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At least 217 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Charge Correlations in Cuprate Superconductors

High-temperature superconductivity, with transition temperatures up to ≈134 K at ambient pressure, occurs in layered cuprate compounds. The conducting CuO 2 planes, which are universally present, are responsible for the superconductivity but also show a disposition to other competing states including spin and charge order. Charge-density-wave (CDW) order appears to be a universal property of cuprate superconductors. It has been studied via a multitude of probes including X-ray and neutron scattering, nuclear magnetic resonance, scanning probe techniques, electronic transport, and quantum oscillations. Here, we review the microscopic properties of the CDW order. We discuss the nature of the ordered state, that is, its symmetry and microscopic structure. Furthermore, we show how the CDW order is related to quenched disorder, host structure, symmetry breaking perturbations, and magnetic fields. Here, we also describe measurements of dynamic collective charge excitations that are closely related to the quasi-static CDW order. Finally, we highlight some of the debated issues in the field, including the origin of the CDW order, the relationship to spin order, and the nature of the spatial CDW correlations.

75 CONDENSED MATTER PHYSICS, SUPERCONDUCTIVITY AND↗
DOE OSTI2022

ORNL/TM-2021/2046 Appendix data repository

Repository of data files used to generate plots for Post-Closure Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations for Disposition of Criticality Control Overpacks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (ORNL/TM-2021/2046). See the readme for information contained in the individual files. See the report for description of the models used to generate the data.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

TRISO Particle Isolation and Graphite Removal Using SRNL Vapor Digestion Technology

Tri-structural isotropic fueled reactors are planned to come online in the next decade, but there is not currently a widely agreed upon disposition pathway for this new fuel stream. For long term used nuclear fuel storage, there would be a significant benefit if the waste volume could be reduced or mitigated. Most of the volume from used TRISO fuel contains graphite. SRNL currently has an active patent which describes one pathway to digest the graphite. One benefit in the utilization of this pathway is that multiple cylindrical pieces can be stacked end-to-end in a reaction tube, then nitric acid and water vapor can be flowed through the tube, and the weight change of the individual cores can provide both a reaction profile and overall oxidant use efficiency. The reaction of nitric acid and graphite passes through a series of intermediate products – NO 2 , NO, and N 2 O – from reaction and decomposition to eventually form N2. The data shows that NO2 grows in with increasing temperature between 500-600°C and then decreases by way of either reaction with graphite or decomposition. Nitric oxide, a reaction and thermal decomposition product of NO 2 , exhibits a consistent decline as a function of temperature, which is consistent with the literature. Similarly, the concentrations of N 2 O and N 2 increase as a function of temperature as their reactions with graphite become more favorable.

Advanced Reactors↗
DOE OSTI2025

A genome-scale metabolic model for the denitrifying bacterium Thauera sp. MZ1T accurately predicts degradation of pollutants and production of polymers

The denitrifying bacterium Thauera sp . MZ1T, a common member of microbial communities in wastewater treatment facilities, can produce different compounds from a range of carbon (C) and nitrogen (N) sources under aerobic and anaerobic conditions. In these different conditions, Thauera modifies its metabolism to produce different compounds that influence the microbial community. In particular, Thauera sp . MZ1T produces different exopolysaccharides with floc-forming properties, impacting the physical disposition of wastewater consortia and the efficiency of nutrient assimilation by the microbial community. Under N-limiting conditions, Thauera sp . MZ1T decreases its growth rate and accelerates the accumulation of polyhydroxyalkanoate-related (PHA) compounds including polyhydroxybutyrate (PHB), which plays a fundamental role as C and energy storage in this β-proteobacterium. However, the metabolic mechanisms employed by Thauera sp . MZ1T to assimilate and catabolize many of the different C and N sources under aerobic and anaerobic conditions remain unknown. Systems biology approaches such as genome-scale metabolic modeling have been successfully used to unveil complex metabolic mechanisms for various microorganisms. Here, we developed a comprehensive metabolic model (M-model) for Thauera sp . MZ1T ( i Thauera861), consisting of 1,744 metabolites, 2,384 reactions, and 861 genes. We validated the model experimentally using over 70 different C and N sources under both aerobic and anaerobic conditions. i Thauera861 achieved a prediction accuracy of 95% for growth on various C and N sources and close to 85% for assimilation of aromatic compounds under denitrifying conditions. The M-model was subsequently deployed to determine the effects of substrates, oxygen presence, and the C:N ratio on the production of PHB and exopolysaccharides (EPS), showing the highest polymer yields are achieved with nucleotides and amino acids under aerobic conditions. This comprehensive M-model will help reveal the metabolic processes by which this ubiquitous species influences communities in wastewater treatment systems and natural environments.

Tec-Campos, Diego (ORCID:0000000188194150)↗
DOE OSTI2020

ARIES team achieves major milestone in support of nonproliferation

The Advanced Recovery and Integrated Extraction System (ARIES) Program is a great example of LANL’s Weapons and Global Security programs working together to achieve important nuclear security mission goals. Executed at PF-4, a facility better known for its pit production mission, the ARIES Program is helping the nation meet its nonproliferation commitments by preparing surplus weapons-grade plutonium for final disposition. ARIES recently met a major milestone of producing 1 metric ton of plutonium oxide from material removed from surplus pits. The milestone was celebrated in an awards ceremony at LANL on January 28.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Project Plan: Salt in Situ Heater Test

This project plan gives a high-level description of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) campaign in situ borehole heater test project planned for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) site, titled the Brine Availability Test in Salt (BATS). BATS is the first stage in a planned sequence of tests to bolster the technical basis for disposal of heat generating waste in salt. This plan provides an overview of the schedule and responsibilities of the parties involved. This project is a collaborative effort by Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratories to execute a series of small-diameter borehole heater tests in salt for the DOE-NE SFWD campaign. Design of a heater test in salt at WIPP has evolved over several years. The experiment has begun in January 2020 and the first phase will continue for several months with the possibility for follow on testing. BATS comprises a suite of modular tests, which consist of a group of adjacent horizontal boreholes in the wall of drifts at WIPP. Each test is centered around a packer-isolated heated borehole (12.2 cm [4.81 diameter) containing equipment for water-vapor collection and borehole closure monitoring, surrounded by smaller-diameter (up to 5.3 cm [2.11 diameter) satellite observation boreholes. Observation boreholes contain grouted-in temperature sensors, electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) sensors, and fiber optics; packer-isolated tracer release and sampling intervals; and acoustic emission (AE) piezoelectric sensors. A larger-diameter (12.2 cm [4.81) satellite borehole includes sorel and salt cement plugs, as part of an engineered barrier sealing test. The first two tests, to be implemented in parallel, are heated (target borehole wall temperature of 120 °C) and unheated, with similar arrays of observation borehole monitoring changes. Follow-on tests will be designed using information gathered from the first two tests, and may be conducted at other borehole wall temperatures, use multiple observation boreholes, and may include different measurement types and test designs. This 2020 update of the original 2018 project plan satisfies DOE-NE Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) milestone M3SF-205N010303034, as part of the SNL "Salt Disposal R&D" work package.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Savannah River Site Composite Analysis (FY2019 Annual Review)

The Savannah River Site (SRS) is a Department of Energy (DOE) site encompassing approximately 310 square miles in South Carolina. It is bounded on the southwest by the Savannah River (SR) and is situated approximately 12 miles south of Aiken, South Carolina, and 15 miles southeast of Augusta, Georgia. Construction of and subsequent operations at the SRS began in 1951 under the direction of the Atomic Energy Commission. The primary mission of the SRS was to produce tritium and plutonium for the national nuclear weapons complex. Between 1953 and 1955, SRS brought five reactors and various support facilities into operation in support of its primary mission. Support facilities included two chemical separations plants, a heavy water extraction plant, a nuclear fuel and target fabrication facility, a tritium extraction facility and waste management facilities. With the declining need for a large nuclear weapons stockpile since the end of the Cold War, many SRS facilities no longer produce or process nuclear materials. All reactors were shut down by 1993. However, the SRS Tritium Extraction Facility continues to supply DOE with tritium. Additionally, operations at the K-Area Complex currently provide interim safe storage for much of DOE’s excess plutonium (Pu) and high enriched uranium, in a building which formerly housed K Reactor. As the SRS mission has changed, many surplus facilities are being dispositioned safely and economically. SRS has completed extensive decommissioning activities in D-Area, M-Area, P-Area, R-Area, and T-Area, with groundwater (GW) remediation ongoing. High-level waste tanks continue to be emptied and closed.

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DOE OSTI2020

Preliminary Analysis of Postclosure DPC Criticality Consequences

One of the objectives of the United States (U.S.) Department of Energy's (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy's Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign is to better understand the technical basis, risks, and uncertainty associated with the safe and secure disposition of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. Commercial nuclear power generation in the U.S. has resulted in thousands of metric tons of SNF, the disposal of which is the responsibility of the DOE (Nuclear Waste Policy Act 1982). Any repository licensed to dispose the SNF must meet requirements regarding the longterm performance of that repository. For an evaluation of the long-term performance of the repository, one of the events that may need to be considered is the SNF achieving a critical configuration. Of particular interest is the potential behavior of SNF in dual-purpose canisters (DPCs), which are currently being used to store and transport SNF but were not designed for permanent geologic disposal. A two-phase study has been initiated to begin examining the potential consequences, with respect to longterm repository performance, of criticality events that might occur during the postclosure period in a hypothetical repository containing DPCs. Phase I, a scoping phase, consisted of developing an approach intended to be a starting point for the development of the modeling tools and techniques that may eventually be required either to exclude criticality from or to include criticality in a performance assessment (PA) as appropriate; Phase I is documented in Price et al. (2019). The Phase I approach guided the analyses and simulations done in Phase II to further the development of these modeling tools and techniques as well as the overall knowledge base. The purpose of this report is to document the results of the analyses conducted during Phase II. The remainder of Section 1 presents the background, objective, and scope of this report, as well as the relevant key assumptions used in the Phase II analyses and simulations. Subsequent sections discuss the analyses that were conducted (Section 2), the results of those analyses (Section 3), and the summary and conclusions (Section 4). This report fulfills the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology Campaign deliverable M2SF-20SN010305061.

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DOE OSTI2020

National-Tribal Critical Infrastructure Protection: Collaboration for Extraordinary National Security Benefit

This paper examines national and tribal collaborative opportunities to get ahead of the critical infrastructure insecurity problem. Recommendations are viewed through the lens of the Sandia Labs Tribal Cyber-Energy initiative and national security projects. Recommendations include 1) Collaboratively address national priority and shared challenges to gain faster and better solutions to national priority problems on a smaller yet comprehensive American Indian and Alaskan Native sovereign single-point of authority scale 2) Utilize newer standards-based technologies to provide scalable, capable, and manageable solutions for greatly expanded and connected national critical infrastructures 3) Employ Cyber-Physical-Resilient design preliminary analysis to define concept- to-disposition design requirements for preemptive critical infrastructure risk mitigation and baked-in security; 4) Develop data-centric protection to provide increased information asset protection as data shifts from data-owner operated on-premises infrastructure to virtual service provider data-steward owned and operated off-premises infrastructure; and 5) Balance shared solutions with the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity and Risk Management frameworks, and the System Security Engineering Guidelines. As yet unallocated federal funding would support research, development, the timely application of National-Tribal critical infrastructure protection, and critical infrastructure Cyber disruption response and recovery with extraordinary mutual benefits for the foreseeable future. The Critical Infrastructure Insecurity Problem: Rapid modernization and expansive connectivity are due to advances in Information and Communications Technologies that have sweeping cyber impact across all critical infrastructure sectors. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition and Industrial Control Systems are particularly impacted as systems long separated from the Internet are now being connected and computerized. Virtualization and mobility create a Data Everywhere-User Anywhere paradigm that has evaporated the enterprise network perimeter. There are multi-front technological challenges at play, where long depended on technologies simply don't scale to current needs resulting in a digital dichotomy of competing old and new standards. New standards-based technologies scale but are not as well-known or as widely deployed, which leaves decision makers, stakeholders, and the workforce in a quandary, caught mid-stream between the technological past and the virtual future. Rapid and expansive cyber threat accompanies disruptive change in connectivity and computational dependencies. A lack of action will exacerbate the problem if new technologies roll out without baked-in security design. The Risk: If National-Tribal CIP collaboration to design in security is not done, then an ongoing state of insufficient bolt-on security and elevated threat exposure will remain for years to come.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

How To Maintain Effective IAEA Safeguards While Reducing Facility Impact

For almost twenty years, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency have been visiting the K-Area Material Storage facility at the Savannah River Site where excess plutonium has been placed under IAEA safeguards as part of the United States Volunatary Offer Agreement. During that time, the mission of K-Area Complex has expanded from storage of nuclear matieral to glovebox operations in support of the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plutonium Disposition program. With this change in mission, it is becoming increasingly challenging to manage facility staff radiation exposure and operating activities during the IAEA’s annual Physcial Inventory Verifications (PIV). This study has identified both near-term and long-term recommendations for IAEA monitoring protocols that would allow the IAEA to maintain effective safeguards of the material while decreasing the impact to the facility. A statisitical analysis has shown that reducing the number of containers measured during an annual PIV from 12 to 4 still ensures a high level of confidence in the confidence while reducing the inspector time in the facility amd with a corresponding significant reduction in personnel radiation exposure. A modified installation pattern of Remotely Monitored Sealing Arrays (RMSAs) is also proposed utilizing only the outer rows of arrays of stored material containers in the Stack Area (SA). The modified RMSA placement will provide equivalent protection, while significantly reducing personnel radiological exposure, manpower requirements and associated costs. With advances in technology, there are additional potential options in containment/surveillance and continuity of knowledge that would allow the agency to be outside of the facility during PIV measurements and have confidence in the accuracy and authencitity of the results.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Crystalline Disposal R&D at LBNL: FY20 Progress Report

Within the Spent Fuel & Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Program, research work continues further with the goal to better understand long-term performance of disposal systems in three main geologic rock types: clay/shale, salt, and crystalline rock. This report documents LBNL’s research activities related to investigations of crystalline host rock according to the scope of two work packages: SF-20LB01030207 “Crystalline International Collaborations – LBNL,” and SF-20LB01030203 “Crystalline Disposal R&D – LBNL.” These research activities correspond are related to key Features, Events, and Processes (FEPs), ranked in importance from medium to high, as listed in Table 7 of the Used Fuel Disposition Campaign Disposal Research and Development Roadmap (FCR&D-USED-2011-000065 REV0) (Nutt, 2011). Specifically, these research activities address FEP 2.2.01, Excavation Disturbed Zone (EZD). The results of these research activities provide important insights into understanding and predicting flow and transport processes that could occur in low-permeability crystalline rocks, in which fractures might serve as main conduits for fluid flow and radionuclide transport. The evolution of the EDZ during the excavation of the tunnel as well as the evolution of microcrack growth within the EDZ after the emplacement of backfill are critical for predicting the long- term behavior of the EDZ. A number of factors including stress, temperature, water activity, capillary pressure, chemistry, and mineralogy can affect the rock evolution, which require advanced experimental tools to study it.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) Material Test Reactor (MTR) (Fuel Inspection Program Report)

The AMCAP MTR Fuel Inspection Program, a special inspection program comprised of four inspection campaigns, examined a total of ten (10) pre-selected aluminum-clad, aluminum-based fuel core spent nuclear fuel assemblies (ASNF) stored in the L Area Disassembly Basin (L Basin) at the Savannah River Site. A full description of the inspections and the results are reported. The fuel had been stored in bundled-tube storage (Vertical Tube Storage) for periods of 18 to 21 years. The prior service experience of the individual 10 assemblies varies, but all included irradiation followed by wet storage at international research reactor sites prior to shipment to the US and storage in L Basin. The 10 assemblies were expected to be among the “worst"’ in terms of prior corrosion damage of the entire inventory of the direct-bundle-stored ASNF in L Basin. The inventory of MTR ASNF in L Basin will continue to be stored in the bundled-tube configuration or in slug-storage buckets with inserts pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The MTR fuel inspections focused on collecting information for characterization of the material condition of the ASNF considering various types of aluminum fuel corrosion degradation of its assembled materials in water storage. A custom-designed Fuel Inspection Table was used to stage the fuel for remote, enhanced visual examination (close-up video imaging & recording) with controlled lighting and positioning that enables reproducibility of imaging conditions. The inspections were conducted by fuel subject matter expert staff from Spent Fuel Project Engineering (SFPE) and the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL). Stills captured from the video records were used to compare the corrosion evolution from previous records, as available. This evaluation of the inspection results including the comparison to the previous inspection results demonstrate that the water quality and the storage configuration of ASNF in L Basin do not cause aggressive corrosion degradation of the fuel; mitigation of the prior corrosion degradation of the fuel also appears to have been achieved with the good water quality conditions of L Basin. Recommendations are made for future inspection of the fuel to trend corrosion degradation and demonstrate continued safe wet storage of the ASNF in L Basin. The next fuel examination is recommended to be performed in 5 years.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

2020 LANL Contributions to the BATS Test in WIPP

The DOE Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) repository research and development program seeks to provide a sound technical basis for multiple viable disposal options, increase confidence in the robustness of generic disposal concepts, and develop science and engineering tools needed to support disposal concept implementation. Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Berkeley National labs are conducting research into salt, which includes the Brine Availability Test in Salt (BATS) field test at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), a DOE Office of Environmental Management facility. BATS is leveraging the existing infrastructure associated with the WIPP to advance science informing generic disposal concepts. BATS is an ongoing heated borehole experiment being conducted in the WIPP underground. The goal of this experiment is to reduce the uncertainty associated with spent nuclear fuel disposition in geologic salt formations. The BATS experiments is designed to accomplish this by increasing our understanding of brine migration in salt, assessing damaged zones from mining and drilling, simulating a post-closure environment, confirming salt properties, and providing data for model validation. Phased testing for generic salt repository R&D was proposed in 2015. Subsequently, borehole thermal testing was developed as a first step in this process. This document summarizes the work conducted on the BATS experiment during fiscal year 2020 with an emphasis on the contributions by Los Alamos National Lab.

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DOE OSTI2020

Advances in GDSA Framework Development and Process Model Integration

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Spent Fuel & Waste Disposition (SFWD) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and highlevel nuclear waste (HLW). A high priority for SFWST disposal R&D is to develop a disposal system modeling and analysis capability for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. This report describes fiscal year (FY) 2020 advances of the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Framework and PFLOTRAN development groups of the SFWST Campaign. The common mission of these groups is to develop a geologic disposal system modeling capability for nuclear waste that can be used to probabilistically assess the performance of disposal options and generic sites. The capability is a framework called GDSA Framework that employs high-performance computing (HPC) capable codes PFLOTRAN and Dakota.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Advances in Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in GDSA Framework.

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE), Office of Fuel Cycle Technology (FCT) is conducting research and development (R&D) on geologic disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level nuclear waste (HLW). Two high priorities for SFWST disposal R&D are design concept development and disposal system modeling. These priorities are directly addressed in the SFWST ''Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment'' (GDSA) control account, which is charged with developing a geologic repository system modeling and analysis capability, and the associated software, ''GDSA Framework'', for evaluating disposal system performance for nuclear waste in geologic media. ''GDSA Framework'' is supported by SFWST Campaign and its predecessor the Used Fuel Disposition (UFD) campaign. This report fulfills the GDSA Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods work package (SF-20SN01030403) level 3 milestone — ''Advances in Uncertainty and Sensitivity Analysis Methods and Applications in GDSA Framework'' (M3SF-20SN010304032). It presents high level objectives and strategy for development of uncertainty and sensitivity analysis tools, demonstrates uncertainty quantification (UQ) and sensitivity analysis (SA) tools in GDSA Framework in FY20, and describes additional UQ/SA tools whose future implementation would enhance the UQ/SA capability of ''GDSA Framework''. This work was closely coordinated with the other Sandia National Laboratory GDSA work packages: the GDSA Framework Development work package (SF- 2051\101030404), the GDSA Repository Systems Analysis work package (SF-2051\101030405), and the GDSA PFLOTRAN Development work package (SF-20SN01030406). This report builds on developments reported in previous ''GDSA Framework'' milestones, particularly M2SF- 19SNO1030403.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

GDSA Repository Systems Analysis Investigations (FY2020)

The Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) Campaign of the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD), has been conducting research and development on generic deep geologic disposal systems (i.e., geologic repositories). This report describes specific activities in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 associated with the Geologic Disposal Safety Assessment (GDSA) Repository Systems Analysis (RSA) work package within the SFWST Campaign. The overall objective of the GDSA RSA work package is to develop generic deep geologic repository concepts and system performance assessment (PA) models in several host-rock environments, and to simulate and analyze these generic repository concepts and models using the GDSA Framework toolkit, and other tools as needed.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Innovative mercury treatment technology options for the liquid waste system at the Savannah River Site: scoping studies

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste System (LWS) contains liquids, salts and sludges that are currently being processed into final wasteforms for disposition, specifically, waste glass for sludges, solids and liquids containing high levels of radioactivity, and saltstone grout for low activity decontaminated liquid solutions. The LWS also contains approximately 60,000 kg of mercury present in the following physical and chemical forms, specifically: a) ionic inorganic mercury, organomercury (e.g., methylmercury), and other minor components found in LWS fluids b) mercury solids such as oxides, hydroxides, amalgams sulfides and sorbed mercury, c) accumulations of dense liquid elemental mercury, and d) vapor phase elemental and organomercury mercury found in tank headspace gas and in evaporators. An effective and proactive management strategy of the mercury present in the LWS is needed to support processing of LWS wastes into glass and saltstone. Sustainable processing of the LAWS to completion requires mercury removal from the LWS at a rate of approximately 2,900 kg/yr. This removal can be accomplished through existing mercury treatment systems or newly implemented LWS “purge points”. The chemical speciation of mercury has emerged as the key factor that controls mercury behavior in the LWS. For example, past studies demonstrated that mercury speciation is adversely impacting the performance of existing removal systems so that significant levels of mercury are recycled from the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) back to the tank farm. Consequently, mercury concentrations have slowly increased in the LWS tank fluids over time. The presence of organo-mercury has also been identified as the cause of increased mercury leaching from saltstone. In response to these challenges, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM-TD) Technology Development Program has supported a series of scoping studies predicated on manipulating or controlling mercury speciation and mercury behaviors within the constraints of LWS waste chemistry and safety conditions. The intent of these studies was to rapidly triage potential technology options and develop a technically based go / no go recommendation for further work. This composite report presents the results of three scoping studies: 1) advanced photooxidation processes, 2) chemical reduction, and 3) mercury getters.

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DOE OSTI2020

Development and Characterization of Cementitious Waste Forms for Immobilization of Granular Activated Carbon, Silver Mordenite, and HEPA Filter Media Solid Secondary Waste

At the Department of Energy’s Hanford site, over 53 million gallons of chemically complex and radioactive wastes have been stored in 177 underground tanks. The Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) is under construction and is designed to treat and immobilize these wastes. During operations of WTP, solid secondary wastes (SSWs) will be generated as a result of waste treatment, vitrification, off-gas management, and supporting process activities. SSW treatment processes and resulting disposal pathways for the final disposition form of the SSW are needed to support direct feed low activity waste (DFLAW) operations and facilitate continued operation of WTP. The SSWs produced through WTP operations are expected to include used process equipment, contaminated tools and instruments, decontamination wastes, high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters, carbon absorption beds (granular activated carbon, GAC), silver mordenite (AgM) and spent ion-exchange resins. These waste streams are planned to be immobilized in a cementitious waste form and disposed of either as stabilized/blended (non-debris) or encapsulated (debris) in a cementitious waste form. Accordingly, cementitious waste forms from these streams were included in the 2017 Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) Performance Assessment (PA). The input data used to represent these SSW forms in the 2017 IDF PA involved many assumptions and associated uncertainties. This data limitation was due to the lack of material- and site-specific data available for representative SSW materials in cementitious matrices. To verify the assumed values used in the IDF PA and fill this limitation in available data, Washington River Protection Solutions, LLC (WRPS), has initiated a program targeted toward gathering site specific data relevant to Hanford SSW disposal. The work within this report is a continuation of this ongoing program.

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