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DOE OSTI2020

Gen IV Education and Training Working Group Webinars’ Initiative

Collaboration and support among national laboratories, industry, universities, and research and development organizations are vital to not only maintain a skilled and competent nuclear workforce but also to avert the risk of human resource shortages. As stated in a recent IAEA paper [1], the world nuclear electrical generating capacity is projected to increase to 554 GW(e) by 2030 and up to 874 GW(e) by 2050 (Fig. 1). This represents a 42% increase over current levels by 2030 and a doubling of the current capacity by 2050. To promote Education and Training (E&T) on Gen IV reactor systems and other nuclear related topics of interest, the Gen IV Education and Training Working Group (ETWG) identifies and advertises training courses; engages collaboration with other international education and training organizations; delivers webinars dedicated to Gen IV systems; and maintains a modern social medium platform to exchange information and ideas on Gen IV R&D topics, as well as on related GIF education and training activities. At the end of June 2020, the GIF ETWG has produced, podcasted and posted forty-one webinars covering the six Gen IV systems and various subjects addressing e.g. the economics of the nuclear fuel cycle, sustainability aspects of Gen IV systems, nuclear fuels and materials challenges, the thorium fuel cycle, energy conversion systems, and lessons learned for knowledge management and preservation. This paper describes the development of these webinars from the initial concept to its full realization, with future webinars planned in 2021, addressing topics such as materials and fuels performance for advanced reactors, small modular reactor.

Paviet, Patricia D.↗
DOE OSTI1994

Nuclear Safety [Vol. 35, No. 1, January-June 1994]

Nuclear Safety is a review journal that covers significant developments in the field of nuclear safety. Its scope includes the analysis and control of hazards associated with nuclear energy, operations involving fissionable materials, and the products of nuclear fission and their effects on the environment. Primary emphasis is on safety in reactor design, construction, and operation; however, the safety aspects of the entire fuel cycle, including fuel fabrication, spent-fuel processing, nuclear waste disposal, handling of radioisotopes, and environmental effects of these operations, are also treated. Table of Contents for this issue follows. GENERAL SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS: THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT: 1 Chernobyl Accident Management Actions, A. R Sich 25 The IAEA-ASSET Approach to Avoiding Accidents is to Recognize the Precursors to Prevent Incidents, F. Reisch; ACCIDENT ANALYSIS: 36 A Review of the Available Information on the Triggering Stage of a Steam Explosion, D. F. Fletcher; 58 Analysis and Modeling of Flow-Blockage-Induced Steam Explosion Events in the High-Flux Isotope Reactor, R. P. Taleyarkhan, V. Georgevich, C. W. Nestor, U. Gat, B. L. Lepard, D. H. Cook, J. Freels, S. J. Chang, C. Luttrell, R. C. Gwaltney, and J. Kirkpatrick; 74 An Analysis of Disassembling the Radial Reflector of a Thermionic Space Nuclear Reactor Power System, M. S. El-Genk and D. V. Paramonov; CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION: 86 Standards for High-Integrity Software, D. R. Wallace, D. R. Kuhn, L M. Ippolito, and L. Beltracchi; DESIGN FEATURES: 98 Adoption of New Design Features for the Next Generation Nuclear Power Reactors, L. S. Tong; 114 Review of Nuclear Piping Seismic Design Requirements, G. C. Slagis and S. E. Moore; ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS: 128 PC-Based Probabilistic Safety Assessment Study for a Geological Waste Repository Placed in a Bedded Salt Formation, S. A. Khan; OPERATING EXPERIENCES: 142 Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights from NRC’s Maintenance Team Inspection Reports, A. Fresco and M. Subudhi; 150 Reactor Shutdown Experience, Compiled by J. W. Cletcher; 153 Selected Safety-Related Events, Compiled by G. A. Murphy; RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 158 Reports, Standards, and Safety Guides, D. S. Queener; 168 Proposed Rule Changes as of Dec. 31, 1993; ANNOUNCEMENTS: 177 Symposium on Radioactive and Mixed Waste—Risk as a Basis for Waste Classification; 177 1995 Incineration Conference 178 Ninth Power Plant Dynamics Control and Testing Symposium; 174 The Authors

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Microreactor Agile Nonnuclear Experimental Testbed Test Plan

Microreactors are an attractive technology option for kick-starting nuclear innovation if they can be operated at high temperature, yielding high power conversion thermal efficiencies comparable or better than in commercial light water reactors. Microreactors are currently the smallest variation of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs). SMRs are “newer generation reactors designed to generate electric power up to 300 MWe and whose components and systems can be shop-fabricated and then transported as modules to the sites for installation as demand arises.” (IAEA, 2016). Vendors are developing microreactor designs to provide an affordable, potentially mobile source of electricity - see Fig. 1 for an example of a microreactor on a semi-truck. Various microreactor designs are possible including heat pipe- and gascooled options, which are the focus of the nonnuclear testing described in this document. In heat pipe microreactors, high-temperature heat pipes using liquid sodium or potassium working fluid transport fission heat from the core to a heat removal section which in turn transfers heat to the power conversion system working fluid. In a gas-cooled design, He or other gas will flow through a solid monolith of material and transfer heat as the temperature of the gas increases through a heat exchanger to a power conversion unit. The logistics of all these processes will be examined and tested through a series of articles at the nonnuclear test bed at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), the Microreactor Agile Nonnuclear Experiment Testbed (MAGNET) facility. Microreactors designed to produce power of 0.1-20 MWt offer the potential for more affordable nuclear energy for a range of applications. In a heat pipe microreactor, heat pipes, fuel rods, and/or moderator are intermixed in the reactor core assembly. Heat pipes extend from the core region into the heat removal section where the power conversion unit working fluid flows through holes or channels, transferring heat from the heat pipes to the working fluid. In a gas-cooled microreactor, gas flows through the solid monolith region and up into the heat exchanger region, transferring heat to the working fluid. For initial testing, the heat removal working fluid can be a low pressure gas for testing that addresses thermal stresses. In the final application, heat addition to the power conversion working fluid typically occurs at high pressure, supporting operation of an air-Brayton, supercritical CO 2 (SCO2), or He-recuperated Brayton cycle. Various stages of the steps above will be demonstrated through the tests described in this report.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety Functions and Features, Events and Processes for the E-Area Performance Assessment

The DOE Technical Standard, “Disposal Authorization Statement and Tank Closure Documentation,” (DOE 2017) recommends the use of safety functions and features, events and processes (FEPs) to support development of conceptual models and identification of scenarios to be considered in a performance assessment (PA). The FEP process provides a means to describe how a PA considers and addresses the factors that could influence the performance of key barriers. Understanding the roles of barriers in terms of limiting migration helps to focus on how changes in the system could lead to a situation where those roles cannot be fulfilled and there is the potential for compromised performance. The FEPs screening and review process was used to identify FEPs that are relevant for the EArea Low-Level Waste Facility (LLWF) and specifically those FEPs that could have a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of a given safety function. For this PA, a default list of FEPs developed at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA 2004) and an approach implemented for PAs at the Hanford and Idaho sites (Mehta et al. 2016, DOE-ID 2019) are used to identify processes and events that could influence the effectiveness of a given safety function for the E-Area LLWF (e.g., subsidence can impact the safety function of the cover system and lead to increased infiltration). The Hanford and Idaho PAs represent two of the most recent applications of this approach. The PA evaluates the potential impacts of changes in performance of different features of the system and demonstrates that the safety functions represent multiple and redundant barriers. Barrier analyses, assuming a safety function is not present, also test the robustness of the system in the event of the loss of one or more safety functions. Such evaluations also support a qualitative illustration of the concept of defense in depth. The safety concept for closure of the E-Area LLWF (generically referred to as “E-Area”) encompasses a variety of different features (i.e., administrative controls, natural site features, and engineered barriers) that reduce the potential impacts on human health and the environment from the residual waste that will remain after closure. These features can be represented as a collection of safety functions acting independently and as a system to provide for overall safety. In some applications, there have been attempts to assign numerical expectations to specific safety functions, but that is not the intent in this case. The concept of safety functions is used more qualitatively in two ways for this PA: 1. To illustrate the robustness of the E-Area design, operational practices and closure approach by documenting features that are and are not credited in different modeling cases. 2. To identify the roles of the different features and potential processes and events that could compromise the performance of safety features and need to be considered when developing the modeling approach. This report addresses both safety functions and FEPs for the E-Area PA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nondestructive Assay for Nuclear Safeguards [Slides]

The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Currently, the IAEA is working to achieve universal acceptance of the AP, safeguards-by-design, unattended monitoring & data integration, and state-level concept/approach. We are trying to verify special nuclear material (SNM) is where it should be, and in the proper amount.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

Gamma Equipment System Requirements by Application

This document outlines a set of requirements for gamma sensitive systems applied to three different applications: (1) homeland security (search and identification); (2) in-situ quantification; and (3) quantification in a material characterization laboratory. These three applications represent a range of activities that a country might use for locating, identifying, and quantifying radioactive material. These applications require increasing accuracy and system advancements, and skill levels. This document considers systems with various detector types and are characterized by their energy resolution: (1) low resolution (e.g., NaI(Tl) scintillation) and (2) higher resolution (e.g., high-purity germanium [HPGe] solid state) systems. The higher resolution systems also include cadmium zinc telluride (CZT) and only mechanically cooled HPGe systems are considered. These detectors and their associated acquisition hardware and analysis software afford a broad range of capabilities with corresponding ranges of complexity, maintainability, and cost. Ultimately, the equipment must meet the measurement goals of the application, and compliance with a given list of hardware specifications does not in itself guarantee meeting those goals. Examples of typical performance objectives for international safeguards applications are documented in International Target Values 2010 for Measurement Uncertainties in Safeguarding Nuclear Materials (IAEA, STR-368, November 2010). Selection of the detector type best suited to a specific application is often a compromise between “state of the art” or best available option and what is practical.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2020

MSTAR2019 Code Description and User's Manual

This report describes an ideal cascade model of uranium enrichment that includes side feed and side product streams and flexible input options. It is based on the original MSTAR model developed by Ed Von Halle and implemented in a Visual Basic code. The current version allows the user to specify integer numbers of stages or the stage numbers of external flows instead of assays in those flows. The computational engine is written in FORTRAN-90 and is invoked by a user-friendly GUI written in C++. This version of MSTAR has been demonstrated to operate on Linux, Mac, and Windows platforms, and has undergone significant testing and quality analysis. A number of examples are presented to illustrate the operation of the code and guide the user. The code is extremely fast, and results are returned immediately. The input and output have been specially configured for analysis by the environmental sampling team of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). A number of additional output features are included to assist the user in visualizing computational results and downloading data to files for use in other analysis software.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2020

SEE LANL: Student Educational Experience at LANL [PowerPoint]

SEE LANL is designed to provide university students a hands-on nuclear safeguards training course based on the courses given to all IAEA inspectors. It aims to encourage networking and collaborations between university students/professors and laboratory staff, introduce students to the variety of safeguards-related technical work at LANL and provides early-career technical staff an opportunity to teach. Further details on the program are provided.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Report of the Sixth Regional Review Meeting of the Radiological Security Partnership.

The Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulatory Commission (AERC) and the United States Department of Energy (U.S. DOE) co-hosted the 6th Regional Review Meeting on Radiological Security involving representatives from over 20 countries, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the World Institute for Nuclear Security. The purpose of the event was to discuss the implementation of, and plans for, high-activity radioactive source security (RSS). The U.S. DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Office of Radiological Security (ORS) fully sponsored this review meeting. Participants were welcomed to Colombo, Sri Lanka, and the meeting was formally opened by Nirmali Karunarathna of the Sri Lanka Atomic Energy Regulator Council who emphasized the strong partnerships among the participants. The opening Ceremony and Lamp Lighting included dignitaries from the sponsoring countries. Robert Hilton, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, and Kristin Hirsch of the ORS gave other opening remarks that highlighted the social benefit from radiological sources in medicine, industry, and agriculture, while stressing the importance of addressing the risks associated with the malicious use of radiological sources. Emphasis was placed on the importance of partnerships among all the participants to help ensure the success of securing radiological materials throughout the world and the opportunity to share information and experiences. AERC was acknowledged with special thanks for hosting this event. A participant list is included as Attachment A, and the meeting agenda is provided as Attachment B. All presentations were made available to participants. The following sections summarize the meeting’s presentations, discussions, issues, suggestions, and recommendations.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗
DOE OSTI2020

The future of the NPT: REVCON and beyond

The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), with its quinquennial review conferences (RevCons), has become the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime over the course of its 50-year history. With more states parties than any other arms control agreement (currently 191), the Treaty provides a legally binding framework for all states parties, constraining proliferation of nuclear weapons and committing the five recognized states who possess nuclear weapons to work toward disarmament. The NPT has enjoyed wide success in constraining the spread of nuclear weapons. Only one state party has left the agreement and gone on to acquire these weapons, and the overall track record of compliance with IAEA safeguards has been robust. However, for all its effectiveness in the area of nonproliferation, its achievements on the disarmament front have been relatively unimpressive. While the NWS – most notably the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia – have decreased the overall size of their nuclear arsenals significantly since 1970, these arsenals have remained an important feature of NWS security policies. The limited progress towards disarmament has created friction between the NNWS and NWS and has been the source of mounting tension within the NPT regime. The 2020 RevCon, the 50th anniversary of the NPT and 25th anniversary of its indefinite extension, faces a range of contentious challenges, old and new, which call into question the Treaty’s future viability.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2020

Verification of Spent Fuel Inside Dry Storage Casks by Fast/Epi-thermal Neutron Mapping: FY2020 Annual Report to NA241 (Annual Report)

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory has embarked upon development of a novel methodology for verification of spent fuel inside dry storage casks. The issue of verification of the integrity of spent fuel inside dry storage has been one of the most challenging technical problems facing IAEA for many decades. The difficulty arises because of the massive amount of shielding between the inner spent fuel and the outer surface where measurements can be performed. Despite many efforts, detection of useful gamma rays or neutrons from the outer surface has so far proven unsuccessful.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Method Development for Measuring U Isotope Ratios by Laser Ablation MC-ICP-MS. Task 1: Hardware Setup

The aim of this project is to develop methodology to identify and analyze U and Pu containing particles using laser ablation MC-ICP-MS. The final methodology will ultimately be described in a detailed procedural document that will be shared with IAEA-NWAL laboratories. In this report, we describe the Task-1 deliverable; the setup and optimization of hardware required to perform U isotopic analyses by laser ablation MC-ICP-MS.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2021

Learning Management System User Requirements for the National Nuclear Security Administration's International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) International Nuclear Safeguards Engagement Program (INSEP) is considering investing in new tools that would allow the program to support its partner states from a distance. At the same time, the program is considering approaches that would allow several organizations, including NNSA, IAEA, national laboratories and contractor staff, to collaborate in the development and maintenance of instructional content. Software systems known as Learning Management Systems (LMSs) might represent a mechanism through which INSEP could accomplish these goals (collaborative development and remote support). To assess the usefulness of an LMS, INSEP has specified its needs for delivering online training and compared those needs to the capability of a range of LMSs. This comparison will allow INSEP to determine whether an LMS would be a useful tool and may set the stage for a "make-buy" decision in the future. The study team concluded that INSEP's content development and delivery needs align well with the capabilities of the leading LMSs on the market today and that that INSEP performance requirements allow for a customized approach using existing training portals that are already available to NNSA. Additional work would be required to specify the desired processes for developing online training and outreach materials, structuring the databases, specifying the data that should be collected, and detailing the desired system reports and documentation.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2021

Safeguards Technology Development Program. FY2021 Mid-Year Report, Encryption of Signal Pulses

Summary statement of work: Develop a signal pulse digital signing and encryption in-line device to verify signal integrity and point of origin for TTL pulse data used in IAEA systems, and to avoid the need for expensive tamper-indicating conduit or techniques. This device will be called Transparent Remote Encryption of Correlated Signals (TRECS). TRECS consists of two parts, a head end which is located in or near the detector assembly and a tail end that is located with the data acquisition electronics, i.e. MiniGrand, UMSR, UDL1 or JSR.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Commonly Overlooked Material Attractiveness Issues [Slides]

SG-Pu, WG-Pu, FG-Pu, RG-Pu, HEU, and Np should not be ignored in safeguards or security discussions: Nation states prefer SG-Pu and WG-Pu for missile delivery. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer FG-Pu and RG-Pu to minimize the mass that must be stolen/diverted and to minimize the risk of detection. Terrorists and some nation states will prefer HEU to eliminate the need for testing. A nation state with reprocessing capabilities might prefer 237 Np because the IAEA doesn’t require it to be safeguarded. Terrorists might prefer 237 Np if the nation state does not provide adequate safeguards and security for it.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Misuse Detection for a Generalized SFR Test Reactor

Sodium-cooled Fast Reactors (SFRs) present unique challenges for international safeguards. SFRs possess neutron physics characteristics that if configured appropriately could produce more fissile material than consumed. An adversary state may choose to build an SFR, justified by a lack of domestic natural uranium and limited access or interest to procuring uranium from international markets. Once constructed, the state may choose to misuse the SFR for the purpose of diverting fissile plutonium from declared operation. This work shows that a demonstration SFR does not need to be configured as a plutonium breeder to create one Significant Quantity (SQ) of plutonium in a short amount of time (e.g., one to few years). However, such an extreme case of misuse would change the core reactivity in such a way as to be easily indicated by deviations of control rod position compared to declared operation. In this work a contrived SFR demonstration reactor was modeled for the purpose of exploring proliferation scenarios and how such misuse could be detected using the SFR's Reactor Data Acquisition System (RDAS). Typically, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) does not have access to the control rod position, power, thermal, pressure sensing and indicating systems of nuclear power plants. However, this work shows that such data streams can be compared against a parallel detailed simulation model (a Digital Twin) to detect possible misuse.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Impact of Extreme Weather Events on Physical Protection System Effectiveness for a Hypothetical Small Modular Reactor Facility: Systems Analysis and Considerations

This report will summarize the group's work to provide recommendations to secure nuclear facilities before, during and after an extreme weather event. Extreme weather events can have drastic impacts to nuclear facilities as seen by the earthquake and subsequent tsunami at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in 2011. Recent hurricanes in the United States including Hurricane Harvey demonstrate the devastating effects these storms can have on infrastructure and the surrounding communities. The group is attempting to identify the gaps that potential small modular reactor (SMR) facilities will need to address in order to provide adequate site security before, during and after extreme weather events. This effort proceeded in three parts to provide insights and recommendations to secure Small Modular Reactor facilities for extreme weather events:(1) a literature review of academic articles as well as relevant documents including the existing regulatory framework and recommendations from the IAEA, NRC, and DOE, (2) subject matter expert interviews from a wide variety of security backgrounds, and (3) modeling and simulation on a hypothetical SMR facility. Special attention was paid to the interactions between stakeholders and nuclear facility design considerations, particularly the topics of safety and security. Engineering design issues from safety and security perspectives were discussed and included in simulation. Each step informed the proceeding, with the result including full tabletop scenarios of EWE impacts to security system effectiveness on the hypothetical model. This systems-level analysis provides results to inform recommendations to secure SMR facilities.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Deep Learning Systems for Increased Safeguards Surveillance Review Productivity

Nuclear safeguards inspectors expend significant time and maintain intense focus in reviewing video surveillance for safeguards relevant events. To increase efficiency and reduce the time burden of safeguards inspectors performing surveillance data review, this paper presents a novel deep learning (DL) systems concept to integrate generalized DL models into the safeguards surveillance review workflow. The Agency is investigating several DL algorithms for object recognition, localization, tracking, and flagging relevant activities. The project team is working closely with nuclear safeguards inspectors to identify review use cases (based on specific safeguards objectives) and collect their associated requirements. We focused on CANDU and LWR Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs) and their associated dry storage areas as these present a particularly heavy burden on the inspector surveillance review process due to the number of these facilities under safeguards worldwide. Initial DL algorithm results on safeguards data are promising. Using a convolutional neural network, the team attained a mean average precision (mAP) of 92.9% identifying and localizing spent fuel (SF) casks from a 475 surveillance image dataset. Further, the team had initial success in training a recurrent neural network to identify reactor area activities in video clips, successfully indicating when SF casks enter or exit a pool. We discuss how such DL algorithms would be integrated into the Next Generation Surveillance Review (NGSR) software application. Another issue impacting review productivity is the long time inspectors may have to wait when running these algorithms in NGSR. We present a concept to pre-process remotely collected surveillance data with DL models as the data arrives to IAEA headquarters so that results are already available when starting a new review in NGSR. The proposed DL system concept shows a pathway and workflow for increasing an inspector’s surveillance review productivity by quickly and accurately identifying declared and undeclared safeguards relevant objects and activities in large quantities of surveillance imagery data.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗