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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.
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The preliminary design of the Owens-Illinois model Sunair SEC-601 tubular air solar collector is presented. Information in this package includes the subsystem design and development approaches, hazard analysis, and detailed drawings available as the preliminary design review.
Information used to evaluate the design of a solar heating, cooling, and domestic hot water system is given. A conventional heat pump provides summer cooling items as the design data brochure, system performance specification, system hazard analysis, spare parts list, and detailed design drawings. A solar system is installed in a single-family dwelling at Akron, Ohio, and at Duffield, Virginia.
Two different topics which only relate in that they are pertinent to lithium thionyl chloride battery safety are discussed. The first topic is a hazards analysis of a system (risk assessment), a formal approach that is used in nuclear engineering, predicting oil spills, etc. It is a formalized approach for obtaining assessment of the degree of risk associated with the use of any particular system. The second topic is a small piece of chemistry related to the explosions that can occur with lithium thionyl chloride systems. After the two topics are presented, a discussion is generated among the Workshop participants.
Package of information includes design data, performance specifications, drawings, hazard analysis, and spare parts list for commercially produced system installed in single-family dwelling in Akron, Ohio. System uses air flat-plate collectors, 12000 kg rock storage and backup heat pump. Solar portion requires 0.7 kW, and provides 35% of average total heating load including hot water. Information aids persons considering installing solar home-heating systems.
The status of the implementation of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident is reported. The implementation of recommendations in the following areas is detailed: (1) solid rocket motor design; (2) shuttle management structure, including the shuttle safety panel and astronauts in management; (3) critical item review and hazard analysis; (4) safety organization; (5) improved communication; (6) landing safety; (7) launch abort and crew escape; (8) flight rate; and (9) maintenance safeguards. Supporting memoranda and communications from NASA are appended.
The status of the implementation of the recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident is reported. The implementation of recommendations in the following areas is detailed: (1) solid rocket motor design; (2) shuttle management structure, including the shuttle safety panel and astronauts in management; (3) critical item review and hazard analysis; (4) safety organization; (5) improved communication; (6) landing safety; (7) launch abort and crew escape; (8) flight rate; and (9) maintenance safeguards. Supporting memoranda and communications from NASA are appended.
As the shock of the Space Shuttle Challenger accident began to subside, NASA initiated a wide range of actions designed to ensure greater safety in various aspects of the Shuttle system and an improved focus on safety throughout the National Space Transportation System (NSTS) Program. Certain specific features of the NASA safety process are examined: the Critical Items List (CIL) and the NASA review of the Shuttle primary and backup units whose failure might result in the loss of life, the Shuttle vehicle, or the mission; the failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA); and the hazard analysis and their review. The conception of modern risk management, including the essential element of objective risk assessment is described and it is contrasted with NASA's safety process in general terms. The discussion, findings, and recommendations regarding particular aspects of the NASA STS safety assurance process are reported. The 11 subsections each deal with a different aspect of the process. The main lessons learned by SCRHAAC in the course of the audit are summarized.
The Space Shuttle Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) redesign program instituted in the wake of the Challenger accident encompassed a design requirements review, a failure modes effect analysis/critical items list determination, a hazards analysis, an operational maintenance and requirements specification study, the definition of operational maintenance instructions and launch commit criteria, and design certification and flight readiness reviews. Attention is presently given to the SRB's thrust vector control, separation, and recovery functions, as well as its electrical and instrumentation systems and its case assembly and hardware interfaces.
A task force was created by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to conduct a 90-day study to support efforts to determine requirements to meet the goals of the Space Exploration Initiative. The task force identified the need for a nuclear reactor to provide the electrical power required as the outpost power demands on the moon and Mars evolve into hundreds of kilowatts. A preliminary hazards analysis has been performed to examine safety aspects of nuclear reactor power systems for representative missions to the moon and Mars. Mission profiles were defined for reference lunar and Martian flights. Potential alternatives to each mission phase were also defined. Accident scenarios were qualitatively defined for the mission phases. The safety issues decay heat removal, reactor control, disposal, criticality, end-of-mission shutdown, radiation exposure, the Martian environment, high speed impact on the surfaces of the moon or Mars, and return flyby trajectories were identified.
Space Transportation System 33 (STS-33) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights, factors from previous flights that have an impact on this flight, and the factors that are not unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late to include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
Space Transportation System 35 (STS-35) safety risk factors that represent a change from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and factors that were unique to this flight are discussed. While some changes to the safety risk baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to insure that changes which were too late too include in formal changes through the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance rationale.
Interface hazard analysis (IHA) is used as a 'tool' to systematically assess safety for the integration of a diverse set of experiments and payload hardware into the Spacelab carrier which flies in the Space Shuttle's Orbiter cargo bay. The IHA when performed by a thorough analysis provides safety assurance of complex integrated systems by systematically linking analysis efforts performed by the organizations thus providing the respective elements to be integrated into an objective, unique analysis. Particular attention is given to verification methods of the safety assurance of the Spacelab carrier and its experiment payload for which the IHA was performed.
A view of the facility and operational requirements involved in performing a manned thermal vacuum test is presented. The requirements fall into two major categories. The first category deals with placing the suited crewmen in a hazardous environment and assuring their safety. The second category deals with the constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment. Design areas that deal with man rating a chamber, including fire suppression, emergency repress, emergency power, backups, reliable instrumentation and data systems, communications, television monitoring, biomedical monitoring, material compatibilities, and equipment supporting the Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) are discussed. The operational issues that are peculiar to manned testing such as test rules, test procedures, test protocol, emergency drills, availability of hyperbaric facilities, test team training and certification engineering concerns for a safe mechanical and instrumentation buildup, hazard analysis, and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis are discussed. The constraints and special requirements involved with a suited crewman operating flight hardware in a 1-G environment are addressed.
A fast and efficient method for simulating potential interactions between space objects is presented. The specialized hazard analysis simulation is run at the Russian Space Surveillance Center. It simulates the motion of objects in space and determines close encounters between these objects. First, ephemerides are predicted for all space objects over the time interval of concern. Second, using the predicted ephemerides, pairs of satellites that would likely collide are grouped together. Throughout the process, the pairs initially chosen are refined until all pairs of satellites are found which come within a certain miss distance of each other. In addition to the miss distance, other characteristics of the encounter including angle of incidence, relative velocity, type of approaching object, and probability of collision come out of the simulation. There are many potential applications of this simulation and its results to missing planning and mission safety. Artificial objects can be introduced to the simulation to examine potential encounters between the new objects and current objects for mission design applications. The simulation can be run many times to create data for statistical analysis of encounter parameters. These as well as many other potential applications are presented and discussed.
Although oxygen is a chemically stable element, it is not shock sensitive, will not decompose, and is not flammable. Oxygen use therefore carries a risk that should never be overlooked, because oxygen is a strong oxidizer that vigorously supports combustion. Safety is of primary concern in oxygen service. To promote safety in oxygen systems, the flammability of materials used in them should be analyzed. At the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF), we have performed configurational tests of components specifically engineered for oxygen service. These tests follow a detailed WSTF oxygen hazards analysis. The stated objective of the tests was to provide performance test data for customer use as part of a qualification plan for a particular component in a particular configuration, and under worst-case conditions. In this document - the 'Guide for Oxygen Component Qualification Tests' - we outline recommended test systems, and cleaning, handling, and test procedures that address worst-case conditions. It should be noted that test results apply specifically to: manual valves, remotely operated valves, check valves, relief valves, filters, regulators, flexible hoses, and intensifiers. Component systems are not covered.
This NASA KSC video release presents a press conference that discusses the major system changes implemented on the shuttle in preparation for the launch of Discovery STS-26. Richard A. Colonna (Mgr. Orbiter and GFE Projects office) and an unidentified colleague present discussions involving hazard analysis, landing safety, launch abort/crew escape and major modidfications made to the Space Shuttle Boosters. Their presentations are followed by a question and answer period for journalists from scientific journals.
Under the sponsorship of the NASA Safety Training Center at the Johnson Space Center, a hypergolic propellant safety course has been developed. This is a 2-day course on guidelines for hypergolic propellant system design, materials selection, operations, storage, and transportation. Recognizing that numerous fuels and oxidizers can be hypergolic, this course is specific to the hydrazine family of fuels and nitrogen tetroxide and its variants. The objectives of the course are to enable the student to identify and evaluate the hazards of hypergolic propellants, and to understand the methods for controlling those hazards and responding to emergencies. The course covers properties and hazards of the hydrazines and oxidizers; design and operations in hypergolic facilities; materials selection for use in hypergol systems; storage vessels, piping, and component considerations; hypergol detection; fire fighting practices; operating and transportation principles and procedures; and emergency practices and considerations. A hazards analysis methodology is presented. Numerous references are provided and the applicability of certain regulatory documents is discussed. A brief overview of other propellants, including hydrogen peroxide, is given at the end of the course.
Selection of a landing site for the '03 and later Mars surface missions represents a balance between potential science results and landing site safety. Although safety has to be the prime consideration, it is the melding together of spacecraft hazard analysis with science analysis that provides the key to understanding the nature of the surface for determining both its safety for landing and its scientific potential. Our goal here is to discuss the geological factors that go into a determination of site safety, at scales from centimeters up to kilometers, and to understand the implications for the resulting scientific return that can be expected.