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At least 217 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2014

A Cultural Resources Inventory and Historical Evaluation of the Smoky Atmospheric Nuclear Test, Areas 8, 9, and 10, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This report presents the results of a National Historic Preservation Act Section 106 cultural resources inventory and historical evaluation of the 1957 Smoky atmospheric test location on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The Desert Research Institute (DRI) was tasked to conduct a cultural resources study of the Smoky test area as a result of a proposed undertaking by the Department of Energy Environmental Management. This undertaking involves investigating Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 550 for potential contaminants of concern as delineated in a Corrective Action Investigation Plan. CAU 550 is an area that spatially overlaps portions of the Smoky test location. Smoky, T-2c, was a 44 kt atmospheric nuclear test detonated at 5:30 am on August 31, 1957, on top of a 213.4 m (700 ft) 200 ton tower (T-2c) in Area 8 of the NNSS. Smoky was a weapons related test of the Plumbbob series (number 19) and part of the Department of Defense Exercise Desert Rock VII and VIII. The cultural resources effort involved the development of a historic context based on archival documents and engineering records, the inventory of the cultural resources in the Smoky test area and an associated military trench location in Areas 9 and 10, and an evaluation of the National Register eligibility of the cultural resources. The inventory of the Smoky test area resulted in the identification of structures, features, and artifacts related to the physical development of the test location and the post-test remains. The Smoky test area was designated historic district D104 and coincides with a historic archaeological site recorded as 26NY14794 and the military trenches designed for troop observation, site 26NY14795. Sites 26NY14794 and 26NY14795 are spatially discrete with the trenches located 4.3 km (2.7 mi) southeast of the Smoky ground zero. As a result, historic district D104 is discontiguous and in total it covers 151.4 hectares (374 acres). The Smoky test location, recorded as historic district D104 and historic sites 26NY14794 and 26NY14795, is the best preserved post-shot atmospheric nuclear tower test at the NNSS and possibly in the world. It is of local, national, and international importance due to nuclear testing’s pivotal role in the Cold War between the United States and the former Soviet Union. The district and sites are linked to the historic theme of atmospheric nuclear testing. D104 retains aspects of the engineering plan and design for the Smoky tower, instrument stations used to measure test effects, German and French personnel shelters, and military trenches. A total of 33 structures contribute to the significance of D104. Artifacts and features provide significant post-test information. Historic district D104 (discontiguous) and historic site 26NY14794 (the Smoky test area) are eligible for listing on the NRHP under Criteria A, B, C, and D. The historic site 26NY14795 (the Smoky military trenches) is eligible for listing under Criteria A, C, and D. Several items have been identified for removal by the CAU 550 investigation. However, none of them is associated with the Smoky atmospheric test, but with later activities in the area. The military trenches are not part of CAU 550 and no actions are planned there. A proposed closure of the Smoky test area with restrictions will limit access and contribute to the preservation of the cultural resources. It is recommended that the Smoky historic district and sites be included in the NNSS cultural resources monitoring program.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Underground Test Area Activity Communication/Interface Plan, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

The purpose of this plan is to provide guidelines for effective communication and interfacing between Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity participants, including the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) and its contractors. This plan specifically establishes the following: • UGTA mission, vision, and core values • Roles and responsibilities for key personnel • Communication with stakeholders • Guidance in key interface areas • Communication matrix

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 0

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are evaluated to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Additionally, monitoring data are used to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries (CBs) calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. In summary, the monitoring results from 2016 indicate the regulatory controls on the closure of CAU 98 remain effective in protection of human health and the environment. Recommendations resulting from this first year of monitoring activities include formally incorporating wells UE-5 PW-1, UE-5 PW-2, and UE-5 PW-3 into the groundwater-level monitoring network given their strategic location in the basin; and early development of a basis for trigger levels for the groundwater-level monitoring given the observed trends. Additionally, it is recommended to improve the Real Estate/Operations Permit process for capturing information important for evaluating the impact of activities on groundwater resources, and to shift the reporting requirement for this annual report from the second quarter of the federal fiscal year (end of March) to the second quarter of the calendar year (end of June).

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2017

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory EnergyX Macroencapsulation Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) EnergyX Macroencapsulation mixed low-level waste (MLLW) (BCLAMACRONCAP, Revision 2 [LLNL 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulation MLLW meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LLNL EnergyX Macroencapsulation waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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DOE OSTI2018

Annual Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: (CY2017 January 2017–December 2017, Rev. 0)

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the URs remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2017. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The 86,000-picocuries-per-liter (pCi/L) tritium concentration in one of the wells is about 12 percent higher than measured in 2016 but is over an order of magnitude less than the peak value measured in the well in 1980. The concentration in the other source/plume well is lower than measured in 2016. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2017 is generally consistent with recent measurements for most wells. Water-level declines differing from long-term trends were observed in four wells. Three of these (WW-4, WW-4A, and WW-5B) are water-supply wells that experienced increases in pumping during the year. No definitive cause for the sharp decline in the fourth well (ER-5-3-2) in 2016 is known as yet. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2018

Post-Closure Report for Closed Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Corrective Action Units, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada: For Calendar Year 2017, Revision 0

This report serves as the combined annual report for post-closure activities for the following closed corrective action units (CAUs): CAU 90, Area 2 Bitcutter Containment; CAU 91, Area 3 U-3fi Injection Well CAU 92, Area 6 Decon Pond Facility; CAU 110, Area 3 WMD U-3ax/bl Crater; CAU 111, Area 5 WMD Retired Mixed Waste Pits; and, CAU 112, Area 23 Hazardous Waste Trenches. The results of the inspections, a summary of maintenance activities, and an evaluation of monitoring data are presented in this report. Site inspections are conducted annually at CAUs 90, 91, and 112; semiannually at CAUs 92 and 110; and quarterly at CAU 111. Additional inspections are conducted at CAU 92 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inches in a 24-hour period and at CAU 111 if precipitation occurs in excess of 1.0 inch in a 24-hour period. Inspections include an evaluation of the condition of the units, including covers, fences, signs, gates, and locks. At CAU 110, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, and subsidence surveys are conducted in addition to the visual inspections. At CAU 111, soil moisture monitoring, vegetation evaluations, subsidence surveys, direct radiation monitoring, air monitoring, radon flux monitoring, and groundwater monitoring are conducted. This report will address all monitoring items notes above except groundwater monitoring. Groundwater monitoring is documented in the Nevada National Security Site Data Report: Groundwater Monitoring Program Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site. All required inspections, maintenance, and monitoring were conducted in accordance with the post-closure requirements of the permit. Revision 4 of Permit NEV HW0101 was issued effective December 10, 2015, and remains in effect until December 10, 2020.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2016

Underground Test Area Fiscal Year 2015 Annual Quality Assurance Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) and identifies the UGTA quality assurance (QA) activities from October 1, 2014, through September 30, 2015 (fiscal year [FY] 2015). All UGTA organizations—U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO); Desert Research Institute (DRI); Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL); Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec); Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I); Navarro Engineering and Research Inc (Navarro); and the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS)—conducted QA activities in FY 2015. The activities included conducting oversight assessments for QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, and publishing documents.

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DOE OSTI2017

Post-Closure Monitoring Report for Corrective Action Unit 98, Frenchman Flat, Underground Test Area, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada for Calendar Year 2016 (January 2016–December 2016), Revision 1

Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 98: Frenchman Flat on the Nevada National Security Site was the location of 10 underground nuclear tests. CAU 98 underwent a series of investigations and actions in accordance with the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order to assess contamination of groundwater by radionuclides from the tests. A Closure Report completed that process in 2016 and called for long-term monitoring, use restrictions (URs), and institutional controls to protect the public and environment from potential exposure to contaminated groundwater. Three types of monitoring are performed for CAU 98: water quality, water level, and institutional control. These are monitored to determine whether the UR boundaries remain protective of human health and the environment, and to ensure that the regulatory boundary objectives are being met. Monitoring data will be used in the future, once multiple years of data are available, to evaluate consistency with the groundwater flow and contaminant transport models because the contaminant boundaries calculated with the models are the primary basis of the UR boundaries. Six wells were sampled for water-quality monitoring in 2016. Contaminants of concern were detected only in the two source/plume wells already known to contain contamination as a result of a radionuclide migration experiment. The tritium concentration in both wells is slowly decreasing. The water-level monitoring network includes 16 wells. Depth to water measured in 2016 in all wells is consistent with recent measurements. Institutional control monitoring confirmed the URs are recorded in U.S. Department of Energy and U.S. Air Force land management systems, and that no activities within Frenchman Flat basin are occurring that could potentially affect the contaminant boundaries. Survey of groundwater resources in basins surrounding Frenchman Flat similarly identify no current or pending development that would indicate the need to increase monitoring activities or would otherwise cause concern for the closure decision. The URs continue to prevent exposure of the public, workers, and the environment to contaminants of concern by preventing use of potentially contaminated groundwater.

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DOE OSTI2018

Underground Test Area Calendar Year 2017 Quality Assurance Report Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This report is required by the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Activity Quality Assurance Plan (QAP) (NNSA/NFO, 2015) and identifies the UGTA quality assurance (QA) activities for calendar year (CY) 2017 (January 1, 2017, through December 31, 2017). UGTA organizations—U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program conduct QA activities throughout the CY. The activities include conducting oversight assessments (OAs) for UGTA Activity QAP compliance, identifying findings and completing corrective actions, evaluating laboratory performance, reviewing technical work, and publishing documents.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2012

Preliminary Investigation for Corrective Action Unit 572: Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures, Corrective Action Site 25-33-05: Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance Building, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada, Revision 0

Navarro-Intera, LLC (N-I), personnel—assisted by National Security Technologies, LLC (NSTec), radiological control personnel—conducted a preliminary field investigation to obtain information about Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 572, Test Cell C Ancillary Building and Structures; Corrective Action Site (CAS) 25-33-05, Building 3901, Engine Transport System Maintenance (ETSM) building. The ETSM building is located in Area 25 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The information learned from the investigation will reduce uncertainty about the nature and scope of potential releases and, therefore, reduce management risk associated with the planning and scheduling of future corrective action investigation activities. Site reconnaissance efforts for CAS 25-33-05 were conducted on June 18 and September 10–11, 2012. Detailed site conditions, building contents, potential waste streams, photographic documentation as well as radiological and chemical survey results are contained within this preliminary investigation.

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DOE OSTI2018

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Contaminated Concrete and General Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Contaminated Concrete and General Debris (WVDP000000013, Revision 12 [WVDP 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris waste stream meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The WVDP Contaminated Concrete and General Debris is recommended for acceptance with the condition that the total radium-226 (226Ra) activity not exceed 8.1E9 becquerels (Bq).

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DOE OSTI2018

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the West Valley Demonstration Project Drum Cell Cement Solidified Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP) Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste (WVDP000000018, Revision 4 [WVDP 2017]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the WVDP Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste meets all performance objectives in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual , Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 1999). The WVDP Drum Cell Cement-Solidified Waste is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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DOE OSTI2019

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Los Alamos National Laboratory H3 Waste from the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Tritium ( 3 H) Waste from the Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility (WETF) (LANL000000039, Revision 0 [LANL 2018]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LANL 3H Waste from WETF waste stream meets all performance objectives of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 2011). The LANL 3 H Waste from the WETF waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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DOE OSTI2019

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Vault Clean-Out Waste at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Vault Clean-Out waste stream (LANL000000030, Revision 4 [LANL 2018]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the LANL Vault Clean-Out waste stream meets all U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 2011). The LANL Vault Clean-Out waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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DOE OSTI2019

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center Mixed Low-Level Waste Requiring Macroencapsulation at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center (INTEC) Mixed Low-Level Waste (MLLW) requiring macroencapsulation (INEL166322NR1, Revision 0 [INL 2019]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the INTEC MLLW requiring macroencapsulation waste stream meets all the performance objectives contained in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 2011). The INTEC MLLW requiring macroencapsulation waste stream is recommended for acceptance without conditions.

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DOE OSTI2019

Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation: Disposal of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Contaminated Debris at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This Unreviewed Disposal Question Evaluation (UDQE) assesses whether the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Contaminated Debris (ORNLDEBRIS001, Revision 11 [ORNL 2019a]) is suitable for shallow land burial (SLB) at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site (RWMS) on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). Disposal of the waste stream meets all performance objectives in U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Manual DOE M 435.1-1, Radioactive Waste Management Manual, Chapter IV, Section P (DOE 2011). The ORNL Contaminated Debris waste stream is recommended for acceptance with conditions on the total activity disposed of tritium ( 3 H), niobium-94 ( 94 Nb), technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), cesium-137 ( 137 Cs), iridium-192 ( 192 mIr), radium-226 ( 226 Ra), uranium-234 ( 234 U), and 238 U. The total activity disposed shall not exceed the following limits: 3 H: 2E12 Bq, 94 Nb: 2E9 Bq, 99 Tc: 8E10 Bq, 137 Cs: 1E11 Bq, 192 mIr: 1E9 Bq, 226 Ra: 3E11 Bq, 234 U: 2E9 Bq, 238 U: 5E9 Bq.

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DOE OSTI2016

Special Analysis for the Disposal of the Portsmouth Uranium Fluoride Solids Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis (SA) evaluates whether the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PORT) Uranium (U) Fluoride Solids waste stream is suitable for disposal by shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The PORT U Fluoride Solids waste stream consists of highly enriched uranium solids. The PORT U Fluoride Solids waste stream requires an SA to resolve whether it is acceptable to dispose of technetium-99 ( 99 Tc), uranium-234 ( 234 U), and thorium-230 ( 230 Th) with activity concentrations exceeding the NNSS Waste Acceptance Criteria Action Levels.

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DOE OSTI2017

Special Analysis for the Disposal of U.S. Department of Energy High Activity Cesium Sources Waste Stream at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

This special analysis evaluates whether the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) High Activity Cesium (Cs) Sources waste stream is suitable for shallow land burial at the Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Site on the Nevada National Security Site. Disposal of the LLNL DOE High Activity Cs Sources waste meets all DOE M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual,” Chapter IV, Section P performance objectives (DOE 1999). The LLNL DOE High Activity Cs Sources waste stream is recommended for acceptance with the conditions that 1) the total waste stream cesium-137 activity be limited to 1.7E16 Bq and 2) the waste be disposed 4.4 m (10 ft) below existing grade.

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