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Innovation in Radiological Security, Part 1 of 2 – Using a Cloud Solution to Compress the Timely Detection Model

The design and implementation of new security technologies must account for numerous and complex operational challenges. For example, traditionally isolated systems must now survive amid the proliferation of network connectivity and endure the dynamic environments created by organizations tolerating bring-your-own-device policies. When evaluating the cyber, physical, or cyber-physical security of an asset, a common practice in the security industry is to apply the Timely Detection Model (TDM)—a versatile concept that relates the security functions of detection, delay, and response to the progression of an oppositional force’s attack timeline. If implemented correctly, security enhancements can compress the TDM to offer efficiencies to the stakeholders responsible for adjudicating threat scenarios. The efficiencies gained by the response force allow for more effective protection strategies to be realized. One such enhancement, deployed within the radiological security domain—the Sentry-Remote Monitoring System (Sentry-RMS)—is a stand-alone security system that detects, assesses, and communicates priority alarms as a means of thwarting internal and external threats. The SEntry-RMS CommUnications and REsponse (Sentry-SECURE) platform—an optional feature of the Sentry-RMS—is being developed to facilitate more efficient alarm adjudication by site stakeholders and, if necessary, a faster response by law enforcement. This Cloud-hosted platform receives protected information from deployed Sentry-RMS units and relays it to stakeholders that have vested interests in maintaining an elevated level of situational awareness. Operationally, this enables real-time delivery of high-priority alarm and video imagery directly to an identified response stakeholder, such as local law enforcement or site management, via natively developed mobile applications or full platform integration. The Sentry-SECURE platform, as implemented by the U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Radiological Security, is an example of an innovative security technology that compresses the TDM by (1) enabling a more efficient time to target and (2) better informing a response force’s predetermined tactics, techniques, and procedures. This paper explores the platform’s operational roles, highlights its principal functions, and presents a use case that demonstrates how the platform provides enhanced situational awareness when adjudicating priority alarms.

Sentry-RMS, Timely Detection Model, Sentry-SECURE↗

Shifting Left for Machine Learning: An Empirical Study of Security Weaknesses in Supervised Learning-based Projects

Context: Supervised learning-based projects (SLPs), i.e., software projects that use supervised learning algorithms, such as decision trees are useful for performing classification-related tasks. Yet, security weaknesses, such as the use of hard-coded passwords in SLPs, can make SLPs susceptible to security attacks. A characterization of security weaknesses in SLPs can help practitioners understand the security weaknesses that are frequent in SLPs and adopt adequate mitigation strategies. Objective: The goal of this paper is to help practitioners se-curely develop supervised learning-based projects by conducting an empirical study of security weaknesses in supervised learning-based projects. Methodology: We conduct an empirical study by quantifying the frequency of security weaknesses in 278 open source SLPs. Results: We identify 22 types of security weaknesses that occur in SLPs. We observe ‘use of potentially dangerous function’ to be the most frequently occurring security weakness in SLPs. Of the identified 3,964 security weaknesses, 23.79 % and 40.49 % respectively, appear for source code files used to train and test models. We also observe evidence of co-location, e.g., instances of command injection co-locates with instances of potentially dangerous function. Conclusion: Based on our findings, we advocate for a shift left approach for SLP development with security-focused code reviews, and application of security static analysis.

Bhuiyan, Farzana Ahamed↗

Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

Turke, Andy↗

Protecting intellectual property in space; Proceedings of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference, McLean, VA, March 20, 1985

The primary purpose of the Aerospace Computer Security Conference was to bring together people and organizations which have a common interest in protecting intellectual property generated in space. Operational concerns are discussed, taking into account security implications of the space station information system, Space Shuttle security policies and programs, potential uses of probabilistic risk assessment techniques for space station development, key considerations in contingency planning for secure space flight ground control centers, a systematic method for evaluating security requirements compliance, and security engineering of secure ground stations. Subjects related to security technologies are also explored, giving attention to processing requirements of secure C3/I and battle management systems and the development of the Gemini trusted multiple microcomputer base, the Restricted Access Processor system as a security guard designed to protect classified information, and observations on local area network security.

Source record↗

Building a Successful Security Infrastructure: What You Want vs. What You Need vs. What You Can Afford

With the fast growing popularity of the Internet, many organizations are racing to get onto the on-ramp to the Information Superhighway. However, with frequent headlines such as 'Hackers' break in at General Electric raises questions about the Net's Security', 'Internet Security Imperiled - Hackers steal data that could threaten computers world-wide' and 'Stanford Computer system infiltrated; Security fears grow', organizations find themselves rethinking their approach to the on-ramp. Is the Internet safe? What do I need to do to protect my organization? Will hackers try to break into my systems? These are questions many organizations are asking themselves today. In order to safely travel along the Information Superhighway, organizations need a strong security framework. Developing such a framework for a computer site, whether it be just a few dozen hosts or several thousand hosts is not an easy task. The security infrastructure for a site is often developed piece-by-piece in response to security incidents which have affected that site over time. Or worse yet, no coordinated effort has been dedicated toward security. The end result is that many sites are still poorly prepared to handle the security dangers of the Internet. This paper presents guidelines for building a successful security infrastructure. The problem is addressed in a cookbook style method. First is a discussion on how to identify your assets and evaluate the threats to those assets; next are suggestions and tips for identifying the weak areas in your security armor. Armed with this information we can begin to think about what you really need for your site and what you can afford. In this stage of the process we examine the different categories of security tools and products that are available and then present some tips for deciding what is best for your site.

Crabb, Michele D.↗

Regulatory Development Challenges and Opportunities for the Safe and Secure Transport of Radioactive Materials

Drafting regulations for transport safety and transport security achieve two separate objectives, which can lead to divergent outcomes. With transport safety, the principle goal is to protect the public and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, while in contrast, the principle goal of transport security is to protect the material from malicious actors. While many Member States may have transport safety regulations for radioactive materials, transport security regulatory development is still in its nascent stages globally. Trying to develop harmonized transport safety and transport security regulations could lead to challenges ranging from differences in terminology used in transport safety versus terminology uses in transport security, roles and responsibilities for the variety of stakeholders involved in transport, and finally, the possible role of multiple competent authorities in governing the transport of dangerous goods, which includes radioactive material. While the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is currently developing a process of a methodology for drafting transport security regulations, any process must address both safety considerations and security requirements. (As the most vulnerable part of the life cycle of radioactive materials, the need for harmonized transport safety/transport security regulations is essential.) This paper investigates the regulatory elements of the safety-security interface for nuclear and other radioactive material in transport. Examining challenges including use of terms, the role of multiple competent authorities, and practical challenges involved in the safe and secure transport of radioactive material, the paper analyzes the need for integrated regulatory development for the safe and secure transport of these materials.

Anderson, Kimberly↗

The Floating Chameleon: Floating Nuclear Power Plants and the Nexus of Maritime and Nuclear Security Law

During the 63rd regular session of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference, as part of Norway's statement to the General Conference, Mr. Auden Halvorsen, State Secretary for Norway, made the following statement about transportable nuclear power plants (TNPPs): "Deployment of transportable nuclear power plants—TNPPs—demands our attention. The Agency must intensify its conversations of all aspects of the safety and security of such facilities. . . . The scope and applicability of existing requirements and instruments need to be clarified and developed including dialogue with the International Maritime Organization [IMO]." Ensuring the security of TNPPs is essential for their deployment and implementation. TNPPs may be floating nuclear power plants (FNPPs), which bring together elements of nuclear security related to the nuclear power plant with elements of maritime security. Insofar as an FNPP weds the principles of nuclear and maritime security, it also weds the two domains, the ancient traditions and contemporary practices of maritime law with the contemporary practices of nuclear law. Fundamentally, this raises the question, what are the legal requirements for the security of a FNPP? Although both maritime law and nuclear law have established regimes for security through various legal instruments, does an FNPP expose gaps between the current international legal instruments? The previous question of whether international legal regimes define requirements for the security of FNPPs, but a threshold question remains: what is an FNPP? For purposes of nuclear and maritime security, is an FNPP a facility, is an FNPP a vessel and therefore a transport, or does an FNPP change its status based upon temporal and spatial considerations such as when it is docked at a port generating power or in transit to its destination? This set of questions, and others addressed later in this article, highlights that the issue is not merely a question about security but intersects elements of safety whether an FNPP is in uncharted waters of the international regime for both nuclear and maritime law. Here, this paper addresses many of the questions posed above related to the security regulations for an FNPP.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Potential impacts of China's climate policies on energy security

Highlights: • We develop an energy security assessment framework in a 3E-integrated system model. • The potential relations between climate targets and energy security are examined. • Climate policy reduces risks of energy system in terms of main safety metrics. • The impact of emission budgets on energy diversity relies on the time scale options. • Co-benefits of energy security would improve the economics of climate policies. - Abstract: Energy security, as an indispensable constituent of economic security, has long been a top research priority, and the dynamics of energy security become particularly complicated with the involvement of climate change. In this work, we combined a one-sector integrated assessment framework with a series of well-proposed energy security metrics to extensively explore the unidirectional consistency between climate policy and energy security from the national perspective. Implementation of climate policy is generally beneficial for improving energy security. Specifically, climate policy helps to reduce the systematic risk of China's energy system according to the metrics of energy (oil) intensity, energy (oil) expenditures and per capita energy (oil) consumption independent of time scale options. As observed from the perspective of energy diversity, co-benefits arising from climate policy primarily emerge in the first half of this century, and they may gradually decline as emission constraints and the phasing out of fossil fuels are enhanced. Additionally, the macroeconomic costs required to reach China's committed carbon-peaking target might be far lower than the costs required to fulfill the emission budgets under the global 2-degree warming rise threshold. If the co-benefits of energy security are considered, the economics of climate policy is expected to significantly improve.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Computer Security for I and C Systems at Nuclear Facilities - 116

Cyber-attacks on Instrumentation and Control (I and C) systems may jeopardize the safety and security of nuclear facilities by contributing to sabotage or aiding in the unauthorized removal of nuclear material. The effects of cyber-attacks on I and C systems important to safety to safety may result in a wide range of consequences, such as a temporary loss of process control or unacceptable radiological consequences. Public awareness of cyber-attacks that affect I and C systems may also undermine confidence in the safety and security of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recognizes the need for the guidance on the protection of I and C systems that provide safety, security, or auxiliary functions at nuclear facilities from cyber-attacks. To meet this need, The IAEA has developed a new Nuclear Security Series publication with the provisional title Computer Security of Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Facilities which builds upon and expands the guidance published in Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities (2011) . This publication will be formally released in 2017 as Technical Guidance and will be the second international consensus publication dedicated to Computer Security at Nuclear Facilities. It was developed in parallel with the new IAEA Nuclear Safety publications providing recommendations on I and C systems at research reactors (RR) and nuclear power plants (NPP) . The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of this publication and its application. The paper will also discuss its relation to other IAEA Nuclear Security Series (NSS) publications on computer security. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cyber Security and Resilient Systems

The Department of Energy (DOE) Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has become a center of excellence for critical infrastructure protection, particularly in the field of cyber security. It is one of only a few national laboratories that have enhanced the nation’s cyber security posture by performing industrial control system (ICS) vendor assessments as well as user on-site assessments. Not only are vulnerabilities discovered, but described actions for enhancing security are suggested – both on a system-specific basis and from a general perspective of identifying common weaknesses and their corresponding corrective actions. These cyber security programs have performed over 40 assessments to date which have led to more robust, secure, and resilient monitoring and control systems for the US electrical grid, oil and gas, chemical, transportation, and many other sectors. In addition to cyber assessments themselves, the INL has been engaged in outreach to the ICS community through vendor forums, technical conferences, vendor user groups, and other special engagements as requested. Training programs have been created to help educate all levels of management and worker alike with an emphasis towards real everyday cyber hacking methods and techniques including typical exploits that are used. The asset owner or end user has many products available for its use created from these programs. One outstanding product is the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems document that provides insight to the user when specifying a new monitoring and control system, particularly concerning security requirements. Employing some of the top cyber researchers in the nation, the INL can leverage this talent towards many applications other than critical infrastructure. Monitoring and control systems are used throughout the world to perform simple tasks such as cooking in a microwave to complex ones such as the monitoring and control of the next generation fighter jets or nuclear material safeguards systems in complex nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It is the intent of this paper to describe the cyber security programs that are currently in place, the experiences and successes achieved in industry including outreach and training, and suggestions about how other sectors and organizations can leverage this national expertise to help their monitoring and control systems become more secure.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Wide Area Security Region Final Report

This report develops innovative and efficient methodologies and practical procedures to determine the wide-area security region of a power system, which take into consideration all types of system constraints including thermal, voltage, voltage stability, transient and potentially oscillatory stability limits in the system. The approach expands the idea of transmission system nomograms to a multidimensional case, involving multiple system limits and parameters such as transmission path constraints, zonal generation or load, etc., considered concurrently. The security region boundary is represented using its piecewise approximation with the help of linear inequalities (so called hyperplanes) in a multi-dimensional space, consisting of system parameters that are critical for security analyses. The goal of this approximation is to find a minimum set of hyperplanes that describe the boundary with a given accuracy. Methodologies are also developed to use the security hyperplanes, pre-calculated offline, to determine system security margins in real-time system operations, to identify weak elements in the system, and to calculate key contributing factors and sensitivities to determine the best system controls in real time and to assist in developing remedial actions and transmission system enhancements offline . A prototype program that automates the simulation procedures used to build the set of security hyperplanes has also been developed. The program makes it convenient to update the set of security hyperplanes necessitated by changes in system configurations. A prototype operational tool that uses the security hyperplanes to assess security margins and to calculate optimal control directions in real time has been built to demonstrate the project success. Numerical simulations have been conducted using the full-size Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC) system model, and they clearly demonstrated the feasibility and the effectiveness of the developed technology. Recommendations for the future work have also been formulated.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Chemical Safety and Security Education in ACS-Approved Chemistry Programs

To date, chemical security education practices in postsecondary institutions are poorly understood. The purpose of this study is to provide an initial understanding of the practices, attitudes, and barriers toward chemical security education for undergraduate and graduate programs in the United States (US) by surveying representatives of American Chemical Society (ACS)-approved programs. All programs with ACS-approved undergraduate chemistry programs (n = 691) were contacted for participation: 21% (n = 148) fully completed and 6% (n = 41) partially completed the survey for a combined total of 27% complete and/or partially complete surveys (n = 189). We observed that most programs currently teach chemical safety (undergraduate >99%, graduate 73%); however, only about one-third of programs teach chemical security at any education level (undergraduate 32%, graduate 34%). We also observed that safety education is provided more frequently than security education. Further, ACS-approved programs reported that their chemical safety culture was stronger than chemical security culture and felt that safety should be taught differently than security. The overwhelming majority of respondents (96%) indicated that chemical safety should be mandatory at some level, while only about half of respondents (57%) indicated that chemical security should be mandatory at some level. More efforts are needed by the chemistry community to raise awareness of the importance of chemical security education so that more institutions commit to training their faculty and students on the topic. The authors suggest that adoption of chemical security education could be increased if ACS were to advocate for chemical security by including it in its guidelines for educational program approval.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Fundamental quantitative security in quantum key generation

We analyze the fundamental security significance of the quantitative criteria on the final generated key K in quantum key generation including the quantum criterion d, the attacker's mutual information on K, and the statistical distance between her distribution on K and the uniform distribution. For operational significance a criterion has to produce a guarantee on the attacker's probability of correctly estimating some portions of K from her measurement, in particular her maximum probability of identifying the whole K. We distinguish between the raw security of K when the attacker just gets at K before it is used in a cryptographic context and its composition security when the attacker may gain further information during its actual use to help get at K. We compare both of these securities of K to those obtainable from conventional key expansion with a symmetric key cipher. It is pointed out that a common belief in the superior security of a quantum generated K is based on an incorrect interpretation of d which cannot be true, and the security significance of d is uncertain. Generally, the quantum key distribution key K has no composition security guarantee and its raw security guarantee from concrete protocols is worse than that of conventional ciphers. Furthermore, for both raw and composition security there is an exponential catch-up problem that would make it difficult to quantitatively improve the security of K in a realistic protocol. Some possible ways to deal with the situation are suggested.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Application of Framework for Integrating Safety, Security and Safeguards (3Ss) into the Design Of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility

Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Fuel Cycle Research and Development develops options to the current commercial fuel cycle management strategy to enable the safe, secure, economic, and sustainable expansion of nuclear energy while minimizing proliferation risks by conducting research and development focused on used nuclear fuel recycling and waste management to meet U.S. needs. Used nuclear fuel is currently stored onsite in either wet pools or in dry storage systems, with disposal envisioned in interim storage facility and, ultimately, in a deep-mined geologic repository. The safe management and disposition of used nuclear fuel and/or nuclear waste is a fundamental aspect of any nuclear fuel cycle. Integrating safety, security, and safeguards (3Ss) fully in the early stages of the design process for a new nuclear facility has the potential to effectively minimize safety, proliferation, and security risks. The 3Ss integration framework could become the new national and international norm and the standard process for designing future nuclear facilities. The purpose of this report is to develop a framework for integrating the safety, security and safeguards concept into the design of Used Nuclear Fuel Storage Facility (UNFSF). The primary focus is on integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF based on the existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approach to addressing the safety/security interface (10 CFR 73.58 and Regulatory Guide 5.73) for nuclear power plants. The methodology used for adaptation of the NRC safety/security interface will be used as the basis for development of the safeguards /security interface and later will be used as the basis for development of safety and safeguards interface. Then this will complete the integration cycle of safety, security, and safeguards. The overall methodology for integration of 3Ss will be proposed, but only the integration of safeguards and security will be applied to the design of the UNFSF. The framework for integration of safeguards and security into the UNFSF will include 1) identification of applicable regulatory requirements, 2) selection of a common system that share dual safeguard and security functions, 3) development of functional design criteria and design requirements for the selected system, 4) identification and integration of the dual safeguards and security design requirements, and 5) assessment of the integration and potential benefit.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Security Governance in India: Institutions, Instruments, and Culture (2019)

There is an emerging consciousness in India of the importance of nuclear security and safety. Motivated by a combination of rapid growth in its civil nuclear sector, heightened scrutiny of recent nuclear accidents around the world, and the deteriorating regional security environment, India has pushed to adopt measures to strengthen and enhance its nuclear security and safety governance structures. India recognizes that the various recent global nuclear security initiatives are in its own best interest and has been an enthusiastic participant in the Nuclear Security Summit process. Today, India demonstrates a greater willingness to showcase its nuclear security arrangements before the public and has undertaken many institutional, legal, and operational reforms to maintain international regime compliance. This study takes a comprehensive look at India's approach to nuclear security and critically examines the physical security measures the country has put in place. Particular focus is placed on the evolution and strengths, as well as weaknesses, of the country's nuclear security institutions, instruments, practices, and culture. Given that the strengthening of India's nuclear security governance is an ongoing endeavor, the paper also puts forward a number of policy recommendations.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

IAEA Guidance on Managing the Interface between Safety and Security for Normal Commercial Shipments of Radioactive Material

Regulations governing the safe transport of radioactive material have been developed and maintained at the international and national levels for more than six decades. Following the events of 9/11, a similar effort was initiated for security during the transport of radioactive material; however, safety and security provisions have generally been developed independent of each other. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State but as part of an international effort to address the provisions that complement or conflict with each other in the interface between safety and security during transport, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) convened a series of consultancy meetings beginning in October 2016, to (a) identify the needs and develop a plan to address those needs for the transport of low-activity radioactive material (defined for the purposes of this effort as “Normal Commercial Shipments”) with respect to the interface between transport safety and transport security, (b) develop guidance on the interface between transport safety and transport security, and (c) development of a model workshop that will inform IAEA Member States of the interface between transport safety and security. Specifically, the materials addressed in the IAEA Technical Report Series, TRS No. 1001 (in preparation), are those that are limited to low activity radioactive material (including nuclear materials) with activities below 3000 A2 – as defined in the IAEA transport safety regulations – or activities below 10 D – as defined in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources – depending on the radionuclide(s) involved. Emphasis was placed in the Technical Report on these materials since, worldwide, little effort has focused on security for their transport and such guidance could prove beneficial to regulators and operators in many developing countries. An IAEA Technical Report has been drafted and is currently undergoing final steps for publication. The Technical Report will address the issues identified during the consultancy meetings, with a focus on the needs and methods for clarifying safety–security interfaces. This paper will introduce the structure and contents of the Technical Report and provide an update on its progress toward publication. A separate PATRAM 2019 paper will outline the workshop materials developed to date.

Ladsous, David↗

Integrating Safety, Security, and Nuclear Operations for Advanced Reactors

The traditional separation between safety, security, and operations teams has created significant barriers to achieving optimal outcomes. When security considerations are introduced late in the design process, they often conflict with already-established architectural, operational, or engineering parameters. Retrofitting security measures can lead to increased costs, schedule delays, and compromises in security effectiveness. For instance, the need to retrofit physical barriers or surveillance systems often results in trade-offs that could have been avoided with earlier input from security professionals. Delayed integration can also affect regulatory processes and result in licensing delays. Security reviews conducted at later stages frequently identify gaps that necessitate significant redesign efforts, impacting not only scope, schedule, and budget, but also adding risk and lowering stakeholder confidence in the project. This paper aims to address these challenges by identifying practical opportunities for integrating security considerations seamlessly with design and operations teams throughout the entire lifecycle of nuclear facilities—from conceptual design to commissioning and beyond. The research emphasizes the value of early and continuous collaboration among stakeholders to ensure that security measures are robust, operationally effective, and cost-efficient. By examining case studies, analyzing past incidents, and leveraging best practices from other high-security industries, this study highlights actionable strategies for bridging the gap between safety, security, and operations teams.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗