Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “cask”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 217 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Perform Design Support with MCNP for New Measurements

This report incorporates our work carried out during our 5-month internship at LANL under an internship agreement with EAMEA (École des Applications Militaires de l’Énergie Atomique). After outlining the context in which we worked, we present our work as aid to modeling and predicting the neutronic behavior of nuclear systems, with a view to carrying out criticality experiments qualifying the MCNP code as part of innovative projects. Fourth generation reactors will enable to tackle a lot of issues such as environmental crisis, affordable energy access, and nuclear waste management. They seem to be one of the keys for a sustainable future. Most of the projects that emerge nowadays include the use of HALEU (high assay low enriched uranium) or MOX recycled fuels. Our projects are part of this dynamic and addresses concrete scientific research issues in the nuclear field. Studies of HALEU package are essential to anticipate the need, therefore the Optimus L (OPTImal Modular Universal Shipping cask technology) designed by NAC (Nuclear Assurance Corporation) international but filled with 20 % enriched uranium dioxide (UO 2 ) will be studied to support safe transportation. However, it seems there is no benchmark with a high correlation with the combination of this fuel and this package to validate MCNP simulations. As such, the study will focus on the development of new criticality safety benchmarks for this case. On the other hand, there is a great need for critical benchmarks in the intermediate energy range with MOX fuel. An IER (Integral Experiment Request) has then be requested to answer it through a partnership between French institution IRSN and U.S. Department of Energy's Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). This experience planned for 2025 requires to gather calculated data through a MCNP model to be realized safely. Finally, a presentation of our one-week experience at the DAF as part of our discovery of criticality experiments will be introduced in Appendix 1: Week at the DAF (Device Assembly Facility)

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Development and Demonstration of a Risk Assessment Approach for Approval of a Transportation Package of a Transportable Nuclear Power Plant for Domestic Highway Shipment

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) Strategic Capabilities Office (SCO) has tasked PNNL to address the regulatory challenges associated with confirming the safe transport of Transportable Nuclear Power Plants (TNPPs) containing irradiated nuclear fuel. A previous report—Proposed Risk-Informed Regulatory Framework for Approval of Microreactor Transportation Packages (PNNL-31867)—determined that the expected radioactive inventory in the irradiated fuel of a TNPP would likely require shipment in an NRC-approved Type B package (or spent nuclear fuel cask) but that a TNPP “package” is unlikely to meet the entire suite of NRC requirements set forth in Part 71 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) for a Type B package. It was therefore concluded that shipment of this initial TNPP transportation package, as well as possibly others, under existing regulations would likely require NRC approval using the 10 CFR 71.12 (“Specific exemptions”) process that relies on risk-informed decision making supported by quantitative risk assessment (i.e., Probabilistic Risk Assessment).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

RANGERS: Modeling Report on Integrity and Performance Assessment of Engineered Barrier Systems in a Salt Repository for HLW/SNF

The Engineered Barrier System (EBS) plays an important role in ensuring the long-term safety and containment of high-level waste (HLW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in deep geological repositories in salt formation. As part of a multi-barrier system, the EBS works alongside the natural barrier, which is the salt formation itself and the technical barrier comprising the disposal casks. The primary function of the EBS is to maintain containment during a defined period until the backfill used in the repository made of crushed salt, develops its sealing capacity through compaction. Over the time, the backfill eventually compacts to a state of low porosity and permeability, acting as a long-term seal. However, until this process is complete, the EBS must retain its structural and functional integrity. Regulatory guidelines in Germany currently require the EBS to remain effective for up to next ice age, that is expected in 50,000 years. The significant hydro-geological and topographic changes expected during an ice age could make it impossible to accurately predict the hydro-chemical conditions within the repository system at that time. In response to these challenges, BGE TECHNOLOGY GmbH (BGE TEC) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) have jointly developed a comprehensive methodology for the design and safety assessment of engineered barrier systems within the scope of the RANGERS project. This methodology is tailored for repositories in salt formations. The developed methodology provides a structured approach for designing and assessing the performance of the EBS in salt-based repositories. It begins with defining a sealing concept based on the geological characteristics of the selected site and the overall repository design. The entire repository system, comprising the geological site, repository infrastructure, and EBS, is then subjected to a Features, Events, and Processes (FEP) analysis, focusing solely on those FEPs that affect the EBS. The derived FEPs help identify the loads and stresses acting on the EBS, which serve as the foundation for conducting an integrity assessment. This analysis helps predict the EBS’s evolution and performance over the regulatory time frame, feeding into integrated performance assessment simulations.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Management of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Accident Corium and Severely Damaged Fuel Debris

The Three Mile Island, Unit Two (TMI-2) pressurized water reactor core melted down in 1979 due to an untimely combination of maintenance problems that led to a loss of feedwater, followed by a series of operational misunderstandings and errors. The melted core recovery process required development of a wide array of tools. After approximately three years of water management and other cleanup actions, the first views of the core revealed a much higher degree of damage than previously expected. Approximately 62 metric tons of the core had melted, leaving only 42 of the 177 fuel assemblies standing with a majority of rods intact. The core to be recovered was composed of loose debris and a solidified mass of formerly molten fuel. Robotic tools that had been designed for the task were of limited effectiveness due to the range of material types and phases. Over a period of several years, the central melt was broken up, primarily by use of a core-boring drill originally designed to acquire samples through the depth of the debris field. The broken pieces were loaded into specially designed debris canisters by use of long-handled pick-and-place tools and suctioned into baffled knockout canisters using an airlift vacuum system. A remotely operable underwater plasma arc torch was developed for removal of the lower core support structure to be able to retrieve the fuel pieces and secondary melt that had accumulated on the bottom reactor vessel head. Canister design played a central role in defining the initial retrieval process and later affected transportation, interim wet and its current interim dry storage. Due to concerns about the potential for radiolysis of residual water in the debris and other canister material, the canisters were fitted with hydrogen recombiner catalyst units to prevent a buildup of flammable gas and potential pressurization. To confirm the effectiveness of the recombiners during shipping, eight dewatered canisters were kept sealed for up to 205 days with periodic sampling of the headspace gas. The highest hydrogen value (9 vol%) was observed in a canister held for 147 days while the longest stored canister resulted in a 5% hydrogen concentration. The oxygen concentration never exceeded 0.5 %, and the primary backfill was >80% argon, meaning there was no flammability risk. Radiolytic hydrogen was also observed in wet pool storage, where the vented canisters discharged a portion of the water backfill as a result of gas production. The 344 canisters (268 fuel debris, 62 filter, and 12 knockout type) were dewatered, loaded in groups of seven into a double barrier shipping cask, and transported to the U.S. Department of Energy site in Idaho for 10 years of pool storage.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Explicit Dynamic Impact Analysis of the Building 3525 Packages

This report describes the methodology used for the safety basis analysis of the Building (Bldg.) 3525 casks and presents preliminary results for a selected geometry. The specific problem analyzed is a free fall load case onto an unyielding target at various orientations. The various orientations were analyzed to ensure that the packages were subjected to the orientation that causes the most damage. The analysis approach, material modeling, finite element modeling, and results for the selected case are presented, along with a brief discussion of conservatism and uncertainties. The results for the analyzed load cases show that through selected administrative controls, no breach of the container or loss of shielding will occur in the package.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Mechanical Loads on Spent Nuclear Fuel in the General 30 cm Package Drop Scenario

The U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Science & Technology (SFWST) research program is guided by the high-level goal of closing prioritized knowledge gaps related to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage and transportation, which are summarized by Saltzstein et al. (2020). One of the high-priority knowledge gaps is the identification and quantification of mechanical loads that are expected to affect SNF during normal conditions of transportation and storage to inform the range of physical SNF test programs. This report uses modeling and analysis methods to estimate the mechanical loads on spent nuclear fuel (SNF) in the general 30 cm package drop scenario. The drop scenario assumes impact limiters are in place in the transportation configuration and the impact surface is perfectly rigid. The goal of this analysis is to consider the universe of potential mechanical loading conditions that can happen to SNF and present the results in a manner that is useful for materials testing, decision making, and regulatory rule making purposes. This study uses validated finite element models and methods to perform a broad parametric study of key variables that can affect the mechanical loads on SNF during a hypothetical package free drop scenario. Physical drop test data from a cask and fuel assembly drop test campaign is the basis for model validation. Additionally, the results of the parametric study are used to inform a damage model, which uses multiple nonlinear regression to estimate the relationships between input variables and output response. The parametric finite element analyses consider thousands of input variable combinations, while the damage model estimates millions of combinations. The breadth of this study provides confidence that the potential range of mechanical loads that SNF might experience during the general 30 cm package drop scenario are characterized well enough to consider this knowledge gap closed. While this report documents the overall peak values calculated in this study, the 95 th percentile values, the histograms, and the observed trends are equally important. This study covered a large range of SNF temperatures, room temperature to 300°C, and burnups, 10 GWd/MTU to 62 GWd/MTU. Each temperature and burnup combination has a different cladding yield strain, so it is more meaningful to summarize the calculated cladding strain response as its factor of safety, which is defined relative to the yield strain. The factor of safety is calculated as the yield strain divided by the peak cladding strain. A factor of safety greater than unity indicates that the cladding remains below yield, whereas a value less than unity is indicative of plastic deformation. In all cases of this study a safety factor over 1.0 was calculated, although in the most limiting case at 300°C the safety factor was only 1.01, which suggests that yielding could occur when additional loads like rod internal pressure are included. When the temperature is restricted to 200°C the limiting safety factor increases to 1.28, which has significant margin to accommodate internal pressure and potential local cladding defects that could cause a local stress concentration. An important trend in the calculated fuel rod mechanical loads is that the 2 nd highest loaded fuel rod in an assembly tends to be significantly lower than the highest loaded rod. The implication is that even if one rod in an assembly experiences a failure the loads would have to be significantly higher to cause two or more rods to fail.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Assessment of Vibration and Shock Loading Environments on Steels Used in Railroad Applications Considering Hydrogen Embrittlement

Studies that examine the combined effects of hydrogen and rail loading environments in the context of hydrogen embrittlement of steels have not been performed. Large-scale hydrogen storage requires either gaseous hydrogen stored in pressure vessels and tubing or liquid hydrogen in cryogenic, insulated tanks. Since the focus of this study is on steels, we examine the influence of hydrogen on stainless steel used for high pressure tubing and cryogenic tanks and Cr-Mo steel liners used in gaseous pressure vessels. Literature studies show that despite hydrogen degradation, these steels can be used effectively and safely if the stresses are managed. The shock and vibration environment on railcars present unique environments where stresses and loading rates can be high. A literature review was conducted to understand the accelerations experienced in rail by examining instrumented railcars of nuclear fuel casks. Hydrogen studies were examined that focused on steel pressure hardware with an emphasis on fatigue, fast loading rates, and low temperatures. A simplified fatigue assessment was performed to examine design cycles for three different hydrogen components: stainless steel tubing, stainless steel cryogenic tanks, and gaseous pressure vessels. The assessments were idealized and used bounding cases of accelerations in both normal rail conditions and coupling events. In normal shock and vibration environments when accelerations were less than 2 g, infinite design life was calculated. In extreme shock or coupling environments, finite design life was calculated which was shown to be dependent on unsupported lengths of pressure components. It was shown that adjusting the unsupported length can reduce the bending stress thereby increasing design life.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2022

Optimization of Canister Loading Patterns in Dual Purpose Canisters for Criticality Suppression

This report documents work performed in support of the US Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition, Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology, under work breakdown structure element 1.08.01.03.05, “Direct Disposal of Dual Purpose Canisters.” In particular, this report fulfills milestone M3SF-22PN010305094, “Application of AI/ML techniques to optimize DPC loading,” within work package SF-22PN01030509, “Direct Disposal of Dual Purpose Canisters - PNNL.” This report continues the process of examining the potential for using loading optimization as a disposal criticality suppression technique. This latest update to the report added: 1. A validation of the artificial neural network (ANN) reactivity prediction tool against as-loaded dual-purpose canisters from the UNF-ST&DARDS database 2. Refinement of the algorithm to incorporate an additional DPC design to improve the predictions 3. Investigation of a storage and transportation focused loading optimization algorithm. A key result from this year’s work is that the ANN performance was significantly improved by including the additional model for the NUHOMS canisters and it is apparent that fuel type specific modeling considerations should be incorporated into the ANN in future work. The GRASP-enabled adaptive multi-objective memetic algorithm with partial clustering (GAMMA-PC) algorithm was evaluated as a tool for storage and transportation oriented optimization. The GAMMA-PC optimization routine considers decay heat at loading, the time between loading and when the canister is eligible for transportation and minimizes the number of casks loaded. Future work will develop a dose minimization optimization routine.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Assessing the release, transport, and retention of radioactive aerosols from hypothetical breaches in spent fuel storage canisters

Interim dry storage of spent nuclear fuel involves storing the fuel in welded stainless-steel canisters. Under certain conditions, the canisters could be subjected to environments that may promote stress corrosion cracking leading to a risk of breach and release of aerosol-sized particulate from the interior of the canister to the external environment through the crack. Research is currently under way by several laboratories to better understand the formation and propagation of stress corrosion cracks, however little work has been done to quantitatively assess the potential aerosol release. The purpose of the present work is to introduce a reliable generic numerical model for prediction of aerosol transport, deposition, and plugging in leak paths similar to stress corrosion cracks, while accounting for potential plugging from particle deposition. The model is dynamic (changing leak path geometry due to plugging) and it relies on the numerical solution of the aerosol transport equation in one dimension using finite differences. The model’s capabilities were also incorporated into a Graphical User Interface (GUI) that was developed to enhance user accessibility. Model validation efforts presented in this paper compare the model’s predictions with recent experimental data from Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and results available in literature. We expect this model to improve the accuracy of consequence assessments and reduce the uncertainty of radiological consequence estimations in the remote event of a through-wall breach in dry cask storage systems.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Choosing Transport Events for Initiating Splitting and Rouletting

A study was performed to determine which transport events should be used to initiate a weight window lookup to achieve the best variance reduction performance. A weight window lookup potentially triggers particle splitting (in important regions of phase space) or rouletting (in unimportant regions), thereby optimizing computational effort. Potential initiating transport events include collisions (both pre- and post-collision), geometry surface crossings, traversing a mean-free path, and streaming across a weight window boundary. Permutations of these initiating events were tested on an urban model with background radiation sources and a spent fuel cask with a neutron dose mesh tally. Generally, all methods perform better with finer weight window meshes. Tracking on weight windows performs well for coarse weight window meshes, while a combination of splitting each mean-free path, geometric surface crossing, and before collisions performs well for fine weight window meshes.

42 ENGINEERING↗
NASA NTRS1972

Heat transfer to four fineness-ratio-1.6 hexagonal prisms with various corner radii at Mach 6

An investigation was conducted in the Langley 20-inch Mach 6 tunnel to define the aerodynamic heat transfer to the radioisotope fuel cask (heat source) of the SNAP-19/Pioneer power system. The shape of the SNAP-19/Pioneer heat source is that of a hexagonal prism with flat ends; the fineness ratio, based on maximum (edge to edge) diameter, is 1.61. Phase-change-paint heat-transfer data and schlieren photographs were obtained on four possible 1/2-scale entry configurations of the SNAP-19/Pioneer heat source. Tests were conducted over a wide range of attitudes and at nominal Reynolds numbers, based on the length of the unablated configuration, of 33,000; 84,000; and 2,200,000.

Hunt, J. L.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Safety aspects of nuclear waste disposal in space

Safety issues involved in the disposal of nuclear wastes in space as a complement to mined geologic repositories are examined as part of an assessment of the feasibility of nuclear waste disposal in space. General safety guidelines for space disposal developed in the areas of radiation exposure and shielding, containment, accident environments, criticality, post-accident recovery, monitoring systems and isolation are presented for a nuclear waste disposal in space mission employing conventional space technology such as the Space Shuttle. The current reference concept under consideration by NASA and DOE is then examined in detail, with attention given to the waste source and mix, the waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, launch site operations and facilities, Shuttle-derived launch vehicle, orbit transfer vehicle, orbital operations and space destination, and the system safety aspects of the concept are discussed for each component. It is pointed out that future work remains in the development of an improved basis for the safety guidelines and the determination of the possible benefits and costs of the space disposal option for nuclear wastes.

Rice, E. E.↗
NASA NTRS1982

Preliminary risk assessment for nuclear waste disposal in space, volume 2

Safety guidelines are presented. Waste form, waste processing and payload fabrication facilities, shipping casks and ground transport vehicles, payload primary container/core, radiation shield, reentry systems, launch site facilities, uprooted space shuttle launch vehicle, Earth packing orbits, orbit transfer systems, and space destination are discussed. Disposed concepts and risks are then discussed.

Rice, E. E.↗
DOE OSTI2020

As-run physics analysis for the EPRI-3 experiment for cycles 155B and 158B

The purpose of this Engineering Calculations Analysis Report (ECAR) is to document the as-run heat generation rates (W/g), flux/fluence, radio-isotopic source term in Curies and grams, decay heat rate in Watts, and specimen DPA for the post-irradiation shipment and examination of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)-3-1 and EPRI-3-2 experiments. EPRI-3-1 was irradiated during cycle 155B ending April 12, 2014. EPRI-3-2, a modification of EPRI-3-1, was irradiated during cycle 158B ending April 1, 2016. Source term, decay heat rate, and DPA calculations were based on scaled Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) calculated fluxes for the EPRI-3-2 experiment. Although EPRI-3-2 is a modification of EPRI-3-1, no significant changes were made in the placement of experiment specimens. Calculated fluxes were scaled using as-run center lobe source powers of the corresponding irradiation cycles for EPRI-3-1 and EPRI-3-2. ORIGEN2 Version 2.2 was used to determine the decay heat rate and source term for the EPRI-3 experiment. The source term analysis was performed as requested by the project staff. The results of this analysis may be used to demonstrate compliance with shipping requirements in the BEA Research Reactor (BRR) cask following irradiation as well as to provide as-run source term to support Post-Irradiation Examination (PIE).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

As-run physics analysis for the EPRI-2 experiment for cycle 153B

The purpose of this ECAR is to document the as-run physics analysis and source term in Curies and decay heat rate (Watts) for the shipment of the EPRI-2 experiment located in the Center Flux Trap (CFT). EPRI-2 was irradiated during cycle 153B. The experiment irradiation ended on April 13, 2013. The as-run heat rates and flux/fluence results were calculated using the MCNP ATR full core model. The heat rates and flux are calculated based on an average center lobe power of 30.8 MW. The fluence is based on the operating time of 13.45 days. ORIGEN2 Version 2.2 is used to determine the decay heat rate, gamma spectrum, and source term for the EPRI-2 experiment. The source term analysis was performed as requested by the project staff to demonstrate compliance with shipping requirements in the GE-2000 cask following irradiation as well as provide an estimated source term to support Post-Irradiation Examination as needed.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Mobile heat pipe cooled fast reactor system

A mobile heat pipe cooled fast nuclear reactor may be configured for transportation to remote locations and may be able to provide 0.5 to 2 megawatts of power. The mobile heat pipe cooled fast reactor may contain a plurality of heat pipes that are proximate to a plurality of fuel pins inside the reactor. The plurality of heat pipes may extend out of the reactor. The reactor may be configured to be placed in a standard shipping container, and may further be configured to be contained within a cask and attached to a skid for easier transportation.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Modeling and Analysis of the Transport and Disposal of Beryllium Moderator Blocks and Greater than Class C (GTCC) Waste

Radioactive waste in the United states is categorized based on its source, radioactivity, and security risk. The categorization method employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC) for low-level radioactive waste is not currently applied to any waste generated by the Department of Energy (DOE) or disposed of in DOE facilities. As a result, there is a large volume of DOE-generated waste with characteristics similar to the NRC’s “Greater than Class C” (GTCC) waste category which presently do not have a path for long-term disposal. Much of this waste cannot undergo the standard commercial disposition process due to it being categorized as Transuranic (TRU) waste under DOE guidelines, due to elevated concentrations of key fission products. Possible solutions to this dilemma are explored in the Environmental Impact Statement for the “Disposal of Greater-Than-Class-C Low Level Radioactive Wave” (EIS-0375). This paper analyzes several EIS possible paths for disposal for this “orphaned” waste. One example that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding that has been extracted from the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR) at Idaho National Laboratory (INL) throughout its operational lifetime. These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s main chambers and components and serve as neutron moderators. This paper will use this particular waste form to analyze the economic and technological viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the Waste isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), which was deemed the most feasible disposition path according to the EIS. The example of this waste form used in this paper that highlights this categorization issue is the spent beryllium cladding extracted from Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Advanced Test Reactor (ATR). These beryllium blocks surround the reactor’s components and serve as neutron moderators, and thus have accumulated high concentration of high-activity transuranic isotopes. This paper analyzed the viability of transporting and storing this material under the storage and transportation criteria of the five primary disposition paths covered in EIS-0375. An array of calculations was carried out to assess the viability of the various disposition paths for the beryllium shipments as well as other waste shipments that fall within the GTCC category. Modeling with MCNP 6.2 was conducted to determine whether the beryllium blocks could be safely stored and transported within a 72-B cask; the standard shipping container for remote-handled, transuranic waste, while also meeting regulatory limits at various disposition paths. A cost analysis of the transportation and long-term disposal paths mentioned in the EIS was also carried out using available data and information from similar waste shipments. Lastly, a geochemical analysis of the various geological repository discussed in the EIS was also carried out using the Geochemists Workbench Release 14. Long-term disposal of the beryllium blocks at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) proved to be the most cost-effective long-term disposition option of the ones considered in the EIS. A dose rate calculation at both contact and remote-handling distances indicate that the analyzed beryllium shipments should not exceed the exposure limits at any of the considered locations. Greater-than-class-C waste has been left in a regulatory state of limbo for years, resulting in backlogs of inventory across several research sites in the United States. Due to its high activity and presence of transuranic isotopes, it is imperative to ensure that it remains inaccessible and sequestered both in its short-term interim as well as a long-term geologic time scale. The information and assessments done in the paper could potentially serve as a reference for any future shipments of this waste form at the WIPP facility as well as other disposition paths that may be considered in the future.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nevada National Security Site V3XA Spherical Explosive Confinement Vessel Awareness Package

This report summarizes the plans and activities that will facilitate shipment of the V3XA experimental spheres (a.k.a., Nevada Spheres) from the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to the Idaho National Laboratory’s (INL) Advanced Mixed Waste Treatment Project (AMWTP). The spheres require shipment to INL to be segmented, characterized, and repackaged for ultimate disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). The NNSS does not currently have the facilities or safety basis to perform these activities. The INL has the facilities, the INL M&O contractor owns an 8-120B cask, and AMWTP has a WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria approved characterization program. The NNSS has shipped other legacy transuranic waste to INL for WIPP certified characterization in the past.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗