Space vehicle water reclamation systems.
Human waste products water reclamation systems rendering space crew independent of stored water requirements
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Human waste products water reclamation systems rendering space crew independent of stored water requirements
Consideration of an integrated human thermal system consisting of a human thermal system proper and an external thermal device. A mathematical model of the integrated system has been used in a computer simulation, and the simulation results have been verified through comparison with the results of experiments carried out on nine human subjects. The comparison indicates that the model simulates the system reasonably well.
In this paper, we present a methodology to assess system performance of human-robotic systems in achievement of collective tasks such as habitat construction, geological sampling, and space exploration.
Human operators of complex dynamic systems can experience difficulties supervising advanced control automation. One remedy is to develop intelligent aiding systems that can provide operators with context-sensitive advice and reminders. The research reported herein proposes, implements, and evaluates a methodology for activity tracking, a form of intent inferencing that can supply the knowledge required for an intelligent aid by constructing and maintaining a representation of operator activities in real time. The methodology was implemented in the Georgia Tech Crew Activity Tracking System (GT-CATS), which predicts and interprets the actions performed by Boeing 757/767 pilots navigating using autopilot flight modes. This report first describes research on intent inferencing and complex modes of automation. It then provides a detailed description of the GT-CATS methodology, knowledge structures, and processing scheme. The results of an experimental evaluation using airline pilots are given. The results show that GT-CATS was effective in predicting and interpreting pilot actions in real time.
A launch pad escape system for human spaceflight is one of those things that everyone hopes they will never need but is critical for every manned space program. Since men were first put into space in the early 1960s, the need for such an Emergency Escape System (EES) has become apparent. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made use of various types of these EESs over the past 50 years. Early programs, like Mercury and Gemini, did not have an official launch pad escape system. Rather, they relied on a Launch Escape System (LES) of a separate solid rocket motor attached to the manned capsule that could pull the astronauts to safety in the event of an emergency. This could only occur after hatch closure at the launch pad or during the first stage of flight. A version of a LES, now called a Launch Abort System (LAS) is still used today for all manned capsule type launch vehicles. However, this system is very limited in that it can only be used after hatch closure and it is for flight crew only. In addition, the forces necessary for the LES/LAS to get the capsule away from a rocket during the first stage of flight are quite high and can cause injury to the crew. These shortcomings led to the development of a ground based EES for the flight crew and ground support personnel as well. This way, a much less dangerous mode of egress is available for any flight or ground personnel up to a few seconds before launch. The early EESs were fairly simple, gravity-powered systems to use when thing's go bad. And things can go bad very quickly and catastrophically when dealing with a flight vehicle fueled with millions of pounds of hazardous propellant. With this in mind, early EES designers saw such a passive/unpowered system as a must for last minute escapes. This and other design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design aspects for a launch pad escape system.
Mathematical and mechanical models of human thermal system thermodynamic/transport processes and external regulation devices for single elements and entire body
Dynamic model for human auditory sound perception and frequency response characteristics
Power system options were reviewed for their appropriateness to meet mission requirements and guidelines. Contending system technologies include: solar, nuclear, isotopic, electro-chemical and chemical. Mission elements can basically be placed into two categories; in-space transportation systems, both cargo and piloted; and surface systems, both stationary and mobile. All transportation and surface element power system requirements were assessed for application synergies that would suggest common hardware (duplicates of the same or similar design) or multi-use (reuse system in a different application/location), wherever prudent.
Both the human factors engineering (HFE) and formal methods communities are concerned with finding and eliminating problems with safety-critical systems. This work discusses a modeling effort that leveraged methods from both fields to use model checking with HFE practices to perform formal verification of a human-interactive system. Despite the use of a seemingly simple target system, a patient controlled analgesia pump, the initial model proved to be difficult for the model checker to verify in a reasonable amount of time. This resulted in a number of model revisions that affected the HFE architectural, representativeness, and understandability goals of the effort. If formal methods are to meet the needs of the HFE community, additional modeling tools and technological developments are necessary.
The 2020 Marshall Aerospace Fellowship Program involved 11 faculty in the laboratories and departments at Marshall Space Flight Center and one faculty researcher working from Colorado. These faculty engineers and scientists worked with NASA collaborators on NASA projects, bringing new perspectives and solutions to bear. This Technical Memorandum is a compilation of nine research reports of the 2020 Marshall Aerospace Fellowship program, along with the Program Announcement (Appendix A) and the Program Description (Appendix B). The research affected the following five areas: (1) Materials (2) Spacecraft systems (3) Human-System Interactions (4) Vehicle systems (5) Space science Additive manufacturing was the single materials investigation during the summer of 2020. Spacecraft systems tasks dominated the fellows’ explorations: covering camera sensors for lunar surface mobility, a real-time system for navigation and mapping, flexible sensor modeling, and transmitter design for high data rate telemetry. One project concentrated on Human-System Interactions. Another fellow designed a model to predict heat leak into a cryogen tank, as in most vehicle systems. One of the scientists worked on a proposed space-based gravitational wave interferometer that will detect Galactic white dwarf binaries. Another space science fellow used a mature astrophysical code to synthesize galactic stellar populations. Our goal is to continue the Marshall Aerospace Program funded by Center project offices.
Human restraint systems development for acceleration research
One of the most fundamental changes to the air traffic management system in NextGen is the concept of trajectory based operations (TBO). With the introduction of such change, system safety and resilience is a critical concern, in particular, the ability of systems to gracefully degrade. In order to design graceful degradation into a TBO envrionment, knowledge of the potential causes of degradation, and appropriate solutions, is required. In addition, previous research has predominantly explored the technological contribution to graceful degradation, frequently neglecting to consider the role of the human operator, specifically, air traffic controllers (ATCOs). This is out of step with real-world operations, and potentially limits an ecologically valid understanding of achieving graceful degradation in an air traffic control (ATC) environment. The following literature review aims to identify and summarize the literature to date on the potential causes of degradation in ATC and the solutions that may be applied within a TBO context, with a specific focus on the contribution of the air traffic controller. A framework of graceful degradation, developed from the literature, is presented. It is argued that in order to achieve graceful degradation within TBO, a human-system integration approach must be applied.
The Human Landing System (HLS) is the mode of transportation that will take astronauts to the lunar surface as part of NASA's Artemis exploration program. HLS also serves as a research platform both on the surface and in lunar orbit, enabling critical scientific investigations on and of the Moon. With support at NASA centers around the country, the HLS program, based at Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, is working closely with its commercial partners throughout the development process to design and build innovative and technically advanced lunar landers – new vehicles designed for the modern era of space travel – leveraging decades of human spaceflight experience and the speed of the commercial sector. In 2019, NASA asked U.S. industry for proposals to design and develop a human lander for the first human mission to the lunar surface under Artemis. Initial contracts were awarded to Blue Origin Federation, Dynetics, and SpaceX to advance their designs. Following the execution of the ten-month Base Period, NASA announced in April 2021 that the agency selected SpaceX to move forward with its human landing system [1] and land the first two astronauts on the lunar surface during the Artemis III mission. Following two protest periods, NASA awarded the contract, known as Option A, to SpaceX in July 2021 and resumed work in November 2021 (Fig. 1). In parallel, the HLS program has been preparing for the acquisition that will procure regular crewed transportation to the lunar surface following Artemis III. NASA released a request for information (RFI) in July 2021 asking U.S. industry for feedback to help inform the future solicitation, known as Lunar Exploration Transportation Services (LETS) [2]. Also in July 2021, NASA released the NextSTEP-2 Appendix N broad agency announcement soliciting new work from U.S. industry to mature their HLS designs and perform risk reduction activities in advance of the LETS procurement [3]. NASA selected Blue Origin Federation, Dynetics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and SpaceX to participate [4]. This work will also help better inform the LETS procurement and prepare industry to propose. NASA hopes to release a draft request for proposals (RFP) in Spring 2022.
One of the most fundamental changes to the air traffic management system in NextGen is the concept of trajectory based operations (TBO). With the introduction of such change, system safety and resilience is a critical concern, in particular, the ability of systems to gracefully degrade. In order to design graceful degradation into a TBO envrionment, knowledge of the potential causes of degradation, and appropriate solutions, is required. In addition, previous research has predominantly explored the technological contribution to graceful degradation, frequently neglecting to consider the role of the human operator, specifically, air traffic controllers (ATCOs). This is out of step with real-world operations, and potentially limits an ecologically valid understanding of achieving graceful degradation in an air traffic control (ATC) environment. The following literature review aims to identify and summarize the literature to date on the potential causes of degradation in ATC and the solutions that may be applied within a TBO context, with a specific focus on the contribution of the air traffic controller. A framework of graceful degradation, developed from the literature, is presented. It is argued that in order to achieve graceful degradation within TBO, a human-system integration approach must be applied.
Human factors considerations in systems design was examined. Human factors in automated command and control, in the efficiency of the human computer interface and system effectiveness are outlined. The following topics are discussed: human factors aspects of control room design; design of interactive systems; human computer dialogue, interaction tasks and techniques; guidelines on ergonomic aspects of control rooms and highly automated environments; system engineering for control by humans; conceptual models of information processing; information display and interaction in real time environments.
Various models of biological human life support systems are surveyed. Biological structures, dimensions, and functional parameters of man-chlorella-microorganism models are described. Significant observations and the results obtained from these models are reported.
During the Orion landing and recovery subsystem design review, June 2009, it was noted that the human system and various vehicle systems, the environmental control and life support (ECLSS) and guidance, navigation and control (GN&C) systems for example, are negatively affected by Orion assuming a stable 2 (upside down; Figure A) configuration post landing. The stable 2 configuration is predicted to occur about 50% of the time based on Apollo landing data and modeling of the current capsule. The stable 2 configuration will be countered by an active up-righting system (crew module up-righting system; CMUS). Post landing balloons will deploy and inflate causing the vehicle to assume or maintain the stable 1 (up-right; Figure B) configuration. During the design review it was proposed that the up-righting system could be capable of righting the vehicle within 60 seconds. However, this time limit posed a series of constraints on the design which made it less robust than desired. The landing and recovery subsystem team requested an analysis of Orion vehicle systems as well as the human system with regard to the effect of stable 2 in order to determine if an up-righting response time greater than 60 seconds could be tolerated. The following report focuses on the assessment of the human system in the posture assumed when Orion is in the stable 2 configuration. Stable 2 will place suited, seated, and restrained crewmembers in a prone (facedown), head-up position for a period of time dependent on the functionality of the up-righting systems, ability of the crew to release themselves from the seat and restraints, and/or time to arrival of rescue forces. Given that the Orion seat and restraint system design is not complete and therefore, not available for evaluation, Space Medicine assessed how long a healthy but deconditioned crewmember could stay in this prone, restrained position and the physiological consequences of this posture by researching terrestrial analogs and considered the known physiological alterations and deconditioning experienced by long duration crewmembers.
Contents include the following: Capability Roadmap Team. Capability Description and Capability Breakdown Structure. Benefits of the Human Systems and Mobility Capability. Roadmap Process and Approach. Drivers and Assumptions for the whole team. Current State-of-the-Art, Assumptions and Requirements will be covered in the appropriate sections. Capability Presentations by Leads under Roadmap (Repeated for each capability under roadmap). Capability Description, Benefits, Current State-of-the-Art. Capability Requirements and Assumptions. Roadmap for Capability. Capability Readiness Level. Technology Readiness Level. Figures of Merit. Summary of Top Level Capability. Significant Technical Challenges. Summary and Forward Work.