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At least 217 records · Page 12

Preface to the Special Issue on Signal Processing, Data Acquisition and Front-end Systems for Radiation Detection and Measurements

This special issue of the Journal of Signal Processing Systems focuses on advancement of signal processing and data-acquisition for radiation detection and measurements. The seven articles included cover diverse topics within the scope of radiation detection ranging from understanding of fundamental fission process, instrumentation, and application of radiation interaction (e.g., tomography and imaging). The articles focus on signal processing for fission spectrometer, neutron and gamma-ray computed tomography and artificial intelligence methods, dynamic neutron imaging system, pulse-pileup correction in x-ray spectroscopy and calibration methods in radiation measurement.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

On the Feynman-alpha method for reflected fissile assemblies

The Feynman-alpha method is a neutron noise technique that is used to estimate the prompt neutron period of fissile assemblies. The method and quantity are of widespread interest including in applications such as nuclear criticality safety, safeguards and nonproliferation, and stockpile stewardship; the prompt neutron period may also be used to infer the k eff multiplication factor. The Feynman-alpha method is predicated on time-correlated neutron detections that deviate from a Poisson random variable due to multiplication. Traditionally, such measurements are diagnosed with one-region point kinetics, but two-region models are required when the fissile assembly is reflected. This paper presents a derivation of the two-region point kinetics Feynman-alpha equations based on a double integration of the Rossi-alpha equations, develops novel propagation of measurement uncertainty, and validates the theory. Validation is achieved with organic scintillator measurements of weapons-grade plutonium reflected by various amounts of copper to achieve k eff values of 0.83–0.94 and prompt periods of 5–75 ns. The results demonstrate that Feynman-alpha measurements should use the two-region model instead of the one-region model. The simplified one-region model deviates from the validated two-region models by as much as 10% in the estimate of the prompt neutron period, and the two-region model reduces to the one-region model for small amounts of reflector. The Feynman-alpha estimates of the prompt neutron period are compared to those of the Rossi-alpha approach. The comparative results demonstrate that the Feynman-alpha method is more precise than the Rossi-alpha method and more accurate for k eff < 0.92, whereas the Rossi-alpha method is generally more accurate for higher multiplications. Here, the uncertainty propagation developed in this work should be used for all Feynman-alpha measurements and will therein improve fitting accuracy and appropriate precision estimates.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

High bias machine learning for antineutrino-based safeguards for small reactors

The statistical methods used for antineutrino detection will need to be improved to effectively monitor the inventory of next-generation nuclear reactors. In this sensitivity study, we evaluate machine learning models compared to previously used statistical approaches to identify diversion scenarios in a simulated Advanced Fast Reactor (AFR)-100. A chi-square goodness-of-fit technique, which individually compares the simulated antineutrino yields to the expected antineutrino yield, resulted in precise but low diversion detection probability. Various support vector machine (SVM) models were applied with diverse training datasets to evaluate the robustness of the method towards unexpected or “unseen” diversion scenarios. Furthermore, our results indicate that while the SVM models significantly improved the detection probability of near-field antineutrino-based safeguards, up to a probability of ~0.04, for the simulated small reactor, the detection system still needs improvements to reach the 0.2 detection limit established by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Utilization of ACE nuclear data file toolkit ACEtk to calculate relative sensitivity coefficients of point-kinetics parameters

Sensitivity and uncertainty methods are quintessential for nuclear criticality safety and experiment design. This type of analysis relies on calculations of sensitivity coefficients; sensitivity coefficients of the effective neutron multiplication factor with respect to some nuclear data are predominantly calculated and used. As a part of the Laboratory Directed Research & Development project EUCLID (Experiments Underpinned by Computational Learning for Improvements in nuclear Data) at Los Alamos National Laboratory, sensitivity coefficients of many radiation detector measurement responses with respect to nuclear data were investigated. Specifically, this paper outlines a method to calculate point-kinetics parameters relative sensitivity coefficients with respect to nuclear data. Point-kinetics parameters such as the prompt neutron decay constant, effective delayed neutron fraction, and neutron generation time are especially important to experimenters and reactor operators designing systems with dynamic neutron populations. This method couples capabilities of the ACE (A Compact ENDF) nuclear data file toolkit, ACEtk, with the ability to load cross sections into the radiation transport code Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP). In conclusion, key aspects of optimizing this method for a particular application and sensitivity profiles of the Jezebel criticality experiment are examined and discussed.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Machine learning at the edge to improve in-field safeguards inspections

Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) are near-ubiquitous in day-to-day life; from cars with automated driver-assistance, recommender systems, generative content platforms, and large language chatbots. Implementing AI as a tool for international safeguards could significantly decrease the burden on safeguards inspectors and nuclear facility operators. The use of AI would allow inspectors to complete their in-field activities quicker, while identifying patterns and anomalies and freeing inspectors to focus on the uniquely human component of inspections. Sandia National Laboratories has spent the past two and a half years developing on-device machine learning to develop both a digital and robotic assistant. This combined platform, which we term inspecta, has numerous on-device machine learning capabilities that have been demonstrated at the laboratory scale. Here this work describes early successes implementing AI/ML capabilities to reduce the burden of tedious inspector tasks such as seal examination, information recall, note taking, and more.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Autonomous anomaly detection of proliferation in the AGN-201 nuclear reactor digital twin

The expansion of global nuclear power necessitates advanced methods for analyzing proliferation indicators. This study introduces a novel application of the Isolation Forest Machine Learning (IFML) algorithm within a digital twin (DT) of the AGN-201 nuclear reactor to autonomously detect anomalies. Leveraging real-time operational data from the AGN-201 DT, the IFML algorithm identifies outliers without prior data labeling and operates as a lightweight, complementary approach to traditional physics-based anomaly detection methods for nuclear safeguards. In a simulated Red vs. Blue team exercise, the IFML algorithm successfully detected six significant unseen anomalies related to reactivity changes, achieving an accuracy of 99% for identifying operational deviationxs. These anomalies, caused by deliberate perturbations, were detected alongside known physics-based models, underscoring the potential of IFML to enhance real-time monitoring without displacing traditional methods. Further, this study highlights the applicability of IFML in nuclear environments by providing an additional, redundant layer of anomaly detection to improve safeguards and operational safety in complex systems.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Semi-automatic image annotation using 3D LiDAR projections and depth camera data

Efficient image annotation is necessary to utilize deep learning object recognition neural networks in nuclear safeguards, such as for the detection and localization of target objects like nuclear material containers (NMCs). This capability can help automate the inventory accounting of different types of NMCs within nuclear storage facilities. The conventional manual annotation process is labor-intensive and time-consuming, hindering the rapid deployment of deep learning models for NMC identifications. This paper introduces a novel semi-automatic method for annotating 2D images of nuclear material containers (NMCs) by combining 3D light detection and ranging (LiDAR) data with color and depth camera images collected from a handheld scan system. The annotation pipeline involves an operator manually marking new target objects on a LiDAR-generated map, and projecting these 3D locations to images, thereby automatically creating annotations from the projections. The semi-automatic approach significantly reduces manual efforts and the expertise in image annotation that is required to perform the task, allowing deep learning models to be trained on-site within a few hours. The paper compares the performance of models trained on datasets annotated through various methods, including semi-automatic, manual, and commercial annotation services. The evaluation demonstrates that the semi-automatic annotation method achieves comparable or superior results, with a mean average precision (mAP) above 0.9, showcasing its efficiency in training object recognition models. Additionally, the paper explores the application of the proposed method to instance segmentation, achieving promising results in detecting multiple types of NMCs in various formations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Preliminary studies on diversion and misuse for TRISO-fueled heat-pipe-cooled microreactors

Microreactors are being developed by multiple reactor designers to mass-produce nuclear facilities for worldwide deployment. Including microreactors in a country’s energy portfolio introduces new concerns for international safeguards regarding the number of reactor locations. Microreactors have smaller quantities of nuclear material compared to current light-water reactors, which makes diverting enough material for clandestine purposes difficult for a single reactor. Diversion or misuse of multiple microreactors to obtain a significant quantity introduces a new acquisition pathway. This work examines diversion and misuse scenarios for a realistic heat-pipe-cooled microreactor to understand how these scenarios would effect reactor operations to determine if monitoring key parameters could reduce the burden of inspection on monitoring agencies. Here, we determined misuse caused too drastic of an effect on core operations to be a valid acquisition pathway for the realistic heat-pipe-cooled microreactor. Diversion was explored across varying levels of severity, where potential diversion scenarios could yield one significant quantity of material from between six and eleven microreactors. Through examining the critical control drum angle, excess reactivity, control drum worth, and power distribution changes from nominal were detected over the operational lifetime, which could indicate a divergence from normal operations.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Isotopic gamma lines for identification of shielding materials

Identifying the constituting materials of concealed objects is crucial in a wide range of sectors, such as medical imaging, geophysics, nonproliferation, national security investigations, and so on. Existing methods face limitations, particularly when multiple materials are involved or when there are challenges posed by scattered radiation and large areal mass. Here we introduce a novel brute-force statistical approach for material identification using high spectral resolution detectors, such as HPGe. The method relies upon updated semianalytic formulae for computing uncollided flux from source of gamma radiation, shielded by a sequence of nested spherical or cylindrical materials. These semianalytical formulae make possible rapid flux estimation for material characterization via combinatorial search through all possible combinations of materials, using a high-resolution HPGe counting detector. An important prerequisite for the method is that the geometry of the objects is known (for example, from X-ray radiography). We demonstrate the viability of this material characterization technique in several use cases with both simulated and experimental data in spherical geometry.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

127 Xe quantification method development and intercomparison exercise

Monitoring of the atmosphere for fission products ( 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe) is performed by various laboratories to detect nuclear explosions. Quantification of 127 Xe is not routinely performed by laboratories measuring atmospheric radioxenon because it is not a fission product. 127 Xe was recently detected by a ground-based beta-gamma air monitoring system. When measured using beta-gamma coincidence detector systems, such as those in use on the International Monitoring System (IMS) of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 127 Xe can interfere with the quantification of fission product radioxenon due to overlap of the 127 Xe beta-gamma coincidence signatures with those of fission product radioxenon. Here, this work demonstrates quantification of 127 Xe at different laboratories with different measurement techniques. Production and purification of 127 Xe was performed by neutron activation of enriched 126 Xe. The purified 127 Xe was then split between laboratories, and detection and quantification methods were developed. At Idaho National Laboratory, a quantification method involving high purity germanium detectors was devised that included self-attenuation correction. At AWE, a beta-gamma coincidence counting method, as used in support of the IMS, was modified to enable the measurement and analysis of the 127 Xe samples. Corrections were made for self-attenuation, which showed a strong xenon volume dependency, for some coincidence signatures. The gas sample activity concentration was used as the comparison metric and it showed excellent agreement between the methods.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Bottom-up and Top-Down Uncertainty Quantification for Measurements

Several recent papers address improved uncertainty quantification (UQ) for measurements used in nuclear safeguards. This paper reviews progress and presents new results for bottom-up (first principles) and top-down (empirical) UQ for safeguards, where the main quantitative measure of uncertainty is the total measurement error standard deviation (SD), which includes both random and systematic error components. The five main UQ topics addressed here include: (1) impact of making data-driven choices in SD estimation; (2) use of approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) for both bottom-up and top-down UQ; (3) computational calibration; (4) revisions to the guide to the expression of uncertainty in measurement (GUM), and (5) critique of a recently-suggested “Unified Theory of Measurement Errors and Uncertainties.”

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Growth interface study of CdTeSe crystals grown by the THM technique

The Traveling Heater Method (THM) is a widely accepted technique to grow high-quality detector grade CdTe and CdZnTe ingots, especially for X-ray and gamma-ray detector applications. Unlike melt-growth techniques, the growth interface for ingots produced by the THM technique consists of two different compounds, viz. the solidified region (just below the interface) consists of the compound to be grown (e.g., CdZnTe for CdZnTe growth), while the molten zone just above the growth interface consists of Te-rich CdZnTe. Thus, optimization of the growth parameters is critical to obtain a clean growth interface with the required shape and presence of minimal Te-rich inclusions. Here, in this study, CdTeSe ingots were grown employing the THM technique to investigate the growth interface. Both macroscopic and microscopic behavior of the interface were studied. The study revealed that a microscopically smooth growth interface can be achieved by optimizing the growth parameters, which is essential for obtaining high-quality, inclusion-free ingots.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Possible impacts of molten salt reactors on the International Monitoring System

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) are gaining support as many countries look for ways to increase power generation and replace aging nuclear energy production facilities. MSRs have inherently safe designs, are scalable in size, can burn transuranic wastes from traditional solid fuel nuclear reactors, can store excess heat in thermal reservoirs for water desalination, and can be used to produce medical isotopes as part of the real-time liquid-fuel recycling process. The ability to remove 135 Xe in real time from the fuel improves the power production in an MSR because 135 Xe is the most significant neutron-absorbing isotope generated by nuclear fission. Xenon-135, and other radioactive gases, are removed by sparging the fuel with an inert gas while the liquid fuel is recirculated from the reactor inner core through the heat exchangers. Without effective abatement technologies, large amounts of radioactive gas could be released during the sparging process. This work examines the potential impact of radioxenon releases on samplers used by the International Monitoring System (IMS) to detect nuclear explosions. Here, atmospheric transport simulations from seven hypothetical MSRs on different continents were used to evaluate the holdup time needed before release of radioxenon so IMS samplers would register few detections. Abatement technologies that retain radioxenon isotopes for at least 120 d before their release will be needed to mitigate the impacts from a molten salt breeder reactor used to replace a nuclear power plant. A holdup time of about 150 d is needed to reduce emissions to the average level of current nuclear power plants.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Gas diffusion through variably-water-saturated zeolitic tuff: Implications for transport following a subsurface nuclear event

Noble gas transport through geologic media has important applications in the characterization of underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). Without accurate transport models, it is nearly impossible to distinguish between xenon signatures originating from civilian nuclear facilities and UNEs. Understanding xenon transport time through the earth is a key parameter for interpreting measured xenon isotopic ratios. One of the most challenging aspects of modeling gas transport time is accounting for the effect of variable water saturation of geological media. In this study, we utilize bench-scale laboratory experiments to characterize the diffusion of krypton, xenon, and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) through intact zeolitic tuff under different saturations. Here, we demonstrate that the water in rock cores with low partial saturation dramatically affects xenon transport time compared to that of krypton and SF6 by blocking sites in zeolitic tuff that preferentially adsorb xenon. This leads to breakthrough trends that are strongly influenced by the degree of the rock saturation. Xenon is especially susceptible to this phenomenon, a finding that is crucial to incorporate in subsurface gas transport models used for nuclear event identification. We also find that the breakthrough of SF6 diverges significantly from that of noble gases within our system. When developing field scale models, it is important to understand how the behavior of xenon deviates from chemical tracers used in the field, such as SF6 (Carrigan et al., 1996). These new insights demonstrate the critical need to consider the interplay between rock saturation and fission product sorption during transport modeling, and the importance of evaluating specific interactions between geomedia and gases of interest, which may differ from geomedia interactions with chemical tracers.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Projected network performance for multiple isotopes using next-generation xenon monitoring systems

Since about 2000 (Bowyer et al., 1998), radioxenon monitoring systems have been under development and testing for the verification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Operation of the systems since then has resulted in development of a next-generation of systems that are nearly ready for operational deployment. By 2010, the need to screen out civilian sources was well known (Auer et al., 2010; Saey, 2009), and isotopic ratio approaches were soon considered (Kalinowski et al., 2014) to identify specific sources. New generation systems are expected to improve the ability to verify the absence of nuclear tests by using isotopic ratios when multiple isotopes are detected. In this work, thousands of releases were simulated to compute the global detection probability of 131m Xe, 133m Xe, 133 Xe, and 135 Xe at 39 noble gas systems in the International Monitoring System (IMS) for both current and next-generation systems. Three release scenarios are defined at 1 h, 1 d, and 10 d past a 1 kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. Multiple cases using from one part in a million to the complete release of the xenon isotopic activity are evaluated for each scenario. Coverage maps and global integrals comparing current and next-generation monitoring systems are presented showing that next-generation noble gas systems will create measurable improvements in the IMS. The global detection probability for 133 Xe is shown to be strong in all scenarios, but only modestly improved by next-generation equipment. However, the detection probability for 131m Xe and 133m Xe increased to about 50% in different scenarios, providing a second detectable isotope for many events. As anticipated from shorter sampling intervals, the expected number of detecting samples roughly doubled and the expected number of detecting stations rose by approximately 50% for all release scenarios. Thus, it might be anticipated that future events would consist of multiple 133 Xe detections and one or more second isotope detections. In conclusion, signals of this nature should increase detection confidence, tighten release location estimates, improve rejection of civilian signals, and lessen the impacts from individual systems being offline for maintenance or repair reasons.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗