Why SRS Matters - Tritium
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site’s (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer.
SEARCH · Engineering Papers
Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site’s (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer. This episode features E Area's mission and operations.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer. This episode features F Area's mission and operations.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer. This episode features H Canyon's mission and operations. H Canyon and its adjoining H B Line facility represent the last full-scale radio chemical processing capabilities left in the United States.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer. This episode features K Area's mission and operations. K area is the former production reactor that's been re-purposed to serve as a plutonium processing and storage facility.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer. This episode features L Area's mission and operations. The L reactor, the former production reactor, now serves as a basin for the storage of used nuclear fuel.
Now that construction is complete, DOE and construction contractor Parsons, are focusing on testing the Savannah River Site’s Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) systems and training the workforce to operate the plant in preparation for the start of operations. Once in operation, the SWPF will significantly increase processing rates at SRS tank farms in an effort to empty the site’s high-level radioactive waste tanks.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer.
A video series presenting an overview of the Savannah River Site's (SRS) mission and operations. Each episode features a specific area/operation and how it contributes to help make the world safer.
At the Savannah River Site (SRS), nuclear production reactors used de-ionizers to control the chemistry of the reactor moderator during their operation to produce nuclear materials primarily for the weapons program. These de-ionizers were removed from the reactors and stored as a legacy waste with no path to disposal due to the relatively high {sup 14}C contamination (i.e., on the order of 20 curies per de-ionizer for 48-50 de-ionizers) and the low disposal limit of 4.2 Ci previously established for the Intermediate Level Vault (ILV). The ILV is considered most appropriate facility within which to dispose these items due to the method of solidifying waste items with cementitious material inside concrete vaults. In previous analyses the {sup 14}C ILV disposal limit was established at 4.2 Ci resulting from the use of a very conservative method to analyze the dose received from atmospheric releases of gaseous {sup 14}C. This investigation implemented a more rigorous evaluation of the physical and chemical processes influencing the release and migration of gaseous {sup 14}C (as CO{sub 2}) to obtain a more realistic estimate of atmospheric dose and to determine new ILV disposal limits. The results are in terms of an emanation rate of {sup 14}C activity at the land surface. There is a rapid buildup to the maximum emanation rate of 1.42 E-8 Ci/year within 0.4 years. This rate continues steadily for the remainder of the simulation. The maximum emanation rate was used to calculate the dose to the Maximally Exposed Individual (MEI) at a point 100 m from the ILV, which is the most restrictive exposure point. The dose to the MEI at this location was calculated to be 3.83 E-05 mrem/yr. which is minuscule compared to the exposure limit defined in US DOE Order 435.1 as 10 mrem/yr. Considering the tiny dose to the MEI calculated in this analysis, no atmospheric pathway limit needed to be applied to the Intermediate Level Vault for {sup 14}C. This is justified in that no matter how much {sup 14}C is disposed in the ILV disposal environment, only a set, relatively small quantity can move into the air space as gas due to the solubility control limitation. Consequently, the groundwater pathway disposal limit for resin-based {sup 14}C in the Intermediate Level Vault became the most restrictive limit among the various pathways, this limit being 2.6 E+06 Ci, which easily allows for disposal of all the Reactor Moderator De-ionizers.
Building 247-F at SRS was a roughly 110,000 ft{sup 2} two-story facility designed and constructed during the height of the cold war naval buildup to provide additional naval nuclear fuel manufacturing capacity in early 1980's. The manufacturing process employed a wide variety of acids, bases, and other hazardous materials. As the need for naval fuel declined, the facility was shut down and underwent initial deactivation, which was completed in 1990. All process systems were flushed with water and drained using the existing process drain valves. However, since these drains were not always installed at the lowest point in piping and equipment systems, a significant volume of liquid remained after initial deactivation. After initial deactivation, a non-destructive assay of the process area identified approximately 17 ({+-}100%) kg of uranium held up in equipment and piping. The facility was placed in Surveillance and Maintenance mode until 2003, when the decision was made to perform final deactivation, and then decommission the facility. The following lessons were learned as a result of the D and D of building 247-F. Successful D and D of a major radiochemical process building requires significant up-front planning by a team of knowledgeable personnel led by a strong project manager. The level of uncertainty and resultant risk to timely, cost effective project execution was found to be high. Examples of the types of problems encountered which had high potential to adversely impact cost and schedule performance are described below. Low level and sanitary waste acceptance criteria do not allow free liquids in waste containers. These liquids, which are often corrosive, must be safely removed from the equipment before it is loaded to waste containers. Drained liquids must be properly managed, often as hazardous or mixed waste. Tapping and draining of process lines is a dangerous operation, which must be performed carefully. The temptation to become complacent when breaking into lines is great. Incidents of personnel exposure to liquids during draining are likely. Records from the initial 1990 deactivation led early work planners to assume the facility was cold, dark and dry. This turned out to be a poor assumption. Work instructions had to be modified to require that engineers evaluate each of several hundred process lines to identify the low point, where a tap and drain system could be installed to allow positive verification that the line was empty before the line was cut for removal. During the period between facility shut down in 1990 and the start of final deactivation in 2003, roof leaks had developed, allowing rain water to enter building 247-F, which provided an environment for mold growth. Sampling confirmed the presence of Stachybotrys chartarum, a toxic indoor mold that grows on wet cellulosic material, such as drywall paper. D and D workers in areas where this hazard was identified were required to where proper personal protective equipment, which complicated work execution. Discovery of the potential presence of uniquely hazardous chemicals such as shock sensitive compounds and toxic uranium hexafluoride became issues which required investigation and special handling strategies. Team access to subject matter experts, who could quickly provide the required guidance for safe material handling, was critical to keeping the project on schedule. In old legacy facilities, it is possible that the D and D workers will be exposed to undocumented energy sources such as energized electrical conductors and pipes containing hazardous materials that originate outside the boundaries of the facility. Significant effort must be expended on adequate mechanical and electrical isolation. Subdividing the facility into well defined zones for which detailed zone-specific end points could be developed proved to be a highly effective project management strategy. Waste management must be carefully planned. The rate of waste generation as the facility is converted from a structure to waste can frequently exceed the D and D team's resources to characterize, package, store and transport the waste to a disposal facility in a timely manner. This can lead to schedule delays and/or increased project cost.
The SRS salt-stone Facility is designed and permitted to immobilize and dispose of low-level radioactive and hazardous liquid waste (salt solution) remaining from the processing of radioactive material at the Savannah River Site. The salt-stone Processing Facility (SPF) is permitted as a wastewater treatment facility per the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control Regulations (SCDHEC) South Carolina Hazardous Waste Management Regulations (SCHWMR) R.61-67. The salt-stone Disposal Facility is permitted as a solid waste landfill site, as defined by SCDHEC Regulations R61-107.19. The salt-stone Sampling and Analysis Plan provides the SCDHEC with the chemical and physical characterization strategy for the salt solution and salt-stone waste form. During operation, samples are collected from Tank 50H on a quarterly basis and are analyzed by the Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) for over chemical and radioactive components. The analytical results are compared to the salt-stone waste acceptance criteria in a technical report. SRNL also prepares salt-stone samples from the quarterly sample and premix binder materials provided by the SPF to determine the non-hazardous nature of the grout to meet the requirements of the SCDHEC regulation for the 'Characteristic of Toxicity', R.61-79.261.24(b) and the 'Universal Treatment Standards', R.61-79.268.48.4. salt-stone samples are collected, size reduced, packaged, and shipped to an independent United States EPA certified laboratory, or a laboratory that holds an equivalent certification such as one from the National Environmental Laboratory Accreditation Program to perform the EPA Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) extraction of the salt-stone sample. SRNL reviews the results of the TCLP analysis and prepares a report detailing the sample preparation and analysis that is used by the salt-stone Facility to demonstrate the nonhazardous nature of the salt-stone waste form. (authors)
Monitoring the effectiveness of natural attenuation for remediating the Savannah River Site (SRS) Chemical, Metals, and Pesticides (CMP) Pits plume fringe has focused intensive sampling of shallow groundwater for different reaches of Pen Branch from 2005 to 2017. Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) were analyzed for the critical hyporheic zone beneath Pen Branch and adjacent floodplain. These sampling efforts assisted larger-scale compliance monitoring in accordance with US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines. When applicable, EPA has found natural attenuation to be an acceptable mode of achieving regulatory compliance. While natural attenuation can include any ecosystem function that reduces contaminant loads, it is focused on microbial biochemical pathways. The study plume originated from CMP Pits, a waste disposal area in operation from 1971 to 1979, when the pits were closed and backfilled. In 1984, excavations of source material and contaminated soils were removed up to a depth of 7.6 m below the trenches. However, monitoring well data indicated that perchloroethylene (PCE) and trichloroethylene (TCE) had seeped beneath the vadose zone and formed groundwater plumes reaching the Pen Branch valley below. Although 'hot spots' of TCE were found within the Pen Branch floodplain, it was unknown just how the flow pattern was entering Pen Branch and to what degree natural attenuation was reducing the contaminant load. For this reason, our stations were located along the Pen Branch reach bordering the modelled plume fringe. In general, VOCs were highest at station piezometer holes in the middle study zone. Moderate VOC levels were detected at upstream stations and lowest VOC levels were found at downstream stations. Electrical resistance heating (ERH) with soil vapor extraction (SVE) conducted by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS) from 2008 to 2009 at the filled CMP Pits helped to remove contaminants trapped in clay horizons beneath the CMP Pits and to reduce overall new plume concentrations. Collectively PCE, TCE, and their degradation products displayed a favorable yearly trend of contaminant natural attenuation. Additionally, phytoremediation actions by native bamboo, Arundinaria gigantea, added to VOC removal from wetlands soils. Total VOC concentrations at some stations declined by >25% and concentrations of vinyl chloride (VC), a nearly-final stage degradation product increased from 0.0 ppb to >20 ppb. Temporal patterns displayed a continued reduction of VOCs, while spatial patterns indicated a possible slow progression of the plume downstream along Pen Branch. Conclusions about plume export into surface waters must address the seasonal and geological complexities of this system. Hydrological patterns are complex and plumes do not directly outcrop into Pen Branch surface waters, but emerge into the stream through pathways in the porous hyporheic zone. For this reason, continued sampling must identify critical depths and downstream locations where plume flows may be more intense. During drought periods with no surface flow in Pen Branch, subsurface plume flows may be flowing downslope in the hyporheic zone. (authors)
Saltstone Disposal Units (SDU) are long term disposal units for low activity grout produced from the solidification of decontaminated non-hazardous salt waste at SRS. The unit is a cylindrical disposal vault of 150 ft. in diameter and 23 ft. in height. The total volume the SDU can hold is 3 million gallons of grout. The hydration process of the grout material produces heat from an exothermic chemical reaction. If the grout reaches temperatures higher than the maximum safety temperature of 95 deg. C, cracks can start forming leading to contamination of the environment. The purpose of this study is to develop the optimal baseline domain boundary conditions and to perform a sensitivity analysis with respect to the baseline modeling conditions. The following assumptions were made for the modeling calculations: - The system geometry is axisymmetric; - The system was at steady state; - Ambient temperature was set to 100 deg. F; - Air was assumed to be an incompressible ideal gas; - Radiation was neglected for a conservative estimation; - Natural convection for the SDU vapor space is assumed to be turbulent because Rayleigh number based on typical operating conditions is higher than 10{sup 8}; - Water tables were not taken into consideration. The following sensitivity analyses were performed to find the optimal domain boundary: - Mesh size sensitivity; - Soil depth sensitivity - Soil depth varied from 30 ft to 250 ft with a soil thickness of 90 ft; - Soil thickness sensitivity - Soil thickness varied from 30 ft to 270 ft with a soil depth of 180 ft; - Soil conductivity sensitivity - Soil thermal conductivity varied from 0.25 W/m-K to 1 W/m-K; - Ambient Temperature Sensitivity - Ambient temperature varied from 70 deg. F to 110 deg. F. For the thermal calculations, the temperature of the bottom of the soil was set to 17.4 deg. C. The heat flux on the roof of the building and surface of the earth is 163.2 W/m{sup 2}. The soil sides are set to be adiabatic. The sensitivity analysis shows that the mesh size has no effect on the numerical results. This is mainly due to a small convection zone and large conduction zones in the modeling domain. The optimal domain boundary was found to be a soil thickness of 90 ft and a soil depth of 150 ft. The different sensitivity analysis performed here shows the optimal boundary domain to be used for thermal calculations is a soil depth of 150 ft beneath the SDU and a soil thickness of 90 ft. Anything larger would produce similar solutions but at a longer computational time to solve. The maximum temperature was more sensitive to soil properties as shown here. While the ambient temperature affected the max temperature linearly. Most of the heat transfer takes place downward vertically between the SDU and the soil beneath it. Using the optimal domain boundary determined by the sensitivity analyses, the maximum thermal loading to keep the maximum grout temperature below 95 deg. C is 1.646 W/m{sup 3}.
The L-Area Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) underwater storage facility at Savannah River Site (SRS), referred to as L-Basin SNF facility, has an array of Vertical Tube Storage (VTS) racks and a group of High Flux Irradiation Reactor (HFIR) fuel cores. The underwater facility is integrally designed as a wet SNF storage system with a chemically-controlled water pool. The SNF storage racks are seismically qualified. The L-Basin pool holds about 3.4 million gallons of water with concrete wall thickness of about 5 ft and water depths of 17 ft to 30 ft. The facility has mainly two different elevation levels of 30 ft and 17 ft below the ground level. At the level 30 ft below the ground, a maximum of 110 racks of VTS and 5 racks of Dry Cave can be stored. At the level of 17 ft below the ground, 120 HFIR cores can be stored, considering that each rack contains two HFIR cores. In case of a hypothetical accident, all cooling water in the storage pool may be drained away, resulting in dry SNF storage condition. The primary objective of the work is to estimate the maximum fuel temperature in a conservative manner when the L-Basin facility is completely dry due to the hypothetical drain-down of the pool water. A three-dimensional Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) modeling approach was taken for the thermal evaluations of the water-drained SNF storage facility. The modeling calculations were performed, assuming that all of the storage racks in L-Basin are fully loaded with SNF assemblies containing decay heat sources. In the case of full loading, the L-Basin facility stores 14,600 SNF assemblies in VTS racks and 120 cores in HFIR racks. The thermal analysis results of the L-Basin model yielded maximum temperatures of VTS and HFIR fuel assemblies for different fuel loading scenarios and boundary conditions of the SNF storage racks.
The CSTF at SRS contain 51 waste tanks with 8 closed waste tanks between FTF and HTF. SRMC is the LW contractor. The LW mission includes removing legacy nuclear waste from these tanks and treating it for final disposition. Once the bulk of the waste has been removed from a tank, it will undergo inspection and sampling to characterize the remaining waste in the tank prior to it being operationally closed. There are multiple points in the tank closure process where an inspection is performed, and there are multiple parts of a tank that get inspected. Waste tanks have a primary containment vessel (referred to as the “Primary”) and a secondary containment vessel (referred to as the “Annulus”) that surrounds the primary. Both of these sections of a tank receive multiple inspections throughout the closure process.