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At least 217 records · Page 12

Belle Physics at Wayne State

The major goals of our work on Belle II were to complete our contributions, a 64-channel PIN diode-based radiation monitor, to the precursor detector called Beast II and the electronics for the endcap K-Long/Muon (E-KLM) detector. This was done by Professor Cinabro, Technician Gutierrez, and undergraduate labor supported by US-Japan funds. Professor Bonvicini through US-Japan funds led the development and installation of a beamstrahlung monitor system in the Belle II interaction region. Graduate students Farhat and DiCarlo worked on this. We also worked on charm physics analysis.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Fault detection and analysis in nuclear research facility using artificial intelligence methods

In this article, an online detection of transducer and actuator condition is discussed. A case study is on the reading of area radiation monitor (ARM) installed at the chimney of PUSPATI TRIGA nuclear reactor building, located at Bangi, Malaysia. There are at least five categories of abnormal ARM reading that could happen during the transducer failure, namely either the reading becomes very high, or very low/ zero, or with high fluctuation and noise. Moreover, the reading may be significantly higher or significantly lower as compared to the normal reading. An artificial neural network (ANN) and adaptive neuro-fuzzy inference system (ANFIS) are good methods for modeling this plant dynamics. The failure of equipment is based on ARM reading so it is then to compare with the estimated ARM data from ANN/ ANFIS function. The failure categories in either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ state are obtained from a comparison between the actual online data and the estimated output from ANN/ ANFIS function. It is found that this system design can correctly report the condition of ARM equipment in a simulated environment and later be implemented for online monitoring. This approach can also be extended to other transducers, such as the temperature profile of reactor core and also to include other critical actuator conditions such as the valves and pumps in the reactor facility provided that the failure symptoms are clearly defined.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Evaluation of Solar Reference Cells on a Two-Axis Tracker Using Spectral Measurements

A simple model calculating the performance of an IMT solar reference cell is proposed and tested under clear sky periods. One-minute data from EKO spectroradiometers collocated with an IMT reference cell are used for the analysis. Data are obtained at the NREL Solar Radiation Research Laboratory in Golden, Colorado and the UO Solar Radiation Monitoring Laboratory in Eugene, Oregon. The model is also applied and evaluated under cloudy conditions. A match of better than 1% is found between calculated clear sky values and IMT measurements for July, 2020. One- minute cloudy sky comparisons show a much larger variation, but when averaged over one hour, a standard deviation of 4% between the calculated and measured values is found.

atmospheric radiation↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions, Calendar Year 2010

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS, formerly the Nevada Test Site) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NNSS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NNSS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) (CFR, 2010a) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as those from the damaged Fukushima nuclear power plant in Japan. Because this report is intended to discuss radioactive air emissions during calendar year 2010, data on radionuclides in air from the 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant releases are not presented but will be included in the report for calendar year 2011. The NNSS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE, 1995). This method was approved by the EPA for use on the NNSS in 2001(EPA, 2001a) and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2 (CFR, 2010a). For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide's concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2010, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NNSS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all air monitoring stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides about 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NNSS, dose to the public would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NNSS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000032 mrem/yr, more than 300,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Operational Focused Data Analytics for Optimizing Radiation Portal Monitor-Based Nuclear Smuggling Detection Systems at Global Ports of Entry

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s Office of Nuclear Smuggling Detection and Deterrence has deployed a fleet of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) across the world at global ports of entry including seaports, airports, and land border crossings. These RPMs are integrated into radiation detection systems (RDS) that also include fixed cameras, optical character recognition (OCR) systems, primary scanning systems (e.g., X-ray or gamma-ray), and secondary scanning systems (e.g., spectroscopic radiation portal monitors, portable radiation detection systems). The data from these sensing technologies is collected at the Central Alarm Station (CAS) where servers and computers reside to control and operate the system. Operators utilize the data collected by the CAS and declared cargo information to make decisions on how to respond to an alarm.This work explores the use of CAS-located data, looking at both the sensor data streams and operator inputs, to perform analysis which supports customs and border protection agencies to improve training capability and operational effectiveness. We focus on analyzing site level effectiveness and behavior by rolling up CAS-located data collected from individual occurrences. To-date, more than 15 sites (e.g., seaports, airports, border crossings) have been analyzed in this manner with the goal of understanding system operations to verify effectiveness and recommend potential improvements. This work first aims to provide background information on relevant CAS-located data sources and our current operational system analytics process including example results. After summarizing our current analytic techniques, we discuss how the future data analytics systems can provide key benefits to improving operational performance while minimizing the burden these detection systems place on operators.

Kuhn, Michael↗

Public Communication of Technical Issues in Today's Changing Visual Language - 12436

Communication regarding the management of radioactive materials is a well-established challenge. Residents and consumers have suspected for years that companies and governments place short-term economic concerns ahead of health and safety. This skepticism is compounded with increased attention to safety issues at nuclear power plants everywhere after Fukushima. Nonetheless, today's environment presents unexpected opportunities to transform public fear into teachable moments that bring knowledge and facts to discussions on nuclear energy. In the weeks following Japan's crisis, the lack of reliable information on radiation levels saw citizens taking to the streets with dosimeters and Geiger counters in crowd-sourced radiation monitoring efforts. Efforts, based mainly online, represent a growing set of examples of how internet and cell-phone technology are being put to use in emergency situations. The maps, graphs and tables created to meet public interest also exemplify some of the psychological priorities of audiences and present learning tools that can improve future education efforts in non-emergency situations. Industry outreach efforts often consist of technical details and quantitative data that are difficult for lay audiences to interpret. The intense attention to nuclear energy issues since last March has produced a wide array of visual samples. Citizen monitors, news organizations, government agencies and others have displayed quantitative information in innovative ways. Their efforts offer new perspective on what charts, maps and info graphics do - or need to do - to illustrate requirements, record assessments and promote understanding of nuclear-waste issues. Surveying the best examples, nuclear communicators can improve their offerings of easy-to-use, evidence-based visuals to inform stakeholders. Familiar to most communications professionals in the nuclear industry, risk communication is a science-based approach with over three decades of research evidence informing the discipline. Risk communication principles address the fact that often perception is reality. Scientific evidence for decision making must be approached differently in situations where stakeholders have high levels of concern and low levels of trust. Visual communications must take this into account to be successful. (author)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Rad Waste Cost/Volume Reduction Using New Monitoring/Decon Techniques, Launderable Items and Recycling - 19297

The use of improved radiation monitoring and decontamination techniques significantly reduces the cost and volume of Canadian radioactive waste via recycling/reuse. Over 2,700 metric tons of scaffolding and tooling have been released for unrestricted use back to the owners or recycled as non-radioactive scrap metal over the last 10 years. Additionally, using reusable launderable items reduces the cost over single use Radiological Personal Protective Equipment (RPPE) and plastic wraps and has eliminated thousands of cubic meters of Canadian station waste each year for over 10 years. The combined effect is the significant volume reduction of radioactive waste in a low risk, cost effective, manner. This paper and presentation will highlight the processes and showcase the types of materials decontaminated. The intent is to make waste generators aware of new processes that could be applied to the waste materials stored in their vaults or generated during a refurbishment/decommissioning project as well as day-to-day power generation operations. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

TH-CD-207A-08: Simulated Real-Time Image Guidance for Lung SBRT Patients Using Scatter Imaging

Purpose: To develop a comprehensive Monte Carlo-based model for the acquisition of scatter images of patient anatomy in real-time, during lung SBRT treatment. Methods: During SBRT treatment, images of patient anatomy can be acquired from scattered radiation. To rigorously examine the utility of scatter images for image guidance, a model is developed using MCNP code to simulate scatter images of phantoms and lung cancer patients. The model is validated by comparing experimental and simulated images of phantoms of different complexity. The differentiation between tissue types is investigated by imaging objects of known compositions (water, lung, and bone equivalent). A lung tumor phantom, simulating materials and geometry encountered during lung SBRT treatments, is used to investigate image noise properties for various quantities of delivered radiation (monitor units(MU)). Patient scatter images are simulated using the validated simulation model. 4DCT patient data is converted to an MCNP input geometry accounting for different tissue composition and densities. Lung tumor phantom images acquired with decreasing imaging time (decreasing MU) are used to model the expected noise amplitude in patient scatter images, producing realistic simulated patient scatter images with varying temporal resolution. Results: Image intensity in simulated and experimental scatter images of tissue equivalent objects (water, lung, bone) match within the uncertainty (∼3%). Lung tumor phantom images agree as well. Specifically, tumor-to-lung contrast matches within the uncertainty. The addition of random noise approximating quantum noise in experimental images to simulated patient images shows that scatter images of lung tumors can provide images in as fast as 0.5 seconds with CNR∼2.7. Conclusions: A scatter imaging simulation model is developed and validated using experimental phantom scatter images. Following validation, lung cancer patient scatter images are simulated. These simulated patient images demonstrate the clinical utility of scatter imaging for real-time tumor tracking during lung SBRT.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2009

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office operates the Nevada Test Site (NTS) and North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NTS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. The release of radionuclides from NTS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. Limitation to underground detonations after 1962 greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public surrounding the NTS. After nuclear testing ended in 1992, NTS radiation monitoring focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of tritium were also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NTS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61 Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy facility to 10 millirem per year (mrem/yr) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation not related to NTS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements or from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides. The NTS demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by using environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations. This method was approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for use on the NTS in 2001 and has been the sole method used since 2005. Six locations on the NTS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations, because no member of the public actually resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration of each detected radionuclide at each of these locations is less than the NESHAP Concentration Levels (CLs) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. At any one location, if multiple radionuclides are detected, then compliance with NESHAP is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2009, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air, resulting from both current and past NTS activities, at onsite compliance monitoring stations was a maximum of 1.69 mrem/yr, well below the 10 mrem/yr dose limit. Air sampling data collected at all six critical receptor stations had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values listed in Table 2 in Appendix E of 40 CFR 61. Concentrations ranged from less than 1 percent to a maximum of 17 percent of the allowed NESHAP limit. Because the nearest member of the public resides approximately 20 kilometers from potential release points on the NTS, concentrations at this location would be only a small fraction of that measured on the NTS. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000044 mrem/yr, 230,000 times lower than the 10 mrem/yr limit.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Development of a Small-Scale Project Model for Waste Management at the Port Hope Conversion Facility - 19126

Cameco Corporation's (Cameco) Port Hope Conversion Facility (PHCF) was previously owned by the federal Crown Corporation, Eldorado Nuclear, which held a significant inventory of legacy waste material at the time Cameco was formed in 1988. Over time, Cameco's ongoing operations contributed to an increase in the volume of low-level radioactive waste managed onsite. Since 2011, Cameco has completed annual waste management campaigns with the goal of accelerating the recycle/disposal of accumulated legacy radioactive wastes stored at its Ontario operations. With disposal options for low-level radioactively contaminated wastes in Canada limited due to cost considerations and no commercially accessible landfills licensed for radioactive material. In recent years, Cameco has started to ship marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) to the United States for disposal in an appropriate landfill owned by US Ecology in Idaho. Numerous successful campaigns totaling over 1,000 successful shipments, have been completed to transport drummed and/or bagged material by rail in gondola cars to the disposal facility in Idaho since 2011. All shipments have been completed in compliance with all environmental regulations, with a perfect compliance record maintained to date. To achieve this excellent compliance record, the campaigns require careful planning by both organizations, as well as deployment of personnel from the Idaho facility during the campaign for project management, characterization and/or radiation monitoring support. As the accumulated waste inventory has been reduced through these projects, the scope and duration of each campaign has also decreased. In the last few years, road transport directly to the Idaho facility has also been utilized. This option allows for the deployment of small projects that may be completed for a smaller inventory of a specific waste type and to manage newly-generated low-level radioactive wastes on an ongoing basis. These projects have ranged from a single standard van shipment to multiple trucks running continuous loops between the Ontario and Idaho or Ontario and an intermediary site and have been utilized for marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) as well as marginally contaminated wastes with additional hazard classification. Cameco and US Ecology personnel have collaborated to develop characterization and shipment procedures that enable these projects to be executed in full compliance with all Canadian and US regulations, without deployment of personnel from the Idaho facility, while maintaining adequate oversight by both organizations to ensure that the waste is safely and compliantly managed. These protocols have been implemented and optimized for the Port Hope Conversion Facility and will be rolled out to other Cameco facilities in Ontario through 2019. Cameco expects to utilize the small project model for the long term to ensure that eligible marginally contaminated wastes (<500 ppm uranium) are managed appropriately to ensure that once the legacy material is eliminated, it remains so. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Utilizing Commercial Submersible Mixer Pumps for Sludge Removal in Savannah River Site's Tank 26 - 20289

The Savannah River Site (SRS) Liquid Waste System (LWS) safely manages, stores, treats, and dispositions liquid radioactive waste. The LWS consists of 51 underground waste storage tanks (eight of which are operationally closed and filled with grout), waste evaporators, treatment facilities, and solidification facilities, known as the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) and Saltstone Production Facility (SPF). One of the waste storage tanks, Tank 26, was placed into service in 1980 as an F Tank Farm (FTF) Evaporator Feed Tank. From 1980 to 2013, Tank 26 received F Canyon receipts and dilute supernate that was then transferred to the 242-16F FTF Evaporator for volume reduction. In 2013, the steam tube bundle failed in the FTF Evaporator, and the decision was made not to repair/resume evaporator operation. During operation of Tank 26, solids built up to a level of 2.03 m in the tank with a volume of 1062.9 kL. Due to the evaporator failure and subsequent shutdown, the solids in Tank 26 were selected to feed Sludge Batch 10, which is collected and prepped prior to being sent to DWPF for final disposition. To accomplish solids removal, Commercial Submersible Mixer Pumps (CSMPs) were selected to slurry the solids in preparation to be sent to Tank 51. Four CSMPs were installed in Tank 26 with each one installed in a separate quadrant of Tank 26. This work would mark the first deployment of CSMPs in an SRS waste tank. The CSMPs were developed in response to operational issues from previous mixing pumps and budgetary constraints. The CSMPs use the concept of modifying commercially available equipment for nuclear waste applications. The CSMPs consist of a 230-horsepower submersible mixing pump (manufactured by GPM, Inc.) joined to a mast fabricated at SRS. For this application, Savannah River Remediation (SRR) design services was challenged to provide a mast design that required no steel superstructure support system on top of Tank 26. Also, SRR design services provided a simplified Tank 26 riser interface that did not require extensive machine parts to adjust height of the suction screen of the CSMP within the tank. Other design improvements include no requirements for tank top radiation monitors and no requirements for flushing of the CSMPs during startup/shutdown operations. The CSMPs were operated at an initial height of 2.29 m above the Tank 26 bottom for 10 days. After sludge sounding, the CSMPs were lowered to a height of 1.52 m with no issues due to proper work planning and the simplified riser interface. With the CSMPs lowered to a level of 1.52 meters above the tank bottom, the CSMPs were operated for 12 days and another sounding was performed. The sounding level came back matching the disturbance depth results of the first pump run. Chemistry samples were analyzed while the tank was left to settle. The analysis revealed enough weight percent solids to provide good feed to Sludge Batch 10. Also, the results revealed the supernate within the mixture would provide good salt solution feed to Salt Waste Processing Facility (SWPF) Salt Batch 3. So, the plan was modified to let the disturbed solids settle and decant the salt solution for addition to SWPF Salt Batch 3. Then water will be added back to Tank 26, and the CSMPs run in order to wash the solids to decrease settling time prior to being sent to Tank 51 for Sludge Batch 10. Utilizing CSMPs for waste removal in an SRS Tank has provided a cost-effective means for further waste removal efforts. In addition, the CSMPs are easier to operate by utilizing a robust and simplified design. The CSMPs performed quite well with no process shutdown or delays during operation. As a result, CSMPs are integral to the future of removing radioactive waste from storage tanks at SRS. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Effects of atmospheric parameters on radon measurements using alpha-track detectors

The calibration factors of alpha-track radon detectors (ATDs) are essential for accurate determination of indoor radon concentrations. In this paper, the effects of atmospheric parameters on the calibration factors were theoretically studied and partially testified. Based on the atmospheric thermodynamics theory and detection characteristics of the allyl diglycol carbonate (CR-39), the calibration factors for 5 types of ATDs were calculated through Monte Carlo simulations under different atmospheric conditions. Simulation results showed that the calibration factor increased by up to 31% for the ATDs with a decrease of air pressure by 35.5 kPa (equivalent to an altitude increase of 3500 m), and it also increased by up to 12% with a temperature increase from 5 °C to 35 °C, but it was hardly affected by the relative humidity unless the water-vapor condensation occurs inside the detectors. Furthermore, it was also found that the effects on calibration factors also depended on the dimensions of ATDs. It indicated that variations of the calibration factor with air pressure and temperature should be considered for an accurate radon measurement with a large dimensional ATD, and water-vapor condensation inside the detector should be avoided in field measurements.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Solid State Radiation Dosimeters for Space and Medical Applications

This report describes the development of two radiation monitors (RADMON's) for use in detecting total radiation dose and high-energy particles. These radiation detectors are chip-size devices fabricated in 1.2 micrometer CMOS and have flown in space on both experimental and commercial spacecraft. They have been used to characterize protons and electrons in the Earth's radiation belts, particles from the Sun, and protons used for medical therapy. Having proven useful in a variety of applications, the detector is now being readied for commercialization.

Buehler, Martin G.↗

RF radiation from lightning

Radiation from lightning in the RF band from 3-300 MHz were monitored. Radiation in this frequency range is of interest as a potential vehicle for monitoring severe storms and for studying the lightning itself. Simultaneous measurements were made of RF radiation and fast and slow field changes. Continuous analogue recordings with a system having 300 kHz of bandwidth were made together with digital records of selected events (principally return strokes) at greater temporal resolution. The data reveal patterns in the RF radiation for the entire flash which are characteristic of flash type and independent of the frequency of observation. Individual events within the flash also have characteristic RF patterns. Strong radiation occurs during the first return strokes, but delayed about 20 micron sec with respect to the begining of the return stroke; whereas, RF radiation from subsequent return strokes tends to be associated with cloud processes preceding the flash with comparatively little radiation occurring during the return stroke itself.

Levine, D. M.↗

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants - Radionuclide Emissions (Calendar Year 2018)

The U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons.The release of radionuclides from NNSS activities has been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of man-made radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP) (Title 40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] Part 61Subpart H) limits the release of radioactivity from a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency [EPA] and DOE 1995). This method was approved by the EPA in 2001 and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are actually pseudo-critical receptor stations because no member of the public resides at these onsite locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in 40 CFR 61, Appendix E, Table 2. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. In 2018, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by air sampling data collected at the critical receptor air monitoring stations which had average concentrations of radioactivity that were a fraction of the CL values. Concentrations ranged from 0.1% to a maximum of 5.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) was used to model dose to the offsite public from all 2018 NNSS radionuclide emissions. The model showed the maximally exposed individual to be on the northern end of Amargosa Valley; this individual received a potential dose of 0.07 mrem/y. The potential dose to the public from NLVF emissions was also very low at 0.000008 mrem/y, over six orders of magnitude lower than the 10 mrem/y limit.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

STS-53 Space Shuttle mission report

The STS-53 Space Shuttle Program Mission Report provides a summary of the Orbiter, External Tank (ET), Solid Rocket Booster/Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor (SRB/RSRM), and the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) subsystems performance during the fifty-second flight of the Space Shuttle Program, and the fifteenth flight of the Orbiter vehicle Discovery (OV-103). In addition to the Orbiter, the flight vehicle consisted of an ET, which was designated as ET-49/LWT-42; three SSME's, which were serial numbers 2024, 2012, and 2017 in positions 1, 2, and 3, respectively; and two SRB's, which were designated BI-055. The lightweight RSRM's that were installed in each SRB were designated 360L028A for the left SRB, and 360L028B for the right SRB. The primary objective of this flight was to successfully deploy the Department of Defense 1 (DOD-1) payload. The secondary objectives of this flight were to perform the operations required by the Glow Experiment/Cryogenic Heat Pipe Experiment Payload (GCP); the Hand-Held, Earth-Oriented, Real-Time, Cooperative, User-Friendly, Location-Targeting and Environmental System (HERCULES); the Space Tissue Loss (STL); the Battlefield Laser Acquisition Sensor Test (BLAST); the Radiation Monitoring Equipment-III (RME-III); the Microcapsules in Space-1 (MIS-1); the Visual Function Tester-2 (VFT-2); the Cosmic Radiation Effects and Activation Monitor (CREAM); the Clouds Logic to Optimize Use of Defense Systems-1A (CLOUDS-1A); the Fluids Acquisition and Resupply Experiment (FARE); and the Orbital Debris Radar Calibration Spheres (ODERACS). In addition to presenting a summary of subsystem performance, this report also discusses each Orbiter, ET, SSME, SRB, and RSRM in-flight anomaly in the applicable section of the report. Listed in the discussion of each anomaly is the officially assigned tracking number as published by each Project Office in their respective Problem Tracking List. All times given in this report are in Greenwich mean time (G.m.t.) as well as mission elapsed time (MET).

Fricke, Robert W., Jr.↗