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At least 217 records · Page 12

Quantifying the Potential of Argon Detection Capabilities for Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

Abstract Current noble gas detection systems for nuclear explosion monitoring are based on the detection of four radioxenon isotopes—Xe-131m, -133, -133m and -135. The data provided by radioxenon detection could be enhanced by other radionuclide signatures such as Ar-37. Activation of Ca-40 in rock by neutrons produces Ar-37, and monitoring for this additional nuclide could help distinguish detections of nuclear explosions from background sources, such as medical isotope production. This work studies the capabilities of a hypothetical argon detection network. A 10 kt explosion was modeled using MCNP and SCALE to determine the inventory of Ar-37 created in a representative granite rock layer, assuming either 0.1, 1 or 10% of the total inventory was released. The Ar-37 inventory was combined with atmospheric transport data from HYSPLIT compiled in a previous study, along with the detection limits of standard Ar-37 detection systems, to determine how many hypothetical monitoring stations would detect Ar-37 from an explosion. This method was repeated for 365 HYSPLIT data sets to create a year’s worth of hypothetical explosions, releases, and detections. The study quantified the average number of detections per release, the number of stations detecting Ar-37, and the possibility of detecting Ar-37 in coincidence with xenon.

37Ar↗

Inclusion of Scatter in HADES: Final Report

Covert nuclear attack is one of the foremost threats facing the United States and is a primary focus of the War on Terror. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is chartered to develop, and improve domestic systems to detect and interdict smuggling for the illicit use of a nuclear explosive device, fissile material or radiologica1 material. The CAARS (Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System) program is a major part of the DHS effort to enhance US security by harnessing cutting-edge technologies to detect radiological and nuclear threats at points of entry to the United States. DNDO has selected vendors to develop complete radiographic systems. It is crucial that the initial design and testing concepts for the systems be validated and compared prior to the substantial efforts to build and deploy prototypes and subsequent large-scale production. An important aspect of these systems is the scatter which interferes with imaging. Monte Carlo codes, such as MCNP (X-5 Monte Carlo Team, 2005 Revision) allow scatter to be calculatied, but these calculations are very time consuming. It would be useful to have a fast scatter estimation algorithm in a fast ray tracing code. We have been extending the HADES ray-tracing radiographic simulation code to model vendor systems in a flexible and quick fashion and to use this tool to study a variety of questions involving system performance and the comparative value of surrogates. To enable this work, HADES has been linked to the BRL-CAD library (BRL-CAD Open Source Project, 2010), in order to enable the inclusion of complex CAD geometries in simulations, scanner geometries have been implemented in HADES, and the novel detector responses have been included in HADES. A major extension of HADES which has been required by this effort is the inclusion of scatter in these radiographic simulations. Ray tracing codes generally do not easily allow the inclusion of scatter, because these codes define a source and a grid of detector pixels and only compute the attenuation along rays between these points. Scatter is an extremely complex set of processes which can involve rays which change directions many times between the source and detector. Scatter from outside the field of view of the imaging system, as well as within the field of view, can have an important role in image formation. In this report, we will describe how we implemented a treatment of scatter in HADES. We begin with a discussion of how we define scatter in Section 2, followed by a description of how single Compton scatter is now included in HADES in Section 3. In Section 4 we report a set of verification tests against MCNP and tests of how the technique scales with image size, number of scatters allowed and number of processors used in the calculations. In Section 5, we describe how we plan to extend this approach to other forms of scatter and conclude in Section 6. It should be emphasized that the purpose of this report is to show that a form of scatter has been implemented in HADES and has been verified against MCNP. Validation, the process of comparing simulation and experiment, is a future task.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Imaging and Radiography with Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence and Effective-Z (EZ-3D) Determination; SNM Detection Using Prompt Neutrons from Photon Induced Fission

Four new technologies have been developed for use in non-intrusive inspection systems to detect nuclear materials, explosives and contraband. Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence (NRF) provides a three dimensional image of the isotopic content of a container. NRF determines the isotopic composition of a region and specifies the isotopic structure of the neighboring regions, thus providing the detailed isotopic composition of any threat. In transmission mode, NRF provides a two dimensional projection of the isotopic content of a container, much as standard X-ray radiography provides for density. The effective-Z method (EZ-3D) uses electromagnetic scattering processes to yield a three-dimensional map of the effective-Z and the density in a container. The EZ-3D method allows for a rapid discrimination based on effective Z and mass of materials such as those with high Z, as well as specifying regions of interest for other contraband. The energy spectrum of prompt neutrons from photon induced fission (PNPF) provides a unique identification of the presence of actinides and SNM. These four new technologies can be used independently or together to automatically determine the presence of hazardous materials or contraband. They can also be combined with other technologies to provide added specificity.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

High Throughput Argon-37 Field System

We report Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has developed a unique fieldable 37 Ar measurement system designed to measure 37 Ar activity concentrations from soil gas samples to detect above ground and underground nuclear explosions. The Argon-37 Field System is modular in design to accommodate both chemical processing and nuclear detection. The system can be packed into shipping crates and shipped to a location near where the sampling is taking place. The system can process six 2-m 3 whole-air samples in 24 hours and can measure the 37 Ar activity in each of the samples using six proportional counters. The proportional counters, designed and built at PNNL, are surrounded with both active and passive shielding to reduce background and can achieve a minimum detection concentration of 10 mBq/m 3 of 37 Ar in whole-air equivalent. The Argon-37 Field System has undergone extensive testing against rigorous requirements to assure the system meets the needs of the noble gas nuclear explosion monitoring community.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Methods and systems for low to ultra-low magnetic field nuclear magnetic resonance for detecting chemical nerve agents

A nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) system is configured to detect chemical threat material. The system comprises a magnet configured to generate a magnetic field of about 300 millitesla or less; and a probe configured to detect nuclear relaxation of at least two nuclei selected from the group consisting of 1H, 19F, 31P and 14N, and detect the spin density of nuclei selected from the group consisting of 1H, 19F, 31P and 14N, following excitation.

Williams, Robert F.↗

Utilization of Local Law Enforcement Aerial Resources in Consequence Management (CM) Response

During the past decade the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was instrumental in enhancing the nation’s ability to detect and prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in the highest risk cities. Under the DHS Securing the Cities initiative, nearly 13,000 personnel in the New York City region have been trained in preventive radiological and nuclear detection operations, and nearly 8,500 pieces of radiological detection equipment have been funded. As part of the preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) mission, several cities have received funding to purchase commercial aerial radiation detection systems. In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Aerial Measuring System (AMS) program started providing Mobile Aerial Radiological Surveillance (MARS) training to such assets, resulting in over 150 HAZMAT teams’ officers and pilots from 10 law enforcement organizations and fire departments being trained in the aerial radiation detection. From the beginning, the MARS training course covered both the PRND and consequence management (CM) missions. Even if the law enforcement main focus is PRND, their aerial assets can be utilized in the collection of initial radiation data for post-event radiological CM response. Based on over 50 years of AMS operational experience and information collected during MARS training, this presentation will focus on the concepts of CM response using aerial assets as well as utilizing law enforcement/fire department aerial assets in CM. Also discussed will be the need for establishing closer relationships between local jurisdictions’ aerial radiation detection capabilities and state and local radiation control program directors, radiological health department managers, etc. During radiological events these individuals may become primary experts/advisers to Incident Commanders for radiological emergency response, especially in the early stages of a response. The knowledge of the existence, specific capabilities, and use of local aerial radiation detection systems would be critical in planning the response, even before federal assets arrive on the scene. The relationship between local and federal aerial assets and the potential role for the further use of the MARS training and expanded AMS Reachback capabilities in facilitating such interactions will be discussed.

consequence management, CM, local law enforcement,↗

Methodology and Software for Gross Defect Detection of Spent Nuclear Fuel at the Atucha-I Reactor [Novel Methodology and Software for Spent Fuel Gross Defect Detection at the Atucha-I Reactor]

Here, fuel assemblies in the spent fuel pool are stored by suspending them in two vertically stacked layers at the Atucha Unit 1 nuclear power plant (Atucha-I). This introduces the unique problem of verifying the presence of fuel in either layer without physically moving the fuel assemblies. Given that the facility uses both natural uranium and slightly enriched uranium at 0.85 wt% 235 U and has been in operation since 1974, a wide range of burnups and cooling times can exist in any given pool. A gross defect detection tool, the spent fuel neutron counter (SFNC), has been used at the site to verify the presence of fuel up to burnups of 8000 MWd/t. At higher discharge burnups, the existing signal processing software of the tool was found to fail due to nonlinearity of the source term with burnup.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Detection Of Special Nuclear Materials Tagged Neutrons

In order to detect Special Nuclear Materials (SNM) in unattended luggage or cargo containers in the field of homeland security, fissions are induced by 14 MeV neutrons produced by an associated particle DT neutron generator, and prompt fission particles correlated with tagged neutron are detected by plastic scintillators. SMN produce high multiplicity events due to induced fissions, whereas nonnuclear materials produce low multiplicity events due to cross-talk, (n,2n) or (n,n'γ) reactions. The data acquisition electronics is made of compact FPGA boards. The coincidence window is triggered by the alpha particle detection, allowing to tag the emission date and direction of the 14 MeV interrogating neutron. The first part of the paper presents experiment vs. calculation comparisons to validate MCNP-PoliMi simulations and the post-processing tools developed with the data analysis framework ROOT. Measurements have been performed using different targets (iron, lead, graphite), first with small plastic scintillators (10 x 10 x 10 cm{sup 3}) and then with large detectors (10 x 10 x 100 cm{sup 3}) to demonstrate that nuclear materials can be differentiated from nonnuclear dense materials (iron, lead) in iron and wood matrixes. A special attention is paid on SNM detection in abandoned luggage. In the second part of the paper, the performances of a cargo container inspection system are studied by numerical simulation, following previous work reported in. Detectors dimensions and shielding against the neutron generator background are optimized for container inspection. Events not correlated to an alpha particle (uncorrelated background), counting statistics, time and energy resolutions of the data acquisition system are all taken into account in a realistic numerical model. The impact of the container matrix (iron, ceramic, wood) has been investigated by studying the system capability to detect a few kilograms of SNM in different positions in the cargo container, within 10 min acquisitions. (authors)

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Novel Perovskite Semiconductors for the Detection of Special Nuclear Material

Special nuclear material (SNM) detection using portable, highly efficient detectors is of paramount importance to national security for treaty verification and nonproliferation monitoring. The most mature technology for neutron detection is the 3He proportional counter; however, despite its high efficiency and ubiquitous use, 3He detectors have significant drawbacks, including long absorption lengths, high voltage requirements, and dependence on the availability of 3 He. The goal of this project is to synthesize a novel, boron-based perovskite semiconductor crystals to create a more efficient and more portable neutron detector. This innovative material will lead to a significant decrease in power and size requirements with higher operating temperatures than other traditional solid-state detectors. Directly incorporating 10 B eliminates the need for a conversion layer and leads to high neutron absorption coefficients. In this seedling project, we successfully synthesized millimeter sized crystals using inverse temperature crystallization with sizes of 1.73 mm in length and 480 μm in thickness.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗