Results for “Organizational” — Page 12

NASA NTRS2012

Command Center Training Tool (C2T2)

This abstract presents the training approach taken to create a management-centered, experiential learning solution for the Virginia Port Authority's Port Command Center. The resultant tool, called the Command Center Training Tool (C2T2), follows a holistic approach integrated across the training management cycle and within a single environment. The approach allows a single training manager to progress from training design through execution and AAR. The approach starts with modeling the training organization, identifying the organizational elements and their individual and collective performance requirements, including organizational-specific performance scoring ontologies. Next, the developer specifies conditions, the problems, and constructs that compose exercises and drive experiential learning. These conditions are defined by incidents, which denote a single, multi-media datum, and scenarios, which are stories told by incidents. To these layered, modular components, previously developed meta-data is attached, including associated performance requirements. The components are then stored in a searchable library An event developer can create a training event by searching the library based on metadata and then selecting and loading the resultant modular pieces. This loading process brings into the training event all the previously associated task and teamwork material as well as AAR preparation materials. The approach includes tools within an integrated management environment that places these materials at the fingertips of the event facilitator such that, in real time, the facilitator can track training audience performance and resultantly modify the training event. The approach also supports the concentrated knowledge management requirements for rapid preparation of an extensive AAR. This approach supports the integrated training cycle and allows a management-based perspective and advanced tools, through which a complex, thorough training event can be developed.

Jones, Phillip↗

NASA NTRS2013

Socio-Technical Perspective on Interdisciplinary Interactions During the Development of Complex Engineered Systems

This study investigates interdisciplinary interactions that take place during the research, development, and early conceptual design phases in the design of large-scale complex engineered systems (LaCES) such as aerospace vehicles. These interactions, that take place throughout a large engineering development organization, become the initial conditions of the systems engineering process that ultimately leads to the development of a viable system. This paper summarizes some of the challenges and opportunities regarding social and organizational issues that emerged from a qualitative study using ethnographic and survey data. The analysis reveals several socio-technical couplings between the engineered system and the organization that creates it. Survey respondents noted the importance of interdisciplinary interactions and their benefits to the engineered system as well as substantial challenges in interdisciplinary interactions. Noted benefits included enhanced knowledge and problem mitigation and noted obstacles centered on organizational and human dynamics. Findings suggest that addressing the social challenges may be a critical need in enabling interdisciplinary interactions

McGowan, Anna-Maria R.↗

NASA NTRS2013

Prospective Safety Analysis and the Complex Aviation System

Fatal accident rates in commercial passenger aviation are at historic lows yet have plateaued and are not showing evidence of further safety advances. Modern aircraft accidents reflect both historic causal factors and new unexpected "Black Swan" events. The ever-increasing complexity of the aviation system, along with its associated technology and organizational relationships, provides fertile ground for fresh problems. It is important to take a proactive approach to aviation safety by working to identify novel causation mechanisms for future aviation accidents before they happen. Progress has been made in using of historic data to identify the telltale signals preceding aviation accidents and incidents, using the large repositories of discrete and continuous data on aircraft and air traffic control performance and information reported by front-line personnel. Nevertheless, the aviation community is increasingly embracing predictive approaches to aviation safety. The "prospective workshop" early assessment tool described in this paper represents an approach toward this prospective mindset-one that attempts to identify the future vectors of aviation and asks the question: "What haven't we considered in our current safety assessments?" New causation mechanisms threatening aviation safety will arise in the future because new (or revised) systems and procedures will have to be used under future contextual conditions that have not been properly anticipated. Many simulation models exist for demonstrating the safety cases of new operational concepts and technologies. However the results from such models can only be as valid as the accuracy and completeness of assumptions made about the future context in which the new operational concepts and/or technologies will be immersed. Of course that future has not happened yet. What is needed is a reasonably high-confidence description of the future operational context, capturing critical contextual characteristics that modulate both the likelihood of occurrence of hazards, and the likelihood that those hazards will lead to negative safety events. Heuristics extracted from scenarios, questionnaires, and observed trends from scanning the aviation horizon may be helpful in capturing those future changes in a way conducive to safety assessment. What is also needed is a checklist of potential sources of emerging risk that arise from organizational features that are frequently overlooked. The ultimate goal is to develop a pragmatic, workable method for using descriptions of the future aviation context, to generate valid predictions of safety risks.

prospection↗

NASA NTRS2017

Cultivating a Grassroots Aerospace Innovation Culture at NASA Ames Research Center

This paper details the adaptation of specific 'knowledge production' methods to implement a first of its kind, grassroots event that provokes a cultural change in how the NASA Ames civil servant community engages in the creation and selection of innovative ideas. Historically, selection of innovative proposals at NASA Ames Research Center is done at the highest levels of management, isolating the views and perspectives of the larger civil servant community. Additionally, NASA innovation programs are typically open to technical organizations and do not engage non-technical organizations to bring forward innovative processes/business practices. Finally, collaboration on innovative ideas and associated solutions tend to be isolated to organizational silos. In this environment, not all Ames employees feel empowered to innovate and opportunities for employee collaboration are limited. In order to address these issues, the 'innovation contest' method was adapted to create the NASA Ames Innovation Fair, a unique, grassroots innovation opportunity for the civil servant community. The Innovation Fair consisted of a physical event with a virtual component. The physical event provided innovators the opportunity to collaborate and pitch their innovations to the NASA Ames community. The civil servant community then voted for the projects that they viewed as innovative and would contribute to NASA's core mission, making this event a truly grassroots effort. The Innovation Fair website provided a location for additional knowledge sharing, discussion, and voting. On March 3rd, 2016, the 'First Annual NASA Ames Innovation Fair' was held with 49 innovators and more than 300 participants collaborating and/or voting for the best innovations. Based on the voting results, seven projects were awarded seed funding for projects ranging from innovative cost models to innovations in aerospace technology. Surveys of both innovators and Fair participants show the Innovation Fair was successful in fostering cross-organizational collaborations, soliciting participation of non-technical innovations, and increasing employee engagement in influencing the future of NASA Ames Research Center. The grassroots component of the Innovation Fair has been bench marked by the agency as a solid foundation for increasing employee engagement in the development of game changing aerospace technology and processes in support of NASA's mission.

Innovation↗

NASA NTRS2018

Engineering Elegant Systems: Postulates, Principles, and Hypotheses of Systems Engineering

Systems engineering integrated both the system and the organizational engineering disciplines to produce an elegant system. The NASA Systems Engineering Research Consortium has developed systems engineering postulates, principles, and hypotheses defining the physical and social aspects of systems engineering. This paper presents an overview of the current revision of this basis for systems engineering. This basis addresses several key aspects of systems engineering including system specific approach, organizational influences, policy and law impacts, application across the system life cycle, the mathematical basis of systems engineering, decision making, clearly distinguishing verification from validation, and system optimization.

Watson, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2018

Engineering Elegant Systems: Postulates, Principles, and Hypotheses of Systems Engineering

Systems engineering integrated both the system and the organizational engineering disciplines to produce an elegant system. The NASA Systems Engineering Research Consortium has developed systems engineering postulates, principles, and hypotheses defining the physical and social aspects of systems engineering. This paper presents an overview of the current revision of this basis for systems engineering. This basis addresses several key aspects of systems engineering including system specific approach, organizational influences, policy and law impacts, application across the system life cycle, the mathematical basis of systems engineering, decision making, clearly distinguishing verification from validation, and system optimization.

Watson, Michael D.↗

NASA NTRS2019

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) Program Status and Technology Investments Overview

The presentation provides an updated, high-level overview of the NEPP Program. The latest organizational chart is presented that shows the names of the Program and Assistant Program Managers. Additionally, the recent work that is on-going with the updating of several NASA NPDs, NPRs and technical standards is reviewed. Internal and external organizational interfaces are described. Finally, the current technology focus areas are described. These areas include passives, wide-band gap power devices, processor units (CPUs and GPUs), 2.5D and 3D device architectures, memories, and data analytics.

NEPAG↗

NASA NTRS2018

Working at the Speed of Innovation: Impedance Mismatch in Rapid and Innovation Projects

In this paper we report on the results of an ethnographic study of a rapid design innovation (RDI) experiment in NASA Aeronautics. This work is based on the study of the Aeronautics Autonomy Testbed Capability (AATC) team in the Convergent Aeronautics Solutions (CAS) project. This paper focuses on and summarizes one of the key over-arching findings from the study: there is a significant mismatch in the organizational culture in the rest of the organization compared with that required for RDI. And, if this organizational cultural mismatch is not addressed, the likelihood of any organization being able to advance a new and different type of work (such as RDI) will be jeopardized. We delineate several aspects of the two different cultures identified in order to enable leaders and practitioners to better understand what contributes to the cultural dissonance and the implications of the differences in the cultures. As well, we identify ways in which those differences can be addressed. Research from organization and other social sciences are incorporated to highlight the differences. The implications of the research suggest that the significant cultural differences trigger a strong and resistive response from the dominant culture that may negate leadership’s strategy to build the new capacity for RDI. While the research results noted the pervasive nature of innovation throughout the workplace, the type of innovation envisioned in RDI is a rare type of innovation that requires significantly new methods, work processes, tools, and skills such that approaches used in the dominate culture cannot be adopted by expediting the existing approaches. Examples include: innovation teaming and leadership; the need for adaptive leadership that changes the relationship of a research leader to the other researchers; and, an interdisciplinary teaming approach which shapes team relationships and activities. Each of these aspects requires new teaming, tools, and skills in order to succeed. Thus, when introducing RDI activities where there is a different dominant culture, teams need to be: well trained; protected; recognized and rewarded. And, team leaders must also be trained in the unique types of teaming and innovation tools used in RDI. Both RDI teaming and team leadership must be sanctioned, supported, and rewarded by leadership. Because of the cultural mismatch, in some organizations looking to add RDI to their existing and established organizations, sep to avoid or mitigate the negative impact of the culture mismatch.

Crain, Cathleen↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Metrics in Space Life Support Technology Selection

Engineering metrics are useful in space life support technology selection, but they must be carefully used. Metrics are only part of a complete system trade-off. Metrics do harm if they cause neglect of other important technical, organizational, or intuitive decision factors. Two metrics have damaged space life support, closure and Equivalent Systems Mass (ESM). Closure measures the fraction of the required system inputs that are produced by recycling system outputs. Increasing closure produces diminishing returns and becomes increasingly expensive. Increasing closure does not directly contribute to providing better life support. ESM measures the total launch mass required to provide life support. ESM includes the mass of the system hardware and of its power, cooling, pressurized volume, spares, and logistics. ESM predicts launch costs, but recently launch costs have been reduced by a factor of 20 or more. System development cost for space hardware is often much greater than launch cost. The past nearly exclusive use of ESM has led to the neglect of Life Cycle Cost (LCC), reliability, cost, and the other engineering factors. Closure and ESM have misguided space life support technology selection for more than twenty years and have adversely affected the expenditure of 100’s of millions of dollars. Metrics can be effectively used three ways in space life support technology selection: 1. A small set of key engineering metrics for preliminary screening. 2. A full set of engineering to guide technical selection. 3. Combining engineering metrics with organizational, political, and intuitive decision factors to understand technology selection. The past emphasis on closure and ESM served to support recycling life support over resupply and built on the intuitive appeal of a human ecosystem in space.

Harry W Jones↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

The Effective Use of Metrics in Space Life Support System Trade-Offs

Engineering metrics are useful in space life support technology selection, but they must be carefully used. Metrics are only part of a complete system trade-off. Metrics do harm if they cause neglect of other important technical, organizational, or intuitive decision factors. Two metrics have damaged space life support, closure and Equivalent Systems Mass (ESM). Closure measures the fraction of the required system inputs that are produced by recycling system outputs. Increasing closure produces diminishing returns and becomes increasingly expensive. Increasing closure does not directly contribute to providing better life support. ESM measures the total launch mass required to provide life support. ESM includes the mass of the system hardware and of its power, cooling, pressurized volume, spares, and logistics. ESM predicts launch costs, but recently launch costs have been reduced by a factor of 20 or more. System development cost for space hardware is often much greater than launch cost. The past nearly exclusive use of ESM has led to the neglect of Life Cycle Cost (LCC), reliability, cost, and the other engineering factors. Closure and ESM have misguided space life support technology selection for more than twenty years and have adversely affected the expenditure of 100’s of millions of dollars. Metrics can be effectively used three ways in space life support technology selection: 1. A small set of key engineering metrics for preliminary screening. 2. A full set of engineering to guide technical selection. 3. Combining engineering metrics with organizational, political, and intuitive decision factors to understand technology selection. The past emphasis on closure and ESM served to support recycling life support over resupply and built on the intuitive appeal of a human ecosystem in space.

Harry W. Jones↗

NASA NTRS2022

Event Report for The Ethical Artificial Intelligence Quantification Workshop

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a powerful emerging technology area which requires special attention to using it ethically. AI ethics is still an emerging field, and the partners for this workshop and report seek to move AI ethics discussion ahead by experimenting with ways to measure AI ethics criteria. The following document describes the outcomes and learnings from The Ethical Artificial Intelligence Quantification Workshop held at the National Institute for Aerospace (NIA), Hampton, Virginia on May 12th, 2022. The purpose of the workshop was for participants to evaluate and experiment-with the methodology and process presented by AIEthics.World in cooperation with Intel Corporation. The meeting participants learned about the Ethical AI Certification and Maturity Model™ and applied the methodology to selected notional AI systems. The workshop facilitated the evaluation of the maturity of the AI system according to ethical considerations relevant to NASA, NIA and other participants. The workshop consisted of three main phases. The first phase focused on understanding and summarizing NASA’s ethical approaches, mission and values based on published documentation, discussions and individual insights & opinions of participants. This information was prioritized, weighted, ordered, and quantified in phase two, to formulate an alignment between human values (ethics) and their applicability to AI systems during all lifecycle phases. The first two phases were summarized as a form of ethical genealogy for artificial intelligence, specific to NASA’s ethical approaches. In the third and last phase of the workshop the participants evaluated notional examples of artificial intelligence to qualify and quantify its ability to adhere to the organizational ethics approaches, using the Ethical AI Certification and Maturity Model™. The workshop uses the concept of genealogy, in the traditional sense: the study and traceability of lines of ancestors in the process of evolutionary development from earlier forms. However, as it is applied to an Ethical AI definition, it is providing the insights to the necessary and mandatory traceability of content, data, metrics, telemetry, elements, and structures which are used in the AI’s lifecycle to foster and measure AI ethics in all steps of its lifecycle. The Ethical Artificial Intelligence Quantification Workshop provided NASA with the opportunity to apply the Ethical AI Certification and Maturity Model™, in combination with existing and well-known decision-making and quality control methods to identify the metrics and measurements for an Ethical AI and assess its ethical condition and quality aligned with NASA ethics approaches. The result of the workshop is the capacity for NASA to apply the maturity model assessment to its AI Systems as desired and if necessary, publish the ability of these AI Systems to adhere to the organizational ethical goals. AI ethics frameworks need to be customized for each application domain, for example, individual NASA Mission Directorates. General principles that work in one area such as AI/Machine Learning-based text analysis (the ethics of information-extraction) may need to be adapted for another such as sense-and-avoid decision-making in a flight environment. The workshop was conducted among approximately twenty NASA subject matter experts, so the elements noted above should be considered examples, not definitive NASA ethical AI principles, genealogy, etc. Generating a definitive AI ethics framework for an organization as diverse as NASA would require far more discussion, debate, review, etc. However, the workshop provided valuable insight into mechanisms and processes for quantifying AI ethical qualities.

Artificial Intelligence↗

NASA NTRS2022

Atmospheric Research 2020 Technical Highlights

Welcome to the 2020 Atmospheres Highlights report. Here we summarize research and scientific communication/outreach accomplishments from the portion of atmospheric science activities at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) that comprises the Earth Science Division’s Atmospheres organization. As in previous years, this report is intended for a broad audience, including colleagues within NASA, scientists outside the Agency, science graduate students, and members of the public. Organizationally, the report covers research activities under the Office of Deputy Organizationally, the report covers research activities under the Office of Deputy Director for Atmospheres (610AT), which is within Earth Sciences Division (Code Director for Atmospheres (610AT), which is within Earth Sciences Division (Code 610) in the Sciences and Exploration Directorate (600). Laboratories and office within 610) in the Sciences and Exploration Directorate (600). Laboratories and office within 610AT include: Mesoscale Atmospheric Processes Laboratory (612), Climate and 610AT include: Mesoscale Atmospheric Processes Laboratory (612), Climate and Radiation Laboratory (613), Atmospheric Chemistry and Dynamics Laboratory (614), Radiation Laboratory (613), Atmospheric Chemistry and Dynamics Laboratory (614), and the Wallops Field Support Office (610.W). As of this writing, the 277 personnel and the Wallops Field Support Office (610.W). As of this writing, the 277 personnel in Code 610AT consist of 53 civil servants and 224 cooperative agreement associates, in Code 610AT consist of 53 civil servants and 224 cooperative agreement associates, postdoctoral fellows and contractors, postdoctoral fellows and contractors.

Annual Report↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Identifying Outside Influences as Latent Factors to Risk in Human Performance

During the Acquisition Life Cycle for a program, there are several opportunities for the system in design to be adjusted in accordance with its changing landscape as it is being shaped by evolving policy and organizational culture. Human Systems Integration is integral to identifying these opportunities of change as there are a set number of activities that may account for altered operational states, human performance deviations, and overall component engagement if HSI is enacted early enough in the life cycle. Some changes that occur in the operational environment may not be accounted for since the organizational culture and practices are not currently a part of the HSI focus. Likewise, policy changes themselves from a top-to-bottom analysis may not have the appearance of effecting human performance until having gone through a trail-and-error period. Workarounds to adjust for unforeseen policy affects become the system's solution that usually includes changes in the training and education of the operators, maintainers, and support personnel. A system full of workarounds and off-normal practices, that cause operators to disregard the purpose of the design, coupled with the false notion that these activities are proven for successful system operation, is the very definition of “an accident waiting to happen”. Unforeseen changes in policies and practices that cause new and unusual activities to successfully and keep the system running, should be considered latent factors that may cause a potential mishap, and not part of the resilience that humans provide to the successful operation of the system. This presentation will explore how latent factors may find their way into system operations and how they can be identified and addressed.

Human Systems Integration↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 1

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0. NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Uncertainty↗

NASA NTRS2024

NASA Risk Management Handbook: Version 2.0, Part 2

The purpose of this handbook is to provide an in-depth reference for the practice of risk management in NASA, updating the guidance offered in its original version, NASA/SP-2011-3422 (November 2011), and closely aligning the updated guidance with the current NASA Procedural Requirements for Agency Risk Management, NPR 8000.4, and the parent NASA Policy Directive for NASA Governance and Strategic Management, NPD 1000.0 (January 2020). NPD 1000.0 introduces with emphasis the concept of “Risk Leadership,” making it a fundamental tenet and pillar of the risk management culture that it advocates for the Agency. NPR 8000.4 applies this concept and establishes Risk Management (RM) requirements for the Agency as an integrated enterprise, as well as the RM requirements for portfolio elements within the enterprise. Such elements include the various programs and projects that contribute to the Agency’s objectives and the various institutional activities carried out by entities that contribute to mission support. The present version of the handbook also emphasizes the integration of risk management processes across activity and project life cycles and their coordination and interaction with day-to-day programmatic and organizational functions. Areas of application of risk assessment and management that were not covered with specific guidance in the preceding version are addressed in this version with in-depth examples. The handbook is structured into two parts, whose chapters are in turn organized in a sequential order intended to facilitate a gradual and progressive introduction of the reader to risk management principles and practices. Part 1 of the handbook is dedicated to the introduction of the basic foundations of the NASA integrated risk management framework, the related fundamental risk concepts, the description of the risk management and decision processes that are to be implemented within the framework, the discussion of the risk assessment techniques that should be utilized in support of such processes, and the management and organizational interactions and interfaces that should be enabled to implement an effective integration of risk management activities within the Agency. Part 2 provides self-contained, end-to-end examples of application of the processes and techniques introduced in Part 1, in the context of both programmatic (i.e., project and/or mission related) and institutional activities.

Risk Leadership↗

DOE OSTI2021

Strategies for Working Remotely: Responding to Pandemic-Driven Change.

In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Exascale Computing Project’s (ECP) Interoperable Design of Extreme-scale Application Software (IDEAS) productivity team launched the panel series Strategies for Working Remotely to facilitate informal, cross-organizational dialog in the absence of face-to-face meetings. In a time of pandemic, organizations increasingly need to reach across perceived boundaries to learn from each other, so that we can move beyond stand-alone silos to more connected multidisciplinary and multiorganizational configurations. The present paper argues that the unplanned transition to remote work, overuse of electronic communication, and need to unlearn habits associated with an overreliance on face-to-face, created unique opportunities to learn from the situation and accelerate cross-institutional cooperation and collaboration through online community dialog facilitated by informal panel discussions. Recommendations for facilitating online panel discussions to foster cross-organizational dialog are provided by applying the Simulation Experience Design Method.

Raybourn, Elaine M.↗