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At least 217 records · Page 12

PM Science Working Group Meeting on Spacecraft Maneuvers

The EOS PM Science Working Group met on May 6, 1997, to examine the issue of spacecraft maneuvers. The meeting was held at NASA Goddard Space Flight Center and was attended by the Team Leaders of all four instrument science teams with instruments on the PM-1 spacecraft, additional representatives from each of the four teams, the PM Project management, and random others. The meeting was chaired by the PM Project Scientist and open to all. The meeting was called in order to untangle some of the concerns raised over the past several months regarding whether or not the PM-1 spacecraft should undergo spacecraft maneuvers to allow the instruments to obtain deep-space views. Two of the Science Teams, those for the Moderate-Resolution Imaging Spectroradiometer (MODIS) and the Clouds and the Earth's Radiant Energy System (CERES), had strongly expressed the need for deep-space views in order to calibrate their instruments properly and conveniently. The other two teams, those for the Advanced Microwave Scanning Radiometer (AMSR-E) and the Atmospheric Infrared Sounder (AIRS), the Advanced Microwave Sounding Unit (AMSU), and the Humidity Sounder for Brazil (HSB), had expressed concerns that the maneuvers involve risks to the instruments and undesired gaps in the data sets.

Parkinson, Claire L.↗

MAVEN Information Security Governance, Risk Management, and Compliance (GRC): Lessons Learned

As the first interplanetary mission managed by the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center, the Mars Atmosphere and Volatile EvolutioN (MAVEN) had three IT security goals for its ground system: COMPLIANCE, (IT) RISK REDUCTION, and COST REDUCTION. In a multiorganizational environment in which government, industry and academia work together in support of the ground system and mission operations, information security governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC) becomes a challenge as each component of the ground system has and follows its own set of IT security requirements. These requirements are not necessarily the same or even similar to each other's, making the auditing of the ground system security a challenging feat. A combination of standards-based information security management based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management Framework (RMF), due diligence by the Mission's leadership, and effective collaboration among all elements of the ground system enabled MAVEN to successfully meet NASA's requirements for IT security, and therefore meet Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) mandate on the Agency. Throughout the implementation of GRC on MAVEN during the early stages of the mission development, the Project faced many challenges some of which have been identified in this paper. The purpose of this paper is to document these challenges, and provide a brief analysis of the lessons MAVEN learned. The historical information documented herein, derived from an internal pre-launch lessons learned analysis, can be used by current and future missions and organizations implementing and auditing GRC.

FISMA↗

Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) Development Effort as a Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP) for Urban Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Operations

NASA’s Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Traffic Management (UTM) project aims to enable the integration of new aviation paradigms such as Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) while providing the necessary infrastructure for future concepts such as On-Demand Mobility (ODM) and Urban Air Mobility (UAM) operations in the National Airspace System (NAS). In order to do so, the UTM project has developed an architecture to allow communication among UAS operators, UAS Service Suppliers (USS), Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSP), and the public. As part of this framework, the Supplemental Data Service Providers (SDSP) are envisioned as model and/or data based services that disseminate essential or enhanced information to ensure safe operations within low-altitude airspace. These services include terrain and obstacle data, specialized weather data, surveillance, constraint information, risk monitoring, etc. This paper highlights the development efforts of a non-participant casualty risk assessment SDSP called Ground Risk Assessment Service Provider (GRASP) which assists operators with preflight planning. GRASP is based on the previously introduced UTM Risk Assessment Framework (URAF) and allows UAS operators to simulate and visualize potential non-participant casualty risks associated with their proposed flight. The risk assessment capability also allows operators to revise their flight plans if the casualty risks are determined to be above acceptable thresholds. GRASP is configured to account for future improvements including servicing airborne aircraft as part of NASA’s System-Wide Safety (SWS) project.

Ancel, Ersin↗

Anomaly Detection for Next-Generation Space Launch Ground Operations

NASA is developing new capabilities that will enable future human exploration missions while reducing mission risk and cost. The Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery (FDIR) project aims to demonstrate the utility of integrated vehicle health management (IVHM) tools in the domain of ground support equipment (GSE) to be used for the next generation launch vehicles. In addition to demonstrating the utility of IVHM tools for GSE, FDIR aims to mature promising tools for use on future missions and document the level of effort - and hence cost - required to implement an application with each selected tool. One of the FDIR capabilities is anomaly detection, i.e., detecting off-nominal behavior. The tool we selected for this task uses a data-driven approach. Unlike rule-based and model-based systems that require manual extraction of system knowledge, data-driven systems take a radically different approach to reasoning. At the basic level, they start with data that represent nominal functioning of the system and automatically learn expected system behavior. The behavior is encoded in a knowledge base that represents "in-family" system operations. During real-time system monitoring or during post-flight analysis, incoming data is compared to that nominal system operating behavior knowledge base; a distance representing deviation from nominal is computed, providing a measure of how far "out of family" current behavior is. We describe the selected tool for FDIR anomaly detection - Inductive Monitoring System (IMS), how it fits into the FDIR architecture, the operations concept for the GSE anomaly monitoring, and some preliminary results of applying IMS to a Space Shuttle GSE anomaly.

Spirkovska, Lilly↗

Planning and Estimation of Operations Support Requirements

Life Cycle Cost (LCC) estimates during the proposal and early design phases, as well as project replans during the development phase, are heavily focused on hardware development schedules and costs. Operations (phase E) costs are typically small compared to the spacecraft development and test costs. This, combined with the long lead time for realizing operations costs, can lead to de-emphasizing estimation of operations support requirements during proposal, early design, and replan cost exercises. The Discovery and New Frontiers (D&NF) programs comprise small, cost-capped missions supporting scientific exploration of the solar system. Any LCC growth can directly impact the programs' ability to fund new missions, and even moderate yearly underestimates of the operations costs can present significant LCC impacts for deep space missions with long operational durations. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) D&NF Program Office at Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) recently studied cost overruns and schedule delays for 5 missions. The goal was to identify the underlying causes for the overruns and delays, and to develop practical mitigations to assist the D&NF projects in identifying potential risks and controlling the associated impacts to proposed mission costs and schedules. The study found that 4 out of the 5 missions studied had significant overruns at or after launch due to underestimation of the complexity and supporting requirements for operations activities; the fifth mission had not launched at the time of the mission. The drivers behind these overruns include overly optimistic assumptions regarding the savings resulting from the use of heritage technology, late development of operations requirements, inadequate planning for sustaining engineering and the special requirements of long duration missions (e.g., knowledge retention and hardware/software refresh), and delayed completion of ground system development work. This paper updates the D&NF LCC study, looking at the operations (phase E) cost drivers in more detail and extending the study to include 2 additional missions and identifies areas for increased emphasis by project management in order to improve the fidelity of operations estimates.

Newhouse, Marilyn E.↗

Medical Updates Number 5 to the International Space Station Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) Model Using the Integrated Medical Model

The Integrated Medical Model (IMM) Project has been developing a probabilistic risk assessment tool, the IMM, to help evaluate in-flight crew health needs and impacts to the mission due to medical events. This package is a follow-up to a data package provided in June 2009. The IMM currently represents 83 medical conditions and associated ISS resources required to mitigate medical events. IMM end state forecasts relevant to the ISS PRA model include evacuation (EVAC) and loss of crew life (LOCL). The current version of the IMM provides the basis for the operational version of IMM expected in the January 2011 timeframe. The objectives of this data package are: 1. To provide a preliminary understanding of medical risk data used to update the ISS PRA Model. The IMM has had limited validation and an initial characterization of maturity has been completed using NASA STD 7009 Standard for Models and Simulation. The IMM has been internally validated by IMM personnel but has not been validated by an independent body external to the IMM Project. 2. To support a continued dialogue between the ISS PRA and IMM teams. To ensure accurate data interpretation, and that IMM output format and content meets the needs of the ISS Risk Management Office and ISS PRA Model, periodic discussions are anticipated between the risk teams. 3. To help assess the differences between the current ISS PRA and IMM medical risk forecasts of EVAC and LOCL. Follow-on activities are anticipated based on the differences between the current ISS PRA medical risk data and the latest medical risk data produced by IMM.

Butler, Doug↗

Characterization of microbial and chemical composition of shuttle wet waste with permanent gas and volatile organic compound analyses

Solid-waste treatment in space for Advanced Life Support, ALS, applications requires that the material can be safely processed and stored in a confined environment. Many solid-wastes are not stable because they are wet (40-90% moisture) and contain levels of soluble organic compounds that can contribute to the growth of undesirable microorganisms with concomitant production of noxious odors. In the absence of integrated Advanced Life Support systems on orbit, permanent gas, trace volatile organic and microbiological analyses were performed on crew refuse returned from the volume F "wet" trash of three consecutive Shuttle missions (STS-105, 109, and 110). These analyses were designed to characterize the short-term biological stability of the material and assess potential crew risks resulting from microbial decay processes during storage. Waste samples were collected post-orbiter landing and sorted into packaging material, food waste, toilet waste, and bulk liquid fractions deposited during flight in the volume F container. Aerobic and anaerobic microbial loads were determined in each fraction by cultivation on R2A and by acridine orange direct count (AODC). Dry and ash weights were performed to determine both water and organic content of the materials. Experiments to determine the aerobic and anaerobic biostability of refuse stored for varying periods of time were performed by on-line monitoring of CO2 and laboratory analysis for production of hydrogen sulfide and methane. Volatile organic compounds and permanent gases were analyzed using EPA Method TO15 by USEPA et al. [EPA Method TO15, The Determination of Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) in Ambient Air using SUMMA, Passivated Canister Sampling and Gas Chromatographic Analysis,1999] with gas chromatography/mass spectrometry and by gas chromatography with selective detectors. These baseline measures of waste stream content, labile organics, and microbial load in the volume F Shuttle trash provide data for waste subsystem analysis and atmospheric management within the ALS Project. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of COSPAR.

NASA Center KSC↗

Artificial Neural Network Test Support Development for the Space Shuttle PRCS Thrusters

A significant anomaly, Fuel Valve Pilot Seal Extrusion, is affecting the Shuttle Primary Reaction Control System (PRCS) Thrusters, and has caused 79 to fail. To help address this problem, a Shuttle PRCS Thruster Process Evaluation Team (TPET) was formed. The White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) and Boeing members of the TPET have identified many discrete valve current trace characteristics that are predictive of the problem. However, these are difficult and time consuming to identify and trend by manual analysis. Based on this exhaustive analysis over months, 22 thrusters previously delivered by the Depot were identified as high risk for flight failures. Although these had only recently been installed, they had to be removed from Shuttles OV103 and OV104 for reprocessing, by directive of the Shuttle Project Office. The resulting impact of the thruster removal, replacement, and valve replacement was significant (months of work and hundreds of thousands of dollars). Much of this could have been saved had the proposed Neural Network (NN) tool described in this paper been in place. In addition to the significant benefits to the Shuttle indicated above, the development and implementation of this type of testing will be the genesis for potential Quality improvements across many areas of WSTF test data analysis and will be shared with other NASA centers. Future tests can be designed to incorporate engineering experience via Artificial Neural Nets (ANN) into depot level acceptance of hardware. Additionally, results were shared with a NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) Super Problem Response Team (SPRT). There was extensive interest voiced among many different personnel from several centers. There are potential spin-offs of this effort that can be directly applied to other data acquisition systems as well as vehicle health management for current and future flight vehicles.

Lehr, Mark E.↗

Strategy for Developing Technologies for Megawatt-class Nuclear Electric Propulsion Systems

In late fiscal year 2020, the Space Nuclear Propulsion (SNP) project began the process of formulating an investment strategy to support development of the technologies required for a high-power (megawatt-class) nuclear electric propulsion (NEP) system capable of performing human-scale missions. This activity was initiated concurrent with several high-level studies and assessments were either under way or had just concluded. Studies of human-scale Mars missions have been performed several times over the past two decades. One of the most recent studies examined opposition-class human Mars missions to occur in the late 2030s timeframe [1,2]. The mission architecture assumed a hybrid NEP/chem-propelled vehicle that used a high specific impulse (Isp) NEP-system and a liquid oxygen (LOx)-liquid methane high thrust chemical stage (two 110 kN (25 klbf) thrust, 365 s Isp engines) for maneuvers performed to enter and exit gravity wells. Trajectory analyses performed in this study showed that such a mission could be performed with 2-4 MWe directed into the electric propulsion system (operating for 20,000+ hours), with the large range representing different opposition-class Mars mission opportunities and permutations on the trajectory design, concept of operations, and technology choices. In 2020, the NASA Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) performed a study to evaluate the maturity of the different technologies required for nuclear propulsion systems [3]. The executive summary of this report provided the following top-level conclusions: • “The majority of critical technologies for… NEP/Chem… systems are relatively immature” • “TRLs [technology readiness levels] in the literature are often overestimated” • “The majority of critical technologies… for NEP/Chem… systems are at a relatively high level of advancement degree of difficulty (AD2 > 4) for maturation, requiring a dual development approach” • “The proper assessment of baseline TRL and AD2 values and the estimation of requirements and resources required for advancement have been consistent issues for NEP,” • “Non-advocate reviews should occur at the start of a technology program and at all key milestones.” In 2021, the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) issued a separate report [4] identifying the “primary technical and programmatic challenges, merits, and risks for maturing space nuclear propulsion technologies of interest to a future human Mars exploration mission.” That work contained several important findings, including: • “Developing a MWe-class NEP system for the baseline mission would require increasing power by orders of magnitude relative to NEP system flight- or ground-based technology demonstrations completed to date.” • “Subscale in-space flight testing of NEP systems cannot address many of the risks and potential failure modes associated with the baseline mission NEP system. With sufficient M&S [modeling & simulation] and ground testing, including modular subsystem tests at full scale and power, flight qualification requirements can be met by the cargo missions that will precede the first crewed mission to Mars. Fully integrated ground testing may not be required.” • “As a result of low and intermittent investment over the past several decades, it is unclear if even an aggressive program would be able to develop an NEP system capable of executing the baseline mission in 2039.” These efforts motivated the SNP project to investigate the technologies available for a megawatt-class high power nuclear electric propulsion system. That system is illustrated schematically in Figure 1 and is comprised of five separate top-level critical technology elements (CTEs). 1. Nuclear Reactor – Thermal power source for the system, utilizing high-assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) as the nuclear fuel. Reactor radiation shielding is also included in this CTE. 2. Power Conversion – Operates as a thermodynamic cycle, accepting nuclear reactor thermal power as an input and converting it to mechanical power. 3. Power Management and Distribution (PMAD) – Accepts as an input mechanical power from the power conversion system, which is used to generate electrical power. The PMAD system also distributes the generated electrical power to all other parts of the spacecraft, including the high-power EP system. The PMAD system may also perform duties such as isolation, fault detection, and power transformation/rectification for different spacecraft systems, including the thrusters. 4. Electric Propulsion (EP) – Accepts as an input electrical power, which is used to accelerate a propellant to high speeds to produce thrust. This system includes the power processing unit (PPU), which converts the power it receives to the correct current and voltage required by the thrusters, and the propellant storage and feed systems, which contain and meter the flow of propellant to the thrusters. 5. Thermal Management (Radiators/Heat Rejection) – The cold side of the thermodynamic power conversion cycle, accepts thermal power from the power conversion system and radiatively rejects that heat to space. In this paper, we describe the SNP project formulation and investment strategy that aims to accomplish the research and development required to advance the technology readiness for each CTE. The strategy relies heavily upon experimental testing supported by modeling and simulation to yield realistic assessments of the technologies, which in turn will be used to inform future NEP system-level design decisions and any potential technology downselects.

Kurt A Polzin↗

Hydrazine Conservation for the Dawn Spacecraft Operations at the Dwarf Planet Ceres

Dawn is a low-thrust interplanetary spacecraft currently orbiting the dwarf planet Ceres. After successfully completing its Vesta and Ceres prime missions, Dawn is now in its extended mission, continuously exploring Ceres. After losing the second reaction wheel assembly at the end of the Vesta mission, the feasibility of the Ceres mission was at risk due to the potentially significant increase in hydrazine consumption from using only the reaction control system thrusters. This paper summarizes the intense, collaborative efforts undertaken by the project to conserve hydrazine prior to Vesta departure, during cruise to Ceres, and throughout the Ceres mission. The project’s efforts in minimizing the number of turns are discussed. A special emphasis is given to describing various efforts taken by the Attitude Control Subsystem team in an attempt to reduce hydrazine consumption. These efforts include: changing default slew rates, control gain tuning, changing nadir pointing strategy with Ahead Cross Nadir pointing, hybrid control implementation using hydrazine based thrusters and two remaining reaction wheels, optimal science turn location analysis, and reaction wheel angular momentum management strategies for reducing the number of momentum unloadings. In addition to the Attitude Control Subsystem team’s efforts, the Mission Design and Navigation team’s efforts taken in designing hydrazine friendly orbit transfers are discussed. The trade study performed collaboratively by the Attitude Control Subsystem team and the Science Operations Support Team in choosing hydrazine friendly off-nadir targets is also discussed. Various simulation results are presented and compared against actual flight data obtained. Lastly, remaining hydrazine status at the end of the prime Ceres mission and the hydrazine management planning for the extended mission are discussed.

Salami, Mana↗

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA): Challenges and New Considerations

Use of commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components and emerging technologies often require space flight missions to accept elevated risk. The Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA) flow includes environment definition, hazard evaluation, requirements definition, evaluation of design, and design trades to accommodate and mitigate the risk a project or program takes. Depending on the mission profile and environment, different missions may not necessarily benefit from the same risk reduction efforts or cost reduction attempts. While this poses challenges for the radiation engineer, it also presents opportunities to tailor the RHA flow to minimize risk based on the environment or design criticality while remaining within budget. This presentation will focus on an approach to RHA amidst the present challenges, using the same RHA flow as in the past, with examples from recent radiation test results. The current challenges and the types of risk will be identified. How these risks drive requirements development and realization will be explained with examples of device results and data for single event effects (SEE) and in one case total ionizing dose (TID).

Radiation Hardness Assurance (RHA); Risk Managemen↗

Transition flight control room automation

The Workstation Prototype Laboratory is currently working on a number of projects which can have a direct impact on ground operations automation. These projects include: (1) The fuel cell monitoring system (FCMS), which will monitor and detect problems with the fuel cells on the shuttle. FCMS will use a combination of rules (forward/backward) and multithreaded procedures, which run concurrently with the rules, to implement the malfunction algorithms of the EGIL flight controllers. The combination of rule-based reasoning and procedural reasoning allows us to more easily map the malfunction algorithms into a real-time system implementation. (2) A graphical computation language (AGCOMPL) is an experimental prototype to determine the benefits and drawbacks of using a graphical language to design computations (algorithms) to work on shuttle or space station telemetry and trajectory data. (3) The design of a system will allow a model of an electrical system, including telemetry sensors, to be configured on the screen graphically using previously defined electrical icons. This electrical model would then be used to generate rules and procedures for detecting malfunctions in the electrical components of the model. (4) A generic message management (GMM) system is being designed for real-time applications as a message management system which sends advisory messages to a user. The primary purpose of GMM is to reduce the risk of overloading a user with information when multiple failures occur and to assist the developer in the devising an explanation facility. The emphasis of our work is to develop practical tools and techniques, including identification of appropriate software tools to support research, application, and tool building activities, while determining the feasibility of a given approach.

Welborn, Curtis Ray↗

Transition Flight Control Room Automation

The Workstation Prototype Laboratory is currently working on a number of projects which we feel can have a direct impact on ground operations automation. These projects include: The Fuel Cell Monitoring System (FCMS), which will monitor and detect problems with the fuel cells on the Shuttle. FCMS will use a combination of rules (forward/backward) and multi-threaded procedures which run concurrently with the rules, to implement the malfunction algorithms of the EGIL flight controllers. The combination of rule based reasoning and procedural reasoning allows us to more easily map the malfunction algorithms into a real-time system implementation. A graphical computation language (AGCOMPL). AGCOMPL is an experimental prototype to determine the benefits and drawbacks of using a graphical language to design computations (algorithms) to work on Shuttle or Space Station telemetry and trajectory data. The design of a system which will allow a model of an electrical system, including telemetry sensors, to be configured on the screen graphically using previously defined electrical icons. This electrical model would then be used to generate rules and procedures for detecting malfunctions in the electrical components of the model. A generic message management (GMM) system. GMM is being designed as a message management system for real-time applications which send advisory messages to a user. The primary purpose of GMM is to reduce the risk of overloading a user with information when multiple failures occurs and in assisting the developer in devising an explanation facility. The emphasis of our work is to develop practical tools and techniques, while determining the feasibility of a given approach, including identification of appropriate software tools to support research, application and tool building activities.

Welborn, Curtis Ray↗

Methods for Determining the Level of Autonomy to Design into a Human Spaceflight Vehicle: A Function Specific Approach

The next-generation human spaceflight vehicle is in a unique position to realize the benefits of more than thirty years of technological advancements since the Space Shuttle was designed. Computer enhancements, the emergence of highly reliable decision-making algorithms, and an emphasis on efficiency make an increased use of autonomous systems highly likely. NASA is in a position to take advantage of these advances and apply them to the human spaceflight environment. One of the key paradigm shifts will be the shift, where appropriate, of monitoring, option development, decision-making, and execution responsibility from humans to an Autonomous Flight Management (AFM) system. As an effort to reduce risk for development of an AFM system, NASA engineers are developing a prototype to prove the utility of previously untested autonomy concepts. This prototype, called SMART (Spacecraft Mission Assessment and Replanning Tool), is a functionally decomposed flight management system with an appropriate level of autonomy for each of its functions. As the development of SMART began, the most important and most often asked question was, How autonomous should an AFM system be? A thorough study of the literature through 2002 surrounding autonomous systems has not yielded a standard method for designing a level of autonomy into either a crewed vehicle or an uncrewed vehicle. The current focus in the literature on defining autonomy is centered on developing IQ tests for built systems. The literature that was analyzed assumes that the goal of all systems is to strive for complete autonomy from human intervention, rather than identifying how autonomous each function within the system should have been. In contrast, the SMART team developed a method for determining the appropriate level of autonomy to be designed into each function within a system. This paper summarizes the development of the Level of Autonomy Assessment Tool and its application to the SMART project.

AFM (AUTONOMOUS FLIGHT MANAGEMENT)↗

Lessons Learned from the Clementine Mission

According to BMDO, the Clementine mission achieved many of its technology objectives during its flight to the Moon in early 1994 but, because of a software error, was unable to test the autonomous tracking of a cold target. The preliminary analyses of the returned lunar data suggest that valuable scientific measurements were made on several important topics but that COMPLEX's highest-priority objectives for lunar science were not achieved. This is not surprising given that the rationale for Clementine was technological rather than scientific. COMPLEX lists below a few of the lessons that may be learned from Clementine. Although the Clementine mission was not conceived as a NASA science mission exactly like those planned for the Discovery program, many operational aspects of the two are similar. It is therefore worthwhile to understand the strengths and faults of the Clementine approach. Some elements of the Clementine operation that led to the mission's success include the following: (1) The mission's achievements were the responsibility of a single organization and its manager, which made that organization and that individual accountable for the final outcome; (2) The sponsor adopted a hands-off approach and set a minimum number of reviews (three); (3) The sponsor accepted a reasonable amount of risk and allowed the project team to make the trade-offs necessary to minimize the mission's risks while still accomplishing all its primary objectives; and (4) The development schedule was brief and the agreed-on funding (and funding profile) was adhered to. Among the operational shortcomings of Clementine were the following: (1) An overly ambitious schedule and a slightly lean budget (meaning insufficient time for software development and testing, and leading ultimately to human exhaustion); and (2) No support for data calibration, reduction, and analysis. The principal lesson to be learned in this category is that any benefits from the constructive application of higher risk for lower cost and faster schedule will be lost if the schedule does not allow adequate time for the development of all essential systems or makes no allowance for human frailties. Another lesson to be drawn is that despite its limitations, if judged strictly as a science mission, Clementine attested that significant scientific information can be gathered during a technology-demonstration mission. In the current era of limited funds, when science missions will be infrequent, the opportunity to fly scientific instruments aboard missions whose objectives might be other than science must be seized and, indeed, encouraged. During such opportunities it would be inexcusable to do second-class science. Thus the scientific community must be actively involved in such projects from their initiation.

Source record↗

Atrial Arrhythmias in Astronauts - Summary of a NASA Summit

Background and Problem Definition: To evaluate NASA s current standards and practices related to atrial arrhythmias in astronauts, Space Medicine s Advanced Projects Section at the Johnson Space Center was tasked with organizing a summit to discuss the approach to atrial arrhythmias in the astronaut cohort. Since 1959, 11 cases of atrial fibrillation, atrial flutter, or supraventricular tachycardia have been recorded among active corps crewmembers. Most of the cases were paroxysmal, although a few were sustained. While most of the affected crewmembers were asymptomatic, those slated for long-duration space flight underwent radiofrequency ablation treatment to prevent further episodes of the arrhythmia. The summit was convened to solicit expert opinion on screening, diagnosis, and treatment options, to identify gaps in knowledge, and to propose relevant research initiatives. Summit Meeting Objectives: The Atrial Arrhythmia Summit brought together a panel of six cardiologists, including nationally and internationally renowned leaders in cardiac electrophysiology, exercise physiology, and space flight cardiovascular physiology. The primary objectives of the summit discussions were to evaluate cases of atrial arrhythmia in the astronaut population, to understand the factors that may predispose an individual to this condition, to understand NASA s current capabilities for screening, diagnosis, and treatment, to discuss the risks associated with treatment of crewmembers assigned to long-duration missions or extravehicular activities, and to discuss recommendations for prevention or management of future cases. Summary of Recommendations: The summit panel s recommendations were grouped into seven categories: Epidemiology, Screening, Standards and Selection, Treatment of Atrial Fibrillation Manifesting Preflight, Atrial Fibrillation during Flight, Prevention of Atrial Fibrillation, and Future Research

Barr, Yael R.↗

Full-Scaled Advanced Systems Testbed: Ensuring Success of Adaptive Control Research Through Project Lifecycle Risk Mitigation

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's Dryden Flight Research Center completed flight testing of adaptive controls research on the Full-Scale Advance Systems Testbed (FAST) in January of 2011. The research addressed technical challenges involved with reducing risk in an increasingly complex and dynamic national airspace. Specific challenges lie with the development of validated, multidisciplinary, integrated aircraft control design tools and techniques to enable safe flight in the presence of adverse conditions such as structural damage, control surface failures, or aerodynamic upsets. The testbed is an F-18 aircraft serving as a full-scale vehicle to test and validate adaptive flight control research and lends a significant confidence to the development, maturation, and acceptance process of incorporating adaptive control laws into follow-on research and the operational environment. The experimental systems integrated into FAST were designed to allow for flexible yet safe flight test evaluation and validation of modern adaptive control technologies and revolve around two major hardware upgrades: the modification of Production Support Flight Control Computers (PSFCC) and integration of two, fourth-generation Airborne Research Test Systems (ARTS). Post-hardware integration verification and validation provided the foundation for safe flight test of Nonlinear Dynamic Inversion and Model Reference Aircraft Control adaptive control law experiments. To ensure success of flight in terms of cost, schedule, and test results, emphasis on risk management was incorporated into early stages of design and flight test planning and continued through the execution of each flight test mission. Specific consideration was made to incorporate safety features within the hardware and software to alleviate user demands as well as into test processes and training to reduce human factor impacts to safe and successful flight test. This paper describes the research configuration, experiment functionality, overall risk mitigation, flight test approach and results, and lessons learned of adaptive controls research of the Full-Scale Advanced Systems Testbed.

Pavlock, Kate M.↗

NASA Human System Risk Assessment Process

NASA utilizes an evidence based system to perform risk assessments for the human system for spaceflight missions. The center of this process is the multi-disciplinary Human System Risk Board (HSRB). The HSRB is chartered from the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) at NASA Headquarters. The HSRB reviews all human system risks via an established comprehensive risk and configuration management plan based on a project management approach. The HSRB facilitates the integration of human research (terrestrial and spaceflight), medical operations, occupational surveillance, systems engineering and many other disciplines in a comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB considers all factors that influence human risk. These factors include pre-mission considerations such as screening criteria, training, age, sex, and physiological condition. In mission factors such as available countermeasures, mission duration and location and post mission factors such as time to return to baseline (reconditioning), post mission health screening, and available treatments. All of the factors influence the total risk assessment for each human risk. The HSRB performed a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30, where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research and, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit for 6 and 12 months, deep space for 30 days and 1 year, a lunar mission for 1 year, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary two-page assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence of that risk, available risk mitigations, traceability to the Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS) and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the Human Research Program, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets to provide the most economical and timely mitigations. The risk assessments were completed for the 6 DRMs and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB reviews each risk at least annually or when new evidence/information is available that adds to the body of evidence. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Francisco, D.↗