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At least 217 records · Page 12

Rossi-α Measurements on a System Consisting of Weapons Grade Plutonium Moderated by Polyethylene [Poster]

A series of experiments nicknamed "TEX," standing for Thermal-Epithermal eXperiments, were performed at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) on the Planet critical assembly. The TEX experiment campaigns are a collaboration between Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and funded by the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). The TEX experiment consists of several campaigns; this work specifically discusses measurements made on one series of TEX experiments designed to examine the thermal scattering law (TSL) for polyethylene. This series consisted of two different critical configurations which contain plutonium fuel. The plutonium plates are 2 in. by 3 in. by 0.125 in. Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) plates and are placed in a tray in an array of 6 plates by 4 plates wide creating a 12 in. by 12 in. square. These trays of plutonium are interleaved between polyethylene plates. These measurements differ from previous TEX experiments in that they examine a more thermal neutron spectrum than previously examined by interleaving much thicker interstitial moderating plates than the previous measurements. The two configurations differ in the thickness of polyethylene between the fissile material. While the experiment was designed to examine the TSL, this work only examines the results of Rossi-α measurements on the two different configurations. For both configurations, Rossi-α measurements were performed to experimentally validate the neutron spectrum.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

SCALE Calculations Replicating ARH-600 Data

This report documents Standardized Computer Analyses for Licensing Evaluation (SCALE) calculations replicating data from the ARH-600 criticality handbook. These calculations complement those reproduced with MCNP in PRC-NS-00009. Calculations were performed with SCALE version 6.1, using the v7-238 cross section library. The original ARH-600 data were calculated by the Atlantic Richfield Hanford (ARH) Company starting in the 1960s, and Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) calculations were performed by the Hanford Plateau Remediation Company in 2010. This report is not intended to replace final analysis of fissile systems by qualified criticality personnel.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Subcriticality Measurements for a Changing Concentration Uranyl Nitrate Solution Tank by Californium Source-Driven Noise Analysis

Subcritical californium source-driven noise analysis (CSDNA) measurements were performed at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility in 1983 using a stainless-steel tank with an inside diameter of 76.2 cm and a height of 91.4 cm but only filled with a uranyl (93.16 wt.% 235 U) nitrate solution to a height of 76.2 cm for all measurements. The free acid content of the uranyl nitrate solution was less than 0.01 N to minimize hazards in handling. The total available highly enriched uranium for these measurements was 5,296 g. The concentration of the solution was varied from the highest density of 14.71 grams of uranium per liter (g U/L) initially in 16 steps, lowering the concentration to 0.3492 g U/L, and finally using a tank filled with only water. The tank had a Plexiglas lid to minimize evaporation. The Cf source was contained in a re-entrant Lexan tube which could be in the solution parallel to the axis of the cylindrical tank. The detectors were 3 He proportional counters in the solution in shrink-fit tubing to isolate the counters from the fissile solution and adjacent to the outside of the tank. In some cases, the detectors were scintillators adjacent to the outside of the tank. In other cases, the source was external to the tank. Some data presented in this report are from notes and are not in the logbook. The prompt neutron decay constant was obtained from fitting the date from the CSDNA measurements. The purpose of this report is to document the experimental information for the measurements performed so that later, researchers could perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Nuclear Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) or a Nuclear Energy Agency benchmark. The prompt neutron decay measurements could be the basis of as International Reactor Physic Benchmark Program. The data from these measurements are available from the Records Management Services Department of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and the logbook is also available from the ICSBEP at Idaho National Laboratory. Preparation of the present report is part of a larger cooperative effort between Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other USDOE critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Critical and Californium Source-Driven Noise Analysis Subcritical Measurements with an Unreflected Cylindrical Tank of Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Nitrate Solution

The reported experiments were performed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) at the Battelle Northwest Laboratory’s (now Pacific Northwest National Laboratory) critical experiments facility at Hanford, Washington in 1981 and used 16 days of critical facility time, not including 10 days for setup and removal of ORNL equipment. These measurements were to assess the capability of the Cf source-driven noise analysis (CSDNA) method to measure the subcriticality (keff) of mixed U-Pu nitrate solutions. In addition to the CSNDA measurements, measurements were also performed near delayed criticality where CSDNA measurements cannot be performed. This report documents the experiments that were not reported at that time by presenting the ORNL experimental results and any online analysis performed during and shortly after the measurements. The mixed nitrate solution had a U concentration at 188 grams per liter (g/L), a Pu concentration of 280 g/L, free acid normality of 2.80, H ion molarity of 5.9 and a specific gravity of 1.754 g/cm 3 , a 240 Pu isotopic content of 7.981 wt. %, and a 235 U isotopic content of 0.724 wt. %. The stainless-steel tank for the solution had an inside diameter of 35.38 cm, an outside diameter of 35.53 cm, a height of 56.72 cm, and bottom thickness of 0.9525 cm. A Zircaloy pipe with a 3.1496 cm outside diameter, a 2.7788 cm inside diameter, and bottom thickness of 0.635 cm was available for insertion of the Cf source in the center of the fissile solution. The Cf source was also located at the outside surface of the tank (solution height varied from 10 to 53 cm) and in the center of the solution (solution height varied from 10 to 60.7 cm). The CSDNA measurements were not analyzed online to determine the subcritical neutron multiplication factors. At all subcritical states, the break frequency noise analysis data was fitted to obtain the prompt neutron decay constant. The neutron multiplication factors were determined for the two configurations of the measurements near delayed criticality. The subcritical neutron multiplication factors from the CNSDA measurements can be obtained with further analysis. However, the near delayed critical configuration, the prompt neutron decay constants, the count rates, and the measured cross and auto power spectral densities can be calculated directly for benchmarking. Much of data presented in this report are from ORNL notes—not in the ORNL logbooks. For the final benchmark analysis, the data from the Battelle Northwest Laboratory (which operated the critical facility in 1981) critical facility logbook should be consulted and be incorporated where appropriate. The purpose of this report is to document the experimental information for the measurements performed so that at a later date researchers could perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Criticality Safety Benchmark Program (ICSBEP) or Nuclear Energy Agency benchmark. The data from these measurements are available from the ORNL Records Management Services Department, and the logbook is available from ICSBEP at Idaho National Laboratory. Preparation of the present report is part of a larger cooperative effort between Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other USDOE critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Codename: Audacious Aardvark

In mid-August, nine members of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) joined nine LANL employees for a three-day cross-training drill in which FBI forensics experts would train fissile material handlers in the work of traditional forensics on nuclear components. The drill was called Audacious Aardvark, reflecting an aardvark’s diligence and fearlessness.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A Semi-Automated Approach for Curating a Glossary of Key Terms for Open-Source Data Queries

In FY20, the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) was funded by the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Defense Nuclear Non-Proliferation Research and Development (NA-22) to build a machine learning based modeling pipeline that could extract proliferation events of interest from open text-based data sources. As a test case, the research team targeted the identification/fusion of events and indicators that fissile core fabrication would be executed at the Savannah River Site prior to its official announcement in May of 2018. The demonstration prototype proved successful by applying natural language processing and graph theoretical techniques to identify contextual shifts in key words and phrases that acted as indicators that pit production would be carried out at the Savannah River Site up to two years prior to the official announcement.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Knowledge Transfer and Training in Safeguards for Decommissioned Nuclear Facilities (Project Final Report for FY2022)

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) applies safeguards to nuclear facilities that are not operating, including those undergoing decommissioning, and the IAEA’s effort in this area is both considerable and increasing. Specifically, the IAEA Department of Safeguards’ Division of Concepts and Planning (SGCP-003: Safeguards Approaches) identified an R&D need to “Develop safeguards implementation guidelines for facilities under decommissioning and safeguards concepts for post-accident facilities under decommissioning”. Nuclear facilities undergoing decommissioning are not exempt from safeguards agreements between the IAEA and Host State, and, accordingly, the requirement for verification of no diversion of nuclear material and detection of undeclared activities at decommissioned facilities remain even after facility shutdown. However, the effort required to meet safeguards objectives diminishes as nuclear material and essential equipment are removed during the decommissioning process which shifts the emphasis from verification of ever-diminishing fissile or source material inventories to verification of changes in facility design and equipment operability.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Preliminary Design of a New Pulsed-Neutron Die--Away Experiments with Absorbers (IER-552 CED-1)

This report presents the preliminary design (CED-1) of IER-552, pulsed-neutron die-away (PNDA) experiments with absorbers, to be conducted by Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). The goal of the PNDA experiments with absorbing materials is to produce high-quality, low-cost integral benchmarks that can be used to validate cross sections that are high priority nuclear data for the Department of Energy’s Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). PNDA experiments can be used to generate nuclear data validation benchmarks quickly and cheaply, as they do not require fissile material or a nuclear facility to conduct them. The original PNDA experiments were set up at LLNL under IER-501. Extending the PNDA experiments to include absorbing materials leverages existing facilities and resources at LLNL to validate cross sections, with a basic experiment design that uses a neutron generator to impinge a short, mono-energetic neutron pulse on a poisoned, moderating target sample. The neutron pulse lasts 100 µs, after which the neutron population in the sample reaches thermal equilibrium and later spatial equilibrium. In this fully equilibrized state, the neutron population has a characteristic decay-time eigenvalue. The eigenvalue can be used as an integral parameter to validate nuclear data involved with neutron scattering and absorption. Two observables can be measured: the neutron population and the population of secondary γ-rays produced by inelastic and capture reactions. This report explores the feasibility of both approaches. For γ-ray measurements, this allows for direct measurement of reactions of interest for validation. During the neutron burst time, inelastic (prompt) γ-rays dominate, and these data can be isolated for validation of neutron inelastic scattering data. After the pulse ends, neutron capture (delayed) γ-rays dominate and are produced by many reaction channels as neutrons slow down to thermal energies. Two sets of γ-ray spectra (inelastic, capture) can be produced for validation. Additionally, the time-dependent decay of the capture γ-ray population when the neutron population is thermalized and in its fundamental mode can be used for validation. Two experiments can be imagined where pulsed neutrons are used to validate the nuclear data of absorbing materials. The first integrates well into the existing PNDA testbed at LLNL. The absorber material would be introduced into a moderating target and the same neutron generator, neutron detectors, electronics, and shielding box used for IER-501 would be employed. From the same experimental setup, many absorbing materials can be validated by simply changing the neutron poison in the moderator. The only significant modification would be the introduction of a γ-ray detector. Such an experiment would primarily serve to validate nuclear data in the thermal energy range. The second kind of experiment would validate the fast and epithermal energy range. It would involve pulsing neutron into a bare assembly of the absorber material and measuring the die-away of neutrons. The fast leakage of such an assembly requires nanosecond neutron-generator pulse widths and fast detectors/electronics that could measure ~200 ns die-away curves. This kind of experiment would ideally be performed at a cyclotron, like that available at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Nondestructive Assay Technical Infrastructure Program Mission and Vision

The Nondestructive Assay Program (NDAP) mission and vision is achieved by identifying and accomplishing a set of programmatic goals that correspond with eight broad technical program elements. The NDAP was created as a result of Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Recommendation 2007-1, entitled “Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials,” which emphasized the need to improve in situ measurements of radioactive material at US Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities. An NDAP five-year plan will define tasks to accomplish specific goals identified in the NDAP mission and vision. This mission and vision is applicable for eight technical program elements: Hardware/Software Development, Algorithm Development and Nuclear Data, Uncertainty Quantification, Nuclear Materials, Staffing, Personnel, And Training, Data Management, Requirement and Standards, and Information Preservation and Dissemination. An additional program element is technical support, which provides daily execution management support for the NDAP, site scope, and deliverable tracking via site task managers, along with technical advisement and support from the technical support group. The NDAP mission and vision provides attributes with specific goals for each program element, and some goals benefit multiple program elements. The goals and attributes defined herein are implemented via an NDAP five-year execution plan that defines site work scope, budget, and deliverables, all of which are updated annually. The NDAP is designed to benefit nondestructive assay (NDA) needs to support DOE nuclear criticality safety programs, ensuring that NDA technology is sufficiently capable of guaranteeing the safety of those who handle, store, process, or transport fissionable materials in the complex. Especially important for the NDAP is to maximize capabilities to identify, characterize, and manage in situ fissile material deposits in process equipment to ensure nuclear criticality safety at processing facilities.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Updates to SNL Nuclear Criticality Safety Benchmark Suite for MCNP

Members of the Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Program at Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have updated the suite of benchmark problems developed to validate MCNP6 Version 2.0 for use in NCS applications. The updated NCS benchmark suite adds approximately 600 new benchmarks and includes peer review of all input files by two different NCS engineers (or one NCS engineer and one candidate NCS engineer). As with the originally released benchmark suite, the updated suite covers a broad range of fissile material types, material forms, moderators, reflectors, and neutron energy spectra. The benchmark suite provides a basis to establish a bias and bias uncertainty for use in NCS analyses at SNL.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Updated Reference VTR Core for CD-1

A preliminary reference core design was previously developed for the Versatile Test Reactor. The main features are that it is a 300 MW th sodium-cooled fast reactor using ternary metallic fuel U-20Pu-10Zr and able to achieve peak fast fluxes (E n > 0.1 MeV) in excess of 4.0x10 15 n/cm 2 -s. The plutonium in the fuel was assumed to be “reactor grade”, with a fissile quality of about 72% (i.e., 239 Pu and 241 Pu comprise 72% of the plutonium isotopes), and the uranium was assumed to be low-enriched uranium with 5% 235 U. This preliminary core design has been used through the CD-0 phase of the VTR project. Progression of the work after CD-0 led to revising, updating and refining the reference VTR core design, based on considerations from the various VTR teams: fuel, experiment, safety, and plant design teams. The objective of this report is to summarize the various changes made and details added to the model, to provide a description of the updated reference VTR core design and of its performance characteristics. This includes the traditional reactor physics characteristics, fuel cycle details, reactivity coefficients, temperature distributions, control rod worths and shutdown requirements. All of these define the updated “reference VTR core” intended to be used through CD-1.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Characterizing the Performance of Fission Chambers for Local Neutron Flux and Spectrum Measurement

Three fission chambers were tested at The Ohio State University Research Reactor (OSURR) to evaluate fission chambers for neutron flux and spectrum measurements. Two of the fission chambers are commercial Photonis CFUR43 fission chambers—one utilizing highly enriched uranium-235 fissile deposits for thermal neutron detection and the other with highly depleted uranium-238 for fast neutron detection. This experiment was also performed in collaboration with French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) with CEA suppling a uranium-235 loaded fission chamber built from the Photonis CFPR CE8/9 kit. The fission chambers were irradiated in a movable 6.5 inch dry tube at reactor powers of 50 kW, 200 kW, and 450 kW at ambient temperature and at 350°C. While all sensors demonstrated good linear sensitivity to reactor power, a leakage current of 6 nA was measured for the CFUR43 detectors. Additionally, the measured signal ratios of the two CFUR43 detectors did not match the theoretical values and are subject to further investigation on individual signal contributors.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Identification of Material Type and Thickness Using Combined X-ray and Fast Neutron Radiography

Material identification (ID) using radiography is a problem that has implicitly existed since the discovery of the X-ray. Since 9-11, this problem has received renewed attention for homeland security applications of the generic, “what is in the box?” type1. Examples of items potentially in the box include: roadside bombs, nuclear weapons, contraband shipments and the like. In these cases, the “what” can include: explosives, projectiles, fissile material, or drugs. Here we investigate the ability of 60Co gamma-rays, 14MeV neutrons, and their combination to tease apart information about density, thickness and atomic number of items in the box. That information subset can be combined with other types of independent information (e.g. neutron and gammaspectroscopy, intelligence, photographs etc.) to assert a more complete picture of what, exactly, is in the box? That more complete information set can form the basis for actions including: remote detonation, evacuations, disablement, detention, search, arrest etc.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Proposed Subcritical Assembly for Nuclear Criticality Safety Training at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The design of a new subcritical assembly at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) has been finalized. This design takes the feasibility study of the subcritical assembly performed in August 2020 to an implementable design. This subcritical assembly will support the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) training and education program. The addition of this subcritical assembly into the NCSP training and education will enhance the program by providing backup capacity for training if nuclear facility operations are disrupted at Sandia National Laboratories or the National Criticality Experiments Research Center; providing a new location that is more accessible to students in the Eastern portion of the United States; providing flexibility to support students from a diverse background (e.g., university students, foreign nationals). The proposed subcritical assembly uses legacy AGN-201M research reactor fuel plates that are available at the Y-12 National Security Complex. The final design of this subcritical assembly contains approximately 617 grams of 235 U as UO 2 powder distributed homogeneously in polyethylene. The fuel plates will have a graphite neutron reflector to obtain a core multiplication, M, from 10 to 20, corresponding to a $k_{eff}$ of 0.90 to 0.95, respectively. The subcritical assembly will be able to support at least four experiments for the training courses: (1) the addition of fissile material to the core (mass), (2) a core separation experiment (interaction), (3) the addition of moderators to the core (moderation), and (4) the addition of neutron absorbers to the core (poison/absorption). The subcritical assembly will be designed to be inherently safe—subcritical under all normal and abnormal conditions— and will provide the capability to conduct hands-on training to support NCSP and general nuclear criticality safety staff training and qualification goals.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Neutron Pulsed Die-Away Experiments at LLNL [Slides]

This presentation discusses why PNDA is ideal for TSL validations as it does not require fissile material, it has very simple target shapes and compositions, it is only sensitive to absorption and scattering of target medium, and that well conducted experiments have uncertainties of 0.1% - 0.5%. The presentation concludes by examining PNDA’s advantages and its role in nuclear data validations as it offers a cost-effective experiment for an integral benchmark, it provides the ability to focus on specific cross section data validation including thermal neutron absorption and thermal scattering laws, and the low experimental uncertainty makes it an excellent benchmark candidate. Additionally, it is easily tunable and can facilitate temperature dependent cross section validation by cooling or heating up targets.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Safeguarding Commercial Breed and Burn Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactors

A new class of reactors is under development in the United States. These new reactor designs use fast neutron spectra and rely on fuel technology advancements to reach fleet-wide operating conditions where neither enrichment nor reprocessing fuel are required to sustain or grow the fleet. Achieving this level of operation requires nuclear fuel that can remain in the reactor environment for much longer than current limits. The transfer of irradiated fuel is also required as the initial fissile source for new and replacement reactors. This class of reactors is known as breed and burn reactors and can be deployed as a fleet whereby the transfer of fuel is used to power subsequent generations of reactors. The use of breed and burn reactors reduces, and potentially eliminates, the need for enrichment and reprocessing to sustain a reactor fleet. Currently, enrichment and reprocessing plants require extremely complicated safeguards implementation and offer States diversion pathways for indirect use material. By eliminating the need for these facilities, a nuclear power fleet based on the BREED AND BURN reactor concept has the potential to indirectly reduce the burden on IAEA safeguards. However, this complex dynamic system does pose new safeguards challenges that are explored further in this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Specifications of EBR-II Neutron Radiography Method Description and Digitization Approach

All neutron radiography (NRAD) images of fuel pins in Argonne’s collection were originally generated using the NRAD imaging facility established in the Hot Fuel Examination Facility (HFEF) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The NRAD reactor facility was built in 1977 and has been operating since. The reactor is a TRIGA-type reactor operating at a power level of 250 kWth to provide a neutron source for radiography imaging. The reactor is equipped with two beam tubes (i.e., east beam tube and north beam tube) to guide the neutron beams to two radiography stations. The east radiography station is directly under the HFEF main cell and is dedicated for specimens already in the HFEF hot cell. The north radiography station is outside of the main HFEF hot cell and allows NRAD imaging of non-irradiated items. The NRAD images of EBR-II irradiated metallic fuel pins were taken in the east radiography station. Thermal neutrons have the capability to transmit through most materials and are ideal for NRAD imaging. However, because of their high thermal neutron absorption cross-section, fissile materials (e.g., highly-enriched nuclear fuels) may not be as transmissible to thermal neutrons. This is also the case for oversize specimens with extraneous thickness. Epithermal neutron imaging is therefore used as a complement to thermal neutron NRAD imaging. At HFEF’s NRAD facility, both thermal and epithermal neutrons can be used for NRAD imaging. Irradiated nuclear fuels emit high levels of γ radiation that can easily darken X-ray films, so direct exposure NRAD cannot be used to image them. Instead, an indirect NRAD imaging method was developed at HFEF’s NRAD facility. In this method, foils made of materials that can be activated by neutrons (i.e., with large neutron absorption cross section) are used to collect transmitted neutron signals. Then the activated foils are then placed against X-ray films and enclosed in a vacuum cassette so that the γ decay from the activated foils can produce images on the X-ray films. Then, general X-ray film processing procedures are used to digitize and store the images. By using different foil materials, different energy neutrons can be used for NRAD imaging. At the HFEF NRAD station, two types of films are commonly used: dysprosium (Dy) foils with thickness of 130 microns are used to capture thermal neutron signal, while indium (In) foils with thickness of 130 microns are used to capture epithermal neutron signal. A cadmium or gadolinium foil is put before the indium foil to work as a thermal neutron filter. The thermal and epithermal NRAD images can be taken simultaneously by using a Dy/Cd/In sandwiched foil combination. The typical NRAD exposure time is approximately 20 minutes. Then the exposed foils are transferred to film vacuum cassettes. The vacuum ensures that there is no gap between the foil and the film. The foil-to-film exposure time is at least three half-lives of the corresponding radioisotopes, which are 3 hours for In and 7.5 hours for Dy, respectively. Exposed films are processed using an automatic film processor to produce completed NRAD images.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Applicability of the Sum-of-Fractions for Moderated Systems [Slides]

This presentation is for addressing the presence of multiple fissionable nuclides in a moderated system and validation with benchmarking gaps. The presentation finds: no instances of the use of the Sum-of-Fractions (SoF) method resulted in k eff values exceeding the calculational margin, when utilizing the SoF include all fissile nuclides, provides additional flexibility than 8.15 for mixtures, extend area of applicability by extending validation.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗