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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 235 records · Page 13
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS1972

Testing of models of VVH particle sources and propagation

For comparisons between theoretical and observed charge spectra of the VVH particles to be meaningful, at least two conditions must be met. First, charge resolution must be adequate to separate important groups of nuclei, and there should be no significant systematic errors in the charge scale developed. Second, there must be adequate rejection of slower particles of smaller Z, which have been observed in several flights. Within these conditions, it has been shown that observed features of the charge spectrum are not accidents of the analysis but reflect real variations in the relative abundances that must be explained by any successful model.

Blanford, G. E., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS1974

Testing of models of VVH particle sources and propagation

For comparisons between theoretical and observed charge spectra of VVH particles to be meaningful, at least two conditions must be met. First, charge resolution must be adequate to separate important groups of nuclei, and there should be no significant systematic errors in the charge scale developed. Second, there must be adequate rejection of slower particles of smaller Z, which have been observed in several flights. Within these conditions, it has been shown that observed features of the charge spectrum are not accidents of the analysis but reflect real variations in the relative abundances that must be explained by any successful model.

Blanford, G. E., Jr.↗
NASA NTRS2004

Effect of Clouds on Optical Imaging of the Space Shuttle During the Ascent Phase: A Statistical Analysis Based on a 3D Model

Clouds are highly effective in obscuring optical images of the Space Shuttle taken during its ascent by ground-based and airborne tracking cameras. Because the imagery is used for quick-look and post-flight engineering analysis, the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended the return-to-flight effort include an upgrade of the imaging system to enable it to obtain at least three useful views of the Shuttle from lift-off to at least solid rocket booster (SRB) separation (NASA 2003). The lifetimes of individual cloud elements capable of obscuring optical views of the Shuttle are typically 20 minutes or less. Therefore, accurately observing and forecasting cloud obscuration over an extended network of cameras poses an unprecedented challenge for the current state of observational and modeling techniques. In addition, even the best numerical simulations based on real observations will never reach "truth." In order to quantify the risk that clouds would obscure optical imagery of the Shuttle, a 3D model to calculate probabilistic risk was developed. The model was used to estimate the ability of a network of optical imaging cameras to obtain at least N simultaneous views of the Shuttle from lift-off to SRB separation in the presence of an idealized, randomized cloud field.

FROM↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Digital Twins and Living Models at NASA

The idea of a “digital twin” was born at NASA in the 1960s as a “living model” of the Apollo mission. In response to Apollo 13’s oxygen tank explosion and subsequent damage to the main engine, NASA employed multiple simulators to evaluate the failure and extended a physical model of the vehicle to include digital components. This “digital twin” was the first of its kind, allowing for a continuous ingestion of data to model the events leading to up to the accident for forensic analysis and exploration of next steps. Fast forward half a century and NASA, along with others in the aerospace community, continues to develop and utilize high-fidelity digital models of physical systems and components as well as the extreme environments in which they operate. NASA aims to travel further and stay longer in space as we realize the Artemis program, taking us from the moon to Mars by establishing a sustainable presence on the Moon to prepare for missions to Mars. We will no longer be able to rely on constant connectivity with an asset nor be in-the-loop for on-demand human intervention in the event of an anomaly. Further, the importance of digital twins is increasing as we seek alternatives for certification of structures so large that they cannot be fully evaluated in existing test facilities and autonomous systems that are not deterministic. The idea of a digital twin is not a new one. What is new is the scale, ordinality, and non-deterministic nature of the models that are critical to achieving NASA’s goals. Their number and autonomy from each other as well as the reference system is suggestive of a changing ecosystem, returning us the idea of a living model.

Digital Twin↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Need for a Maximum Intensity Accident in ANS 8-Series Standards

Y-12 has installed one CAAS system under the ANS 8.3 framework as a safety significant system, and is in the process of designing, installing, and qualifying another. As a safety significant system, the Y-12 CAAS is required to demonstrate that it is able to perform its function and actuate an alarm when exposed to the radiation from both a Minimum Accident of Concern and a maximum intensity accident. The ANS 8-series standards do not present a maximum accident to be considered, nor do they specify dose rate tolerance requirements, leading CAAS vendors to potentially use other standards that provide inadequate criteria. A maximum intensity accident is proposed, and the effects of this accident on CAAS analysis and the vendor’s equipment qualification are discussed

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

The Need for a Maximum Intensity Accident in ANS 8-Series Standards

The Y-12 National Security Complex has installed one Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) under the ANS 8.3 framework as a safety significant system, and is in the process of designing, installing, and qualifying another. As a safety significant system, the Y-12 CAAS is required to demonstrate that it is able to perform its function and actuate an alarm when exposed to the radiation from both a Minimum Accident of Concern and a maximum intensity accident. The ANS 8-series standards do not present a maximum accident to be considered, nor do they specify radiation tolerance requirements for the CAAS equipment, leading CAAS vendors to potentially use other standards that provide inadequate criteria. In this paper, the historical basis and need for a maximum intensity accident in the ANS standards is discussed, the fission rate of a maximum intensity accident is proposed, and the effects of this accident on CAAS analysis and the vendor’s equipment qualification are discussed.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
NASA NTRS1989

Final environmental impact statement for the Galileo Mission (Tier 2)

This Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) addresses the proposed action of completing the preparation and operation of the Galileo spacecraft, including its planned launch on the Space Transportation System (STS) Shuttle in October 1989, and the alternative of canceling further work on the mission. The only expected environmental effects of the proposed action are associated with normal launch vehicle operation, and are treated in published National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documents on the Shuttle (NASA 1978) and the Kennedy Space Center (NASA 1979), and in the KSC Environmental Resources Document (NASA 1986) and the Galileo Tier 1 EIS (NASA 1988a). The environmental impacts of a normal launch were deemed insufficient to preclude Shuttle operations. Environmental impacts may also result from launch or mission accidents that could release plutonium fuel used in the Galileo power system. Intensive analysis of the possible accidents associated with the proposed action reveal small health or environmental risks. There are no environmental impacts in the no-action alternative. The remote possibility of environmental impacts of the proposed action must be weighed against the large adverse fiscal and programmatic impacts inherent in the no-action alternative.

Source record↗
DOE OSTI2026

Multiphysics Analysis of Li Cooled Divertor Substrate During Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA)

In the ongoing study of potential designs for liquid metal (LM) plasma-facing components (PFCs), so-called “slow” and “fast” Li flow divertor concepts are under investigation. In the previous studies on design and analysis of the slow Li flow divertor and comparison with the fast Li flow divertor, the magnetohydrodynamics (MHD)/heat transfer effects of the Li flowing inside the substrate as a second coolant were comprehensively investigated under the normal steady-state operation conditions. Here, in the present study, the multiphysics analysis is extended to the unsteady abnormal divertor scenario where the Li layer on top of the substrate does not provide full coverage or even totally disappears for a certain period of time, so that the substrate becomes directly exposed to the incident high plasma heat flux. Such an unwanted event may happen regardless of the concept of the divertor and is worth detailed investigations, typically referred to as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). To address this situation, a simplified scoping analysis is conducted first in 2-D, and then an integrated 3-D modeling is performed using a time-dependent multiphysics model in COMSOL Multiphysics that integrates LM MHD, heat transfer, and solid mechanics. The main goal is to evaluate conditions under which the major material limits, such as the maximum allowable temperature, stress, and displacement of the substrate, can still be met. It was shown that the maximum time over which the substrate of RAFM steel can retain structural integrity during the LOCA is around 0.2 ∼ 0.3 s. Any divertor concept that utilizes RAFM steel as a substrate material and liquid Li as a second coolant should take such a permitted time into consideration.

divertor↗
NASA NTRS2014

A Comprehensive Analysis of the X-15 Flight 3-65 Accident

The November 15, 1967, loss of X-15 Flight 3-65-97 (hereafter referred to as Flight 3-65) was a unique incident in that it was the first and only aerospace flight accident involving loss of crew on a vehicle with an adaptive flight control system (AFCS). In addition, Flight 3-65 remains the only incidence of a single-pilot departure from controlled flight of a manned entry vehicle in a hypersonic flight regime. To mitigate risk to emerging aerospace systems, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) proposed a comprehensive review of this accident. The goal of the assessment was to resolve lingering questions regarding the failure modes of the aircraft systems (including the AFCS) and thoroughly analyze the interactions among the human agents and autonomous systems that contributed to the loss of the pilot and aircraft. This document contains the outcome of the accident review.

Dennehy, Cornelius J.↗
NASA NTRS2017

Analysis of Alerting System Failures in Commercial Aviation Accidents

The role of an alerting system is to make the system operator (e.g., pilot) aware of an impending hazard or unsafe state so the hazard can be avoided or managed successfully. A review of 46 commercial aviation accidents (between 1998 and 2014) revealed that, in the vast majority of events, either the hazard was not alerted or relevant hazard alerting occurred but failed to aid the flight crew sufficiently. For this set of events, alerting system failures were placed in one of five phases: Detection, Understanding, Action Selection, Prioritization, and Execution. This study also reviewed the evolution of alerting system schemes in commercial aviation, which revealed naive assumptions about pilot reliability in monitoring flight path parameters; specifically, pilot monitoring was assumed to be more effective than it actually is. Examples are provided of the types of alerting system failures that have occurred, and recommendations are provided for alerting system improvements.

aviation accidents↗
NASA NTRS1994

Analysis of Crew Fatigue in AIA Guantanamo Bay Aviation Accident

Flight operations can engender fatigue, which can affect flight crew performance, vigilance, and mood. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) requested the NASA Fatigue Countermeasures Program to analyze crew fatigue factors in an aviation accident that occurred at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. There are specific fatigue factors that can be considered in such investigations: cumulative sleep loss, continuous hours of wakefulness prior to the incident or accident, and the time of day at which the accident occurred. Data from the NTSB Human Performance Investigator's Factual Report, the Operations Group Chairman's Factual Report, and the Flight 808 Crew Statements were analyzed, using conservative estimates and averages to reconcile discrepancies among the sources. Analysis of these data determined the following: the entire crew displayed cumulative sleep loss, operated during an extended period of continuous wakefulness, and obtained sleep at times in opposition to the circadian disposition for sleep, and that the accident occurred in the afternoon window of physiological sleepiness. In addition to these findings, evidence that fatigue affected performance was suggested by the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) transcript as well as in the captain's testimony. Examples from the CVR showed degraded decision-making skills, fixation, and slowed responses, all of which can be affected by fatigue; also, the captain testified to feeling "lethargic and indifferent" just prior to the accident. Therefore, the sleep/wake history data supports the hypothesis that fatigue was a factor that affected crewmembers' performance. Furthermore, the examples from the CVR and the captain's testimony support the hypothesis that the fatigue had an impact on specific actions involved in the occurrence of the accident.

Rosekind, Mark R.↗
NASA NTRS1998

U.S. Civil Rotorcraft Accidents, 1963 through 1997

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has recorded 8,436 rotorcraft accidents during the period mid - 1963 through the end of 1997. Review and analysis of the NTSB summary narrative for each accident has been completed. In addition, FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) counts of the growing registered rotorcraft fleet over this period has obtained. Taken together, a large and informative data base is now available, which indicates that the accident rate (on a per airframe basis) has changed very little since the mid 1970s. The data base, even in the summary form provided by this paper, offers suggestions for safer designs and improved flight operations. For analysis purposes, each accident has been placed in one of 21 top level categories as defined by the NTSB. Analysis of this grouping shows that 70 percent of rotorcraft accidents are associated with four categories. The accident count in these top four categories are: (1) 2,408 Loss of engine power (2) 1,322 In flight collision with object (3) 1,114 Loss of control (4) 1,083 Airframe/component/system failure or malfunction. Single engine rotorcraft dominate these accident statistics because of their sheer numbers over the study period. One-third of the loss of engine power accidents with these aircraft is fuel/air mixture related and fuel exhaustion is a common event. This appears to be the case whether a piston or turbine engine is installed. This paper provides similar study results in the other major mishap categories. It shows that both minor and major design and flight operations changes can -- and should -- be made to reduce rotorcraft accidents in the future. The paper outlines these changes and suggests how they may be made.

Harris, Franklin D.↗
DOE OSTI2021

MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) User Guide

The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) is used by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This User Guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/WinMACCS model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 3.10.0. Features that have been added to MACCS in subsequent versions are described in separate documentation. This User Guide provides a brief description of the model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2. PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The NUREG does not contain information collection requirements and, therefore, is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 USC 3501, et seq.). PUBLIC PROTECTION NOTIFICATION The NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, a request for information or an information collection requirement unless the requesting document displays a currently valid OMB control number. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Contributions to this User Guide were received from NRC and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) project managers, technical experts, and code authors dedicated to the production of a valuable resource for the MACCS user community. Instructions and guidance included herein were developed over many years and include advancements in the code that provide users the ability to develop complex consequence modeling scenarios. WinMACCS and many of the early MACCS developments were due to vision of an earlier Project Manager, Jocelyn Mitchell. Jonathan Barr and AJ Nosek also contributed to the development of this report. The current NRC Project Manager, Salman Haq, provided the leadership to ensure this document was completed. Several other NRC and Sandia staff provided insights supporting development of the MACCS code and of this document.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) User Guide -- Version 4.0

The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) is used by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This User Guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/WinMACCS model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 4.0. Features that have been added to MACCS in subsequent versions are described in separate documentation. This User Guide provides a brief description of the model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System) User Guide Version 4.0, Revision 1

The MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) is used by Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and various national and international organizations for probabilistic consequence analysis of nuclear power accidents. This User Guide is intended to assist analysts in understanding the MACCS/WinMACCS model and to provide information regarding the code. This user guide version describes MACCS Version 4.0. Features that have been added to MACCS in subsequent versions are described in separate documentation. This User Guide provides a brief description of the model history, explains how to set up and execute a problem, and informs the user of the definition of various input parameters and any constraints placed on those parameters. This report is part of a series of reports documenting MACCS. Other reports include the MACCS Theory Manual, MACCS Verification Report, Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS, as well as documentation for preprocessor codes including SecPop, MelMACCS, and COMIDA2.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analysis of iron-chromium-aluminum samples exposed to accident conditions followed by quench in the QUENCH-19 experiment

The QUENCH-19 experiment was a first-of-its-kind full-bundle test simulating accident conditions followed by water quench on accident-tolerant fuel (ATF) cladding. Here, a type of FeCrAl(Y) alloy, B136Y3, was developed at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and tested at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology using Kanthal APM corner rods, a shroud, and Kanthal AF spacer grids. Testing conditions were similar to those in QUENCH-15—which tested ZIRLO cladding behavior—so that B136Y3 and ZIRLO cladding could be compared. QUENCH-19 consisted of an initial pre-oxidation heating followed by a transient. Then, a maximum power hold, which was not present in QUENCH-15, was executed to extend the heating period for the FeCrAl(Y) rods. Finally, a rapid water quench was executed that was similar to emergency core coolant system (ECCS) actuation. Compared with the ZIRLO rods in QUENCH-15, the bundle in QUENCH-19 released significantly less H 2 (9.2 g vs. 47.6 g) and achieved a much lower maximum temperature (1455°C vs. 1880°C). Furthermore, no breakaway oxidation was observed in QUENCH-19. Metallographic mounts revealed that despite the symmetry of the setup, at elevations near the maximum temperature, cladding and thermocouples were heavily damaged, substantial melting and oxidation occurred, and the cladding underwent chemical interaction with the thermocouple sheaths. Additionally, the ZrO 2 spacers detrimentally interacted with the cladding, leading to mixed oxide debris and the full destruction of some rods. Additional failure was found in certain cooler rods that may have risen due to the high thermal expansion coefficient of FeCrAl alloys. This paper presents an analysis of this work, which suggests that FeCrAl cladding can chemically survive anticipated loss-of-coolant accident events followed by rapid ECCS quench if the correct geometry and core design are present.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Reactivity-initiated accidents in two pressurized water reactor high burnup core designs

Here, this paper presents a safety analysis of two proposed core loadings for 24-month Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) fuel cycles. This analysis focuses on reactivity-initiated accidents (RIAs) and evaluates core safety performance impacts of rod-averaged burnup limits up to 75 GWD/MTU and less than 7 % enriched UO 2 . The capabilities of Polaris, PARCS, and RELAP5-3D are leveraged to evaluate the core neutronic and thermal–hydraulic behavior for normal-operation, uncontrolled control rod withdrawal (CRW) transients, and control rod ejection (CRE) accidents. The two core designs are compared to identify features of realistic high burnup/extended enrichment core design approaches which have significant safety impact, identify experimental data needs for high-fidelity predictive modeling, and provide recommendations for future high burnup core designs. The first core design evaluated in this study was developed by Southern Nuclear Company and used an ZrB 2 Integral Fuel Burnable Absorber (IFBA) and B 4 C Wet-Annular Burnable Absorber (WABA)-based burnable poison strategy. The second core design assessed in this work used a Gd 2 O 3 -doped UO 2 burnable poison, similar to that used in boiling water reactors or French PWRs. Results indicate that fuel thermal limits are maintained for limiting CRW and hot full power (HFP) CRE transients. Cladding failure is predicted for the highest energy deposition rods in each core during limiting hot zero power (HZP) CRE accidents (where maximum radially averaged enthalpy exceeds 120 cal/g), though licensing may be permissible with a limited number of failed rods. While concerns exist regarding high critical boron concentration during steady state for the IFBA core and large plenum pressures for the gadolinia core design, the analysis demonstrates adequate safety performance during limiting RIA accident scenarios for two representative high burnup core designs. Design changes limiting plenum pressures and implementation of accident tolerant fuel (ATF) cladding features which minimize hydriding and susceptibility to pellet-cladding mechanical interaction (PCMI) are recommended for future high burnup fuel concepts. To support the technical basis for burnup limit increases, high-fidelity fuel performance models are needed to address physical effects not considered in this analysis, and high burnup irradiated fuel tests are required to extend applicability of the fuel failure limits and validate existing and future models.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗