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At least 217 records · Page 12

National Nuclear Security Administration Strategic Vision Strengthening our Nation through Nuclear Security

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s enduring mission is to protect our nation by maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear weapons stockpile, reducing global nuclear threats, and providing our submarines and aircraft carriers with militarily effective nuclear propulsion. Although we have numerous strategic partners that enable, contribute to, and benefit from our efforts, no other organization, government or civilian, can accomplish our unique mission on behalf of the American people. In this area, we stand alone. This strategic vision pursues urgent change at a significant scale to develop creative approaches, make sustained investments, and be disciplined in our approach to develop a nuclear capability for our time and for the foreseeable future. It is incumbent on us to anticipate our future security challenges and ensure our country is ready to meet them. Not doing so would have far-reaching consequences. Failure to meet our vital mission objectives will erode confidence in the security that the United States strategic deterrent umbrella provides. In assessing the current mission environment in NNSA, we can count on one thing—change: The geopolitical environment for our deterrent is ever-changing Threats from rogue states and terrorists are evolving Our nuclear weapons and the infrastructure that supports them are aging Science and technology continue to move forward at an ever-increasing pace In this dynamic environment, it is not sufficient to remedy today’s situation and meet our current mission requirements. We must lean forward in the development, planning, and execution of programs that address our current challenges while developing the workforce, infrastructure, tools, and governance systems that will enable us to meet our deterrence, non-proliferation, and naval propulsion mission requirements for the next 50 years. We must embrace a next-generation enterprise that is flexible enough to respond to future challenges. With decades of stagnation following the end of the Cold War, we find ourselves in the unenviable position of implementing near-term fixes while using those lessons learned to better prepare for the future. Without sustained and predictable investments to restore and modernize our infrastructure, we will rapidly lose our ability to deliver on our promise of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile, which will degrade our deterrent capability and render legacy weapon systems irrelevant to the defense of our nation. We must not and will not allow the next generation of our nuclear security enterprise to simply maintain the status quo. We have a storied past that guides us. For 75 years our enterprise has overcome every challenge, led the country in incredible scientific and engineering endeavors and discoveries, and successfully ensured constant vigilance in maintaining an effective deterrent, reducing global nuclear threats, and powering our nuclear navy. Now is the time for us to take decisive action in forging the enterprise of the future. As I have traveled to all of our labs, plants, and sites and met with people across our complex, I have been left with one overwhelming impression: the incredible workforce that makes up our nuclear security enterprise is up to all of the challenges we have before us. Together we can and will ensure that those in the future workforce have the resources and the responsive, agile infrastructure they need to maintain the systems of today and to design and field the systems of tomorrow.

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Scintillation Hydro-Gel for Isotopic Neutron (SHINE): Eco-Friendly Quantum Dot Neutron Detectors

The development of new neutron detectors to replace helium-3 (3He) detectors is imperative due to a worldwide shortage of 3He following the draw down in nuclear weapons production since the end of the Cold War. The United States Department of Homeland Security would like to deploy monitors for the detection of neutron emissions from shipping containers housing illicit nuclear material; however, this effort has been put on hold until new replacements for 3He detectors can be developed. Scintillation Hydro-Gel for isotopic Neutron Emitters (SHINE) is a unique, first of its kind, 6Li-loaded quantum dot gel scintillator developed at INL. By incorporating 6Li with quantum dots in a gel matrix, SHINE displays the best properties of liquid and solid scintillators without their disadvantages such as continuous filtering to keep liquids free of contaminates, slow throughput of containers, higher base component costs, ‘dead’ voids in solid scintillators, and a high loading of 6Li without compromising on light transparency. Additionally, SHINE is completely eco-friendly, a breakthrough in high-efficiency detection systems. SHINE is a unique combination of 6LiCl, a highly water-soluble compound, and InP/ZnS core/shell quantum dots, which are poured into a gel-form using cross-linking polymers. In this presentation, SHINE has been successfully tested for neutron detection and shows promise as both a replacement for current 3He neutron detectors as well as potential use in handheld, compact neutron detection units and antineutrino detection.

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Data Driven Analysis for Modernization Program Management

NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions: ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, over half of NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and roughly one-third date back to the Manhattan Project. To execute its critical nuclear security missions, NNSA is making large investments to modernize its nuclear production capabilities. This ramp up represents NNSA’s largest modernization effort since the Cold War. Given the scale of these efforts, NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization has implemented data driven techniques to prioritize investments and inform strategic decision making. NNSA, with support from its site managing contractors, has developed and implemented an integrated schedule and risk management system to address the issues and limitations with the traditional approach. The multi-year integrated schedules are key to identifying program linkages and managing large portfolios comprised of many different projects and efforts. In conjunction with the integrated schedule, a new program risk management system has also been developed and implemented, which manages program risks and opportunities, along with specific mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks per timelines that are tracked in the integrated schedule. This paper is supplemented with a follow-on presentation on effective management of program material and throughput modeling.

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Building upon Historical Competencies: Next-generation Clean-up Technologies for World-Wide Application - 13368

The Department of Energy's Savannah River Site has a 60-year history of successfully operating nuclear facilities and cleaning up the nuclear legacy of the Cold War era through the processing of radioactive and otherwise hazardous wastes, remediation of contaminated soil and groundwater, management of nuclear materials, and deactivation and decommissioning of excess facilities. SRS recently unveiled its Enterprise.SRS (E.SRS) strategic vision to identify and facilitate application of the historical competencies of the site to current and future national and global challenges. E.SRS initiatives such as the initiative to Develop and Demonstrate Next generation Clean-up Technologies seek timely and mutually beneficial engagements with entities around the country and the world. One such ongoing engagement is with government and industry in Japan in the recovery from the devastation of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station. (authors)

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Back from the Brink with Something for Everyone - The Final Executed Memorandum of Agreement for Interpretation of the East Tennessee Technology Park and the K-25 Building - 13370

When the Environmental Management (EM) Program at the Oak Ridge Office of the Department of Energy (DOE) began its major decontamination and decommissioning (D and D) program activities in the mid-1990's, it was understood that the work to demolish the gaseous diffusion process buildings at the K-25 Site, as it was then known, would be challenging. Nothing of that size and breadth had ever been done within the DOE complex and the job brought about a full menu of unique attributes: radiological contamination with enriched materials entrained in certain areas of the system, a facility that was never designed not to operate but had been shut down since 1964, and a loyal following of individuals and organizations who were committed to the physical preservation of at least some portion of the historic Manhattan Project property. DOE was able to solve and resolve the issues related to nuclear materials management, contamination control, and determining the best way to safely and efficiently deconstruct the massive building. However, for a variety of reasons, resolution of the historic preservation questions - what and how much to preserve, how to preserve it, where to preserve it, how to interpret it, how much to spend on preservation, and by and for whom preservation should occur - remained open to debate for over a decade. After a dozen years, countless meetings, phone calls, discussions and other exchanges, and four National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) [1] Memoranda of Agreement (MOA), a final MOA [2] has been executed. The final executed MOA's measures are robust, creative, substantive, and will be effective. They include a multi-story replica of a portion of the K-25 Building, the dedication of the K-25 Building footprint for preservation purposes, an equipment building to house authentic Manhattan Project and Cold War equipment, a virtual museum, an on-site history center, a grant to preserve a historically-significant Manhattan Project-era hotel in Oak Ridge, and more. The MOA was designed to offer something for everyone. The MOA for the K- 25 Building and interpretation of the East Tennessee Technology Park (ETTP; formerly the K-25 Site) was executed by all of the signatory parties on August 7, 2012 - almost 67 years to-the-day after the 'product' of the K-25 process building became known to more than just a small group of scientists and engineers working on a secret project for the Army Corps of Engineers Manhattan District. (authors)

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Collaboration in Long-Term Stewardship at DOE's Hanford Site - 13019

The U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site comprises approximately 1,517 km{sup 2} (586 mi{sup 2}) of land in southeastern Washington. The site was established in 1943 as part of the Manhattan Project to produce plutonium for the nation's nuclear weapons program. As the Cold War era came to an end, the mission of the site transitioned from weapons production to environmental cleanup. As the River Corridor area of the site cleanup is completed, the mission for that portion of the site will transition from active cleanup to continued protection of environment through the Long-Term Stewardship (LTS) Program. The key to successful transition from cleanup to LTS is the unique collaboration among three (3) different DOE Programs and three (3) different prime contractors with each contractor having different contracts. The LTS Program at the site is a successful model of collaboration resulting in efficient resolution of issues and accelerated progress that supports DOE's Richland Office 2015 Vision for the Hanford Site. The 2015 Vision for the Hanford Site involves shrinking the active cleanup footprint of the surface area of the site to approximately 20 mi{sup 2} on the Central Plateau. Hanford's LTS Program is defined in DOE's planning document, Hanford Long-Term Stewardship Program Plan [1]. The Plan defines the relationship and respective responsibilities between the federal cleanup projects and the LTS Program along with their respective contractors. The LTS Program involves these different parties (cleanup program and contractors) who must work together to achieve the objective for transition of land parcels. Through the collaborative efforts with the prime contractors on site over the past two years,, 253.8 km{sup 2} (98 mi{sup 2}) of property has been successfully transitioned from the cleanup program to the LTS Program upon completion of active surface cleanup. Upcoming efforts in the near term will include transitioning another large parcel that includes one of the six (6) cocooned reactors on site. These accomplishments relied upon the transparency between DOE cleanup programs and their contractors working together to successfully transition the land while addressing the challenges that arise. All parties, the three different DOE Programs and their respective prime contractors are dedicated to working together and continuing the progress of transitioning land to LTS, in alignment with the Program Plan and compliant with contractual requirements. (authors)

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Preparation for the Recovery of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) at Andreeva Bay, North West Russia - 13309

Andreeva Bay is located near Murmansk in the Russian Federation close to the Norwegian border. The ex-naval site was used to de-fuel nuclear-powered submarines and icebreakers during the Cold War. Approximately 22,000 fuel assemblies remain in three Dry Storage Units (DSUs) which means that Andreeva Bay has one of the largest stockpiles of highly enriched spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the world. The high contamination and deteriorating condition of the SNF canisters has made improvements to the management of the SNF a high priority for the international community for safety, security and environmental reasons. International Donors have, since 2002, provided support to projects at Andreeva concerned with improving the management of the SNF. This long-term programme of work has been coordinated between the International Donors and responsible bodies within the Russian Federation. Options for the safe and secure management of SNF at Andreeva Bay were considered in 2004 and developed by a number of Russian Institutes with international participation. This consisted of site investigations, surveys and studies to understand the technical challenges. A principal agreement was reached that the SNF would be removed from the site altogether and transported to Russia's reprocessing facility at Mayak in the Urals. The analytical studies provided the information necessary to develop the construction plan for the site. Following design and regulatory processes, stakeholders endorsed the technical solution in April 2007. This detailed the processes, facilities and equipment required to safely remove the SNF and identified other site services and support facilities required on the site. Implementation of this strategy is now well underway with the facilities in various states of construction. Physical works have been performed to address the most urgent tasks including weather protection over one of the DSUs, installation of shielding over the cells, provision of radiation protection infrastructure and general preparation of the site for construction of the facilities for the removal of the SNF. This paper describes the development and implementation of the strategy and work to improve the safe and secure management of SNF, preparing it for retrieval and removal from Andreeva Bay. (authors)

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Management Challenges in Developing Performance Assessments and Effectively Communicating Their Results - 13612

The end of the Cold War has left a legacy of approximately 37 million gallons of radioactive waste in the aging waste tanks at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS). A robust program is in place to remove waste from these tanks, treat the waste to separate into a relatively small volume of high level waste and a large volume of low-level waste, and to actively dispose of the low-level waste on-site and close the cleaned waste tanks and associated ancillary structures. To support performance-based, risk-informed decision making, performance assessments have been developed for the low-level waste disposal facility and for the SRS Tank Farms. Although these performance assessments share many similar features, the nature of the hazards and associated containments differ. As a management team, we are challenged to effectively communicate both the similarities and differences of these performance assessments, how they should be used to support sound decision making for treatment, disposal and waste tank cleaning decisions, and in defending their respective assumptions to the regulatory community and the public but, equally important, to our own corporate decision makers and operations personnel. Effective development and defense of these performance assessments, and effective interpretation and communication of the results are key to making cost-effective, pragmatic decisions for the safe disposal of the low-level waste and stabilization and operational closure of the cleaned tanks and associated structures. This paper will focus on the importance and challenges in communicating key attributes, conclusions and operational implications within a company. (authors)

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Regulatory Framework for Salt Waste Disposal and Tank Closure at the Savannah River Site - 13663

The end of the Cold War has left a legacy of approximately 37 million gallons of radioactive waste in the aging waste tanks at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS). A robust program is in place to remove waste from these tanks, treat the waste to separate into a relatively small volume of high-level waste and a large volume of low-level waste, and to actively dispose of the low-level waste on-site and close the waste tanks and associated ancillary structures. To support performance-based, risk-informed decision making and to ensure compliance with all regulatory requirements, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its current and past contractors have worked closely with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC), the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to develop and implement a framework for on-site low-level waste disposal and closure of the SRS waste tanks. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, provides DOE the authority to manage defense-related radioactive waste. DOE Order 435.1 and its associated manual and guidance documents detail this radioactive waste management process. The DOE also has a requirement to consult with the NRC in determining that waste that formerly was classified as high-level waste can be safely managed as either low-level waste or transuranic waste. Once DOE makes a determination, NRC then has a responsibility to monitor DOE's actions in coordination with SCDHEC to ensure compliance with the Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part 61 (10CFR61), Subpart C performance objectives. The management of hazardous waste substances or components at SRS is regulated by SCDHEC and the EPA. The foundation for the interactions between DOE, SCDHEC and EPA is the SRS Federal Facility Agreement (FFA). Managing this array of requirements and successfully interacting with regulators, consultants and stakeholders is a challenging task but ensures thorough and thoughtful processes for disposing of the SRS low-level waste and the closure of the tank farm facilities. (authors)

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Disposition of Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators Currently Located at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory - 12232

Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) awarded SEC Federal Services Corporation (SEC) a 34-building demolition and disposal (D and D) project at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) that included the disposition of six Strontium (Sr-90) powered Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) stored outside of ORNL Building 3517. Disposition of the RTGs is very complex both in terms of complying with disposal facility waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) requirements for packaging and transportation in commerce. Two of the RTGs contain elemental mercury which requires them to be Land Disposal Restrictions (LDR) compliant prior to disposal. In addition, all of the RTGs exceed the Class C waste concentration limits under Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Waste Classification Guidelines. In order to meet the LDR requirements and Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) WAC, a site specific treatability variance for mercury was submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to allow macro-encapsulation to be an acceptable treatment standard for elemental mercury. By identifying and confirming the design configuration of the mercury containing RTGs, the SEC team proved that the current configuration met the macro-encapsulation standard of 40 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 268.45. The SEC Team also worked with NNSS to demonstrate that all radioisotope considerations are compliant with the NNSS low-level waste (LLW) disposal facility performance assessment and WAC. Lastly, the SEC team determined that the GE2000 Type B cask met the necessary size, weight, and thermal loading requirements for five of the six RTGs. The sixth RTG (BUP-500) required a one-time DOT shipment exemption request due to the RTG's large size. The DOT exemption justification for the BUP-500 relies on the inherent robust construction and material make-up of the BUP- 500 RTG. DOE-ORO, SEC, and the entire SEC RTG team are nearing the conclusion of the Sr-90 RTG disposition challenge - a legacy now 50 years in the making. Over 600,000 Ci of Sr-90 waste await disposal and its removal from ORNL will mark an historical moment in the clean-up of the cold-war legacy in the ORNL central industrial area. Elimination (i.e., removal) of the RTGs will reduce security risks at ORNL and disposal will permanently eliminate security risks. The RTGs will eventually decay to benign levels within a reasonable timeframe relative to radiological risks posed by long-lived isotopes. The safety authorization basis at ORNL Building 3517 will be reduced enabling greater operational flexibility in future clean-out and D and D campaigns. Upon disposition the Department of Energy will realize reduced direct and indirect surveillance and maintenance costs that can be reapplied to accelerated and enhanced clean-up of the Oak Ridge Reservation. At present, waste profiles for the RTGs are developed and under review by NNSS RWAP staff and approval authorities. Disposition schedule is driven by the availability of compliant shipping casks necessary to safely transport the RTGs from ORNL to NNSS. The first disposal of the RCA RTG is expected in April 2012 and the remaining RTGs disposed in 2012 and 2013. (authors)

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Solar-Powered Air Stripping at the Rocky Flats Site, Colorado - 12361

The U.S. Department of Energy's Rocky Flats Site (the Site), near Denver, Colorado, is a former nuclear weapons facility that was constructed beginning in 1951. With the end of the Cold War, the Site was cleaned up and closed in 2005. Four gravity-driven groundwater treatment systems were installed during cleanup, and their continued operation was incorporated into the final remedy for the Site. All utilities, including electrical power, were removed as part of this closure, so all Site electrical power needs are now met with small solar-powered systems. The Mound Site Plume Treatment System (MSPTS) was installed in 1998 as an innovative system based on zero-valent iron (ZVI). Groundwater flow from the Mound source area containing elevated concentrations of volatile organic compounds (VOCs), primarily in the tetrachloroethene (PCE)-trichloroethene (TCE) family of chlorinated solvents, is intercepted by a collection trench and routed to twin ZVI treatment cells. Later, in 2005, remediation of VOC-contaminated soils at a second up-gradient source area included adding an electron donor to the backfill to help stimulate biodegradation. This reduced concentrations of primary constituents but caused down-gradient groundwater to contain elevated levels of recalcitrant degradation byproducts, particularly cis-1,2-dichloroethene and vinyl chloride. A gravel drain installed as part of the 2005 remediation directs contaminated groundwater from this second source area to the MSPTS for treatment. This additional contaminant load, coupled with correspondingly reduced residence time within the ZVI media due to the increased flow rate, resulted in reduced treatment effectiveness. Elevated concentrations of VOCs were then detected in MSPTS effluent, as well as in surface water at the downstream performance monitoring location for the MSPTS. Subsequent consultations with the Site regulators led to the decision to add a polishing component to reduce residual VOCs in MSPTS effluent. Initially, several alternatives such as commercial air strippers and cascade aerators were evaluated; resulting cost estimates exceeded $100,000. After several simpler alternatives were considered and prototype testing was conducted, the existing effluent metering manhole was converted to house a spray-nozzle based, solar-powered air stripper, at a cost of approximately $20,000. About two-thirds of this cost was for the solar power system, which was initially designed to only provide power for 12 hours per day. Performance data are being collected and adjustments made to optimize the design, determine maintenance requirements, and establish power needs for continuous operation. Analytical data confirm the air stripper is sharply reducing concentrations of residual contaminants. (authors)

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Electro-Mechanical Manipulator for Use in the Remote Equipment Decontamination Cell at the Defense Waste Processing Facility, Savannah River Site - 12454

One of the legacies of the cold war is millions of liters of radioactive waste. One of the locations where this waste is stored is at the Savannah River Site (SRS) in South Carolina. A major effort to clean up this waste is on-going at the defense waste processing facility (DWPF) at SRS. A piece of this effort is decontamination of the equipment used in the DWPF to process the waste. The remote equipment decontamination cell (REDC) in the DWPF uses electro-mechanical manipulators (EMM) arms manufactured and supplied by PaR Systems to decontaminate DWPF process equipment. The decontamination fluid creates a highly corrosive environment. After 25 years of operational use the original EMM arms are aging and need replacement. To support continued operation of the DWPF, two direct replacement EMM arms were delivered to the REDC in the summer of 2011. (authors)

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Mercury Reduction and Removal from High Level Waste at the Defense Waste Processing Facility - 12511

The Defense Waste Processing Facility processes legacy nuclear waste generated at the Savannah River Site during production of enriched uranium and plutonium required by the Cold War. The nuclear waste is first treated via a complex sequence of controlled chemical reactions and then vitrified into a borosilicate glass form and poured into stainless steel canisters. Converting the nuclear waste into borosilicate glass is a safe, effective way to reduce the volume of the waste and stabilize the radionuclides. One of the constituents in the nuclear waste is mercury, which is present because it served as a catalyst in the dissolution of uranium-aluminum alloy fuel rods. At high temperatures mercury is corrosive to off-gas equipment, this poses a major challenge to the overall vitrification process in separating mercury from the waste stream prior to feeding the high temperature melter. Mercury is currently removed during the chemical process via formic acid reduction followed by steam stripping, which allows elemental mercury to be evaporated with the water vapor generated during boiling. The vapors are then condensed and sent to a hold tank where mercury coalesces and is recovered in the tank's sump via gravity settling. Next, mercury is transferred from the tank sump to a purification cell where it is washed with water and nitric acid and removed from the facility. Throughout the chemical processing cell, compounds of mercury exist in the sludge, condensate, and off-gas; all of which present unique challenges. Mercury removal from sludge waste being fed to the DWPF melter is required to avoid exhausting it to the environment or any negative impacts to the Melter Off-Gas system. The mercury concentration must be reduced to a level of 0.8 wt% or less before being introduced to the melter. Even though this is being successfully accomplished, the material balances accounting for incoming and collected mercury are not equal. In addition, mercury has not been effectively purified and collected in the Mercury Purification Cell (MPC) since 2008. A significant cleaning campaign aims to bring the MPC back up to facility housekeeping standards. Two significant investigations are being undertaken to restore mercury collection. The SMECT mercury pump has been removed from the tank and will be functionally tested. Also, research is being conducted by the Savannah River National Laboratory to determine the effects of antifoam addition on the behavior of mercury. These path forward items will help us better understand what is occurring in the mercury collection system and ultimately lead to an improved DWPF production rate and mercury recovery rate. (authors)

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Update on Demolition Strategy and Progress at Hanford's Plutonium Finishing Plant - 17161

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M) is currently demolishing the Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP). The facility is located on the Hanford Site and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1988, the facility was formally shut-down in 1996 and material processing completed in 2004. In November 2016, the project team, partnering with DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL) began demolition of the building. CH2M and DOE-RL will demolish PFP as a Hazardous Category II nuclear facility (HazCat II). The PFP is considered one of the most hazardous buildings on the Hanford site; employees have performed some of the most hazardous work anywhere across the DOE Environmental Management complex. Since 2008, employees have removed much of the plutonium-processing infrastructure. Four main buildings make up the majority of the PFP complex. As of November 2016, one building is undergoing demolition, another is ready for demolition and, concurrently, demolition preparations continue in the remaining two buildings. That hazard mitigation work includes removing contaminated ventilation duct work, process lines and performing asbestos abatement. To ensure safe and compliant demolition, CH2M employees researched, trained and deployed personal protective equipment never before used on the Hanford Site to complete some of the most hazardous demolition preparations. Project management commissioned the development of an air dispersion model that dictated ready-for-demolition criteria and established conservative demolition parameters. Management also sequenced project work to allow demolition to occur while demolition preparations continue a safe distance away in adjacent buildings. This paper will allow CH2M and DOE-RL to share lessons learned and progress to date with other complex and hazardous projects across the DOE complex. (authors)

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The Evolution of Community Engagement Through Ongoing Services Provided by the Fernald Preserve Visitors Center - 17402

The Fernald Preserve is located on the site of a former uranium-processing plant that underwent extensive environmental remediation followed by comprehensive ecological restoration. It is managed by the US Department of Energy Office of Legacy Management and is located approximately 29 kilometers (km) (18 miles) northwest of Cincinnati, Ohio. Remedial activities and subsequent ecological restoration have converted the site from an industrial production facility to an undeveloped park, encompassing a series of wetlands, prairies, and forested communities. Although the remediation of buildings and soil contamination was completed in 2006, site aquifer remediation is ongoing and remains a topic of interest to the community. Much of the site is open to the public, with approximately 11 km (7 miles) of year-round walking trails within the 425-hectare (1050-acre) site. The Fernald Preserve Visitors Center is open Wednesdays through Saturdays and site staff are available to accommodate program requests as needed. The Visitors Center was originally requested by stakeholders involved in developing recommendations for the site's final land use. Stakeholders requested a 'multi-use educational facility' that would recognize the site's history, serve as a source of site information, and recognize the contributions of energy workers during the Cold War. This building was converted from a warehouse built to support site cleanup and was ultimately awarded a Platinum rating by the U.S. Green Building Council. The Visitors Center was designed to accommodate site history exhibits, free meeting space for nonprofit groups, and public interpretive programs. It was opened to the public in 2008, and today's ongoing visitor services are continually adapted to meet the needs of current stakeholders. Over time, the interpretive services have evolved to include more diverse onsite cultural and natural history public programs, events, and activities. Today's community engagement efforts include public and private onsite programs and exhibits, public and private offsite programs and displays, meeting space, and regular open hours for the Visitors Center. This paper presents the various methods used to engage the greater Cincinnati community at the Fernald Preserve. (authors)

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Preparing for safe and compliant open air demolition at Hanford's plutonium finishing plant - 15100

The Plutonium Finishing Plant (PFP), located in the 200 West Area of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Hanford Site, began operations in 1949 and produced plutonium metal during the Cold War. Production was stopped in 1989, the facility was formally shut-down in 1996, and material stabilization completed in 2004. DOE contractor CH2M HILL Plateau Remediation Company (CH2M HILL) is tasked with the plant's deactivation, decommissioning, decontamination and demolition, to be completed by September 30, 2016. The project team, partnering with DOE-Richland Operations Office (DOE-RL), is exploring, evaluating and implementing efficiencies to safely and compliantly prepare the facility for demolition. Since 2008, employees have prepared approximately 75 percent of the complex for demolition. More than 90 percent of the 232 glove boxes have been removed from ventilation and more than 80 percent of pencil tank units have been dispositioned. As decontamination, deactivation and removal nears completion on the remaining glove boxes, pencil tanks and other radiological and chemical processing infrastructure, CH2M HILL and DOE-RL are making preparations to demolish PFP itself, a Hazardous Category II nuclear facility (HazCat II). Conventional techniques used to demolish buildings heavily contaminated with radiological hazards typically involve extensive hands-on work to remove Material at Risk (MAR) and decontaminate the building to low levels before conventional demolition techniques can be used to remove the building. A safe and more cost effective approach is packaging MAR located in hard to access areas of the plant and removing it during demolition. That process, combined with affixing remaining contamination to walls, floors and equipment, performing detailed air dispersion modeling before demolition and air monitoring and dust suppression during demolition, will reduce employee risk and is more efficient in demolishing a HazCat II facility. (authors)

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Integration of performance assessments and 3116 basis documents within the Savannah River Site liquid waste facilities - 15375

The end of the Cold War has left a legacy of over 136 million liters (36 million gallons) of radioactive waste in the aging waste tanks at the Department of Energy's Savannah River Site (SRS). A robust program is in place to remove waste from these tanks, treat the waste to separate it into a relatively small volume of high-level waste and a large volume of low-level waste, and to actively dispose of the low-level waste on-site. This process allows the US Department of Energy (DOE) to move forward with closure of the cleaned waste tanks and associated ancillary structures. To support performance-based, risk decision making for closure and disposal activities, three individual performance assessments (PAs) have been developed - salt-stone Disposal Facility, F-Tank Farm and H-Tank Farm. In addition, three Waste Determinations (WDs) have been made by the Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), under the authority of Section 3116 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (NDAA Section 3116). To support these waste determination decisions, individual '3116 Basis Documents' were developed that describe the assumptions and conditions under which the criteria outlined in NDAA Section 3116 are met. The development of each of the PAs represented a long and arduous effort that involved the development of both deterministic and probabilistic conceptual models of the facilities, the development of assumptions and associated ranges, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses, model data collection and analyses, writing of the actual performance assessment, internal and external peer reviews, and ultimately approval by DOE. Similarly, the development of the 3116 Basis Documents represents similar time and financial commitments. At the end of these efforts, after years of preparation and millions of dollars in investment, we have thousands of pages of highly technical text, tables of data and hundreds of graphs and charts all contained in a series of thick binders that fit neatly on the shelf of a bookcase. We were done - right? Actually, we were just getting started. Performance Assessments and 3116 Basis Documents are living documents that shape day-to-day and long-term decision making in the operation of a low-level waste disposal facility (e.g., salt-stone Disposal Facility) or in area closure activities (e.g., F-Tank Farm or H-Tank Farm). Although these documents do not contain specifically described requirements per se, they do utilize specific assumptions that, if changed significantly, could result in no longer being able to demonstrate that there is reasonable assurance that the required performance objectives or the criteria from NDAA Section 3116 can be met. Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR), the contractor responsible for Liquid Waste operations at SRS, has not only developed the PAs and 3116 Basis Documents to support this work and shepherded these documents through the DOE approval process, but has also developed the processes and procedures to ensure the successful implementation and integration of these documents into day-to-day decision making within the associated facilities. This paper describes these processes, including the Un-reviewed Waste Management Question process and the PA Maintenance process, and provides specific examples of their successful implementation. (authors)

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An approach to evaluating and monitoring ecological resources for sustainability on DOE remediation sites: Hanford as a case study - 15524

Protecting ecological and environmental resources is a worthy aspect of the Department of Energy's site missions, for each of its sites, during and after remediation. Ecological resources are important to a range of stakeholders, including regulatory agencies, resource agencies, natural resource trustees, Tribal governments, and the public, and may be an essential component of Native American cultural resources. Because the nature and value of ecological resources can change over time as a result of remediation, succession, and global climate change, it is imperative for DOE to have instituted an acceptable method of evaluating resources before initiation of active remediation, over the ensuing century when institutional and engineering controls are considered to be in effect. Having such a methodology in place also would be key to resource sustainability. Department of Energy sites generally have environmental programs, so instituting specific unified practices for evaluating resources should not be difficult to implement. Instituting these practices would assure the public that ecological resources, as well as human and cultural resources, are being protected now, and can be protected into the future. Key ecological species and/or unique habitats have been preserved at Department of Energy sites since the mid-20. century because of federal government stewardship. Such preservation is particularly true for the sites with larger land areas, including the Hanford Reservation, the Idaho National Laboratory and the Savannah River Site. Individual sites typically have extensive studies of site biodiversity, but site resources are not routinely examined within a regional or national context (Eco-region). The evaluation of the on-site resources with those resources in the appropriate Eco-region provides a context for 'valuing' on- site resources. On-site resources should also be evaluated in terms of federal and state legislation where species may have legal protection and require legal consideration during remediation if present or adjacent to the remediation site. A method is needed in this study for evaluating ecological resources prior to remediation and during remediation, and a paradigm is proposed that will ensure sustainability. Finally, in a period of climate change and instability, developing methods of evaluating ecological resources is essential to successful protection, enhancement, and sustainability. The ecological methodology is part of a Hanford site-wide Risk Review Project, conducted by the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP). Our method adapts an existing methodology that includes using established levels for evaluating ecological resources by expanding the existing methodology to include field work for validating previous resource level designations, to assess the occurrence of invasive/exotic species, and to identify landscape scale features (patch size, connectivity). Evaluations should be conducted in the remediation unit itself, and in a buffer zone surrounding the remediation site. The methodology described has been applied to several remediation areas at Hanford, and issues that emerged during its application are discussed. The methodology can be applied at the major sites. Application of the Eco-region analysis will provide regulators and the public with an understanding of the value of the ecological resources in relation to the region, as well as an appreciation for the stewardship role the Department of Energy has played in protecting these resources since the beginning of the Cold War Era and can continue to do so sustainably. (authors)

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