MANAGING RISKS FOR RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS IN TRANSPORT: UNDERSTANDING LIKELIHOODS AND CONSEQUENCES
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This report focuses on the detection and control of radioactive contamination, which are an integral part of an aggressive ALARA program and provide an indication of the effectiveness of engineering controls and proper work practices in preventing the release of radioactive material. Radioactive contamination, if undetected or not properly controlled, can be spread and contaminate areas, equipment, personnel, and the environment.
Most applications of honeycomb materials are for lightweight structural members. This area of honeycomb material behavior has been extensively researched. In packaging design, honeycomb materials are used for impact energy absorption. Data concerning the deformation of stainless steel honeycomb structures is not widely available. It is being proposed to use honeycomb stainless steel as an impact energy absorber in a new radioactive material shipping package. Honeycomb materials can be useful for energy absorption applications because the geometry causes the structure to have a constant compressive force during buckling. This Finite Element Analysis is used to predict the compressive buckling strength of various honeycomb structures in order to design an energy absorber for a specific package weight and geometry. The model simulates a drop test where a 50 pound plate lands flat on a honeycomb stainless steel structure from a height of 30 feet. Some actual drop tests have already been performed on real specimens. Most of the resulting deformations of these tests include the bottom of the honeycomb structure buckling while the rest of the structure was either slightly deformed or straight. The deformation of the simulated honeycomb specimen matched the deformation from the actual drop tests. This is one verification that the model is working properly. It is evident that after about 2.5% strain the strength is a relatively linear value, and eventually flattens out to about 875 psi. The crush strength measured from the actual drop tests for the same density honeycomb was just over 800 psi. This is further verification that the model is working correctly. The results gathered from the FEA model successfully mirror the results from a real drop test. The deformation looks realistic, and the compressive strength found is consistent with the empirically measured value. Future work for this model includes modeling different density honeycomb structures which have not been tested before. This will allow for optimization of honeycomb stainless steel use for impact absorption in radioactive material shipping packages.
The 'Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act' (NMRWMA) in Taiwan has been in use since 2002. To promote further administrative efficiency and improve regulatory capacity, an amendment of the act has been initiated by the Atomic Energy Council (AEC). It is now being reviewed by outside experts and related communities so as to include the best understanding of risk management factors. For the future decommissioning challenges of nuclear facilities, the act is also being amended to comply with the regulatory requirements of the decommissioning mandates. Currently the Taiwan government is conducting government reorganization, and AEC will be reformed but will remain as an independent regulatory body. AEC will then be capable of improving the regulatory capacity for facilitating licensing and inspection, ensuring operational safety, environmental protection and public involvement, and giving a more flexible administrative discretion, such as expending the margin of penalty. The amendment is also required to provide a formal legal basis for the Nuclear Backend Fund, and to mandate the waste producers to take responsibility for any final debt repayment. In addition, this amendment promotes measures to prevent accidents or emergencies concerning radioactive materials and facilities and procedures to reduce the impact and effect of any unexpected events. Furthermore, this amendment intends to implement the concept of information transparency and public participation so as to meet the public needs. Finally, radioactive waste final disposal tasks have to be completed by waste producers under the supervision of the AEC. (authors)
Deep, underground repositories are needed to isolate radioactive waste from the biosphere. Because bentonite is an integral component of many multibarrier repository systems, information on the hydraulic behavior of bentonite is crucial for modeling the long-term viability of such systems. In this paper the hydraulic behavior of bentonite samples was analyzed as a function of aggregate size, and samples were subjected to hydrothermal treatments involving contact with NaCl, KCl, and deionized water. Neutron and X-ray imaging were used to quantify water sorption into packed bentonite samples and bentonite swelling into the water column. The distance between the original clay-water interface and the wetting front was determined as a function of time. Average water uptake exhibited a square-root-of-time dependence in freshly prepared samples, but more variable rates were observed for samples previously in contact with water. The radiography was supported by small-angle neutron scattering analysis and ultra-small-angle neutron scattering analysis of aggregate size distributions and by inelastic neutron scattering to understand the physicochemical environment of the sorbed water. Results showed that hydrothermal treatment with KCl had the greatest effect of increased water transport in the bentonite, possibly as a result of the interaction of K + with smectite layers in the clay.
When transporting highly radioactive material, it is vital to provide a successful delivery. Without proper containment, radioactive materials can become exposed to the surrounding environment and pose a serious threat. To ensure a safe transition of radioactive material, packaging components must be able to withstand high levels of heat during the event of a fire while maintaining the integrity of the structure to safety contain the radioactive material. Various types of polyurethane and silicone have been selected to observe at high temperatures to analyze outgassing characteristics of the materials.
Ubiquitous natural sources of radiation and radioactive material (naturally occurring radioactive material, NORM) have exposed humans throughout history. To these natural sources have been added technologically-enhanced naturally occurring radioactive material (TENORM) sources and human-made (anthropogenic) sources. This chapter describes the ubiquitous radiation sources that we call background, including primordial radionuclides such as 40K, 87Rb, the 232Th series, the 238U series, and the 235U series; cosmogenic radionuclides such as 3H and 14C; anthropogenic radionuclides such as 3H, 14C, 137Cs, 90Sr, and 129I; radiation from space; and radiation from technologically-enhanced concentrations of natural radionuclides, particularly the short-lived decay products of 222Rn ("radon") and 220Rn ("thoron") in indoor air. These sources produce radiation doses to people principally via external irradiation or internal irradiation following intakes by inhalation or ingestion. The effective doses from each are given, with a total of 3.11 mSv y-1 (311 mrem y-1) to the average US resident. Over 2.5 million US residents receive over 20 mSv y-1 (2 rem y-1), primarily due to indoor radon. Exposure to radiation from NORM and TENORM produces the largest fraction of ubiquitous background exposure to US residents, on the order of 2.78 mSv (278 mrem) or about 89%. This is roughly 45% of the average annual effective dose to a US resident of 6.2 mSv y-1 (620 mrem y-1) that includes medical (48%), consumer products and air travel (2%), and occupational and industrial (0.1%). Much of this chapter is based on National Council on Radiation Protection and Measurements (NCRP) Report No. 160, "Ionizing Radiation Exposure of the Population of the United States," for which the author chaired the subcommittee that wrote Chapter 3 on "Ubiquitous Background Radiation."
The Department of Energy (DOE) is working to de-inventory sites and consolidate hazardous materials for processing and disposal. The DOE administers a wide range of certified shipping packages for the transport of hazardous materials to include Special Nuclear Material (SNM), radioactive materials, sealed sources and radioactive wastes. A critical element to successful and safe transportation of these materials is the availability of certified shipping packages. There are over seven thousand certified packagings (i.e., Type B/Type AF) utilized within the DOE for current missions. The synergistic effects of consolidated maintenance, refurbishment, testing, certification, and costing of these services would allow for efficient management of the packagings inventory and to support anticipated future in-commerce shipping needs. The Savannah River Site (SRS) receives and ships radioactive materials (including SNM) and waste on a regular basis for critical missions such as consolidated storage, stabilization, purification, or disposition using H-Canyon and HB-Line. The Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) has the technical capability and equipment for all aspects of packaging management. SRS has the only active material processing facility in the DOE complex and is one of the sites of choice for nuclear material consolidation. SRS is a logical location to perform maintenance and periodic testing of the DOE fleet of certified packagings. This initiative envisions a DOE Eastern Packaging Staging and Maintenance Center (PSMC) at the SRS and a western hub at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), an active DOE Regional Disposal Site. The PSMC's would be the first place DOE would go to meet their radioactive packaging needs and the primary locations projects would go to disposition excess packaging for beneficial reuse. These two hubs would provide the centralized management of a packaging fleet rather than the current approach to design, procure, maintain and dispose of packagings on a project-by-project basis. This initiative provides significant savings in packaging costs and acceleration of project schedules. In addition to certified packaging, the PSMC would be well suited for select designs of 7A Type A packaging and Industrial Packaging. (authors)
Screening and inspection of cargo containers are two essential methods to nondestructively examine the contents of shipment. These methods enable the detection of illicit transportation of unauthorized materials such as nuclear and radioactive materials, explosives, drugs, and so on, typically at borders or secure facilities. Although high-energy X-ray transmission is a standard system and is widely used for cargo inspection, the inherent challenges of high false-positive rates and high attenuation factors necessitate the development of complementary techniques that can increase the detection efficiency and accuracy in large and dense materials. Gamma-rays, which possess higher penetration characteristics because of their high energy, offer an alternative nonintrusive modality for cargo scanning. They represent a promising inspection method when compared to X-rays for three reasons: (1) improved ability to detect nuclear and radioactive materials, (2) higher inspection throughput rates, and (3) lower false-positive rates. Currently, there are two main gamma-ray inspection techniques, active and passive interrogation. Active interrogation can be further grouped into (1) gamma-ray transmission imaging and (2) neutron-induced gamma-ray emission detection. Gamma-ray transmission imaging utilizes differences in material densities for mapping the shipment contents and detecting anomalies. It is analogous to the X-ray transmission method; however, the high-energy photons make it more difficult to shield against, which enables more efficient performance in large and dense material inspection. Neutron-induced gamma-ray emission inspection is designed for the detection of nuclear and radioactive material because those materials emit characteristic gamma-rays when they are activated by neutron absorption. On the other hand, passive interrogation techniques rely on high-efficiency detectors to detect radiation emitted from hidden special nuclear or other radioactive materials. Similar to passive interrogation, cosmic ray muon monitoring and imaging are relatively new techniques that do not require external radioactive sources. These techniques have received attention as a potential next-generation radiographic probe to identify illicit transportation of nuclear and radioactive materials in cargo containers. Cosmic ray muons have unique features, (1) much higher energies than X-rays or gamma-rays (on the order of 10−1—104 GeV), (2) enhanced penetration capability, and (3) natural occurrence, thereby eliminating the need for induced radiation sources. These features enable cosmic ray muons to be utilized for detection of special nuclear materials in high-background-noise environments. By analyzing incoming and outgoing muon trajectories, scattering angles, and energies, it has been shown that it would be possible to locate hidden and well-shielded materials in cargo containers via three-dimensional muon tomography images or signal analysis. Gamma-rays, cosmic ray muons, and other nonintrusive cargo inspection modalities are complementary to each other, allowing them to address various cargo inspection conditions (i.e., scanning time, cost, radiation exposure level, and types of target materials). This chapter presents a detailed review of the theoretical fundamentals and technical principles behind the current gamma-ray and cosmic ray muon modalities for cargo inspection. Additionally, critical assessments and suggestions for the future directions to advance the use of gamma and muon modalities are discussed.
This is a student training course. Some course objectives are to: recognize and use standard international and US customary units to describe activities and exposure rates associated with radioactive material; determine whether a quantity of a single radionuclide meets the definition of a class 7 (radioactive) material; determine, for a given single radionuclide, the shipping quantity activity limits per 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 173.435; determine the appropriate radioactive material hazard class proper shipping name for a given material; determine when a single radionuclide meets the DOT definition of a hazardous substance; determine the appropriate packaging required for a given radioactive material; identify the markings to be placed on a package of radioactive material; determine the label(s) to apply to a given radioactive material package; identify the entry requirements for radioactive material labels; determine the proper placement for radioactive material label(s); identify the shipping paper entry requirements for radioactive material; select the appropriate placards for a given radioactive material shipment or vehicle load; and identify allowable transport limits and unacceptable transport conditions for radioactive material.
The Small Gram Quantity (SGQ) concept is based on the understanding that small amounts of hazardous materials, in this case radioactive materials (RAM), are significantly less hazardous than large amounts of the same materials. This paper describes a methodology designed to estimate an SGQ for several neutron and gamma emitting isotopes that can be shipped in a package compliant with 10 CFR Part 71 external radiation level limits regulations. These regulations require packaging for the shipment of radioactive materials, under both normal and accident conditions, to perform the essential functions of material containment, subcriticality, and maintain external radiation levels within the specified limits. By placing the contents in a helium leak-tight containment vessel, and limiting the mass to ensure subcriticality, the first two essential functions are readily met. Some isotopes emit sufficiently strong photon radiation that small amounts of material can yield a large dose rate outside the package. Quantifying the dose rate for a proposed content is a challenging issue for the SGQ approach. It is essential to quantify external radiation levels from several common gamma and neutron sources that can be safely placed in a specific packaging, to ensure compliance with federal regulations. The Packaging Certification Program (PCP) Methodology for Determining Dose Rate for Small Gram Quantities in Shipping Packagings provides bounding shielding calculations that define mass limits compliant with 10 CFR 71.47 for a set of proposed SGQ isotopes. The approach is based on energy superposition with dose response calculated for a set of spectral groups for a baseline physical packaging configuration. The methodology includes using the MCNP radiation transport code to evaluate a family of neutron and photon spectral groups using the 9977 shipping package and its associated shielded containers as the base case. This results in a set of multipliers for 'dose per particle' for each spectral group. For a given isotope, the source spectrum is folded with the response for each group. The summed contribution from all isotopes determines the total dose from the RAM in the container.
For the purpose of decontaminating radioactive cesium from a huge amount of soil, which has been estimated to be 1.2x10{sup 8} m{sup 3} by excavating to a 5-cm depth from the surface of Fukushima Prefecture where a severe nuclear accident occurred at TEPCO's power generating site and has emitted a significant amount of radioactive materials, mainly radioactive cesium, a wet sieving process was selected as one of effective methods available in Japan. Some private companies have demonstrated this process for soil treatment in the Fukushima area by testing at their plants. The results were very promising, and a full-fledged application is expected to follow. In the present study, we spiked several aqueous samples containing soil collected from an industrial wet sieving plant located near our university for the recycling of construction wastes with non-radioactive cesium hydroxide. The present study provides scientific data concerning the effectiveness in volume reduction of the contaminated soil by a wet sieving process as well as the cesium distribution between the liquid phase and clay minerals for each sub-process of the full-scale one, but a simulating plant equipped with a process of coagulating sedimentation and operational safety fundamentals for the plant. Especially for the latter aspect, the study showed that clay minerals of submicron size strongly bind a high content of cesium, which was only slightly removed by coagulation with natural sedimentation (1 G) nor centrifugal sedimentation (3,700 G) and some of the cesium may be transferred to the effluent or recycled water. By applying ultracentrifugation (257,000 G), most of submicron clay minerals containing cesium was removed, and the cesium amount which might be transferred to the effluent or recycled water, could be reduced to less than 2.3 % of the original design by the addition of a cesium barrier consisting of ultracentrifugation or a hollow fiber membrane. (authors)
When dismantling a nuclear power plant, structures must be cut to reduce size. The cutting of radioactive material produces radioactive aerosols, which pose a health risk including radiation risk to site workers and the general public. However, due to a lack of research on the physical and chemical characteristics of aerosols produced in these processes, the calculation of internal dose in the event of an expected or unexpected accident is inaccurate. For the measurement of aerosols generated from cutting for internal dose calculations, we measured the number concentration distribution and nuclide distribution of aerosols from plasma arc cutting in a laboratory experimental setup, considering isokinetic sampling and automatic cutting. The results may suggest internal dose assessment without characteristics of radioactive aerosol has uncertainty and the possibility of being undervalued. (authors)
Radioactive materials are widespread in our everyday activities which are used in many different types of industries: Consumer products, Medicine, Industry, Energy, and Defense. In the United States there is about 3 million shipments of radioactive materials per year. With radioactive material being very widespread the number of new applications to ship these quantities increases daily. As such, ensuring the safe and secure transport of these materials is paramount, necessitating stringent packaging, transportation, and certification requirements. Shipments of radioactive materials have been made from Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) for the past 65 years. Since the 1940s ORNL has been at the forefront of the early development of regulations pertaining to the transport of radioactive shipments and associated regulatory testing. The early involvement resulted in ORNL being one of the leaders in the development of regulations and testing standards pertaining to the testing and design of packages. Today all package testing activities are conducted under the Package Testing Program (PTP) at ORNL at the Package Evaluation Facility (PEF). The PTP develops and evaluates testing solutions – ensuring that they are safe, efficient, and meet regulatory requirements ORNL PTP has extensive experience in the regulatory testing of radioactive material packages, supporting certification of Type A, Type, B, Type AF, and special form packages. The PEF serves as a one-stop-shop for design, testing, and certification of a wide variety of packages needed for shipment of radioactive materials. The facility provides the space, expertise, and equipment necessary to conduct rigorous performance testing under both normal and accident conditions or transport environments including free drop, dynamic crush, puncture, penetration, compression, vibration, water spray, water immersion, and thermal test. The PTP remains a key contributor to the safety and compliance of radioactive material transportation. This presentation will provide an overview of the program’s history, capabilities, and its ongoing role in advancing regulatory standards and transportation safety.
In 2011, Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan caused contamination of lakes and rivers due to radioactive materials released. As time passes, the radioactivity of radioactive contaminated water has been lowered, but there is still some level of radioactive contamination. At present, decontamination of radioactive contaminated water uses a method of removing radioactive materials in polluted water by using resin or filter. This conventional decontamination method can lower the radioactive concentration of contaminated water to a certain level. However, it is difficult to reduce the amount of contaminated water to a level lower than the very low level due to technical and economic reasons. In this study, we propose a method to decontaminate water contaminated with radioactive materials using microalgae. In addition, a system for the treatment of radioactive contaminated water using microalgae has been conceptually designed.