Engineering Papers⌕ Search

SEARCH · Engineering Papers

Results for “Lessons learned”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 217 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2018

International Space Station Passive Thermal Control System Top Ten Lessons-Learned

Final document not an Abstract attached. The International Space Station (ISS) has been on-orbit for nearly 20 years, and there have been numerous technical challenges along the way from design to assembly to on-orbit anomalies and repairs. The Passive Thermal Control System (PTCS) management team has been a key player in successfully dealing with these challenges. The PTCS team performs thermal analysis in support of design and verification, launch and assembly constraints, integration, sustaining engineering, failure response, and model validation. This analysis is a significant body of work and provides a unique opportunity to compile a wealth of real world engineering and analysis knowledge and the corresponding lessons-learned. The PTCS lessons encompass the full life cycle of flight hardware from design to on-orbit performance and sustaining engineering. These lessons can provide significant insight for new projects and programs. Key areas to be presented include thermal model fidelity, verification methods, analysis uncertainty, and operations support.

Iovine, John V.↗
NASA NTRS1995

Workshop on Discovery Lessons-Learned

As part of the Discovery Program's continuous improvement effort, a Discovery Program Lessons-Learned workshop was designed to review how well the Discovery Program is moving toward its goal of providing low-cost research opportunities to the planetary science community while ensuring continued U.S. leadership in solar system exploration. The principal focus of the workshop was on the recently completed Announcement of Opportunity (AO) cycle, but the program direction and program management were also open to comment. The objective of the workshop was to identify both the strengths and weaknesses of the process up to this point, with the goal of improving the process for the next AO cycle. The process for initializing the workshop was to solicit comments from the communities involved in the program and to use the feedback as the basis for establishing the workshop agenda. The following four sessions were developed after reviewing and synthesizing both the formal feedback received and informal feedback obtained during discussions with various participants: (1) Science and Return on Investment; (2) Technology vs. Risk; Mission Success and Other Factors; (3) Cost; and (4) AO.AO Process Changes and Program Management.

Saunders, M.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Lessons Learned from CFD Validation Study of Protuberance Heating

The objectives of this presentation are: (1) Share lessons learned from a recent exercise in CFD validation of protuberance heating (2) Impact of experimental data reduction assumptions and techniques on validation activity (3) Advanced data reduction techniques may provide useful data from non-typical test methods (4) Significance of the recovery factor for high-speed flows (5) Show typical results of the Lag turbulence model on protuberances (6) Introduce and inform the listener of a protuberance heating dataset which will soon be available for comparison

Oliver, Brandon↗
NASA NTRS2012

EOS MLS Lessons Learned: Design Ideas for Safer and Lower Cost Operations

The Earth Observing System (EOS) Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) is a complex instrument with a front end computer and 32 subsystem computers. MLS is one of four instruments on NASA's EOS Aura spacecraft With almost 8 years in orbit, MLS has a few lessons learned which can be applied during the design phase of future instruments to effect better longevity, more robust operations and a significant cost benefit during operations phase.

flight software design↗
NASA NTRS1991

Sounding rocket lessons learned

Programmatic, applicatory, developmental, and operational aspects of sounding rocket utilization for materials processing studies are discussed. Lessons learned through the experience of 10 sounding rocket missions are described. Particular attention is given to missions from the SPAR, Consort, and Joust programs. Successful experiments on Consort include the study of polymer membranes and resins, biological processes, demixing of immiscible liquids, and electrodeposition.

Wessling, Francis C.↗
NASA NTRS2010

Space Shuttle Program Primary Avionics Software System (PASS) Success Legacy -Major Accomplishments and Lessons Learned

This presentation has shown the accomplishments of the PASS project over three decades and highlighted the lessons learned. Over the entire time, our goal has been to continuously improve our process, implement automation for both quality and increased productivity, and identify and remove all defects due to prior execution of a flawed process in addition to improving our processes following identification of significant process escapes. Morale and workforce instability have been issues, most significantly during 1993 to 1998 (period of consolidation in aerospace industry). The PASS project has also consulted with others, including the Software Engineering Institute, so as to be an early evaluator, adopter, and adapter of state-of-the-art software engineering innovations.

Orr, James K.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Lessons Learned During Instrument Testing for the Thermal Infrared Sensor (TIRS)

The Themal InfraRed Sensor (TIRS) instrument, set to launch on the Landsat Data Continuity Mission in 2013, features a passively cooled telescope and IR detectors which are actively cooled by a two stage cryocooler. In order to proceed to the instrument level test campaign, at least one full functional test was required, necessitating a thermal vacuum test to sufficiently cool the detectors and demonstrate performance. This was fairly unique in that this test occurred before the Pre Environmental Review, but yielded significant knowledge gains before the planned instrument level test. During the pre-PER test, numerous discrepancies were found between the model and the actual hardware, which were revealed by poor correlation between model predictions and test data. With the inclusion of pseudo-balance points, the test also provided an opportunity to perform a pre-correlation to test data prior to the instrument level test campaign. Various lessons were learned during this test related to modeling and design of both the flight hardware and the Ground Support Equipment and test setup. The lessons learned in the pre-PER test resulted in a better test setup for the nstrument level test and the completion of the final instrument model correlation in a shorter period of time. Upon completion of the correlation, the flight predictions were generated including the full suite of off-nominal cases, including some new cases defined by the spacecraft. For some of these ·new cases, some components now revealed limit exceedances, in particular for a portion of the hardware that could not be tested due to its size and chamber limitations.. Further lessons were learned during the completion of flight predictions. With a correlated detalled instrument model, significant efforts were made to generate a reduced model suitable for observatory level analyses. This proved a major effort both to generate an appropriate network as well as to convert to the final model to the required format and yielded additional lessons learned. In spite of all the challenges encountered by TIRS, the instrument was successfully delivered to the spacecraft and will soon be tested at observatory level in preparation for a successful mission launch.

Peabody, Hume L.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Lessons learned from an historical look at flight testing

A brief historical review of accidents was made to examine lessons learned in flight testing with major emphasis on human factors limitations. The results of this survey show undeniably that new aircraft and new pilots are not immune to old problems. Of three related human factors limitations, pilot skill frequently showed up as the primary factor responsible for accidents due to inadequate training (or proficiency) to handle an unexpected situation. A primary contributing factor was unsatisfactory aircraft handling qualities which increased pilot work load and therefore were less forgiving to 'pilot error,' particularly when flown in a stressful situation at the extremes of the flight envelope. Historically, pilot induced oscillation (PIO) has persisted as a major control problem particularly in first-flight operation. Deliberate errors involving a conscious decision to 'take a chance' by flying an aircraft with known deficiencies occurred more frequently in early times. Finally, inadvertent errors involving forgetfulness, indecision, and confusion are occurring more frequently with the current trend toward automated computerized controlled cockpits.

Seth B. Anderson↗
NASA NTRS1984

Lessons learned from KSC processing on STS science, applications, and commercial payloads

The present investigation is concerned with an evaluation of the lessons learned in connection with the flights of the Shuttle orbiters Columbia, Challenger, and Discovery. A description is provided of several general and specific lessons related to the processing of free-flying and attached payloads. John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC), as the prime launch and landing site, is responsible for managing all payload-to-payload, payload-to-simulated orbiter, and payload-to-orbiter operations. For each payload, a KSC Launch Site Support Manager (LSSM) is named as the primary point of contact for the customer. Attention is given to aspects of planning interaction, payload types, and problems of ground processing. The discussed lessons are partly related to the value of early contact between customers and KSC representatives, the primary point of contact, the launch site support plan, and the importance of customer participation.

Williams, W. E.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Stardust-next : Lessons Learned from a Comet Flyby Mission

The Stardust-NExT (New Exploration of Tempel) mission, a follow-on to the Stardust prime mission, successfully completed a flyby of comet Tempel-1 on 2/14/11. However there were many challenges along the way, most significantly low propellant margin and detection of the comet in imagery later than antici-pated. These challenges and their ramifications forced the project to respond with flexibility and ingenuity. As a result, the flyby at an altitude of 178 km was nearly flawless, accomplishing all its science objectives. Lessons learned on Stardust-NExT may have relevance to other spacecraft missions.

Tempel 1↗
NASA NTRS1987

The Solar Maximum Mission repair - Lessons learned

The on-orbit repair sequence of the Solar Maximum Mission in April 1984 is described, and important lessons learned concerning orbital debris are summarized. Scientific results pertaining to a solar flare which occurred just before the repair are reviewed. The implications of the repair experience for serviceability in the design of future spacecraft and instruments are illustrated by the case of the Hubble Space Telescope and its second generation spectrograph.

Woodgate, Bruce E.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Apollo Lesson Sampler: Apollo 13 Lessons Learned

This CD-ROM contains a two-part case study of the Apollo 13 accident. The first lesson contains an overview of the electrical system hardware on the Apollo spacecraft, providing a context for the details of the oxygen tank explosion, and the failure chain reconstruction that led to the conditions present at the time of the accident. Given this background, the lesson then covers the tank explosion and immediate damage to the spacecraft, and the immediate response of Mission Control to what they saw. Part 2 of the lesson picks up shortly after the explosion of the oxygen tank on Apollo 13, and discusses how Mission Control gained insight to and understanding of the damage in the aftermath. Impacts to various spacecraft systems are presented, along with Mission Control's reactions and plans for in-flight recovery leading to a successful entry. Finally, post-flight vehicle changes are presented along with the lessons learned.

Interbartolo, Michael A.↗
NASA NTRS2016

How Do Lessons Learned on the International Space Station (ISS) Help Plan Life Support for Mars?

How can our experience in developing and operating the International Space Station (ISS) guide the design, development, and operation of life support for the journey to Mars? The Mars deep space Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) must incorporate the knowledge and experience gained in developing ECLSS for low Earth orbit, but it must also meet the challenging new requirements of operation in deep space where there is no possibility of emergency resupply or quick crew return. The understanding gained by developing ISS flight hardware and successfully supporting a crew in orbit for many years is uniquely instructive. Different requirements for Mars life support suggest that different decisions may be made in design, testing, and operations planning, but the lessons learned developing the ECLSS for ISS provide valuable guidance.

Lessons learned↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned from the STS-107 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014 presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goal of this book is to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews. This poster presents an outline of Loss of Signal contents and highlights from each of five sections - the mission and mishap, the response, the investigation, the analysis and the future.

Stepaniak, Phillip C.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Best Practices, Lessons Learned, and Examples on the Application of Damage Tolerance in Space Structures

Damage tolerance is an important consideration in space structures applications. The intent of damage tolerance is to demonstrate that the structure is robust to the presence of flaws over the service life of the space vehicle. Damage tolerance requirements in documents such as those in NASA, AIAA, and ISO can be challenging to implement. The intent of this paper is three-fold: (1) Provide best practices in the application of damage tolerance requirements for space applications, (2) Provide lessons learned for each of class of hardware, (3) Provide examples of challenging situations encountered in the application of damage tolerance. Examples cover additive manufacturing, composite overwrapped pressure vessels, pressurized structures, liquid rocket engines, thermal protection systems, and other classes of hardware. The philosophy and limitations of leak before burst and proof test logic are also discussed. Finally, a discussion on elastic-plastic fracture mechanics with comparisons to test data will be presented.

Best Practices↗
NASA NTRS2014

Loss of Signal, Aeromedical Lessons Learned for the STS-I07 Columbia Space Shuttle Mishap

Loss of Signal, a NASA publication to be available in May 2014, presents the aeromedical lessons learned from the Columbia accident that will enhance crew safety and survival on human space flight missions. These lessons were presented to limited audiences at three separate Aerospace Medical Association (AsMA) conferences: in 2004 in Anchorage, Alaska, on the causes of the accident; in 2005 in Kansas City, Missouri, on the response, recovery, and identification aspects of the investigation; and in 2011, again in Anchorage, Alaska, on future implications for human space flight. As we embark on the development of new spacefaring vehicles through both government and commercial efforts, the NASA Johnson Space Center Human Health and Performance Directorate is continuing to make this information available to a wider audience engaged in the design and development of future space vehicles. Loss of Signal summarizes and consolidates the aeromedical impacts of the Columbia mishap process-the response, recovery, identification, investigative studies, medical and legal forensic analysis, and future preparation that are needed to respond to spacecraft mishaps. The goals of this book are to provide an account of the aeromedical aspects of the Columbia accident and the investigation that followed, and to encourage aerospace medical specialists to continue to capture information, learn from it, and improve procedures and spacecraft designs for the safety of future crews.

Patlach, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2024

Lessons Learned from Particulate Characterization Laboratory Anomalies

The White Sands Test Facility chemistry laboratory provides quality control for cleanroom operations including cleanliness verification of aerospace hardware by particulate counts and non-volatile residue determinations, particulate counts for liquid hypergolic propellants, gaseous helium and nitrogen propellant pressurizing agents used for ground support equipment and flight test article valve actuation, gaseous oxygen primarily used for component testing, and deionized water for refurbished propellant hardware flushing. Cleanliness verification includes particulate counts and non-volatile residue determinations to industry standard, NASA, and program specifications and levels. Particulate counts are typically to customer-specified specifications and levels including JPR 5322.1H (2016) Levels 50 and 100, Orion (MPCV 70156. Revision H (2018)) Level 100, RPTSTD-8070-0001 Revision 3 (2022), and IEST-STD-CC1246E (2013) Levels 50 and 100. The laboratory issues high pressure filter holders containing membrane filters to test operations personnel, who collect samples by flowing the required volumes of fluid through the filter holder, and the filter holder is returned to the lab for counting. A passing particulate count is required before testing may proceed. Rapid data reduction and issuing of reports indicating a pass or fail of the particulate specification are required. Corrective action and resampling invariably occurs if a sample fails. Consequently, the laboratory must maintain the highest degree of reliability to facilitate quality data used to decide if testing may proceed. Experience and continual improvements have enabled reliability. However, anomalies attributed to lab processes and hardware including filter holders, membranes, and Petri dishes have been encountered. This paper presents a summary of problems, solutions, successes, and lessons learned from particle counting experience for over 35 years.

Lessons Learned↗