to create an unobtrusive research infrastructure that can be expanded to include future Artemis missions. This goal spans four aims across three research phases: (1) identify and operationally define key performances metrics and constructs across the four aforementioned risks, (2) develop an unobtrusive methodology and coding scheme for in-mission data collection, (3) characterize performance decrements due to Bmed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep Risks, and (4) develop a data infrastructure for future Artemis missions. The following details results of Phase I efforts in which we address Aims 1 and 2 to develop an unobtrusive measurement plan and coding scheme to capture key constructs, contributing factors, and performance decrements across each risk area. METHOD As part of Phase I, we conducted an interdisciplinary literature review and consulted with SMEs to identify unobtrusive methodologies that leverage text, audio, and/or video data as well as conceptualize key performance metrics, contributing factors, and BMed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep risk constructs related to performance decrements. The Phase I effort resulted in a finalized pre- and post-mission protocol for Artemis II, along with a measurement and coding scheme for in-mission Artemis II data. Phase II will involve data collection from the upcoming Artemis II mission. Phase III will include data processing, coding, depiction, analysis, and report writing of the Artemis II data. RESULTS & DISCUSSION To date, we have completed Phase I efforts. Specifically, we identified BMed, Team, HSIA, and Sleep risk constructs related to performance metrics, summarized how these constructs can be measured using audiovisual data collected during the mission, and worked with NASA’s HFBP Element to finalize a data collection protocol that leverages audiovisual input from the Orion spacecraft system. Our protocol includes novel unobtrusive methodologies that adhere to in-mission data streams and subsequent constraints (e.g., limited storage space on GoPro cameras, ambient noise impeding audio files) to best capture in-mission phenomena across each risk area. We will present our results from Phase I efforts, namely best practices for unobtrusive measurement as identified through literature reviews and SME consultation as well as codebook excerpts for use in Artemis II. We will include a description of planned work as we prepare for Phase II and Phase III of this research plan and the Artemis II mission itself. SUMMARY We describe progress on our Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Research for Artemis II study.

behavioral health↗

Newberry Volcano EGS Demonstration - Phase I Results

Phase I of the Newberry Volcano Enhanced Geothermal System (EGS) Demonstration included permitting, community outreach, seismic hazards analysis, initial microseismic array deployment and calibration, final MSA design, site characterization, and stimulation planning. The multi-disciplinary Phase I site characterization supports stimulation planning and regulatory permitting, as well as addressing public concerns including water usage and induced seismicity. A review of the project's water usage plan by an independent hydrology consultant found no expected impacts to local stakeholders, and recommended additional monitoring procedures. The IEA Protocol for Induced Seismicity Associated with Enhanced Geothermal Systems was applied to assess site conditions, properly inform stakeholders, and develop a comprehensive mitigation plan. Analysis of precision LiDAR elevation maps has concluded that there is no evidence of recent faulting near the target well. A borehole televiewer image log of the well bore revealed over three hundred fractures and predicted stress orientations. No natural, background seismicity has been identified in a review of historic data, or in more than seven months of seismic data recorded on an array of seven seismometers operating around the target well. A seismic hazards and induced seismicity risk assessment by an independent consultant concluded that the Demonstration would contribute no additional risk to residents of the nearest town of La Pine, Oregon. In Phase II of the demonstration, an existing deep hot well, NWG 55-29, will be stimulated using hydroshearing techniques to create an EGS reservoir. The Newberry Volcano EGS Demonstration is allowing geothermal industry and academic experts to develop, validate and enhance geoscience and engineering techniques, and other procedures essential to the expansion of EGS throughout the country. Successful development will demonstrate to the American public that EGS can play a significant role in reducing foreign energy dependence, and provide clean, renewable, baseload geothermal power generation in the State of Oregon.

15 GEOTHERMAL ENERGY↗

Updated - Research Support Facility (RSF) construction time lapse

Haselden Construction and RNL built the 222,000 square-foot Research Support Facility (RSF) for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) campus. This time lapse video begins on July 23, 2009 and the last shot was taken in June 2010. The building is designed to be a model for sustainable, high-performance building design, and will provide DOE-owned work space for administrative staff who currently occupy leased space in the nearby Denver West Office Park. The engineers and scientists from NREL's Building Technology Program set the energy criteria and the energy design strategies that are making it possible for the RSF to use no more carbon-based energy than is produced by renewables. The RSF was designed by RNL. Stantec Consulting served as the project's engineering, energy modeling and sustainability consultant.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Handling and Treatment of Sodium-Potassium Alloy (NaK) after the Loss of Key Personnel – 19002

ABSTRACT In September 2010, during cleanup and removal efforts associated with a glovebox containing a sodium-potassium alloy (NaK) cooling system, a NaK reaction event occurred. Near the end of the evolution, which was at a Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) research facility at the Idaho National Laboratory, a 2 to 3-ounce sample of NaK was being transferred from a metal can to a polyethylene bottle so it could be sent to the disposal outlet for verification analysis. During the transfer, a reaction of the NaK with ambient air was observed in both the metal can and sample container. The potential for a reaction was identified during the planning of this activity and mitigating steps were included in the procedures. In response, the two containers were flooded with argon, closed, and observed overnight. No additional reaction was noted. The sample container and metal can were packaged into a 10-gallon drum and transferred to a permitted storage location pending disposal. While the other containers generated from the deactivation and decommissioning activity were sent off-site for disposal, the 10-gal drum remained due to concerns by a staff specialist that the material could contain potassium superoxide (KO2) as a result of the reaction event. The intent at that time was to treat the NaK in a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-permitted treatment facility at MFC, instead of sending it off-site for disposal. The container was labeled, inspected, and managed as a hazardous waste. Due to the complexities associated with safely handling and treating NaK and KO2, the container remained in storage. Treatment and disposal of the NaK and KO2 container was revisited in 2016, when researchers and chemists were consulted regarding the potential for superoxide formation and the best means to safely store and treat the container. The facility came to realize that due to the retirements of key personnel, it needed to provide current employees operational experience with the handling and treatment of NaK. An outside company was identified and contracted to provide training and consulting services. Several Battelle Energy Alliance, Inc. (BEA) personnel then attended an alkali metals safety training class. The training course provided participants with classroom and hands–on instruction associated with: • Hazards associated with handling and using sodium and NaK • Proper personal protection equipment, spill control techniques, and first aid • Common design approaches for buildings, systems, and equipment used to contain sodium and NaK • What to expect in the event of a water reaction and how to respond • How to properly prepare for a fire and contain/extinguish small metal fires • A hands-on demonstration of NaK reaction and controls. Following the training, a procedure was developed to open the container, and inspect and treat the NaK. In June 2017, facility operations personnel successfully completed the inspection and treatment of the NaK drum, eliminating the legacy liability.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗

A Comparison of Preconstruction and Operational Wake Loss Estimates for Land-Based Wind Plants

Recent studies suggest that biases between wind plant pre-construction energy yield estimates and actual energy production are decreasing over time. However, variability in energy yield prediction accuracy across different projects and wind energy consultants remains high. Wake effects are one of the largest categories comprising the pre-construction energy yield assessment process. To assess the accuracy of wake loss predictions, we compare pre-construction wake loss estimates provided by 8 consultants to the estimated operational wake losses for 10 North American wind plants, as part of the Wind Plant Performance Prediction (WP3) Benchmark project. We estimate operational wake losses using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) data by comparing total wind plant energy production to the potential energy production based on the power produced by freestream wind turbines. In the presentation, we will discuss the overall wake loss prediction bias as well as the project-to-project variability in the prediction accuracy. Further, we will highlight challenges encountered when estimating operational wake losses, including the impact of complex terrain and the presence of neighboring wind plants.

benchmark↗

Port Radium Canada's Original Radium/Uranium Mine, The Complete Story of Canada's Historic Radium/Uranium Mine, 1932 to 2012 - 13159

This paper provides the life story of Canada's original radium/uranium mine. In addition to the history of operations, it discusses the unique and successful approach used to identify the key issues and concerns associated with the former radium, uranium and silver mining property and the activities undertaken to define the remedial actions and subsequent remedial plan. The Port Radium Mine site, situated approximately 275 km north of Yellowknife on the east shore of Great Bear Lake, Northwest Territories, was discovered in 1930 and underground mining began in 1932. The mine operated almost continuously from 1932 to 1982, initially for recovery of radium, then uranium and finally, for recovery of silver. Tailings production totaled an estimated 900,000 tons and 800,000 tons from uranium and silver processing operations respectively. In the early days of mining, Port Radium miners were exposed to radon and associated decay product levels (in Working Level Months of exposure - WLM) hundreds of times greater than modern standards. The experience of the Port Radium miners provides important contribution to understanding the risks from radon. While the uranium mine was originally decommissioned in the early 1960's, to the standards of the day, the community of Deline (formerly Fort Franklin) had concerns about residual contamination at the mine site and the potential effects arising from use of traditional lands. The Deline people were also concerned about the possible risks to Deline Dene arising from their work as ore carriers. In the late 1990's, the community of Deline brought these concerns to national attention and consequently, the Government of Canada and the community of Deline agreed to move forward in a collaborative manner to address these concerns. The approach agreed to was to establish the Canada-Deline Uranium Table (CDUT) to provide a joint process by which the people of Deline could have their concerns expressed and addressed. A great deal of work was done through the CDUT, including efforts to assess site environment and safety issues in the context of modern reclamation standards. In addition to the environmental and remediation studies, an assessment of historic exposures of Deline ore carriers to radiation and a follow-up epidemiological feasibility study were performed. SENES Consultants Limited (SENES) carried out the dose reconstruction for the Port Radium miners in the 1990's, was the environmental consultant to the CDUT from 2000 to 2005, developed the Remedial Action Plan (RAP), engineering plans and specifications for decommissioning the Port Radium mine and vicinity sites in 2005/6, supervised the remedial works in 2007 and carried out the long term post closure monitoring from 2008 to 2012. Our firsthand experience from working cooperatively with the CDUT provides insights into effective decommissioning of historic contaminated sites. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Waste Determination Equivalency - 12172

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) facility encompassing approximately 800 square kilometers near Aiken, South Carolina which began operations in the 1950's with the mission to produce nuclear materials. The SRS contains fifty-one tanks (2 stabilized, 49 yet to be closed) distributed between two liquid radioactive waste storage facilities at SRS containing carbon steel underground tanks with storage capacities ranging from 2,800,000 to 4,900,000 liters. Treatment of the liquid waste from these tanks is essential both to closing older tanks and to maintaining space needed to treat the waste that is eventually vitrified or disposed of onsite. Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA) provides the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), a methodology to determine that certain waste resulting from prior reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel are not high-level radioactive waste if it can be demonstrated that the waste meets the criteria set forth in Section 3116(a) of the NDAA. The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the NRC, signed a determination in January 2006, pursuant to Section 3116(a) of the NDAA, for salt waste disposal at the SRS Saltstone Disposal Facility. This determination is based, in part, on the Basis for Section 3116 Determination for Salt Waste Disposal at the Savannah River Site and supporting references, a document that describes the planned methods of liquid waste treatment and the resulting waste streams. The document provides descriptions of the proposed methods for processing salt waste, dividing them into 'Interim Salt Processing' and later processing through the Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF). Interim Salt Processing is separated into Deliquification, Dissolution, and Adjustment (DDA) and Actinide Removal Process/Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (ARP/MCU). The Waste Determination was signed by the Secretary of Energy in January of 2006 based on proposed processing techniques with the expectation that it could be revised as new processing capabilities became viable. Once signed, however, it became evident that any changes would require lengthy review and another determination signed by the Secretary of Energy. With the maturation of additional salt removal technologies and the extension of the SWPF start-up date, it becomes necessary to define 'equivalency' to the processes laid out in the original determination. For the purposes of SRS, any waste not processed through Interim Salt Processing must be processed through SWPF or an equivalent process, and therefore a clear statement of the requirements for a process to be equivalent to SWPF becomes necessary. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Endangered species act impacts on office of legacy management activities at the Rocky Flats, Colorado, Site - 15268

The Endangered Species Act was passed by Congress in 1973 to protect and recover imperiled species and the ecosystems they rely on. The Preble's meadow jumping mouse (Preble's mouse, Zapus hudsonius preblei) was discovered living along the streams at the Rocky Flats Site on the Front Range of Colorado, in the early 1990's during baseline ecological monitoring. In 1998, the Preble's mouse was classified as a federally listed threatened species under the Endangered Species Act. As a result, the mouse and its habitat are protected and Section 7 consultation with the US Fish and Wildlife Service (US FWS) is required before activities may be conducted in Preble's mouse habitat. This requirement has the potential to impact Rocky Flats project schedules and costs since approval from US FWS is needed prior to conducting activities. To reduce the need to consult with US FWS for projects on a case-by-case basis, a programmatic approach was taken. A master list of ongoing activities and other potential future activities was developed and evaluated in a Programmatic Biological Assessment (PBA) that was written for site activities. The PBA that was approved in 2004 worked well during closure, but did not address many ongoing, postclosure US DOE Office of Legacy Management activities. As a result, the PBA was rewritten in 2013 to address postclosure routine and project-specific activities. The use of a programmatic approach has reduced the time and costs associated with getting individual US FWS approvals, which has in turn minimized impacts to schedules. The programmatic approach could prove useful for other US DOE sites with federally listed species. (authors)

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Managing Low-Level Waste at Dounreay - 16269

Dounreay Site Restoration Limited (DSRL) is the site licence company responsible for the clean-up and demolition of Britain's former centre of fast reactor research and development. The Dounreay site requires facilities to dispose of up to 175,000 cubic metres of low level waste (LLW) that has been and will continue to be generated during the decommissioning and restoration of the site. In May 2014, construction of two new vaults for the disposal of LLW at Dounreay was completed, including the necessary roads, infrastructures and services, followed by an encapsulation plant in September 2014. The vaults are located immediately to the northeast of the Dounreay licensed site, on NDA-owned land. The facilities are for disposal of the solid LLW generated at Dounreay and the adjacent Vulcan site only. In 2004, following consultation with stakeholders and members of the public, Dounreay issued the 'Best Practicable Environmental Option (BPEO) Report' on the management of Dounreay LLW. This report assessed potential management options for LLW against a range of criteria, including technical, environmental, cost, health and safety issues. The study was conducted in line with best practice and involved consultation with a range of people, including the local community and organisations with an interest in radioactive waste management. The recommendations and conclusions from the study provided the basis for the 'Dounreay Solid LLW Overall Strategy', which was published in March 2005. A fundamental component of this strategy was the development of new below-ground disposal vaults for LLW at Dounreay. Siting the vaults on land at Dounreay avoids any need to transport the LLW away from Dounreay on public roads. Disposal at Dounreay therefore satisfies the proximity principle of managing the waste at source. Disposal at Dounreay is also consistent with UK Government Policy on LLW management, the Scottish Government's Radioactive Waste Management Policy and the Nuclear Decommissioning Authority's (NDA's) strategy on management of LLW from the UK nuclear industry. A planning application was initially lodged with the Highland Council in June 2006. The period for the determination of this application was extended to allow the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) sufficient time to assess fully the supporting Environmental Safety Case (ESC). The planning application was re-activated in May 2008, and planning permission was granted by Highland Council in April 2009. The planning permission included 26 conditions on DSRL, covering a wide range of environmental issues such as construction noise/dust, traffic, visual impact and also a condition to develop a community fund aimed at socio-economic development of the area around the Dounreay site. After undertaking the necessary detailed design work, construction of the phase one vaults commenced in November 2011 by principal contractor, Graham Construction. Work was undertaken on both vaults simultaneously, excavating around 243,000 m{sup 3} of rock. When excavation was complete, steel reinforcement was placed and concrete poured to construct the floor slabs. This was followed by the construction of the reinforced walls and then the installation of the steel support structure and materials that form the roof. Mechanical and electrical installation then followed, in parallel with the construction of the vault apron, ramps and access roads. A pumping system and control building was also constructed to remove groundwater from around the vaults to allow the vaults to be kept dry while they are being filled with waste. A layer of excavated material, approximately 3 m thick, was placed across the existing ground surface between the vaults and the coast, to ensure the water table lies well below the new ground surface after closure of the vaults, and that any future trace contaminated groundwater flows out to the sea rather than to the soil zone. This layer is referred to in project documents as the 'enhanced geosphere'. After disposals are completed and the vaults are closed, this layer will be joined to the capping over the vaults so that the ensemble merges visually with the surrounding landscape. The original vegetation and soil mix will be returned as far as is practicable. An encapsulation plant has been constructed to fill the LLW containers with grout prior to disposal in the vault, similar to the process used at the national Low-Level Waste Repository facility (LLWR), near Drigg in Cumbria. The plant has the capacity to grout up to four containers per day. The grout fills voids in the container and helps provide chemical conditions in the vault that limit the release of radionuclides in the far future, after the vault has been penetrated by groundwater. On April 24 2015, active commissioning began at the Encapsulation Plant and LLW Vaults. Half-height ISO containers packed with low level waste are currently being filled with grout and disposed of in the LLW Vault. Also packaged Demolition Low Level Waste (DLLW) is being processed and disposed of in the Demolition Low Level Waste Vault. To date over 2500 packages of DLLW and 70 containers LLW have been disposed of. Completion of construction and the start of operating the Phase One vaults and encapsulation plant are fundamental to the successful and efficient decommissioning of the Dounreay site, upon which many millions of pounds of investment and hundreds of jobs rely.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radioactive Waste Disposal Strategies within the US Army Corps of Engineers FUSRAP - 18328

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' (USACE) highest priority is the protection of human health and the environment and public and worker safety during the cleanup, transportation, and disposal of Formerly Utilized Sites Remedial Action Program (FUSRAP) material. In addition to following all appropriate federal and state rules and regulations, the USACE has its own safety program that ensures that we are being protective. One aspect of the USACE FUSRAP is the radioactive waste disposal strategies that we must consider. The USACE will only dispose of FUSRAP material in a facility that is licenses/permitted to accept it. The estimated exposures to facility workers and members of the public from the permitted disposal of FUSRAP wastes is evaluated as part of this process. The USACE uses the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) process to study and remediate FUSRAP sites. An evaluation is performed to decide whether it is best to manage the waste on-site or off-site and the requirements for disposal. The action selected must be protective of human health and the environment and must comply with regulations. When making the decision, there are several other factors taken into consideration including cost of the disposal and whether the public and state agencies support the action. Prior to determining disposal options, wastes must first be characterized. This involves an evaluation of both site history and analytical data. Determining the proper disposal requirements and subsequent disposal option involves: Characterizing the waste as stated above. This is important because there are several regulatory agencies which may oversee management of the waste. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the US Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA), the US Department of Transportation, and state hazardous waste and/or radiation protection agencies may all have varying degrees of involvement. Identifying disposal requirements. Certain wastes must be disposed at licensed radioactive waste disposal facilities. Wastes containing US EPA regulated hazardous waste must be disposed at permitted hazardous waste disposal facilities. Certain wastes must be disposed at facilities licensed/permitted for both radioactive and hazardous waste. Some lower activity wastes may be accepted for disposal at other types of landfills. Considering acceptance criteria of the disposal facility. Radionuclides and/or hazardous constituents in the waste, as well as physical and chemical form of the waste, are evaluated to ensure they meet the acceptance criteria of the receiving facility's license and/or permit. If they don't, another disposal location must be used. Considering the accessibility and location of the disposal facility. Some facilities are able to accept shipments only by truck and others can accept material via railcar as well. The distance to a disposal facility impacts the risk of transportation accidents and efficient use of project resources such as the number of trucks required to perform the transportation. These factors are also important in evaluating whether material can be cost effectively shipped to a disposal facility. Evaluating the compliance status of the receiving facility. It is not assumed that just because a facility has a license or permit that it is acceptable for the USACE' waste. Prior to selecting a facility for disposal of FUSRAP waste, a site visit, audit and consultation with the US EPA is required to determine whether there are any known relevant violations at the facility. Facilities that have violations that negatively impact the USACE or US EPA approval of the facility are not used for disposal of FUSRAP waste. Once a facility is selected. The USACE procures contracts, or utilizes existing contracts, to facilitate the transportation and disposal action. Additionally, the USACE continues to consult with US EPA routinely to confirm the compliance status of the facility. Considering state acceptance of wastes to a facility. The USACE seeks to obtain written authorization from the facility state regulator indicating the action is compliant with existing licenses, permits, laws, and regulations. Each of these factors is considered by the USACE in selecting a FUSRAP disposal location. The goal is to provide safe, cost effective disposal which is protective of human health and the environment and which complies with all regulatory requirements. These steps all feed in to the disposal strategy consideration that USACE must go through for our FUSRAP waste streams. There are a number of challenges in the process to include In order to achieve the Congressional mandate of completing cleanup work under FUSRAP in a more cost effective, timely manner, while assuring protection of public health and safety. USACE must determine all disposal options that are available for the types of waste at each FUSRAP site. As a solution, completion of a disposal strategy document can help ensure this goal is met and will foster consistency across the FUSRAP. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Handling and Treatment of Sodium-Potassium Alloy (NaK) after the Loss of Key Personnel - 19002

In September 2010, during cleanup and removal efforts associated with a glovebox containing a sodium-potassium alloy (NaK) cooling system, a NaK reaction event occurred. Near the end of the evolution, which was at a Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC) research facility at the Idaho National Laboratory, a 2 to 3-ounce sample of NaK was being transferred from a metal can to a polyethylene bottle so it could be sent to the disposal outlet for verification analysis. During the transfer, a reaction of the NaK with ambient air was observed in both the metal can and sample container. The potential for a reaction was identified during the planning of this activity and mitigating steps were included in the procedures. In response, the two containers were flooded with argon, closed, and observed overnight. No additional reaction was noted. The sample container and metal can were packaged into a 10-gallon drum and transferred to a permitted storage location pending disposal. While the other containers generated from the deactivation and decommissioning activity were sent off-site for disposal, the 10-gal drum remained due to concerns by a staff specialist that the material could contain potassium superoxide (KO{sub 2}) as a result of the reaction event. The intent at that time was to treat the NaK in a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)-permitted treatment facility at MFC, instead of sending it off-site for disposal. The container was labeled, inspected, and managed as a hazardous waste. Due to the complexities associated with safely handling and treating NaK and KO{sub 2}, the container remained in storage. Treatment and disposal of the NaK and KO{sub 2} container was revisited in 2016, when researchers and chemists were consulted regarding the potential for superoxide formation and the best means to safely store and treat the container. The facility came to realize that due to the retirements of key personnel, it needed to provide current employees operational experience with the handling and treatment of NaK. An outside company was identified and contracted to provide training and consulting services. Several Battelle Energy Alliance, Inc. (BEA) personnel then attended an alkali metals safety training class. The training course provided participants with classroom and hands-on instruction associated with: - Hazards associated with handling and using sodium and NaK; - Proper personal protection equipment, spill control techniques, and first aid; - Common design approaches for buildings, systems, and equipment used to contain sodium and NaK; - What to expect in the event of a water reaction and how to respond; - How to properly prepare for a fire and contain/extinguish small metal fires; - A hands-on demonstration of NaK reaction and controls. Following the training, a procedure was developed to open the container, and inspect and treat the NaK. In June 2017, facility operations personnel successfully completed the inspection and treatment of the NaK drum, eliminating the legacy liability. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Implications of End Points on Remediation - 20476

The Port Hope Area Initiative (PHAI) is a federal environmental clean-up program. Its mandate is the remediation and local, long-term, safe management of approximately 1.7 million cubic metres of historic low-level radioactive waste in the adjacent communities of Port Hope and Port Granby in Southern Ontario, Canada. The PHAI is being undertaken by Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL), on behalf of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, a federal Crown corporation. It is currently one of the largest environmental remediation projects in Canada. The safety of workers, the public and the environment while delivering the PHAI compliantly, on time and within budget is CNL's number one priority. The PHAI is being implemented as two projects - the Port Hope Project and the Port Granby Project. The Port Hope Project is the larger of the two and includes the cleanup of approximately 1.2 million cubic metres of historic waste. The Port Hope Project includes a unique and important component - the remediation of approximately 1,200 private residences and businesses to include both interior and exterior verification of soil and surface-contaminated objects. Planning and consultation for the PHAI clean-up criteria and remediation verification standard operating procedures (RVSOP) were initiated in the early 2000's. The criteria were developed through a cooperative effort involving the PHAI, scientific specialists, federal and provincial government agencies, peer reviewers, the municipalities and members of the public. Subsequent verification procedures which detail the unique systematic methods to verify compliance with the clean-up criteria were developed by CNL in consultation with federal regulators and relevant stakeholders. Now, specifically with the Port Hope Small-Scale Sites project having been underway for a year and approximately 38 properties in some stage of remediation, it has become increasingly evident that the practical application of the clean-up criteria and RVSOP methodology is posing unique challenges that are having direct impact on project execution. The current RVSOP approach is based on discrete sample verification not allowing failure of any one sample. When implemented in the field, particularly at the Small-Scale Sites, it leads to a much more extensive excavation than what was accounted for in the original design, the implications of which are substantial delays in project progress and much more significant impact on the individual properties than originally anticipated. This paper will examine the evolution of PHAI clean-up criteria, subsequent RVSOP methodology and its impact on current project execution and the justification for exploring potential revisions to methods of remediation verification. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Simulation in the Service of Design - Asking the Right Questions

This paper proposes an approach to the creation of design tools that address the real information needs of designers in the early stages of design of nonresidential buildings. Traditional simplified design tools are typically too limited to be of much use, even in conceptual design. The proposal is to provide access to the power of detailed simulation tools, at a stage in design when little is known about the final building, but at a stage also when the freedom to explore options is greatest. The proposed approach to tool design has been derived from consultation with design analysis teams as part of the COMFEN tool development. The paper explores how tools like COMFEN have been shaped by this consultation and how requests from these teams for real-world relevance might shape such tools in the future, drawing into the simulation process the lessons from Post Occupancy Evaluation (POE) of buildings.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

Whitestone Poncelet RISEC Project Final Technical Report

This report covers the development of the Poncelet Kinetics RHK100 Prototype. The work was completed by Hasz Consulting, LLC; CE2 Engineers, LLC; Energetic Drives, LLC; and Applied Power and Control all operating as subcontractors to Whitestone Power and Communications during the year from October 1, 2010 to September 23, 2011. As designed, the prototype is run-of-river instream energy conversion (RISEC) system. The design is principally a three-stage undershot water wheel arranged according to the method of General Poncelet. The power train consists of an epicyclic transmission coupled to a permanent magnet generator. The electronic controls system governs the speed of the wheel and rectifies the power signal to enable the system to be integrated with infinite grid infrastructures, to operate in parallel in finite grid applications with other small power productions sources or to operate in stand-alone mode on demand.

13 HYDRO ENERGY↗

An exploration of the feasibility of radiation therapist participation in treatment reviews

As radiation oncologists' (ROs') workload has increased over time, treatment review clinics have become recognized as an area of RO practice into which radiation therapist (RT) practice could extend. There has been limited utilization of RTs in this role in Australia and a paucity of data on the acceptability and opinions regarding RTs practising in this role in an Australian context. The purpose of this audit was to investigate the feasibility of RT participation in review clinics at Calvary Mater Newcastle. Feasibility was determined by two methods: an audit of 200 treatment reviews to determine medical intervention (MI) levels required and a survey of 80 clinical staff to explore attitudes towards RT participation in clinics. Medical intervention was required in 59% (n = 118) of observed reviews, with the lowest being for breast (33%) and prostate (28%) cancers. MI peaked at 73% between fractions 16–20 and was lowest early and late in the treatment period at 48%. There were 60 responses to the staff survey. All but one respondent agreed that RTs would be willing to participate in treatment review clinics, but all five consultant ROs indicated they would not be willing to delegate reviews to RTs. Neither feasibility measure reached acceptable levels to recommend RT participation in treatment review clinics. Further investigation and RT education are required to help meet the future RO workforce shortfall. As MI rates are lowest for breast and prostate cancer RT participation could be targeted to these clinics.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

Identifying the Learning Curve for Uterine Artery Embolisation in an Interventional Radiological Training Unit

AimA clear understanding of operator experience is important in improving technical success whilst minimising patient risk undergoing endovascular procedures, and there is the need to ensure that trainees have the appropriate skills as primary operators. The aim of the study is to retrospectively analyse uterine artery embolisation (UAE) procedures performed by interventional radiology (IR) trainees at an IR training unit analysing fluoroscopy times and radiation dose as surrogate markers of technical skill.MethodsTen IR fellows were primary operator in 200 UAE procedures over a 5-year period. We compared fluoroscopy times, radiation dose and complications, after having them categorised according to three groups: Group 1, initial five, Group 2, >5 procedures and Group 3, penultimate five UAE procedures. We documented factors that may affect screening time (number of vials employed and use of microcatheters).ResultsMean fluoroscopy time was 18.4 (±8.1), 17.3 (±9.0), 16.3 (±8.4) min in Groups 1, 2 and 3, respectively. There was no statistically significant difference between these groups (p > 0.05) with respect to fluoroscopy time or radiation dose. Analysis after correction for confounding factors showed no statistical significance (p > 0.05). All procedures were technically successful, and total complication rate was 4 %.ConclusionUAE was chosen as a highly standardised procedure followed by IR practitioners. Although there is a non-significant trend for shorter screening times with experience, technical success and safety were not compromised with appropriate Consultant supervision, which illustrates a safe construct for IR training. This is important and reassuring information for patients undergoing a procedure in a training unit.

62 RADIOLOGY AND NUCLEAR MEDICINE↗

A critique of the performance of EIA within the offshore oil and gas sector

The oil and gas sector is a key driver of the offshore economy. Yet, it is also associated with a number of unwanted environmental impacts which potentially threaten the long term economic and environmental viability of marine ecosystems. Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) can potentially make a significant contribution to the identification and management of adverse impacts through the promotion of evidence based decision making. However, the extent to which EIA has been embraced by key stakeholders is poorly understood. On this basis, this paper provides an initial evaluation of EIA performance within the oil and gas sector. The methodology adopted for the paper consisted of the structured review of 35 Environmental Statements (ESs) along with interviews with regulators, operators, consultants and advisory bodies. The findings reveal a mixed picture of EIA performance with a significant number of ESs falling short of satisfactory quality and a tendency for the process to be driven by compliance rather than best practice. -- Highlights: • Concerns identified relating to impacts of offshore oil and gas industry. • Research assesses performance of EIA in addressing impacts. • Findings highlight weak quality standards and procedural deficiencies. • Institutional reforms identified in order to improve practice.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗