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At least 217 records · Page 12

Development of Future Heatwaves for Different Hazard Thresholds

In 2018 and 2019, heatwaves set all-time temperature records around the world and caused adverse effects on human health, agriculture, natural ecosystems, and infrastructure. Often, severe impacts relate to the joint spatial and temporal extent of the heatwaves, but most research so far focuses either on spatial or temporal attributes of heatwaves. Furthermore, sensitivity of heatwaves characteristics to the choice of the heatwave thresholds in a warming climate are rarely discussed. Here, we analyze the largest spatiotemporal moderate heatwaves—that is, three-dimensional (space-time) clusters of hot days—in simulations of global climate models. We use three different hazard thresholds to define a hot day: fixed thresholds (time-invariant climatological thresholds), seasonally moving thresholds based on changes in the summer means, and fully moving thresholds (hot days defined relative to the future climatology). We find a substantial increase of spatiotemporally contiguous moderate heatwaves with global warming using fixed thresholds, whereas changes for the other two hazard thresholds are much less pronounced. In particular, no or very little changes in the overall magnitude, spatial extent, and duration are detected when heatwaves are defined relative to the future climatology using a temporally fully moving threshold. This suggests a dominant contribution of thermodynamic compared to dynamic effects in global climate model simulations. The similarity between seasonally moving and fully moving thresholds indicates that seasonal mean warming alone can explain large parts of the warming of extremes. The strong sensitivity of simulated future heatwaves to hazard thresholds should be considered in the projections of potential future heat-related impacts.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Climate Change and Changes in Compound Coastal-Riverine Flooding Hazard Along the U.S. Coasts

The cooccurrence of coastal and riverine flooding leads to compound events with substantial impacts on people and property in low-lying coastal areas. Climate change could increase the level of compound flood hazard through higher extreme sea levels and river flows. Here, a bivariate flood hazard assessment method is proposed to estimate compound coastal-riverine frequency under current and future climate conditions. A copula-based approach is used to estimate the joint return period (JRP) of compound floods by incorporating sea-level rise (SLR) and changes in peak river flows into the marginal distributions of flood drivers. Specifically, the changes in JRP of compound major coastal-riverine flooding defined based on simultaneous exceedances above major coastal and riverine thresholds, are explored by midcentury. Subsequently, the increase in the probability of occurrence of at least one compound major coastal-riverine flooding for a given period of time is quantified. The proposed compound flood hazard assessment is conducted at 26 paired tidal-riverine stations along the Contiguous United States coast with long-term data and defined flood thresholds. We show that the northeast Atlantic and the western part of the Gulf coasts are experiencing the highest compound major coastal-riverine flood probability under current conditions. However, future SLR scenarios show the highest frequency amplification along the southeast Atlantic coast. The impact of changes in peak river flows is found to be considerably less than that of SLR. Climate change impacts, especially SLR, may lead to more frequent compound events, which cannot be ignored for future adaptation responses in estuary regions.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Large-scale tearing-mode hazard function analysis with standard matched equilibrium reconstructions

The association between features from standard tokamak equilibrium reconstructions and the onset of n = 1 tearing modes (TMs) is analyzed at scale. The TM onset rate is directly modeled with a ‘hazard’ function which gives the expected number of onsets (per unit time spent) in a given equilibrium parameter region. In particular the different statistical modeling performance achieved for magnetics-only reconstructions and motional Stark effect (MSE) enhanced reconstructions is studied. It is observed that a better hazard model for the TM onset rate can be built with the MSE-enhanced equilibria compared to the matched magnetics-only situation. This advantage disappears if internal profile details are withheld from the matched analysis. Plausibility of the hazard function is further demonstrated with visualizations of global trends in the operational space, and time-traces from specific tokamak discharges. As a result, TMs typically degrade tokamak plasma performance and may lead to plasma termination, motivating this statistical study.

equilibrium↗

Simple Battery Hazard Calculator

SAND2025-00455O Simple Battery Hazard Calculator is a software tool developed in Excel to analyze the electrical hazards of battery systems and determine the required personal protective equipment (PPE) for safe assembly and disassembly. It calculates potential arc flash incident energy, contact thermal hazard level, and recommends PPE based on parameters such as voltage, short circuit current, and over current protection trip time. The calculator uses a recognized method for calculating arc flash incident energy, which was previously inaccessible to most battery workers. Sandia National Laboratories is a multimission laboratory managed and operated by National Technology & Engineering Solutions of Sandia, LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Honeywell International Inc., for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-NA0003525.

Rosewater, David↗

The Hazards Posed by Mesoscale Lightning Megaflashes

Lightning megaflashes extending over >100-km distances have been observed by the Geostationary Lightning Mappers (GLMs) on NOAA’s R-series Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES). The hazards posed by megaflashes are unclear, however, because of limitations in the GLM data. We address these by reprocessing GOES-16 GLM measurements from 1 January 2018 to 15 January 2020 and integrating them with Earth Networks Global Lightning Network (ENGLN) observations. ENGLN verified 194 880 GLM megaflashes as natural lightning. Of these, 127 479 flashes occurred following the October 2018 GLM software update that standardized GLM timing. Reprocessed GLM/ENGLN lightning maps from these postupdate cases provide a comprehensive view of how individual megaflashes evolve. This megaflash dataset is used to generate statistics that describe their hazards. The average megaflash produces 5–7 cloud-to-ground (CG) strokes that are spread across 40%–50% of the flash extent. As flash extent increases beyond 100 km, megaflashes become concentrated in key hot-spot regions in North and South America while the number of CG and intracloud events per flash and the overall peak current increase. CGs in the larger megaflashes occur over 80% of the flash extent measured by GLM, and the majority contain regions where the megaflash is the only lightning activity in the preceding hour. These statistics demonstrate that there is no safe location below an electrified cloud that is producing megaflashes, and current lightning safety guidance is not always sufficient to mitigate megaflash hazards.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Assessing North Atlantic Tropical Cyclone Rainfall Hazard Using Engineered-Synthetic Storms and a Physics-Based Tropical Cyclone Rainfall Model

In this study, we design a statistical method to couple observations with a physics-based tropical cyclone (TC) rainfall model (TCR) and engineered-synthetic storms for assessing TC rainfall hazard. We first propose a bias-correction method to minimize the errors induced by TCR via matching the probability distribution of TCR-simulated historical TC rainfall with gauge observations. Then we assign occurrence probabilities to engineered-synthetic storms to reflect local climatology, through a resampling method that matches the probability distribution of a newly proposed storm parameter named rainfall potential (POT) in the synthetic dataset with that in the observation. POT is constructed to include several important storm parameters for TC rainfall such as TC intensity, duration, and distance and environmental humidity near landfall, and it is shown to be correlated with TCR-simulated rainfall. The proposed method has a satisfactory performance in reproducing the rainfall hazard curve in various locations in the continental United States; it is an improvement over the traditional joint probability method (JPM) for TC rainfall hazard assessment.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Multi-Mechanism Flood Hazard Assessment: Critical Review of Current Practice and Approaches

This report documents the initial findings from the Nuclear Regulatory commission (NRC)-sponsored research project Methods for Estimating Joint Probabilities of Coincident and Correlated Flooding Mechanisms for Nuclear Power Plant Flood Hazard Assessments.¹ This research project is a part of NRC’s Probabilistic Flood Hazard Assessment (PFHA) Research Program and will aid the development of guidance on the use of PFHA methods to evaluate infrastructure safety for existing and proposed US nuclear power plants (NPPs). More specifically, this project intends to provide technical background for the development of flood hazard curves for multi-mechanism floods (MMFs). MMFs are flood events caused by more than one flooding mechanism (e.g., flood events due to the simultaneous occurrence of precipitation-induced river flooding and storm surge).

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Soil Sample Plan in Support of the Site 300 Explosives Waste Treatment Facility Ecological Risk Assessment Pursuant to the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Part V, Special Condition #14 a-f. August 2020

The Department of Toxic Substances Control issued the Final Hazardous Waste Facility Permit to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Site 300 in 2017. As part of the continual process to ensure waste treatment emissions are not impacting ecological receptors, LLNL analyzed soil samples in the vicinity of the Explosive Waste Treatment Facility (EWTF) Burn Units (i.e., Burn Cage and Burn Pan) and the Detonation Pad. Soil samples were analyzed by EPA Solid Waste 846 Methods for furans, explosives, metals, and semivolatile compounds. In all samples, furans, explosives, and semi-volatile organic compounds were not detected. Metals were detected at concentrations below background levels. This soil sample plan will sample the same four downwind areas of the Burn Units and the same downwind areas of the Detonation, as well as including four new sample locations. The four new locations will be located to the northeast and southwest of the Burn Units and Detonation (as shown in Figure 3). The constituents to be analyzed are in Tables 2 and 3. Perchlorate was not identified as a constituent of concern in the 2007 Soil Sampling Plan. However, for this plan, all soil samples will be analyzed for perchlorate. After completion of the sampling event, a soil sample report will be submitted to DTSC in accordance with requirements specified in the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Part V, Special Conditions 16 a-f. This proposed soil sampling plan will be fully implemented no later than one year after receiving DTSC approval, in accordance with the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Part V, Special Condition 15.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Wood-to-Fuel Demonstration Project for California's Transportation Sector using Autothermal Pyrolysis (Non-Proprietary Summary Process Hazard Assessment)

Frontline has prioritized personnel safety, equipment preservation, and environmental protection throughout the design process of the autothermal pyrolysis unit. To facilitate a safe design, Frontline completed an informal hazards and operability (HAZOP) study and a formal HAZOP study, and employ management of change procedures. The result of these safety procedures is a plant that will function in a safe manner with a limited and acceptable amount of risk. Frontline took an approach it used in previous projects to execute a preliminary, internally facilitated hazards and operability (HAZOP) study. While this HAZOP study was performed without any subsequent change tracking, it enables a group of well-trained engineers to consider the safety implications of each part of the plant in a thorough and methodical manner. Frontline chose to bring in a pyrolysis consultant (Daren Daugaard of Burning Oak Energy) to participate in the review. Following the preliminary HAZOP and once the detailed design work was nearing completion, Frontline performed a formal HAZOP with a third-party facilitator, Jason Stittleburg of Novetus Engineering. Although the plant is not subject to process safety management (PSM) requirements, this formal HAZOP was performed in accordance with OSHA regulations deemed reasonable for PSM. Finally, after the formal HAZOP was conducted, Frontline maintained a safe system by implementing and following management of change procedures on each substantial change to the process. Frontline has kept a record of each subsequent change made to the formal HAZOP P&IDs. The process hazard assessment process allowed Frontline to find and correct several unacceptable configurations within the plant.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

Soil Sample Workplan in Support of the Site 300 Explosives Waste Treatment Facility Ecological Risk Assessment Pursuant to the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (Part V, Special Condition #14 a-f)

The Department of Toxic Substances Control issued the Final Hazardous Waste Facility Permit to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Site 300 in 2017. As part of the continual process to ensure waste treatment emissions are not impacting ecological receptors, LLNL analyzed soil samples in the vicinity of the Explosive Waste Treatment Facility (EWTF) Burn Units (i.e., Burn Cage and Burn Pan) and the Detonation Pad. Soil samples were analyzed by EPA Solid Waste 846 Methods for furans, explosives, metals, and semi-volatile compounds. In all samples, furans, explosives, and semi-volatile organic compounds were not detected. Metals were detected at concentrations below background levels. This soil sample plan will sample the same four downwind areas of the Burn Units and the same downwind areas of the Detonation, as well as including four new sample locations. The four new locations will be located to the northeast and southwest of the Burn Units and Detonation (as shown in Figure 3). The constituents to be analyzed are in Tables 7 and 8. Perchlorate was not identified as a constituent of concern in the 2007 Soil Sampling Plan. However, for this plan, all soil samples will be analyzed for perchlorate. Nitrate and all CAM17 metals have been added to the sampling plan to comply with DTSC comments received in correspondence dated June 4, 2021. After completion of the sampling event, a soil sample report will be submitted to DTSC in accordance with requirements specified in the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Part V, Special Conditions 16 a-f. This proposed soil sampling plan will be fully implemented no later than one year after receiving DTSC approval, in accordance with the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit, Part V, Special Condition 15.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Hazard and Operability Study for the Ammonia Fuel Systems at the National Transportation Research Center

Oak Ridge National Laboratory’s (ORNL’s) Buildings and Transportation Science Division (BTSD) plans to operate research engines fueled by ammonia in two engine test cells at the National Transportation Research Center (NTRC). A scientific need has recently emerged to evaluate the suitability of liquid anhydrous ammonia as a low-lifecycle-carbon fuel source for difficult-to-electrify transportation sectors, including the marine sector. Therefore, BTSD plans to install an ammonia storage and delivery system to 2360 HVC engine research labs L125 (Cell 3) and L111 (Cell 7) capable of delivering 35 and 75 lb/h, respectively. These laboratories are specifically designed to allow for engine and fuels research and development, and they have existing safety systems for mitigating risks associated with toxics and flammables. Anhydrous ammonia is toxic and flammable, and the system will use relatively large quantities compared with standard gas bottles. Ammonia is one of the most widely produced chemicals in the world, and the hazards associated with toxicity and flammability are well understood. Ammonia storage for use in engine research at NTRC is anticipated to take the form of an ammonia tank with capacity of 1,000 water gallons; this quantity will remain below the threshold quantity of 10,000 lb (~2,000 gal) used both by the US Environmental Protection Agency for reporting under the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act and for Risk Management Program requirements, and also by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration for Process Safety Management requirements. ORNL’s Environmental Protection Services Division was also consulted to verify that the quantities of ammonia anticipated to be used would be in compliance with environmental regulations. The Environmental Protection Services Division staff confirmed that the anticipated quantities fall below ORNL’s permit thresholds. However, because of the hazards associated with anhydrous ammonia, the quantities to be used, and the limited experience with similar quantities of ammonia at ORNL, BTSD decided to perform a hazard and operability (HazOp) study on the ammonia storage and delivery system.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

MARVEL Hazard Evaluation ECAR-6440

MARVEL Hazards Evaluation evaluated the impacts of MARVEL operations, hazards, and postulated accidents. The hazard evaluation of MARVEL events and associated operations was performed for selection and evaluation of safety classification of systems, structures, and components (SSCs) and SSC safety functions, and for selection of design basis accidents (DBAs) applicable to the MARVEL microreactor design.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Advanced Offshore Hazard Forecasting to Enable Resilient Offshore Operations

Presentation for the Offshore Technology Conference 2024 manuscript, "Advanced Offshore Hazard Forecasting to Enable Resilient Offshore Operations." This presentation describes the use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) tools to assess offshore hazards and their impact to vulnerable infrastructure, in this case, pipelines. The results show the potential intersection of seafloor instability and pipelines with potentially lower integrity, then compares them to metocean pathways that could attract hazardous materials such as oil in the event that the pipelines are compromised.

Mark-Moser, Mackenzie K.↗

Uncertainty in Synthetic Tropical Cyclone Hazard and Risk Estimates: Insights from RAFT, CHAZ, MIT, STORM, and CLIMADA

We synthesize five complementary tropical cyclone (TC) hazard frameworks—RAFT (physics-based machine learning), CHAZ and MIT (statistical–dynamical), STORM (fully statistical), and CLIMADA (observation-driven resampling)—to characterize uncertainty in wind-related TC metrics relevant to energy applications. All datasets and the IBTrACS observational record are harmonized to a common 6-hourly, 2.5° grid. We compare basin-wide and coastal properties using consistent definitions for TC frequency, mean and maximum intensity, 24-hour intensification, and 6-hour translation speed, and quantify agreement with Pearson r, RMSE, and Kling–Gupta efficiency (KGE) alongside resampling-based confidence intervals. CLIMADA is included for basin context but excluded from coastal skill scoring because it resamples historical IBTrACS; if supplied with projected future tracks from an external hazard model, CLIMADA can be used to simulate future TC scenarios. Results show robust, cross-model signals: (i) a corridor of activity from the tropical Atlantic through the Caribbean into the Bahamas and western subtropical Atlantic; (ii) a meridional dipole in 24-hour intensification (low-latitude strengthening, subtropical weakening); and (iii) a transition from slower tropical motion to faster midlatitude translation. Coastal winds (mean and maximum) consistently cluster from the eastern Gulf into the Bahamas–western Atlantic transition. The largest structural spread occurs in the amplitude and footprint of lifetime maximum intensity and, secondarily, in translation speed; intensification exhibits similar central behavior across frameworks with variability in extremes. Translation speed shows the most uniform coastal agreement. These findings provide a decision envelope for wind-focused risk screening and clarify where uncertainty should be carried forward; wind-only results represent a lower bound on total hazard, motivating integration of surge and rainfall modules and a companion, asset-level damage analysis.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Identification of Hydrogen Rail Maintenance Facility Hazards

Maintenance facilities for hydrogen rail, the activities conducted within such facilities, and how these activities differ from ordinary rail or hydrogen vehicle maintenance are currently being considered for the hazards specific to hydrogen. By performing a hazard and operability study (HAZOP) on numerous potential maintenance and repair scenarios, select low, medium, and high risk hazards relevant to hydrogen rail systems in such environments have been identified. The analysis resulted in 79 unique HAZOP scenarios: one scenario in the high risk category, 43 in the medium risk category, and 35 in the low risk category. Notably, large accidental releases of hydrogen due to tank rupture, aberrant defueling processes, or relief device opening within a facility are important low likelihood consequences that should nevertheless be appropriately prevented and mitigated.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Aerosol Can Fireball Tests: Commodity Hazards in the Transportation Environment Phase 1 Report

This report describes a series of tests performed at Sandia’s burn site to better understand the behavior of aerosol commodities and their hazards in the transportation environment. This comes on the tail of a prior study on the use cases and historical hazards associated with aerosol commodities in the shipping environment (Cambridge Systematics Incorporated, CSI, 2020). It is also mindful of the National Fire Protection Agency NFPA30B standard for safe warehousing of aerosol commodities. Warehousing is different from transit because warehousing typically involves active suppression and mitigation measures not practical or relevant to the shipping environment. Transit also typically involves tighter packing and smaller enclosure spaces. The transportation hazard space has not been heavily studied in prior testing specifically aimed towards the ground, rail, and nautical shipping environments.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Advanced Offshore Hazard Forecasting to Enable Resilient Offshore Operations

Paper prepared for the Offshore Technology Conference, 2024. Hazards in the offshore environment can imperil successful energy operations, whether those operations are conventional, renewable, or for decarbonization. The expanding accessibility of data science and the advanced applications of machine learning (ML) models creates an opportunity to assess potential hazards and the infrastructure they impact. We present a use case demonstrating the combined application of published ML tools to U.S. federal waters of the Gulf of Mexico, an actively explored region for offshore energy that is affected by variable metocean conditions and geologic processes contributing to potential hazards.

Mark-Moser, Mackenzie K.↗

Safety in earth orbit study. Volume 2: Analysis of hazardous payloads, docking, on-board survivability

Detailed and supporting analyses are presented of the hazardous payloads, docking, and on-board survivability aspects connected with earth orbital operations of the space shuttle program. The hazards resulting from delivery, deployment, and retrieval of hazardous payloads, and from handling and transport of cargo between orbiter, sortie modules, and space station are identified and analyzed. The safety aspects of shuttle orbiter to modular space station docking includes docking for assembly of space station, normal resupply docking, and emergency docking. Personnel traffic patterns, escape routes, and on-board survivability are analyzed for orbiter with crew and passenger, sortie modules, and modular space station, under normal, emergency, and EVA and IVA operations.

Source record↗