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NASA NTRS2015

Human System Risk Management for Space Flight

This brief abstract reviews the development of the current day approach to human system risk management for space flight and the development of the critical components of this process over the past few years. The human system risk management process now provides a comprehensive assessment of each human system risk by design reference mission (DRM) and is evaluated not only for mission success but also for long‐term health impacts for the astronauts. The discipline of bioastronautics is the study of the biological and medical effects of space flight on humans. In 1997, the Space Life Sciences Directorate (SLSD) initiated the Bioastronautics Roadmap (Roadmap) as the "Critical Path Roadmap", and in 1998 participation in the roadmap was expanded to include the National Space Biomedical Research Institute (NSBRI) and the external community. A total of 55 risks and 250 questions were identified and prioritized and in 2000, the Roadmap was base-lined and put under configuration control. The Roadmap took into account several major advisory committee reviews including the Institute of Medicine (IOM) "Safe Passage: Astronaut care for Exploration Missions", 2001. Subsequently, three collaborating organizations at NASA HQ (Chief Health and Medical Officer, Office of Space Flight and Office of Biological & Physical Research), published the Bioastronautics Strategy in 2003, that identified the human as a "critical subsystem of space flight" and noted that "tolerance limits and safe operating bands must be established" to enable human space flight. These offices also requested a review by the IOM of the Roadmap and that review was published in October 2005 as "A Risk Reduction Strategy for Human Exploration of Space: A Review of NASA's Bioastronautics Roadmap", that noted several strengths and weaknesses of the Roadmap and made several recommendations. In parallel with the development of the Roadmap, the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer (OCHMO) began a process in 2004 of evaluating the tolerance limits and safe operating bands called for in the Bioastronautics Strategy. Over the next several years, the concept of the "operating bands" were turned into Space Flight Human System Standards (SFHSS), developed by the technical resources of the SLSD at the NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC). These standards were developed and reviewed at the SLSD and then presented to the OCHMO for acceptance. The first set of standards was published in 2007 as the NASA‐STD‐3001, Volume 1, Crew Health that elaborated standards for several physiological areas such as cardiovascular, musculoskeletal, radiation exposure and nutrition. Volume 2, Human Factors, Habitability and Human Health was published in 2011, along with development guidance in the Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). Taken together, the SFHSS Volumes 1 and 2, and the HIDH replaced the NASA‐STD‐3000 with new standards and revisions of the older document. Three other changes were also taking place that facilitated the development of the human system risk management approach. In 2005, the life sciences research and development portfolio underwent a comprehensive review through the Exploration Systems Architecture Study (ESAS) that resulted in the reformulation of the Bioastronautics Program into Human Research Program (HRP) that was focused on appropriate mitigation results for high priority human health risks. The baseline HRP budget was established in August 2005. In addition, the OCHMO formulated the Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) in 2006 that established the position of the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the NASA JSC along with other key technical disciplines, and the OCHMO became the responsible office for the SFHSS as noted above. The final change was the establishment in 2008 of the Human System Risk Board (HSRB), chaired by the CMO with representation from the HRP, SLSD management and technical experts. The HSRB then began to review all human system risks, established a comprehensive risk management and configuration management plan and data sharing policy. These major developments of standards, the HRP, the HMTA and a forum for review of human system risks (HSRB) facilitated the integration of human research, medical operations, systems engineering and many other disciplines in the comprehensive review of human system risks. The HSRB began a comprehensive review of all potential inflight medical conditions and events and over the course of several reviews consolidated the number of human system risks to 30 where the greatest emphasis is placed for investing program dollars for risk mitigation. The HSRB considers all available evidence from human research, medical operations and occupational surveillance in assessing the risks for appropriate mitigation and future work. All applicable DRMs (low earth orbit 6 and 12 months, deep space sortie for 30 days and 1 year, a one year lunar mission, and a planetary mission for 3 years) are considered as human system risks are modified by the hazards associated with space flight such as microgravity, exposure to radiation, distance from the earth, isolation and a closed environment. Each risk has a summary assessment representing the state of knowledge/evidence base for that risk, the available risk mitigations, traceability to the SFHSS and program requirements, and future work required. These data then can drive coordinated budgets across the HRP, the International Space Station, Crew Health and Safety and Advanced Exploration System budgets. These risk assessments were completed for 6 DRMs in December of 2014 and serve as the baseline for which subsequent research and technology development and crew health care portfolios can be assessed. The HSRB will review each risk at least annually and especially when new information is available that must be considered for effective risk mitigation. The current status of each risk can be reported to program management for operations, budget reviews and general oversight of the human system risk management program.

Davis, Jeffrey↗
NASA NTRS1997

Wings: A New Paradigm in Human-Centered Design

Many aircraft accidents/incidents investigations cite crew error as a causal factor (Boeing Commercial Airplane Group 1996). Human factors experts suggest that crew error has many underlying causes and should be the start of an accident investigation and not the end. One of those causes, the flight deck design, is correctable. If a flight deck design does not accommodate the human's unique abilities and deficits, crew error may simply be the manifestation of this mismatch. Pilots repeatedly report that they are "behind the aircraft" , i.e., they do not know what the automated aircraft is doing or how the aircraft is doing it until after the fact. Billings (1991) promotes the concept of "human-centered automation"; calling on designers to allocate appropriate control and information to the human. However, there is much ambiguity regarding what it mean's to be human-centered. What often are labeled as "human-centered designs" are actually designs where a human factors expert has been involved in the design process or designs where tests have shown that humans can operate them. While such designs may be excellent, they do not represent designs that are systematically produced according to some set of prescribed methods and procedures. This paper describes a design concept, called Wings, that offers a clearer definition for human-centered design. This new design concept is radically different from current design processes in that the design begins with the human and uses the human body as a metaphor for designing the aircraft. This is not because the human is the most important part of the aircraft (certainly the aircraft would be useless without lift and thrust), but because he is the least understood, the least programmable, and one of the more critical elements. The Wings design concept has three properties: a reversal in the design process, from aerodynamics-, structures-, and propulsion-centered to truly human-centered; a design metaphor that guides function allocation and control and display design; and a deliberate distinction between two fundamental functions of design, to complement and to interpret human performance. The complementary function extends the human's capabilities beyond his or her current limitations - this includes sensing, computation, memory, physical force, and human decision making styles and skills. The interpretive (or hermeneutic, Hollnagel 1991) function translates information, functionality, and commands between the human and the aircraft. The Wings design concept allows the human to remain aware of the aircraft through natural interpretation. It also affords great improvements in system performance by maximizing the human's natural abilities and complementing the human's skills in a natural way. This paper will discuss the Wings design concept by describing the reversal in the traditional design process, the function allocation strategy of Wings, and the functions of complementing and interpreting the human.

Schutte, Paul C.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP)

The purpose of the Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP) document is to provide human-systems integration design processes, including methodologies and best practices that NASA has used to meet human systems and human rating requirements for developing crewed spacecraft. HIDP content is framed around human-centered design methodologies and processes in support of human-system integration requirements and human rating. NASA-STD-3001, Space Flight Human-System Standard, is a two-volume set of National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Agency-level standards established by the Office of the Chief Health and Medical Officer, directed at minimizing health and performance risks for flight crews in human space flight programs. Volume 1 of NASA-STD-3001, Crew Health, sets standards for fitness for duty, space flight permissible exposure limits, permissible outcome limits, levels of medical care, medical diagnosis, intervention, treatment and care, and countermeasures. Volume 2 of NASASTD- 3001, Human Factors, Habitability, and Environmental Health, focuses on human physical and cognitive capabilities and limitations and defines standards for spacecraft (including orbiters, habitats, and suits), internal environments, facilities, payloads, and related equipment, hardware, and software with which the crew interfaces during space operations. The NASA Procedural Requirements (NPR) 8705.2B, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems, specifies the Agency's human-rating processes, procedures, and requirements. The HIDP was written to share NASA's knowledge of processes directed toward achieving human certification of a spacecraft through implementation of human-systems integration requirements. Although the HIDP speaks directly to implementation of NASA-STD-3001 and NPR 8705.2B requirements, the human-centered design, evaluation, and design processes described in this document can be applied to any set of human-systems requirements and are independent of reference missions. The HIDP is a reference document that is intended to be used during the development of crewed space systems and operations to guide human-systems development process activities.

Boyer, Jennifer↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Campaign Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the Moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program's objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, the crew will need more onboard systems autonomy and functionality to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft to ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with: audio, video, lighting, and crew controls subsystems. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program--especially crew controls, which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable enough to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error--especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA's approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls, is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that focuses on incorporating NASA's Human-Rating Requirements-that ensures human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

artemis↗
NASA NTRS2014

Data Mining of Historical Human Data to Assess the Risk of Injury due to Dynamic Loads

The NASA Occupant Protection Group is charged with ensuring crewmembers are protected during all dynamic phases of spaceflight. Previous work with outside experts has led to the development of a definition of acceptable risk (DAR) for space capsule vehicles. The DAR defines allowable probability rates for various categories of injuries. An important question is how to validate these probabilities for a given vehicle. One approach is to impact test human volunteers under projected nominal landing loads. The main drawback is the large number of subject tests required to attain a reasonable level of confidence that the injury probability rates would meet those outlined in the DAR. An alternative is to mine existing databases containing human responses to impact. Testing an anthropomorphic test device (ATD) at the same human‐exposure levels could yield a range of ATD responses that would meet DAR. As one aspect of future vehicle validation, the ATD could be tested in the vehicle's seat and suit configuration at nominal landing loads and compared with the ATD responses supported by the human data set. This approach could reduce the number of human‐volunteer tests NASA would need to conduct to validate that a vehicle meets occupant protection standards. METHODS: The U.S. Air Force has recorded hundreds of human responses to frontal, lateral, and spinal impacts at many acceleration levels and pulse durations. All of this data are stored on the Collaborative Biomechanics Data Network (CBDN), which is maintained by the Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB). The test device for human occupant restraint (THOR) ATD was impact tested on WPAFB's horizontal impulse accelerator (HIA) matching human‐volunteer exposures on the HIA to 5 frontal and 3 spinal loading conditions. No human injuries occurred as a result of these impact conditions. Peak THOR response variables for neck axial tension and compression, and thoracic‐spine axial compression were collected. Maximal chest deflection was determined from motion capture video of the impact test. HIC‐ 15 and BRIC were calculated from head acceleration responses. Given the number of human subjects for each test condition a confidence interval of injury probability will be obtained. RESULTS: Results will be discussed in terms of injury‐risk probability estimates based on the human data set evaluated. Also, gaps in the data set will be identified. These gaps could be one of two types. One is areas where additional THOR testing would increase the comparable human data set, thereby improving confidence in the injury probability rate. The other is where additional human testing would assist in obtaining information on other acceleration levels or directions. DISCUSSION: The historical human data showed validity of the THOR ATD for supplemental testing. The historical human data are limited in scope, however. Further data are needed to characterize the effects of sex, age, anthropometry, and deconditioning due to spaceflight on risk of injury

Wells, Jesica↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Establishing Trust in NASA’s Artemis Program Computer-Human Interface (CHI) Implementation

The NASA Artemis program will return humans to the moon. This time, with the help of commercial and international partners, the program’s objective is a permanent moon base. The moon base infrastructure, including an orbiting moon station and moon surface assets, will be developed for astronauts to stay for the long haul to learn to live and work on another planet in preparation for an eventual Humans-to-Mars mission. As the roundtrip communication delays increase in deep space exploration, more onboard systems autonomy and functionality will be needed to maintain and control the vehicle or habitat. These mission constraints will change the current Earth-based spacecraft ground control support approach that will demand more safe, efficient, and effective Computer-Human Interface (CHI) control. For Artemis, CHI is defined as the elements that the crew interfaces with-audio, video, lighting, and crew controls. Understanding how CHI will need to evolve to support deep space missions will be critical for the Artemis program-especially crew controls which is the focus of this paper. How does NASA ensure crew controls are reliable to control complex systems and prevent a catastrophic event due to human error-especially when the astronauts could be physiologically and/or psychologically impaired? NASA’s approach to mitigating catastrophic hazards in human spaceflight system development such as crew controls is through a holistic system engineering and Human System Integration methodology that embraces NASA’s Human-Rating Requirements-ensuring human performance characteristics to control/safely recover the crew from hazardous situations within the human interface design are considered. This paper discusses, at a high level, CHI for the Artemis program. Next, a discussion of what it means to human-rate a space system crew controls and how trust in the human-computer interface begins with the NASA human rating requirements. Finally, a discussion on how systems engineering, and the human system integration process ensures that crew control implementation incorporates the NASA human-rating requirements.

Human-Rating↗
DOE OSTI2024

Rancor-HUNTER: A Virtual Plant and Operator Environment for Predicting Human Performance

Advances in simulation capabilities to model physical systems have outpaced the development of simulations for humans using those physical systems. There is an argument that the infinite span of potential human behaviors inherently render human modeling more challenging than physical systems. Despite this challenge, the need for modeling humans interacting with these complex systems is paramount. As technologies have improved, many of the failure modes originating from the physical systems have been solved. This means the overall proportion of human errors has increased, such that it is not uncommon to be the primary driver of system failure in modern complex systems. Moreover, technologies such as automated systems may introduce emerging contexts that can cause new, unanticipated modes of human error. Therefore, it is now more important than ever to develop models of human behavior to realize overall system error reductions and achieve established safety margins. To support new and novel concepts of operations for the anticipated wave of advanced nuclear reactor deployments, human factors and human reliability analysis researchers need to develop advanced simulation-based approaches. This talk presents a simulation environment suitable to both collect data and then perform Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate human performance and develop better models of human behavior. Specifically, the Rancor Microworld Simulator models a complex energy production system in a simplified manner. Rancor includes computer-based procedures, which serve as a framework to automatically classify human behaviors without manual, subjective experimenter coding during scenarios. This method supports a detailed level of analysis at the task level. It is feasible for collecting large sample sizes required to develop quantitative modelling elements that have historically challenged traditional full-scope simulator study approaches. Additionally, the other portion of this experimental platform, the Human Unimodel for Nuclear Technology to Enhance Reliability (HUNTER), is presented to show how the collected data can be used to evaluate novel scenarios based on the contextual factors, or performance shaping factors, derived from Rancor simulations. Rancor-HUNTER is being used to predict operator performance with new procedures, such as results from control room modernization or new-build situations. Rancor-HUNTER is also proving a useful surrogate platform to model human performance for other complex systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
NASA NTRS2010

The Importance of HRA in Human Space Flight: Understanding the Risks

Human performance is critical to crew safety during space missions. Humans interact with hardware and software during ground processing, normal flight, and in response to events. Human interactions with hardware and software can cause Loss of Crew and/or Vehicle (LOCV) through improper actions, or may prevent LOCV through recovery and control actions. Humans have the ability to deal with complex situations and system interactions beyond the capability of machines. Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) is a method used to qualitatively and quantitatively assess the occurrence of human failures that affect availability and reliability of complex systems. Modeling human actions with their corresponding failure probabilities in a Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) provides a more complete picture of system risks and risk contributions. A high-quality HRA can provide valuable information on potential areas for improvement, including training, procedures, human interfaces design, and the need for automation. Modeling human error has always been a challenge in part because performance data is not always readily available. For spaceflight, the challenge is amplified not only because of the small number of participants and limited amount of performance data available, but also due to the lack of definition of the unique factors influencing human performance in space. These factors, called performance shaping factors in HRA terminology, are used in HRA techniques to modify basic human error probabilities in order to capture the context of an analyzed task. Many of the human error modeling techniques were developed within the context of nuclear power plants and therefore the methodologies do not address spaceflight factors such as the effects of microgravity and longer duration missions. This presentation will describe the types of human error risks which have shown up as risk drivers in the Shuttle PRA which may be applicable to commercial space flight. As with other large PRAs of complex machines, human error in the Shuttle PRA proved to be an important contributor (~12 percent) to LOCV. An existing HRA technique was adapted for use in the Shuttle PRA, but additional guidance and improvements are needed to make the HRA task in space-related PRAs easier and more accurate. Therefore, this presentation will also outline plans for expanding current HRA methodology to more explicitly cover spaceflight performance shaping factors.

Hamlin, Teri↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy

In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency s increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HHPD functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
NASA NTRS2012

NASA Human Health and Performance Strategy

In May 2007, what was then the Space Life Sciences Directorate, issued the 2007 Space Life Sciences Strategy for Human Space Exploration. In January 2012, leadership and key directorate personnel were once again brought together to assess the current and expected future environment against its 2007 Strategy and the Agency and Johnson Space Center goals and strategies. The result was a refined vision and mission, and revised goals, objectives, and strategies. One of the first changes implemented was to rename the directorate from Space Life Sciences to Human Health and Performance to better reflect our vision and mission. The most significant change in the directorate from 2007 to the present is the integration of the Human Research Program and Crew Health and Safety activities. Subsequently, the Human Health and Performance Directorate underwent a reorganization to achieve enhanced integration of research and development with operations to better support human spaceflight and International Space Station utilization. These changes also enable a more effective and efficient approach to human system risk mitigation. Since 2007, we have also made significant advances in external collaboration and implementation of new business models within the directorate and the Agency, and through two newly established virtual centers, the NASA Human Health and Performance Center and the Center of Excellence for Collaborative Innovation. Our 2012 Strategy builds upon these successes to address the Agency's increased emphasis on societal relevance and being a leader in research and development and innovative business and communications practices. The 2012 Human Health and Performance Vision is to lead the world in human health and performance innovations for life in space and on Earth. Our mission is to enable optimization of human health and performance throughout all phases of spaceflight. All HH&P functions are ultimately aimed at achieving this mission. Our activities enable mission success, optimizing human health and productivity in space before, during, and after the actual spaceflight experience of our crews, and include support for ground-­‐ based functions. Many of our spaceflight innovations also provide solutions for terrestrial challenges, thereby enhancing life on Earth. Our strategic goals are aimed at leading human exploration and ISS utilization, leading human health and performance internationally, excelling in management and advancement of innovations in health and human system integration, and expanding relevance to life on Earth and creating enduring support and enthusiasm for space exploration.

Davis, Jeffrey R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Prospects for Future Human Space Flight Missions to Near-Earth Asteroids

The forthcoming Near-Earth Object (NEO) Surveyor space telescope is a foundational asset designed to complete NASA’s congressionally-mandated goal of cataloging ≥90% of NEOs ≥140 meters in size as soon as practical, and discover Earth impactors far in advance. NEO Surveyor is also critical to near-Earth asteroid (NEA) exploration because it will find suitable low-Δv NEAs for robotic and human missions, often on Earth-like orbits with long synodic periods. Such NEAs have usually not been detected until imminent Earth launch opportunities because they were not observable until close to Earth. Discovering them far enough in advance to deploy missions requires a deep-space infrared survey telescope such as NEO Surveyor. In addition to posing hazards and being scientifically important, NEAs contain resources, such as water (OH), that could be utilized off-Earth. They also offer unique opportunities for the most ambitious human voyages ever undertaken. The Apollo program forever changed humanity’s perspective by showing us Earthrise from our Moon through human eyes. Crewed missions to NEAs will forever change our perspective again by showing us Earth as a distant point of light in the heavens as seen from an asteroid by astronauts. Planetary defense endeavors to understand asteroid and comet impact risks and develop mitigation capabilities. NEA exploration is synergistic in multiple ways. NEO Surveyor will discover and help characterize Earth impactors and accessible NEAs. Heavy-lift launch is highly enabling for both human NEA missions and planetary defense. Reconnaissance missions for planetary defense can also characterize NEAs prior to crewed missions. In situ resource utilization (ISRU) systems may be applicable to deflecting or destroying hazardous NEAs. NEA characterization data critically inform planetary defense efforts and indicate NEA types suitable for human exploration or ISRU. In 2010, NASA performed the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Human Space Flight (HSF) Accessible Targets Study (NHATS), creating an automated online system monitoring mission accessibility of NEAs 2 . NHATS database NEAs meet criteria that require less total mission Δv and/or round-trip mission duration than the Martian surface or even Mars orbit. There are currently 4,658 NHATS NEAs, and many rival or exceed lunar orbit/surface accessibility. Thus, NHATS NEAs could be explored by humans prior to attempting a Mars mission. Human missions to NEAs would test human-rated spacecraft systems with less cost and risk than Mars missions. Thus, human missions to NEAs are compelling in their own right while also providing prudent preparation for more demanding Mars missions. Lunar missions can offer similar opportunities, but they differ from NEA missions in important ways. Lunar missions pose less demanding psychological challenges to crew and ground staff. Earth light-time delay for communications is significantly longer during NEA missions. NEA missions are available that require more propulsion system consumables than lunar missions but less than Mars missions. In this paper, we summarize NEA accessibility for human missions, discuss motivations for such missions, survey knowledge about NEAs that informs future human missions, present exemplar mission opportunities to the currently known NHATS NEAs, and describe future work towards enabling human NEA missions.

Near-Earth asteroids↗
NASA NTRS2016

Human-Robot Interaction in High Vulnerability Domains

Future NASA missions will require successful integration of the human with highly complex systems. Highly complex systems are likely to involve humans, automation, and some level of robotic assistance. The complex environments will require successful integration of the human with automation, with robots, and with human-automation-robot teams to accomplish mission critical goals. Many challenges exist for the human performing in these types of operational environments with these kinds of systems. Systems must be designed to optimally integrate various levels of inputs and outputs based on the roles and responsibilities of the human, the automation, and the robots; from direct manual control, shared human-robotic control, or no active human control (i.e. human supervisory control). It is assumed that the human will remain involved at some level. Technologies that vary based on contextual demands and on operator characteristics (workload, situation awareness) will be needed when the human integrates into these systems. Predictive models that estimate the impact of the technologies on the system performance and the on the human operator are also needed to meet the challenges associated with such future complex human-automation-robot systems in extreme environments.

workload↗
NASA NTRS2004

Human-Robot Planetary Exploration Teams

The EVA Robotic Assistant (ERA) project at NASA Johnson Space Center studies human-robot interaction and robotic assistance for future human planetary exploration. Over the past four years, the ERA project has been performing field tests with one or more four-wheeled robotic platforms and one or more space-suited humans. These tests have provided experience in how robots can assist humans, how robots and humans can communicate in remote environments, and what combination of humans and robots works best for different scenarios. The most efficient way to understand what tasks human explorers will actually perform, and how robots can best assist them, is to have human explorers and scientists go and explore in an outdoor, planetary-relevant environment, with robots to demonstrate what they are capable of, and roboticists to observe the results. It can be difficult to have a human expert itemize all the needed tasks required for exploration while sitting in a lab: humans do not always remember all the details, and experts in one arena may not even recognize that the lower level tasks they take for granted may be essential for a roboticist to know about. Field tests thus create conditions that more accurately reveal missing components and invalid assumptions, as well as allow tests and comparisons of new approaches and demonstrations of working systems. We have performed field tests in our local rock yard, in several locations in the Arizona desert, and in the Utah desert. We have tested multiple exploration scenarios, such as geological traverses, cable or solar panel deployments, and science instrument deployments. The configuration of our robot can be changed, based on what equipment is needed for a given scenario, and the sensor mast can even be placed on one of two robot bases, each with different motion capabilities. The software architecture of our robot is also designed to be as modular as possible, to allow for hardware and configuration changes. Two focus areas of our research are safety and crew time efficiency. For safety, our work involves enabling humans to reliably communicate with a robot while moving in the same workspace, and enabling robots to monitor and advise humans of potential problems. Voice, gesture, remote computer control, and enhanced robot intelligence are methods we are studying. For crew time efficiency, we are investigating the effects of assigning different roles to humans and robots in collaborative exploration scenarios.

Tyree, Kimberly↗
NASA NTRS2014

How Well Does the Latest Anthropomorphic Test Device Mimic Human Impact Responses?

One of the goals of the NASA Occupant Protection Group is to understand the human tolerance to dynamic loading. This knowledge has to come through indirect approaches such as existing human response databases, anthropometric test devices (ATD), animal testing, post‐mortem human subjects, and models. This study investigated the biofidelity of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's ATD named the THOR (test device for human occupant restraint). If THOR responds comparably to humans, then it could potentially be used as a human surrogate to help validate space vehicle requirements for occupant protection. The THOR responses to frontal and spinal impacts (ranging from 8 to 12 G with rise times of 40, 70, and 100 ms) were measured and compared to human volunteer responses (95 trials in frontal and 58 in spinal) previously collected by the U. S. Air Force on the same horizontal impact accelerator. The impact acceleration profiles tested are within the expected range of multi‐purpose crew vehicle (MPCV) landing dynamics. A correlation score was calculated for each THOR to human comparison using CORA (CORrelation and Analysis) software. A two‐parameter beta distribution model fit was obtained for each dependent variable using maximum likelihood estimation. For frontal impacts, the THOR head x‐acceleration peak response correlated with the human response at 8 and 10‐G 100 ms but not 10‐G 70 ms. The phase lagged the human response. Head z‐acceleration was not correlated. Chest x‐acceleration was in phase, had a higher peak response, and was well correlated with lighter subjects (Cora = 0.8 for 46 kg vs. Cora = 0.4 for 126 kg). Head x‐displacement had a leading phase. Several subjects responded with the same peak displacement but the mean of the group was lower. The shoulder x‐displacement was in phase but had higher peaks than the human response. For spinal impacts, the THOR head x‐acceleration was not well correlated. Head and chest z‐acceleration was in phase but had a higher peak response. Chest z‐acceleration was highly correlated with heavier subjects at lower G pulses (Cora = 0.86 for 125 kg at 8 G). The human response was variable in shoulder z‐displacement but the THOR was in phase and was comparable to the mean peak response. Head xand z‐displacement was in phase but had higher peaks. Seat pan forces were well correlated, were in phase, but had a larger peak response than most subjects. The THOR does not respond to frontal and spinal impacts exactly the same way that a human does. Some responses are well matched and others are not. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of this ATD is an important first step in determining its usefulness in occupant protection at NASA

Newby, N.↗
NASA NTRS2014

How Well Does the Latest Anthropomorphic Test Device Mimic Human Impact Responses?

One of the goals of the NASA Occupant Protection Group is to understand the human tolerance to dynamic loading. This knowledge has to come through indirect approaches such as existing human response databases, anthropometric test devices (ATD), animal testing, post-­‐mortem human subjects, and models. This study investigated the biofidelity of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's ATD named the THOR (test device for human occupant restraint). If THOR responds comparably to humans, then it could potentially be used as a human surrogate to help validate space vehicle requirements for occupant protection. The THOR responses to frontal and spinal impacts (ranging from 8 to 12 G with rise times of 40, 70, and 100 ms) were measured and compared to human volunteer responses (95 trials in frontal and 58 in spinal) previously collected by the U. S. Air Force on the same horizontal impact accelerator. The impact acceleration profiles tested are within the expected range of multi-­‐purpose crew vehicle (MPCV) landing dynamics. A correlation score was calculated for each THOR to human comparison using CORA (CORrelation and Analysis) software. A two-­‐parameter beta distribution model fit was obtained for each dependent variable using maximum likelihood estimation. For frontal impacts, the THOR head x-­‐acceleration peak response correlated with the human response at 8 and 10-­‐G 100 ms but not 10-­‐G 70 ms. The phase lagged the human response. Head z-­‐acceleration was not correlated. Chest x-­‐acceleration was in phase, had a higher peak response, and was well correlated with lighter subjects (Cora = 0.8 for 46 kg vs. Cora = 0.4 for 126 kg). Head x-­‐displacement had a leading phase. Several subjects responded with the same peak displacement but the mean of the group was lower. The shoulder x-­‐displacement was in phase but had higher peaks than the human response. For spinal impacts, the THOR head x-­‐acceleration was not well correlated. Head and chest z-­‐acceleration was in phase but had a higher peak response. Chest z-­‐acceleration was highly correlated with heavier subjects at lower G pulses (Cora = 0.86 for 125 kg at 8 G). The human response was variable in shoulder z-­‐displacement but the THOR was in phase and was comparable to the mean peak response. Head x-­‐ and z-­‐displacement was in phase but had higher peaks. Seat pan forces were well correlated, were in phase, but had a larger peak response than most subjects. The THOR does not respond to frontal and spinal impacts exactly the same way that a human does. Some responses are well matched and others are not. Understanding the strengths and weaknesses of this ATD is an important first step in determining its usefulness in occupant protection at NASA

Newby, Nate↗
NASA NTRS2015

Human Factors and Habitability Challenges for Mars Missions

As NASA is planning to send humans deeper into space than ever before, adequate crew health and performance will be critical for mission success. Within the NASA Human Research Program (HRP), the Space Human Factors and Habitability (SHFH) team is responsible for characterizing the risks associated with human capabilities and limitations with respect to long-duration spaceflight, and for providing mitigations (e.g., guidelines, technologies, and tools) to promote safe, reliable and productive missions. SHFH research includes three domains: Advanced Environmental Health (AEH), Advanced Food Technology (AFT), and Space Human Factors Engineering (SHFE). The AEH portfolio focuses on understanding the risk of microbial contamination of the spacecraft and on the development of standards for exposure to potential toxins such as chemicals, bacteria, fungus, and lunar/Martian dust. The two risks that the environmental health project focuses on are adverse health effects due to changes in host-microbe interactions, and risks associated with exposure to dust in planetary surface habitats. This portfolio also proposes countermeasures to these risks by making recommendations that relate to requirements for environmental quality, foods, and crew health on spacecraft and space missions. The AFT portfolio focuses on reducing the mass, volume, and waste of the entire integrated food system to be used in exploration missions, and investigating processing methods to extend the shelf life of food items up to five years, while assuring that exploration crews will have nutritious and palatable foods. The portfolio also delivers improvements in both the food itself and the technologies for storing and preparing it. SHFE sponsors research to establish human factors and habitability standards and guidelines in five risk areas, and provides improved design concepts for advanced crew interfaces and habitability systems. These risk areas include: Incompatible vehicle/habitat design, inadequate human-computer interaction, inadequate critical task design, inadequate human-automation/robotic interaction, and performance errors due to training deficiencies. To address the identified research gaps within each risk, SHFH's research plan includes studies in the laboratory, in analogs, and on International Space Station (ISS). In addition to establishing and maintaining the risk-based research portfolio, SHFH is also implementing a qualitative approach to determine how we at NASA evaluate human performance. Via interviews with experts, such as trainers, flight controllers, and flight surgeons, we are collecting the metrics by which they assess human performance, evidence of performance issues, and potential or actual consequences. The Human Performance Data Project will determine what human performance data have been collected in the past at NASA, and what data should be collected in the future in order to complete our knowledgebase and reduce risks related to human factors and habitability.

Whitmore, Mihriban↗
NASA NTRS2016

Tailoring a Human Reliability Analysis to Your Industry Needs

Companies at risk of accidents caused by human error that result in catastrophic consequences include: airline industry mishaps, medical malpractice, medication mistakes, aerospace failures, major oil spills, transportation mishaps, power production failures and manufacturing facility incidents. Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) is used to analyze the inherent risk of human behavior or actions introducing errors into the operation of a system or process. These assessments can be used to identify where errors are most likely to arise and the potential risks involved if they do occur. Using the basic concepts of HRA, an evolving group of methodologies are used to meet various industry needs. Determining which methodology or combination of techniques will provide a quality human reliability assessment is a key element to developing effective strategies for understanding and dealing with risks caused by human errors. There are a number of concerns and difficulties in "tailoring" a Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) for different industries. Although a variety of HRA methodologies are available to analyze human error events, determining the most appropriate tools to provide the most useful results can depend on industry specific cultures and requirements. Methodology selection may be based on a variety of factors that include: 1) how people act and react in different industries, 2) expectations based on industry standards, 3) factors that influence how the human errors could occur such as tasks, tools, environment, workplace, support, training and procedure, 4) type and availability of data, 5) how the industry views risk & reliability, and 6) types of emergencies, contingencies and routine tasks. Other considerations for methodology selection should be based on what information is needed from the assessment. If the principal concern is determination of the primary risk factors contributing to the potential human error, a more detailed analysis method may be employed versus a requirement to provide a numerical value as part of a probabilistic risk assessment. Industries involved with humans operating large equipment or transport systems (ex. railroads or airlines) would have more need to address the man machine interface than medical workers administering medications. Human error occurs in every industry; in most cases the consequences are relatively benign and occasionally beneficial. In cases where the results can have disastrous consequences, the use of Human Reliability techniques to identify and classify the risk of human errors allows a company more opportunities to mitigate or eliminate these types of risks and prevent costly tragedies.

DeMott, D. L.↗