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At least 217 records · Page 12

Improving the Cyber Resiliency and Security Posture of Public Power (Final Report)

The key objective of Improving the Cyber Resiliency and Security Posture of Public Power (Project) was to develop a culture of cyber resiliency and security within the public power community. The relative smaller size and unique structure of community-owned electric utilities can sometimes present challenges in immediate recognition of threats and the escalation of potential incidents. The Project offered targeted education, coordination, capability building, and resources to help the public power community better understand, install, and implement cyber and physical resiliency and security systems. The American Public Power Association (APPA) accelerated efforts to develop resources for and with the public power community to understand and implement resiliency, cybersecurity and cyber-physical solutions, including refining and improving the adoption of advanced control concepts. The Project consisted of four major multi-pronged tasks which included: 1) Advance cyber resiliency and security assessments; 2) Conduct, evaluate, and use the results of onsite vulnerability assessments; 3) Research, evaluate, deploy, and integrate both commercial and pre-commercial security technologies; and 4) Research, evaluate, and implement information sharing mechanisms.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Cyber-Physical Events Emulation Based Transmission and Distribution Co-Simulation for Situation Awareness and Grid Anomaly (SAGA) Detection: Preprint

Energy management of transmission and distribution networks is becoming more challenged with the accelerated increasing of distributed energy resources (DERs) such as distributed photovoltaic (PV) generation and distributed energy storage. To better analyze the impacts of DERs on both transmission and distribution systems, a comprehensive transmission and distribution co-simulation platform should be developed. Furthermore, with DERs more actively participated in system operation such as providing real time grid services, their cyber vulnerability should be better understood to maintain system reliability. This paper discussed a cyber-physical events emulation based transmission & distribution co-simulation platform to perform different cyber events emulation and analyze the impacts of cyber physical events happened in distribution system on the T&D system operation. The case studies with both a transmission network and a synthetic distribution network data validate that the proposed T&D co-simulation platform can perform comprehensive cyber physical events emulation. Therefore, with extensive simulation using the proposed model, the system operator can accumulate adequate training data for the system situation awareness and grid anomaly detection purpose.

31 CESER - Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Securit↗

PSA 2025 DPRA for Cyber Optimization

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Evaluating defense options should include quantitative evaluation of overall effectiveness to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation and have difficulty with time dependent scenarios. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related integrity is a requirement set by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. But companies are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want reliability analysis while optimizing cost, which requires more than safety modeling methods. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with timing and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues such as state-base explosion found in Markov-based tools. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Tensions in collaborative cyber security and how they affect incident detection and response

Security often requires collaboration, but when multiple stakeholders are involved, it is typical for their priorities to differ or even conflict with one another. In today’s increasingly networked world, cyber security collaborations may span organizations and countries. In this chapter, we address collaboration tensions, their effects on incident detection and response, and how these tensions may potentially be resolved. We present three case studies of collaborative cyber security within the U.S. government and discuss technical, social, and regulatory challenges to collaborative cyber security. We suggest possible solutions, and present lessons learned from conflicts. Finally, we compare collaborative solutions from other domains and apply them to cyber security collaboration. Although we concentrate our analysis on collaborations whose purpose is to achieve cyber security, we believe that this work applies readily to security tensions found in collaborations of a general nature as well.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber Threats to Nuclear Infrastructures

Nuclear facility personnel expend considerable efforts to ensure that their facilities can maintain continuity of operations against both natural and man-made threats. Historically, most attention has been placed on physical security. Recently however, the threat of cyber-related attacks has become a recognized and growing world-wide concern. Much attention has focused on the vulnerability of the electric grid and chemical industries to cyber attacks, in part, because of their use of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. Lessons learned from work in these sectors indicate that the cyber threat may extend to other critical infrastructures including sites where nuclear and radiological materials are now stored. In this context, this white paper presents a hypothetical scenario by which a determined adversary launches a cyber attack that compromises the physical protection system and results in a reduced security posture at such a site. The compromised security posture might then be malevolently exploited in a variety of ways. The authors conclude that the cyber threat should be carefully considered for all nuclear infrastructures.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering (CCE)

The Idaho National Lab (INL) is leading a high-impact, national security-level initiative to reprioritize the way the nation looks at high-consequence risk within the industrial control systems (ICS) environment of the country’s most critical infrastructure and other national assets. The Consequence-driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE) effort provides both private and public organizations with the steps required to examine their own environments for high-impact events/risks; identify implementation of key devices and components that facilitate that risk; illuminate specific, plausible cyber attack paths to manipulate these devices; and develop concrete mitigations, protections, and tripwires to address the high-consequence risk. The ultimate goal of the CCE effort is to help organizations take the steps necessary to thwart cyber attacks from even top-tier, highly resourced adversaries that would result in a catastrophic physical effect. CCE participants are encouraged to work collaboratively with each other and with key U.S. Government (USG) contributors to establish a coalition, maximizing the positive effect of lessons-learned and further contributing to the protection of critical infrastructure and other national assets.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Technical and Policy Toolkit for Cyber Deterrence and Stability

In the post-World War II era, nuclear deterrence and arms control established a strategic equilibrium between the superpowers that has come under increasing threat as cyber conflict becomes more prevalent. This study seeks to assist policymakers and scholars build a theoretical, policy, and technical framework to address cyber conflict. Based on an analysis of deterrence theory and application and prior arms control regimes, the study presents a toolkit of policies and actions for national governments based on elements of deterrence and arms control that is applicable to cyber conflict. The study illustrates how these could be prospectively applied in a treaty framework to facilitate attribution of hostile cyber actions.

Cyber Deterrence, Cyber Stability, Cyber Conflict,↗

Trade-off Analysis of Operational Technologies to Advance Cyber Resilience through Automated and Autonomous Response to Threats

The advancement of cyber resilience requires a preliminary stage of characterizing the trade-off space of mitigation options and how these might affect the stability and determinism of an operational technology (OT). This first step will set the stage for the proper cyber-secure and cyber-resilient design and confirm the affects that can be considered and approved by the OT and the security groups. To provide a baseline for this discussion, this paper provides a consideration of the cyberphysical interactions, possible mitigation steps against certain attacks and their corresponding affects that lend to the security design planning and evaluation process. As an integral part of the proposed scheme this work introduces the concept of systemwide fuzzer, i.e., a tool that manipulates the system state in an effort to determine mitigation response sequences that minimize detriments and maximize benefit in accordance with specified operational requirements.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Risk-Averse Bi-Level Stochastic Network Interdiction Model for Cyber-Security Risk Management

Security of cyber networks is crucial; recent severe cyber-attacks have had a devastating effect on many large organizations. The attack graph, which maps the potential attack paths of a cyber network, is a popular tool for analyzing cyber system vulnerability. In this study, we propose a bi-level stochastic network interdiction model on an attack graph to enable a risk-averse, resource constrained cyber network defender to optimally deploy security countermeasures that protect against attackers with an uncertain budget. This risk- averse conditional-value-at-risk (CVaR) model minimizes a weighted sum of the expected maximum loss over all scenarios and the expected maximum loss from the most damaging attack scenarios. We develop a customized constraint and column generation algorithm to solve our model as well as several acceleration techniques to improve the computational efficiency. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the acceleration techniques enable the solution of relatively large problems within a reasonable amount of time: applying all the acceleration techniques also reduces the average computation time of the basic algorithm by 71% for 100-node graphs. Using metrics called mean-risk value of stochastic solution and value of risk-aversion, computational results suggest that our stochastic risk-averse model significantly outperforms deterministic and risk-neutral models when 1) the distribution of attacker budget is heavy-right-tailed and 2) the defender is highly risk-averse.

Bhuiyan, Tanveer H.↗

Inferring adversarial behaviour in cyber‐physical power systems using a Bayesian attack graph approach

Abstract Highly connected smart power systems are subject to increasing vulnerabilities and adversarial threats. Defenders need to proactively identify and defend new high‐risk access paths of cyber intruders that target grid resilience. However, cyber‐physical risk analysis and defense in power systems often requires making assumptions on adversary behaviour, and these assumptions can be wrong. Thus, this work examines the problem of inferring adversary behaviour in power systems to improve risk‐based defense and detection. To achieve this, a Bayesian approach for inference of the Cyber‐Adversarial Power System (Bayes‐CAPS) is proposed that uses Bayesian networks (BNs) to define and solve the inference problem of adversarial movement in the grid infrastructure towards targets of physical impact. Specifically, BNs are used to compute conditional probabilities to queries, such as the probability of observing an event given a set of alerts. Bayes‐CAPS builds initial Bayesian attack graphs for realistic power system cyber‐physical models. These models are adaptable using collected data from the system under study. Then, Bayes‐CAPS computes the posterior probabilities of the occurrence of a security breach event in power systems. Experiments are conducted that evaluate algorithms based on time complexity, accuracy and impact of evidence for different scales and densities of network. The performance is evaluated and compared for five realistic cyber‐physical power system models of increasing size and complexities ranging from 8 to 300 substations based on computation and accuracy impacts.

Sahu, Abhijeet↗

Evaluating Resilience of Water Distribution Networks to Operational Failures from Cyber-Physical Attacks

Water cyber-physical systems (CPSs) have gained increasing interest to improve operational efficiency and reliability. However, due to growing exposure to cyber-physical attacks, cybersecurity and resilience against the attacks have become significant concerns. There have been efforts to improve cybersecurity in water CPSs, yet few attempts to investigate resilience against cyber-physical attacks. This study contributes to characterizing resilience of a water CPS and investigating potential resilience strategies. An advanced resilience measure integrating withstanding, absorptive, adaptive, and restorative capability of a system is proposed and applied to the C-town water distribution network (WDN) for 15 failure set scenarios with a pressure-driven hydraulic simulation. The results provide identification of failure sets and unfavorable operational conditions that make the system more vulnerable to the cyber-physical attacks and in turn produce low resilience and capabilities. It is also found that, after recovery of a disrupted component, adjustment of overall operational interactions across system components is needed for complete restoration of disrupted functionality. The findings provide insights on infrastructure investment with resilience strategies in cyber and physical water system domains.

Shin, Sangmin↗

Cyber-Physical System Security of Smart Grids

Abstract—This panel presentation will provide perspectives of cyber-physical system security of smart grids. As smart grid technologies are deployed, the interconnected nature of these systems is becoming more prevalent and more complex, and the cyber component of this cyber-physical system is increasing in importance. Studying system behavior in the face of failures (e.g., cyber attacks) allows a characterization of the systems’ response to failure scenarios, loss of communications, and other changes in system environment (such as the need for emergent updates and rapid reconfiguration). The impact of such failures on the availability of the system can be assessed and mitigation strategies considered. Scenarios associated with confidentiality, integrity, and availability are considered. The cyber security implications associated with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 in the United States are discussed.

Dagle, Jeffery E.↗

Evaluation of Anomaly Detection for Wide-Area Protection Using Cyber Federation Testbed

Cyber physical security research for smart grid is currently one of the nation's top R&D priorities. The existing vulnerabilities in the legacy grid infrastructure make it particularly susceptible to countless cyber-attacks. There is a growing emphasis towards building interconnected, sophisticated federated testbeds to perform realistic experiments by allowing the integration of geographically-dispersed resources in the dynamic cyber-physical environment. In this paper, we present a cyber (network) based federation testbed to validate the performance of an anomaly detector in context of a Wide Area Protection (WAP) security. Specifically, we have utilized the resources available at the Iowa State University Power Cyber (ISU PCL) Laboratory to emulate the substation and local center networks; and the US Army Research Laboratory (ARL); to emulate the regional control center network. Initially, we describe a hardware-in-the loop based experimental setup for implementing data integrity attacks on an IEEE 39 bus system. We then perform network packet analysis focusing on latency and bandwidth as well as evaluate the performance of a decision tree based anomaly detector in measuring its ability to identify different attacks. Our experimental results reveal the computed wide area network latency; bandwidth requirement for minimum packet loss; and successful performance of the anomaly detector. Our studies also highlight the conceptual architecture necessary for developing the federated testbed, inspired by the NASPI network.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

GraphCH: A Deep Framework for Assessing Cyber-Human Aspects in Insider Threat Detection

Insider threat is one of the most damaging cyber attacks that could cause the loss of intellectual property and enterprise data security breaches. Action sequence data such as host logs are used to investigate such threats and develop anomaly-based AI detectors. However, insider threat actions are similar to legitimate user activities, causing AI detectors to fail and suffer from high false alarm rates. Therefore, user cyber activity logs are inadequate to fully unfold insider threats. In this study, we adopt human psychological principles of risk-taking and impulsiveness along with host data to assess the influence and usefulness of human behavioral aspects in insider threat detection. Here, we hypothesize that individuals' impulsive and risk-taking behavior correlates with cyberspace activities. To validate our hypothesis, we conducted an IRB-approved study recruiting 35 participants who work in a large U.S. university and collected their cyber and psychological data for 90 days. Host and human-behavioral data analysis and mapping indicate that impulsive and risk-taking users trigger more system errors causing (un)intentional insider threats and are susceptible to attackers' social engineering and cognitive hacking. Utilizing cyber-human aspects, we introduce a Cyber-Human Graph Neural Network (GNN) based framework GraphCH to identify abnormal user behaviors and detect insider threats.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Federation of UML models for cyber physical use cases

This method employs the concept of federation, which is defined as the use of existing models that represent aspects of a system in specific domains (such as physical and cyber security domains) and building interfaces to link all of domain models. Federation seeks to build on existing bodies of work. Some examples include the Common Information Models (CIM) maintained by the International Electrotechnical Commission Technical Committee 57 (IEC TC 57) for the electric power industry. Another relevant model is the CIM maintained by the Distributed Management Task Force (DMTF)? this CIM defines a representation of the managed elements in an Information Technology (IT) environment. The power system is an example of a cyber-physical system, where the cyber systems, consisting of computing infrastructure such as networks and devices, play a critical role in the operation of the underlying physical electricity delivery system. Measurements from remote field devices are relayed to control centers through computer networks, and the data is processed to determine suitable control actions. Control decisions are then relayed back to field devices. It has been observed that threat actors may be able to successfully compromise this cyber layer in order to impact power system operation. Therefore, future control center applications must be wary of potentially compromised measurements coming from field devices. In order to ensure the integrity of the field measurements, these applications could make use of compromise indicators from alternate sources of information such as cyber security. Thus, modern control applications may require access to data from sources that are not defined in the local information model. In such cases, software application interfaces will require integration of data objects from cross-domain data models. When incorporating or federating different domains, it is important to have subject matter experts work together, recognizing that not everyone has the same knowledge, responsibilities, focus, or skill set.

Source record↗

Evolution and Trends of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents since 2017

The industrial control systems (ICSs) that manage our critical infrastructure are increasingly converging with corporate networks and the Internet as technology and businesses prioritize digital connectivity. These connections make them more vulnerable and available to malicious cyber actors who traditionally targeted the companies’ more public-facing information technology (IT) networks. This paper will review select publicly reported cyber incidents to highlight the continued and growing threat to ICS devices and operational technology (OT) environments. It will summarize the incident and when available, will provide information on the cyber actors, the vulnerabilities they exploited, and any publications the U.S. Government (USG) provided in response. Data belonging to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be used to highlight quantitative trends concerning ICS incidents. This paper builds on “History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents” (Hemsley & Fisher 2018), a paper that highlighted select noteworthy threats and incidents to ICS systems up to 2017. This paper will similarly review select incidents occurring after the last previously reviewed incident, Triton/HatMan, December 2017, and will note ICS incident trends including IT/OT convergence and advances in cyber-threat actors’ capabilities in observed in the examined incidents.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cyber Science and Security - An R&D Partnership at LLNL

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has established a mechanism for partnership that integrates the high-performance computing capabilities of the National Labs, the network and cyber technology expertise of leading information technology companies, and the long-term research vision of leading academic cyber programs. The Cyber Science and Security Center is designed to be a working partnership among Laboratory, Industrial, and Academic institutions, and provides all three with a shared R&D environment, technical information sharing, sophisticated high-performance computing facilities, and data resources for the partner institutions and sponsors. The CSSC model is an institution where partner organizations can work singly or in groups on the most pressing problems of cyber security, where shared vision and mutual leveraging of expertise and facilities can produce results and tools at the cutting edge of cyber science.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Investigating the effectiveness of many-core network processors for high performance cyber protection systems. Part I, FY2011.

This report documents our first year efforts to address the use of many-core processors for high performance cyber protection. As the demands grow for higher bandwidth (beyond 1 Gbits/sec) on network connections, the need to provide faster and more efficient solution to cyber security grows. Fortunately, in recent years, the development of many-core network processors have seen increased interest. Prior working experiences with many-core processors have led us to investigate its effectiveness for cyber protection tools, with particular emphasis on high performance firewalls. Although advanced algorithms for smarter cyber protection of high-speed network traffic are being developed, these advanced analysis techniques require significantly more computational capabilities than static techniques. Moreover, many locations where cyber protections are deployed have limited power, space and cooling resources. This makes the use of traditionally large computing systems impractical for the front-end systems that process large network streams; hence, the drive for this study which could potentially yield a highly reconfigurable and rapidly scalable solution.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗