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At least 217 records · Page 12

The Application of materials attractiveness in a graded approach to nuclear materials security

The threat from terrorist groups has recently received greater attention. In this paper, material quantity and material attractiveness are addressed through the lens of a minimum security strategy needed to prevent the construction of a nuclear explosive device (NED) by an adversary. Nuclear materials are placed into specific security categories (3 or 4 categories) , which define a number of security requirements to protect the material. Materials attractiveness can be divided into four attractiveness levels, High, Medium, Low, and Very Low that correspond to the utility of the material to the adversary and to a minimum security strategy that is necessary to adequately protect the nuclear material. We propose a graded approach to materials attractiveness that recognizes for instance substantial differences in attractiveness between pure reactor-grade Pu oxide (High attractiveness) and fresh MOX fuel (Low attractiveness). In either case, an adversary's acquisition of a Category I quantity of plutonium would be a major incident, but the acquisition of Pu oxide by the adversary would be substantially worse than the acquisition of fresh MOX fuel because of the substantial differences in the time and complexity required of the adversary to process the material and fashion it into a NED.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Physical Protection of Spent Fuel Shipments: Resolution of Stakeholder Concerns Through Rulemaking - 12284

In 1999, the State of Nevada brought its concerns about physical protection of current spent nuclear fuel (SNF) shipments, and future SNF shipments to a federal repository, before the NRC in a 1999 petition for rulemaking (PRM-73-10). In October 2010, the NRC published a rulemaking decision which would significantly strengthen physical protection of SNF in transit. The newest articulation of the rule (10 CFR 73.37) incorporates regulatory clarifications and security enhancements requested in Nevada's 1999 petition for rulemaking, codifies the findings of the Nuclear NRC and DOE consequence analyses into policy guidance documents and brings forward into regulations the agency and licensee experience gained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Although at present DOE SNF shipments would continue to be exempt from these NRC regulations, Nevada considers the rule to constitute a largely satisfactory resolution to stakeholder concerns raised in the original petition and in subsequent comments submitted to the NRC. This paper reviews the process of regulatory changes, assesses the specific improvements contained in the new rules and briefly describes the significance of the new rule in the context of a future national nuclear waste management program. Nevada's petition for rulemaking led to a generally satisfactory resolution of the State's concerns. The decade plus timeframe from petition to rulemaking conclusion saw a sea change in many aspects of the relevant issues - perhaps most importantly the attacks on 9/11 led to the recognition by regulatory bodies that a new threat environment exists wherein shipments of SNF and HLW pose a viable target for human initiated events. The State of Nevada has always considered security a critical concern for the transport of these highly radioactive materials. This was one of the primary reasons for the original rulemaking petition and subsequent advocacy by Nevada on related issues. NRC decisions on the majority of the concerns expressed in the petition, additional developments by other regulatory bodies and the change in how the United States sees threats to the homeland - all of these produced a satisfactory resolution through the rulemaking process. While not all of the concerns expressed by Nevada were addressed in the proposed rule and significant challenges face any programmatic shipment campaign in the future, the lesson learned on this occasion is that stakeholder concerns can be resolved through rulemaking. If DOE would engage with stakeholders on its role in transport of SNF and HLW under the NWPA, these concerns would be better addressed. Specifically the attempts by DOE to resist transportation and security regulations now considered necessary by the NRC for the adequate protection of the shipments of highly radioactive materials, these DOE efforts seem ill advised. One clear lesson learned from this successful rulemaking petition process is that the system of stakeholder input can work to better the regulatory environment. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A Non-Proliferating Fuel Cycle: No Enrichment, Reprocessing or Accessible Spent Fuel - 12375

Current fuel cycles offer a number of opportunities for access to plutonium, opportunities to create highly enriched uranium and access highly radioactive wastes to create nuclear weapons and 'dirty' bombs. The non-proliferating fuel cycle however eliminates or reduces such opportunities and access by eliminating the mining, milling and enrichment of uranium. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces the production of plutonium per unit of energy created, eliminates reprocessing and the separation of plutonium from the spent fuel and the creation of a stream of high-level waste. It further simplifies the search for land based deep geologic repositories and interim storage sites for spent fuel in the USA by disposing of the spent fuel in deep sub-seabed sediments after storing the spent fuel at U.S. Navy Nuclear Shipyards that have the space and all of the necessary equipment and security already in place. The non-proliferating fuel cycle also reduces transportation risks by utilizing barges for the collection of spent fuel and transport to the Navy shipyards and specially designed ships to take the spent fuel to designated disposal sites at sea and to dispose of them there in deep sub-seabed sediments. Disposal in the sub-seabed sediments practically eliminates human intrusion. Potential disposal sites include Great Meteor East and Southern Nares Abyssal Plain. Such sites then could easily become international disposal sites since they occur in the open ocean. It also reduces the level of human exposure in case of failure because of the large physical and chemical dilution and the elimination of a major pathway to man-seawater is not potable. Of course, the recovery of uranium from sea water and the disposal of spent fuel in sub-seabed sediments must be proven on an industrial scale. All other technologies are already operating on an industrial scale. If externalities, such as reduced terrorist threats, environmental damage (including embedded emissions), long term care, reduced access to 'dirty' bomb materials, the social and political costs of siting new facilities and the psychological impact of no solution to the nuclear waste problem, were taken into account, the costs would be far lower than those of the present fuel cycle. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

OSRP Source Repatriations-Case Studies: Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay

The Global Threat Reduction Initiative's (GTRI) Offsite Source Recovery Project (OSRP) began recovering excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources (sources) in 1999. As of February 2012, the project had recovered over 30,000 sources totaling over 820,000 Ci. OSRP grew out of early efforts at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to recover disused excess Plutonium- 239 (Pu-239) sources that were distributed in the 1960's and 1970's under the Atoms for Peace Program. Source recovery was initially considered a waste management activity. However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the interagency community began to recognize that excess and unwanted radioactive sealed sources pose a national security threat, particularly those that lack a disposition path. After OSRP's transfer to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to be part of GTRI, its mission was expanded to include all disused sealed sources that might require national security consideration. Recognizing the transnational threat posed by porous borders and the ubiquitous nature of sources, GTRI/OSRP repatriates U.S. origin sources based on threat reduction prioritization criteria. For example, several recent challenging source repatriation missions have been conducted by GTRI/OSRP in South America. These include the repatriation of a significant amount of Cs-137 and other isotopes from Brazil; re-packaging of conditioned Ra-226 sources in Ecuador for future repatriation; and, multilateral cooperation in the consolidation and export of Canadian, US, and Indian Co-60/Cs-137 sources from Uruguay. In addition, cooperation with regulators and private source owners in other countries presents opportunities for GTRI/OSRP to exchange best practices for managing disused sources. These positive experiences often result in long-term cooperation and information sharing with key foreign counterparts. International source recovery operations are essential to the preservation of U.S. national security interests. They are also mutually beneficial for fostering positive relationships with other governments and private industry, and demonstrate that responsible end-of-life options are given to legacy U.S.-origin sources in other countries. GTRI/OSRP does not take back sources that have a viable path for commercial disposal. Most US origin sources were sold commercially and were not provided by the US government. Below is a synopsis of cooperative efforts with Brazil, Ecuador, and Uruguay. Bilateral and multilateral efforts have been successful in removing hundreds of U.S.origin sealed radioactive sources from Latin American countries to the U.S. As many disused sources remain in the region, and since repatriation is not always an option, GTRI will continue to work with those countries to ensure that these sources are stored securely for the long-term. Successful Latin America operations should serve as a model for other regional cooperation in the repatriation of sealed sources, encouraging other source exporting countries to implement similar programs. Securing and removing sources, both domestically and internationally, is crucial to strengthening the life-cycle management of radioactive sources worldwide. Such efforts not only prevent these materials from being used maliciously, but also address public health and safety concerns, and under-gird the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Safety and security of radioactive sources in industrial radiography in Bangladesh

Malicious use of radioactive sources can involve dispersal of that material through an explosive device. There has been recognition of the threat posed by the potential malicious misuse of NDT radioactive source by terrorists. The dispersal of radioactive material using conventional explosives, referred to as a 'dirty bomb', could create considerable panic, disruption and area access denial in an urban environment. However, as it is still a relatively new topic among regulators, users, and transport and storage operators worldwide, international assistance and cooperation in developing the necessary regulatory and security infrastructure is required. The most important action in reducing the risk of radiological terrorism is to increase the security of radioactive sources. This paper presents safety and security considerations for the transport and site storage of the industrial radiography sources as per national regulations entitled 'Nuclear Safety and Radiation Control Rules-1997'.The main emphasis was put on the stages of some safety and security actions in order to prevent theft, sabotage or other malicious acts during the transport of the packages. As a conclusion it must be mentioned that both safety and security considerations are very important aspects that must be taking in account for the transport and site storage of radioactive sources used in the practice of industrial radiography. (authors)

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Radioactive Contamination Tenacity on Building Substrate - 17417

Radiological decontamination is an essential enterprise that has become more important over the last four decades due to unfortunate accidents and the threat of terrorist actions. Decontamination can be an effective, beneficial alternative for the cleanup of radiological contamination events; however, the costs and benefits need to be balanced against those for complete removal and demolition of contaminated areas or facilities. Demolition and removal are often the first options considered in such circumstances as decontamination may be thought of as slow and costly. Decontamination has advantages, including significant waste reduction over demolition. In areas with buildings of cultural or societal importance, demolition may not be an option. Three decontamination evaluation test series are the focus of this article: SIMCON 1 and 2 (i.e., simulated contamination), and Urban RDD (radiological dispersal device, i.e., a dirty bomb detonation). These test series revealed that different contaminants respond differently during decontamination. This was found to be true with both SIMCON and Urban RDD simulant tests. SIMCON 2 especially demonstrated that chemically different contaminants respond differently to different decontamination methods: cesium appears to be less tenacious (more easily removed) than zirconium using chemical methods. These differences were underscored by the Urban RDD tests where americium and cobalt tended to precipitate on high pH surfaces (such as concrete), making them easier to remove, while cesium and strontium were essentially unaffected by surface pH and were imbibed more strongly into the substrate pore structure. While authorities argue over the contributions of contaminant chemistry and substrate morphology, the clear answer is that each has a contribution to the tenacity of a contaminant. Knowing how these characteristics interact will make us better at decontamination in the field. This knowledge refutes the efforts of perhaps well-meaning marketers to define our decontamination problems by what products they are trying to sell; often a 'one size fits all' type approach. Knowing even a little bit about the character of the decontamination problem will save time and money and increase the efficacy of decontamination. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

A whole wilderness of warning: Assessing economic consequences of nuclear releases - 15494

The consequences of the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster may provide a useful analogue for assessing the consequences of an accident involving the transport of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. An unexamined, to date, aspect of the Fukushima Dai-ichi disaster is the wide disagreement about the economic consequences of the release. There exist a variety of different estimates and different models and methods for performing these estimates, but not a systematic way to address the range of issues such a disaster generated. This paper examines the sources, methods, data, and assumptions used to prepare economic consequence estimates of the disaster. This paper compares and contrasts these estimates and evaluates them for their reliability. The wide dispersion of consequence assessments as defined by various media and agency impact reports in the post-Fukushima era are evidence that such variability does not serve the industry, regulators, government or researchers well. While a protocol exists to gauge the intensity of an incident (INES Scale) no pre-existing methodology exists to measure the various socioeconomic impacts associated with a radiological disaster, be it induced by a natural disaster incident or human initiated. This paper argues that an improved method will be necessary and suggests some parameters for such a method. Nevada has started the dialogue on such a comprehensive methodology (Ballard 2012, Ballard 2014). Despite this effort by a stakeholder, the regulatory agencies involved in nuclear waste shipments in the United States appear reluctant to begin a dialogue about how to address the full range and scope of issues. Resolution of this problem will be a necessary prerequisite to any large scale shipping program. It will be necessary to adopt a standardized methodology to assess consequences of a radiological emergency and incorporate this into the environmental impact statement process for the shipping program. This analytical deficiency should be addressed by these agencies/regulators and in preparation for the potential movement of nuclear waste in the quantities necessary to service the nuclear power industry and to address the existing spent nuclear fuel (SNF) stockpiles across the United States. It will be necessary to demonstrate to stakeholders that the benefits of shipping radioactive substances this dangerous outweigh the costs of a possible accident or terrorist incident. The nuclear energy industry should support funding for these assessment studies in order to provide a basis for discussions about the costs and benefits of the shipments. The studies would provide stakeholders with clarity about the possible consequences of the program. The studies will also assist Japan in its efforts to understand what their disaster means for that country. This paper will begin the dialogue on how such analytical protocols could be constructed to pre-stage the research necessary to assess such consequences. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NAMP Radiochemistry Webinars: The Next Educational Tool for the Next Generation Workforce - 18386

With an aging work force and only a few universities offering programs in radiochemistry, laboratories are increasingly finding it more challenging to hire and retain qualified radiochemists. Further, this challenge is a growing trend being seen worldwide. Expertise in radiochemistry is vital to advance our nation's progress in development of the next generation of nuclear reactor technology, drug discovery, environmental stewardship, and the development of technologies to prevent and respond to nuclear terrorist events. The National Analytical Management Program (NAMP) Education and Training subcommittee was established in response to the challenge of promoting radiochemistry and maintaining a well-educated work force to meet the projected growth in nuclear medicine, nuclear energy, safeguards, and nuclear forensics. The NAMP Education and Training subcommittee has offered radiochemistry webinars to a broad audience and is educating and strengthening the knowledge of participants in applications related to actinide and fission products chemistry, sample preparation, detection, dosimetry, nuclear forensics, nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear forensics, and risk assessment. These webinars are presented by renowned experts in the field of Radiochemistry. Additionally, through the partnering of the Education and Training subcommittee with various universities, the NAMP webinars offer a platform for graduate students, PhD candidates, and postdoctoral students to present their research to a wider audience. Since 2012, NAMP has conducted monthly, live webinars - all of which are recorded and archived as an online educational resource to the public from the NAMP web site (http://www.wipp.energy.gov/namp). With over 50 archived presentations, the NAMP webinars provide a comprehensive and interdisciplinary examination of radiochemistry topics. By partnering with university professors and renowned scientific professionals, the NAMP continues to expand the list of webinar topics, increasing the depth of knowledge in this online resource and rapidly becoming the next educational tool in radiochemistry for the next generation workforce. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

How to Handle the Conflict between Safety and Security - 18564

The purpose of safety and security for nuclear activities are the same. They are both necessary measures to protect people and the environment from radioactive material. There are many measures that enhance both the safety and the security but there are also measures serving one area that are in direct conflict with the other. How information is handled is maybe the best example to demonstrate this conflict between interests. In the security field, information is handled on a need-to-know basis, preventing valuable details to fall into hands of antagonists, terrorists etc. The safety culture, on the contrary, is based on knowledge and transparency and it encourages the sharing of information and experience to improve the safety. There is little guidance on how to manage the conflicts between safety and security for a transport system moving nuclear fuel and radioactive waste and especially when there are conflicts between different legislation areas, for example the Act on Nuclear Activities and Safety of Life at Sea. The Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Co, SKB, transports all Swedish spent fuel and operational waste from the Nuclear Power Plants to the central storage facilities in Sweden. To manage the transport system, SKB owns a fleet of packages, road vehicles and an INF 3 ship. For the shipments of nuclear material, the security focus has increased rapidly over the years after the 9/11 attack, followed by regulatory requirements on enhanced security. SKB is currently running a project to further strengthen the transport security, an activity that requires a careful balance between safety and security. This paper describes the methods used and the challenges experienced trying to manage the conflicts between safety and security for the Swedish nuclear transport system. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Radiation Simulation using Wi-Fi Signal Strength and Frequency

For routine radiological operations, lost radioactive sources, decommissioning and cleanup of nuclear facilities, and radiological terrorist events such as Radioactive Dispersive Devices (RDDs) or Radiological Exposure Devices (REDs), individuals are tasked with accurately locating both point and distributed sources of radiation. Radiation workers must often practice these tasks, whether part of initial training or periodically as part of formal or informal exercises or drills. In such circumstances, it is desirable to have an accurate recreation of a radioactive source, including a method of detecting it, which does not include dangerous amounts of radiation. The goal of this research was to develop a radiation simulation technology that uses IEEE 802.11x W-LAN protocol, i.e. Wi-Fi sources and detectors for these, as an inexpensive, precise and accurate method of replicating sources of gamma radiation. For this work, existing 802.11x sources were used. Software was developed for use with an Android smartphone to detect the presence of these sources. The measurements followed the expected behavior as a function of distance from the sources, mimicking that of gamma radiation, thus demonstrating the fundamental principle of operation. The ultimate system will be used in an outreach program to interest students in the radiation protection field.

07 ISOTOPE AND RADIATION SOURCES↗

Nuisance Alarm Reductions In Organic Scintillation Detector-Based Radiation Portal Monitors

A worldwide system of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) detects and deters the smuggling of special nuclear material (SNM) and other radiological sources that could be used by terrorist organizations in an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device. Nuisance alarms from non-SNM sources of radiation, however, account for the vast majority of RPM radiation alarms. We present research on a liquid organic scintillation detector-based RPM that reduces the impact of nuisance alarms through on-the- fly radionuclide identification. (authors)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD): Standard Reference Materials 4600 and 4601

If a terrorist nuclear explosion were to occur in the United States, high-quality (accurate and precise) legally defensible nuclear forensics measurements will be required to assure the certainty and confidence needed, for conclusions drawn from these data will be coupled with law enforcement and intelligence information for the purposes of attribution and retribution. Standard Reference Materials (SRMs)/Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) establish the traceability, accuracy, and precision of nuclear forensic measurements and provide the ability to benchmark measurement methods essential to meeting the requirements of legal scrutiny. Currently there is a critical shortage of key SRMs/CRMs required for accurate and precise measurements that are fundamental to nuclear measurements supporting pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics. Supplies either do not exist, are not good enough, are in short supply, and/or are very expensive. The radionuclide measurement techniques and data quality objectives for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are quite different than the applications for which the current suite of available SRMs/CRMs was developed. Specifically, 1) modern mass spectrometry methods have largely replaced traditional activity-based measurement methods for quantifying small quantities of long-lived radionuclides and most trace radionuclide SRMs/CRMs are certified for activity and are thus not adequate for current applications, 2) modern instrumental methods are capable of higher precision than historic measurement techniques, and in some cases exceed the precision of the available SRMs/CRMs, and 3) the quality assurance requirements for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are such that the existing cadre of SRMs/CRMs does not adequately support the needs for method validation. There are numerous governmental stakeholders both within the US (DOE, DoD) and internationally (IAEA, JRC-ITU) whose missions are either directly involved with nuclear forensics measurements or rely on the forensic data obtained to make the exacting policy decisions (DOJ (FBI), DHS, CIA, DIA, DoD) associated with disrupting the production of illicit nuclear materials, interdicted nuclear materials or a nuclear/radiological detonation event. Starting in 2008 the DHS NTNFC, in collaboration with NBL and NIST, took on the production of suitable SRMs/CRMs for the pre-detonation nuclear forensics community. Two CRMs have been released since the start of this effort and two more are slated for completion in 2016. More recently, NIST, as a part of its mission as the US National Metrology Institute (NMI) to deliver standards (providing traceability) and foster homeland security, has launched the first certification campaign of a measurement traceable post nuclear detonation SRM. NIST, in cooperation with partner labs (AFIT (DoD), FBI (DOJ), and NPL) and with support from the FBI, has developed two Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD) Standard Reference Materials (SRMs) - SRM 4600 and 4601. These SRMs have been developed to simulate the expected debris mixture from the detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) in an urban environment, which is capable of producing fresh fission as well as activation products. The elemental composition of the vitrified debris materials is a composite of minerals and metals characteristic of the concrete and steel, the building materials that would be exposed to a nuclear detonation and whose resulting activation products would be found in rubble samples collected for forensics evidence and attribution. Additionally, because post-detonation samples would also contain short-lived fission products, the debris materials have been doped with Uranium (U). To create the nuclear fission products, samples of the SPUD materials can be placed in a well-characterized nuclear reactor and exposed to a set neutron flux and energy, causing the encased U atoms to split and yield short-lived fission products. Because a known amount of U is added to the SPUD materials it is feasible to determine the concentration of the resulting fission products. The subsequent irradiated SPUD glass would be chemically similar to samples that would be generated in an actual detonation, and thus can serve as a standardized reference material for nuclear forensic post detonation measurements. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Bond Strength of Plasma Sprayed Zr Diffusion Barrier on U-Mo Fuels

The United States government is continually committed to strengthening nuclear security and nonproliferation for reducing the threat of radioactive materials acquisition by terrorists. To meet this important mission, the US Department of Energy and National Nuclear Security Agency's (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization (M{sup 3}) Reactor Conversion Program (CONVERT) seeks to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications through work with governments and facilities around the world to convert research reactors to the use of non-weapons-usable low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. Each reactor converted not only eliminates the need for HEU at civilian sites, but also reduces the amount of HEU being manufactured, stored, and transported, where the nuclear material is most vulnerable. In instances where suitable LEU fuels do not exist for the conversion of particular reactors, CONVERT contributes to development of new LEU fuels. Currently, the CONVERT Program is committed to development of a high-density U-Mo fuel that will be able to convert high performance research reactors, while establishing an efficient and economic fabrication capability to manufacture the fuel. To that end, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been tasked with development of a method to affix zirconium (Zr) metal fuel diffusion barrier via plasma spraying, which will prevent a reaction between the U-Mo fuel and the 6061 aluminum cladding. A successful diffusion barrier requires adequate Zr layer thickness, uniform coverage, sufficient bonding at the Zr/fuel and Zr/aluminum cladding interface, and maintenance of the original nuclear fuel properties i.e. physical dimensions, alloy composition and dispersion, crystallographic phase concentration, neutronics, etc. This work outlines development of the Zr plasma spray processing techniques, parameters affecting the diffusion barrier/nuclear fuel bond strength, and characterization of the Zr diffusion barrier. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Feasibility of Applying a Human Bio-signals Monitoring to Minimize Insider Threats

With the on-going global war on terror, a potential terrorist attack on a Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is getting a lot of attention. In particular, the potential threat of an insider is a major concern as it could lead to the loss of a nationally critical asset and thus deserves serious consideration. The current approach to preventing an insider threat is the Insider Mitigation Program (IMP) based on periodic self-assessment or peer and manager review of specific employees. These are potentially biased and subjective assessments and are unreliable. Also, as the approach is reactive-based, identifying a problem employee could be too late to protect NPP assets (i.e., confidential information and nuclear materials). Thus, a new approach for detecting and predicting an insider is necessary. We propose a proactive approach based on using bio-signals as an alternative. To address the vulnerability of current insider detection systems, our studies investigated the possibility of insider detection and prediction by using biosignals (electroencephalogram (EEG), electrocardiogram (ECG), and galvanic skin response (GSR)). But one main question remained in the previous studies was: Is the method using key EEG indicators specific enough to discern the difference between a normal worker's motivation level change and being ready to commit a crime? This study examined the answer to the question.

47 OTHER INSTRUMENTATION↗

Understanding Manufacturing Scale-Up of Plasma Sprayed Zr Barrier Coatings on U-10Mo Fuels

The United States government is committed to further strengthening nuclear security and nonproliferation in order to reduce the threat of terrorists acquiring nuclear material. To meet this important mission, the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Agency's Office of Material Management and Minimization (M{sup 3}) Reactor Conversion Program minimizes the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian applications by working with governments and facilities around the world to convert research reactors to the use of non-weapons-usable low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuels. Each reactor converted not only eliminates the need for HEU at civilian sites, but also reduces the amount of HEU being manufactured, stored, and transported, where it is at its most vulnerable. In instances where suitable LEU fuels do not exist for particular reactors to convert, the M{sup 3} Reactor Conversion Program (CONVERT) contributes to the development of new LEU fuels. Currently, the M{sup 3} Reactor Conversion Program is committed to developing a high-density U-Mo LEU fuel that will be able to convert high performance research reactors while establishing an efficient and economic fabrication capability to make the fuel. To that end, Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has been tasked with developing a method to affix a Zirconium fuel diffusion barrier via plasma spraying that will prevent a reaction between the U-Mo fuel and the aluminum cladding. This report discusses the transitions from development of the plasma spray deposition process to a scientific understanding of pseudo-production conditions and quantification of coating layer properties, characterization, reproducibility, etc. Understanding quality assurance and its applications to experiment work is non-trivial; statistical analysis of various measurement techniques not only improve quality, but will allow for scale up of manufacturing.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Validation of Methodology to Simulate Gamma Doses from Historical Weapons Tests

The United States tested nuclear weapons in the atmosphere (aboveground) from 1945 until 1963, when the nation became a signatory to the Partial Test Ban Treaty. During those tests, gamma doses were often measured within kilometers of the point of detonation. Additional gamma dose measurements were made in and around the location of any personnel conducting the test, possibly with personal dosimeters. These gamma dose measurements have been declassified to provide the personnel involved with an estimate of the total dose they received while involved with the aboveground testing program. Several years ago, interest in these gamma doses was renewed by organizations that would need to provide the public with dose estimates in the event of a radiological or nuclear weapon terrorist attack on the United States. This work provides an initial validation of the computational methods used to simulate dose from a radiological or nuclear weapon. This initial work will focus on dose from gamma rays. The sources of gamma rays from a nuclear weapon include prompt fission gammas, gammas generated via neutron interactions (capture, inelastic scattering, and activation), and gammas produced by the decay of fission products. All of these gamma ray sources for a nuclear weapon are also potential sources of gammas from a radiological weapon. However, the sources of gamma rays from a radiological weapon depend on the material present in the device, and prompt fission gammas will mostly come from spontaneous fission instead of induced fission. This paper focuses on validation using gamma ray dose measurements from nuclear detonations, which is adequate to validate the requisite transport methodologies, source term generation, and cross sections needed to model gamma doses delivered by most radiological weapons. The 1961 report on Operation Plumbbob provides an overview of how the total gamma dose delivered by a nuclear weapon is broken down by the different sources specified above. The prompt fission gamma rays contribute about 5% of the total gamma dose. The gamma rays produced by neutron interactions usually deliver the largest portion of the total gamma dose, which is typically between 55% and 85% of the total. The remainder of the total gamma ray dose is attributed to decay of fission products.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

ILLICIT TRANSIT INTERDICTION GLOBAL ANALYSIS

This study aims to enhance the security of radioactive materials during transport by analyzing commonalities in cargo thefts conducted by non-state groups such as thieves and terrorists. This research focuses on identifying patterns and trends in the methods used to steal high-value cargo, with the goal of applying these insights to improve transport security of radioactive materials. Key questions addressed include the frequency of specific tools, techniques, and insider involvement in thefts, as well as the use of weapons, electronic jamming equipment, and specialized tools. Findings will inform security design improvements and industry practices to mitigate vulnerabilities. The study involves a comprehensive review of literature and case studies, utilizing data sources from 2018 to 2023. Articles will be selected based on their relevance to thefts of valuable cargo in transit, with a focus on incidents involving non-state actors. The methodology will include statistical and inferential analysis to identify trends, with results visualized through pie charts, frequency analyses, and terrain maps. The discussion will highlight the implications of findings and provide actionable recommendations for strengthening security measures. Limitations such as data availability and reporting inconsistencies will be acknowledged. Suggestions for future improvements will be constructed using existing case studies and expert feedback. The study’s outcomes aim to raise awareness within the industry, inform policy decisions, and enhance security protocols for radioactive material transport. Metrics for impact include the potential publication of findings, presentations at conferences to raise awareness, and the subsequent actions taken by stakeholders based on the research. By identifying trends and vulnerabilities and suggesting improvements, this research contributes to preventing the illicit use of nuclear and radiological materials.

Zineddin, Dr. Z. [ORNL] (ORCID:0009000848740725)↗

Secure Route: Roadway Risk Mapping for Transportation Planners

The secure transport of sensitive materials across U.S. road networks pose unique challenges for local, state, and federal agencies. Threats range from random events (e.g., accidents, medical emergencies, mechanical failures) to opportunistic or organized tactical assaults. Although the probability of such attacks is very low, the consequences of material loss to foreign states or terrorists can be catastrophic, qualifying these scenarios as “grey swan” events—low-probability, high-impact occurrences that are predictable but difficult to quantify. Traditional risk assessments struggle in these contexts, necessitating a shift toward subjective risk perception to inform planning. Risk perception in transport planning is shaped by various factors, including knowledge of adversarial capabilities, vehicle defenses, manifest details, and geographic features along the route. Geographic features such as bridges, tunnels, roadside elevation, and gaps in cellular coverage introduce vulnerabilities, while mitigative features include safe havens, police stations, and medical services. Temporal variables such as congestion, accidents, and weather further complicate route planning. Despite their importance, existing routing tools like Google Maps and commercial software do not explicitly account for geographic risk features, requiring planners to rely on personal familiarity with routes—a time-intensive, non-scalable approach. This work addresses these gaps by: (1) developing datasets that catalog geographic risk features along U.S. roadways, (2) eliciting risk perceptions from experienced transportation security experts, and (3) linking these perceptions to roadway conditions and geographic data. We implement these capabilities within Secure Route a novel mapping tool for classifying route segment risks associated with roadway conditions. This system provides transportation planners with an intuitive interface to assess and contextualize risk along potential routes, improving decision-making for secure transport. We present current progress in this effort and identify next steps.

Stewart, Robert [ORNL] (ORCID:0000000281867559)↗