Development of passive temperature control coatings for use on the Apollo vehicle ablative thermal protection system Final report
Passive temperature control coatings for Apollo spacecraft ablative thermal protection system
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Passive temperature control coatings for Apollo spacecraft ablative thermal protection system
Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2016. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The tritium concentration in both wells is slowly decreasing. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2016 in all wells is consistent with recent measurements. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.
Hanford's 242-A Evaporator has had the mission of reducing waste volume in the Hanford Tank Farms since the late 1970's. Until 2014, the Documented Safety Analysis for the 242-A facility considered protection and controls of the collocated worker (workers outside the facility) and the public. In 2010, Tank Farms Nuclear Safety engineers initiated a significant revision of the Documented Safety Analysis to implement DOE-STD-3009, Change Notice 3, which requires the protection of the facility worker in addition to the collocated worker and public. Through the use of an extensive process hazards analysis performed on the facility, it was concluded that it was essential to control conditions in the primary evaporation vessel (C-A-1) such that flammable gasses could not build up to the Lower Flammability Limit, and that another control was necessary to ensure that the C-A-1 vessel could not overflow. Early control decision meetings held during the development of the Documented Safety Analysis revision yielded no simple solution to the protection of workers from a flammable gas deflagration. Controls selected for the waste overflow accident were all mitigative in nature (i.e. the detection of a waste overflow after it already happened). Engineering could not replace the mitigative controls with preventive controls without attempting to credit some of the existing facility interlocks associated with the C-A-1 vessel operations. Software and hard-wired interlocks had been used at the facility to prevent overheating of the waste and overfilling of the C-A-1 vessel. These interlocks were considered useful to the prevention of the flammable gas deflagration and vessel overfilling accidents, but lacked the pedigree and reliability necessary to credit the interlocks as safety significant. It was at this stage of the Documented Safety Analysis control decision and control development that engineering became aware of the DOE's acceptance of the ISA-84 instrumented system standard. It became apparent that the ideal solution was not to attempt to credit existing interlock systems, but to develop a new system of 'safety interlocks' to the ISA-84 standard. A meeting was held with upper management of both engineering and operations to propose the use of safety instrumented systems at the 242-A facility. URS Corporation (now AECOM), who had recently supported the Savanah River site in developing ISA-84 controls, was consulted to support the development of two new instrumented systems for the 242-A facility. In addition to the use of the newly adopted ISA-84 standard, the failure modes and effect analysis process was implemented in a very effective manner to support the development of the new safety instrumented systems. Through a brand new methodology, and through a very dedicated and hard-working engineering, projects, and operations team, the new controls were designed, built, tested, and commissioned. At this time, five successful waste reduction campaigns have been performed at the facility with the new safety instrumented systems. During these waste processing campaigns, trips and spurious trips of the SIS have occurred - all of which acted properly. (authors)
The most promising closed CO2 control concept identified by this study is the solid pellet, Mg(OH2)2 system. Two promising approaches to closed thermal control were identified. The AHS system uses modular fusible heat sinks, with a contingency evaporative mode, to allow maximum EVA mobility. The AHS/refrigerator top-off subsystem requires an umbilical to minimize expendables, but less EVA time is used to operate the system, since there is no requirement to change modules. Both of these subsystems are thought to be practical solutions to the problem of providing closed heat rejection for an EVA system.
The Watchdog Project completed 100% of the project Statement of Project Objective (SOPO). The Watchdog project was a very aggressive project looking to accomplish commercialization of technology that had never been commercialized, as a result it took six years to complete not the original three that were planned. No additional federal funds were requested from the original proposal and SEL contributed the additional cost share required to complete the project. The result of the Watchdog Project is the world’s first industrial rated Software Defined Network (SDN) switch commercially available. This technology achieved the SOPOO and DOE Roadmap goals to have strong network access control, improve reliability and network performance, and give the asset owner the ability to minimize attack surface before and during an attack. The Watchdog project is an alliance between CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, Pacific Northwest National Laboratories (PNNL), and Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. (SEL). SEL is the world’s leader in microprocessor-based electronic equipment for protecting electric power systems. PNNL performs basic and applied research to deliver energy, environmental, and national security for our nation. CenterPoint Energy is the third largest publicly traded natural gas delivery company in the U.S and third largest combined electricity and natural gas delivery company. The Watchdog Project efforts were combined with the SDN Project efforts to produce the entire SDN system solution for the critical infrastructure. The Watchdog project addresses Topic Area of Interest 5: Secure Communications, for the DEFOA- 0000359 by protecting the control system local area network itself and the communications coming from and going to the electronic devices on the local network. Local area networks usually are not routed and have little or no filtering capabilities. Combine this with the fact control system protocols are designed with inherent trust the control system owners have very little choice on how to protect communications on the local network. The Watchdog project reduces security risks in electric sector control system local area networks (LANs) by providing: Network access control (NAC) Multi-Layer firewall (physical through transport layer) Containment of malware or unauthorized traffic spreading across the network White list protocols and application message types filtering Configurable, proactive traffic engineering The Watchdog project achieved all of the above by developing an SDN switch.
An ICRF discharge cleaning and a plasma heating experiment were performed in KSTAR toka-mak. For an automated operation and the diagnostics of the ICRF system, the ICRF local network was designed and implemented. This internal network provides monitoring, RF protection, remote control and RF diagnostics. All the functions of the control system were realized by customized DSP units. The DSP units were tied by a local network in parallel. For RF diagnostics, a detector based on digital I/Q demodulation technique was fabricated. The I/Q detector collects the RF amplitude and phase at the same time without errors from I/Q imbalance inherent in an analog counterpart. During the first experimental campaign of the KSTAR tokamak, the control system was operated as expected without any major problems such as affecting the tokamak operation. The transmitter was protected from the harmful over-voltage events through a reliable operation of the system. Details of ICRF control system and RF detecting technique with a brief experimental result will be presented.
One of the most promising forms of developing the apparatus part of relay protection and automation devices is considered. The advantages of choosing programmable logic integrated circuits to obtain adaptive technological algorithms in power system protection and control systems are pointed out. The technical difficulties in the problems which today stand in the way of using relay protection and automation systems are indicated and a new technology for solving these problems is presented. Particular attention is devoted to the possibility of reconfiguring the logic of these devices, using programmable logic integrated circuits.
With the development and research into the generation IV fast sodium reactors, great attention is paid to the enhancement of the core inherent self-protection characteristics. One of the problems dealt here is connected with the reduction of the reactivity margin so that the control rods running should not result in the core overheating and melting. In this paper we consider the possibilities of improving the core of BN-1200 with oxide fuel by a known method of introducing an axial fertile layer into the core. But unlike earlier studies this paper looks at the possibility of using such a layer not only for improving breeding, but also for reducing sodium void reactivity effect (SVRE). This proposed improvement of the BN-1200 core does not solve the problem of strong interference in control and protection system (CPS) rods of BN-1200, but they reduce significantly the reactivity margin for burn-up compensation. This helps compensate all the reactivity balances in the improved core configurations without violating constraints on SVRE value.
High temperature fission chambers are key instruments for the control and protection of the sodium-cooled fast reactor. First, the developments of those neutron detectors, which are carried out either in France or abroad are reviewed. Second, the French realizations are assessed with the use of the technology readiness levels in order to identify tracks of improvement. (authors)
Nascent platforms for programmable quantum simulation offer unprecedented access to new regimes of far-from-equilibrium quantum many-body dynamics in almost isolated systems. Here achieving precise control over quantum many-body entanglement is an essential task for quantum sensing and computation. Extensive theoretical work indicates that these capabilities can enable dynamical phases and critical phenomena that show topologically robust methods to create, protect and manipulate quantum entanglement that self-correct against large classes of errors. However, so far, experimental realizations have been confined to classical (non-entangled) symmetry-breaking orders. In this work, we demonstrate an emergent dynamical symmetry-protected topological phase, in a quasiperiodically driven array of ten 171 Yb + hyperfine qubits in Quantinuum’s System Model H1 trapped-ion quantum processor. This phase shows edge qubits that are dynamically protected from control errors, cross-talk and stray fields. Crucially, this edge protection relies purely on emergent dynamical symmetries that are absolutely stable to generic coherent perturbations. Here, this property is special to quasiperiodically driven systems: as we demonstrate, the analogous edge states of a periodically driven qubit array are vulnerable to symmetry-breaking errors and quickly decohere. Our work paves the way for implementation of more complex dynamical topological orders that would enable error-resilient manipulation of quantum information.
The cells in battery energy storage systems are monitored, protected, and controlled by battery management systems whose sensors are susceptible to cyberattacks. False data injection attacks (FDIAs) targeting batteries’ voltage sensors affect cell protection functions and the estimation of critical battery states like the state of charge (SoC). Inaccurate SoC estimation could result in battery overcharging and over discharging, which can have disastrous consequences on grid operations. This paper proposes a three-pronged online and offline method to detect, identify, and classify FDIAs corrupting the voltage sensors of a battery stack. To accurately model the dynamics of the series-connected cells a single particle model is used and to estimate the SoC, the unscented Kalman filter is employed. FDIA detection, identification, and classification was accomplished using a tuned cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm, which was compared with a baseline method, the chi-squared error detector. Online simulations and offline batch simulations were performed to determine the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Throughout the batch simulations, the CUSUM algorithm detected attacks, with no false positives, in 99.83% of cases, identified the corrupted sensor in 97% of cases, and determined if the attack was positively or negatively biased in 97% of cases.
Downtown low-voltage (LV) distribution networks are generally protected with network protectors that detect faults by restricting reverse power flow out of the network. This creates protection challenges for protecting the system as new smart grid technologies and distributed generation are installed. This report summarizes well-established methods for the control and protection of LV secondary network systems and spot networks, including operating features of network relays. Some current challenges and findings are presented from interviews with three utilities, PHI PEPCO, Oncor Energy Delivery, and Consolidated Edison Company of New York. Opportunities for technical exploration are presented with an assessment of the importance or value and the difficulty or cost. Finally, this leads to some recommendations for research to improve protection in secondary networks.
The National Spherical Torus Experiment (NSTX) has been designed and installed in the existing facilities at Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory (PPPL). Most of the hardware, plant facilities, auxiliary sub-systems, and power systems originally used for the Tokamak Fusion Test Reactor (TFTR) have been used with suitable modifications to reflect NSTX needs. The original TFTR Hardwired Control System (HCS) with electromechanical relays was used for NSTX DC Power loop control and protection during NSTX operations. As part of the NSTX Upgrade, the HCS is being changed to a PLC-based system with the same control logic. This paper gives a description of the changeover to the new PLC-based system __________________________________________________
The Advanced composites Sub-experiment includes numerous metal matrix composites, primarily graphite fiber reinforced aluminum and magnesium, and several classes of graphite fiber reinforced organic matrix (epoxy, polysulfone, polyimide) composites with and/or without thermal control or protective coatings. The experiment included over 500 flight samples, mounted on the leading and trailing edges of LDEF, and a full complement of the laboratory control samples. Preliminary results are presented reviewing changes in the visual appearance of the samples, atomic oxygen erosion of the organic matrix composites, contamination effects, and the effects of micrometeorite impacts and thermal fatigue on the metal matrix composites.
Digital safety platform considerations for power plant modernization or new build efforts involve a burdensome task of implementing a large number of software-based functions onto a designated platform to match the plant's architecture. This problem is not unique to any particular safety-related platform solution, but is prevalent across the landscape of current Qualified and Licensed Safety-related Instrumentation and Control (I and C) Solutions. As an example when implementing a RG 1.97 compliant Post Accident Monitoring System (PAMS) solution with the Lockheed Martin Nuclear Protection and Control (NuPAC) safety platform, 72 unique software loads are needed to configure the Qualified Display System (QDS). Large scale development and customization efforts to upgrade existing plant functions or systems require the licensee to assume the cost and technical risk necessary to undergo a digital based upgrade. Often the cost, schedule, and technical risk outweighed the benefit of modernization efforts due to the unknown hurdles and past projects that overran cost and schedule projections. Lockheed Martin's Engineering Production Suite (EPS) minimizes the licensee risk and expense associated with modernization efforts through a developer's toolkit for rapid, automated, and repeatable development of Programmable Logic used to implement plant functions and architectures for use on the Lockheed Martin NuPAC platform. This paper describes a use case where by EPS can create system level representations, simulate system functions, partition logic designs to accommodate hardware constraints through logic partitioning, automate the assembly of Application Specific Programmable Logic (ASPL), generate system test cases, program the NuPAC hardware, and perform testing throughout the design workflow. (authors)
Lower Three Runs is a large blackwater stream that runs through the eastern and southern portion of the Savannah River Site. The Lower Three Runs watershed includes two SRS facility areas: P Area (P Reactor) and R Area (R Reactor) that provided effluent discharges to Lower Three Runs. During reactor operations, effluent discharges were well above natural (pre-industrial) or present day stream discharges. The watershed contains a 2,500-acre mainstream impoundment (PAR Pond), several smaller pre-cooler ponds, and a canal system that connects the pre-cooler ponds and discharges surface water to PAR Pond. From the PAR Pond dam, Lower Three Runs flows approximately 36 kilometers braiding through bottom-land/flood-plain forests before it enters the Savannah River. About eight kilometers downstream from the PAR Pond dam, the SRS boundary narrows (termed the Lower Three Runs tail) providing a limited buffer of DOE property for the Lower Three Runs stream and associated flood-plain. Previous screening characterization efforts revealed Cs-137 contamination in the sediment/soils of the flood-plain. As a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act stimulus package, a comprehensive characterization effort was executed on the sediment/soils of the Lower Three Runs tail flood-plain providing a comprehensive look at the contaminant signature of the area. As a follow-up to that characterization, a regulatory decision Core Team, comprised of members of the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control, Environmental Protection Agency - Region IV, and DOE, conducted negotiations on a risk-based approach to address the level of contamination found in the tail flood-plain as an early action that provided a long-term solution to exposure scenarios. For evaluation purposes, the adolescent trespasser was selected as the most likely human receptor for the Lower Three Runs tail portion because of the natural attractiveness of the area for recreational activities (i.e., hunting, fishing, hiking etc.) and access from public property. Exposure of the adolescent trespasser to Cs-137 contaminated sediment/soil at concentrations greater than 23.7 pico curies per gram have been calculated to result in an unacceptable cancer risk (> 1 x 10{sup -4}). Comparing the characterization sampling results conducted in 2009 with the benchmark concentration of 23.7 pCi/g, identified elevated risk levels along three sampling areas in the Lower Three Runs tail portion. On January 5, 2012, it was agreed by the core team that a Removal Action in the Lower Three Runs tail was to be conducted for the identified soil/sediment locations in the three identified areas that exceed the 1 x 10{sup -4} risk (23.7 pCi/g) for the adolescent trespasser receptor. The addition of Land Use Controls following the Removal Action was appropriate to protect human health and the environment. A systematic screening matrix was initiated at the identified hot spots (i.e., sampling points with Cs-137 activities greater than 23.7 pCi/g) to identify the limits of the excavation area. Sediment/soil within the defined removal areas would be excavated to the depth necessary to achieve the cleanup goal and disposed of in a CERCLA Off-Site Rule approved disposal facility. It was agreed that this removal action would adequately reduce the volume of available Cs-137 in the Lower Three Runs tail and consequently residual activities of the Cs-137 would decay over time reducing the amount of Cs-137 available in the tail which would curtail risk. The Land Use Controls consist of installation of an additional seven miles of fencing at major road crossings, utility easements, and at areas that showed a higher probability of access. In addition, signs were placed along the entire SRS perimeter of the Lower Three Runs tail approximately every 200 feet. Sign posts included both a No Trespassing sign and a Contaminant Warning sign. The project initiated a subcontract for both the removal action and the installation of fencing and signs on May 1, 2012. All field activities were completed by July 26, 2012. The project excavated and disposed of over 2700 cubic yards of contaminated sediment/soil, erected approximately seven miles of fence and placed over 2,000 signs demonstrating DOE's commitment to protect human health and act as a good neighbor to residents in the area. (authors)
The NASA Passive Thermal Control Engineering Guidebook provides recommendations, including best practices and lessons learned, related to the passive thermal control engineering discipline. Topics include analysis (including documentation and review), thermal hardware (design/selection, vendors, and integration), testing, and flight operations. The passive thermal discipline includes thermal control and thermal protection systems. The passive thermal control discipline, which is addressed in this Guidebook, is broad and covers internal and external systems, component passive thermal analysis, vehicle on-orbit attitude timeline analysis, integrated thermal analysis, various thermal control apparatus (heaters and controls, coatings, blankets and insulations, isolators, geometric design for view factors, materials emissivity/absorptivity properties), passive cooling of avionics, purge, vent, and drain for vehicle cavities and compartments, thermal model development and correlation, thermal cycle and thermal-vacuum testing. Topics related to thermal protection systems (TPS) are not within the scope of this document. The Guidebook provides a consolidated reference for early career as well as experienced engineers embarking on a new task. Leveraging the experience of the group minimizes the learning curve that exists at the start of new projects, reduces the risk of repeating mistakes, and improves the organization’s ability to deliver high-quality products efficiently. The intent of this document is to provide guidance based on collective experience, and is not intended impose constraints on project work. Best practices can vary substantially and it is important to apply judgment wisely based on careful consideration of the specific design and requirements. Implementation of the methods described will vary from project to project and should be applied in conjunction with the judgment of the thermal engineers performing and reviewing the work. The recommendations in this document are not intended to replace program, project, branch, Center, or NASA requirements and/or policies.
The NASA Passive Thermal Control Engineering Guidebook provides recommendations, including best practices and lessons learned, related to the passive thermal control engineering discipline. Topics include analysis (including documentation and review), thermal hardware (design/selection, vendors, and integration), testing, and flight operations. The passive thermal discipline includes thermal control and thermal protection systems. The passive thermal control discipline, which is addressed in this Guidebook, is broad and covers internal and external systems, component passive thermal analysis, vehicle on-orbit attitude timeline analysis, integrated thermal analysis, various thermal control apparatus (heaters and controls, coatings, blankets and insulations, isolators, geometric design for view factors, materials emissivity/absorptivity properties), passive cooling of avionics, purge, vent, and drain for vehicle cavities and compartments, thermal model development and correlation, thermal cycle and thermal-vacuum testing. Topics related to thermal protection systems (TPS) are not within the scope of this document. The Guidebook provides a consolidated reference for early career as well as experienced engineers embarking on a new task. Leveraging the experience of the group minimizes the learning curve that exists at the start of new projects, reduces the risk of repeating mistakes, and improves the organization’s ability to deliver high-quality products efficiently. The intent of this document is to provide guidance based on collective experience, and is not intended impose constraints on project work. Best practices can vary substantially and it is important to apply judgment wisely based on careful consideration of the specific design and requirements. Implementation of the methods described will vary from project to project and should be applied in conjunction with the judgment of the thermal engineers performing and reviewing the work. The recommendations in this document are not intended to replace program, project, branch, Center, or NASA requirements and/or policies.