DOE OSTI2018
It is demanded to find key issues and critical paths for verifying and monitoring a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage with a purpose of non-proliferation of nuclear weapon. However, unfortunately there are no reliable methods to verify the containment in a spent nuclear fuel cask or storage. Therefore, research and development (R and D) has been continuously required to develop new and alternative technologies for searching and verifying undeclared nuclear materials, activities, and facilities. Therefore, the present authors have developed a new safeguards technique of passively scanning a spent fuel cask or storage using pressurized He-4 scintillation neutron detectors. A new approach is to quickly verify content in a spent nuclear fuel cask or presence of all special nuclear materials in unknown packages by comparing experimental and computational results. For that, the present authors have developed a new algorithm and user-interface coupled ORIGEN-ARP and MCNP codes, and the prototype safeguards apparatus employing the array of He-4 fast neutron detectors has been designed, built, and tested. The feasibility test of this new apparatus has been performed with Cf-252 neutron sources and the laboratory scale model cask, minimized by a factor of ten compared to the actual dimension of a KN-21 cask. This technique has several advantages over current methods based on neutron and gamma detection; (1) incident neutron energy information is preserved, (2) disturbance of gamma-ray is excellently rejected (discriminated), and (3) much higher neutron counts and operational cost and space-effectiveness are expected since no moderator is required for fast neutrons. The final goal of this study will (1) conduct a prototype instrument and employ it to monitor a nuclear spent fuel cask or storage at a commercial nuclear power reactor facilities, (2) use spectral-specific measurement data to show proof of concept for measurable data successfully converted to quantifiable signatures, such as diversion/removal of fuel, and maintenance of fuel and cask integrity of fuel, and (3) develop a cask imaging capability. (authors)
12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗