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At least 217 records · Page 12

Optimal contracting structure between cellulosic biorefineries and farmers to reduce the impact of biomass supply variation: game theoretic analysis

There is considerable year–to–year variability in the supply of cellulosic biomass used in the production of cellulosic biofuels, yet strategies to mitigate these variations in biofuel development are not well understood. Biorefineries and farmers venturing into the cellulosic biofuel industry will require biomass supply and contracting strategies that can minimize the impact of these large variations. Some studies have proposed biomass pre–treatment and storage to address biomass supply variations. Other studies have used transportation modeling approaches to manage supply variations and select the optimal location of a cellulosic biorefinery. However, storage, pre–treatment, and similar engineering approaches lead to higher costs and have other limitations such as additional infrastructural requirements. There is a gap in understanding how contracting strategies between biorefineries and the biomass suppliers (farmers) can reduce the risks with biomass supply variations. In this study, the contracting structure between biorefineries and biomass suppliers is studied under different market structures for the US Corn Belt. A theoretical framework is then developed to use contracting strategies for mitigating the impact of biomass supply variations. First, the trade–offs between intricately linked components of biomass cost, such as biomass transport, biomass price (incentive) to suppliers, variation in biomass supply, biorefinery size, and alternative feedstock availability are examined. Next, an optimal contracting structure is developed between biorefineries and biomass suppliers using game theoretic analysis. Here, the results show that both the impact of biomass supply variations and the overall biomass cost can be significantly reduced through the use of the optimal contracting strategy between biorefineries and suppliers.

cellulosic biofuel↗

A Stochastic Maximum Principle for a Stochastic Differential Game of a Mean-Field Type

We construct a stochastic maximum principle (SMP) which provides necessary conditions for the existence of Nash equilibria in a certain form of N-agent stochastic differential game (SDG) of a mean-field type. The information structure considered for the SDG is of a possible asymmetric and partial type. To prove our SMP we take an approach based on spike-variations and adjoint representation techniques, analogous to that of S. Peng (SIAM J. Control Optim. 28(4):966-979, 1990) in the optimal stochastic control context. In our proof we apply adjoint representation procedures at three points. The first-order adjoint processes are defined as solutions to certain mean-field backward stochastic differential equations, and second-order adjoint processes of a first type are defined as solutions to certain backward stochastic differential equations. Second-order adjoint processes of a second type are defined as solutions of certain backward stochastic equations of a type that we introduce in this paper, and which we term conditional mean-field backward stochastic differential equations. From the resulting representations, we show that the terms relating to these second-order adjoint processes of the second type are of an order such that they do not appear in our final SMP equations. A comparable situation exists in an article by R. Buckdahn, B. Djehiche, and J. Li (Appl. Math. Optim. 64(2):197-216, 2011) that constructs a SMP for a mean-field type optimal stochastic control problem; however, the approach we take of using these second-order adjoint processes of a second type to deal with the type of terms that we refer to as the second form of quadratic-type terms represents an alternative to a development, to our setting, of the approach used in their article for their analogous type of term.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Existence and Uniqueness Result for Mean Field Games with Congestion Effect on Graphs

This paper presents a general existence and uniqueness result for mean field games equations on graphs (G-MFG). In particular, our setting allows to take into account congestion effects of almost any form. These general congestion effects are particularly relevant in graphs in which the cost to move from one node to another may for instance depend on the proportion of players in both the source node and the target node. Existence is proved using a priori estimates and a fixed point argument à la Schauder. We propose a new criterion to ensure uniqueness in the case of Hamiltonian functions with a complex (non-local) structure. This result generalizes the discrete counterpart of uniqueness results obtained in Lasry and Lions (C. R. Acad. Sci. Paris 343(10):679–684, 2006). Lions ( http://www.college-de-france.fr/default/EN/all/equ-der/audio-video.jsp http://www.college-de-france.fr/default/EN/all/equ{sub d}er/audio{sub v}ideo.jsp , 2014).

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Solving the duck curve in a smart grid environment using a non-cooperative game theory and dynamic pricing profiles

With the intermittency that comes with electricity generation from renewables, utilizing dynamic pricing will encourage the demand-side to respond in a smart way that would minimize the electricity costs and flatten the net electricity demand curve. Determining the optimal dynamic pricing profile that would leverage distributed storage to flatten the curve is a novel idea that needs to be studied. Moreover, the economic feasibility of utilizing distributed electrical energy storage is still not given in the literature. Therefore, in this paper, a novel way of solving a citywide dynamic model using a bilevel programming algorithm is introduced. The problem is developed as a novel non-cooperative Stackelberg game that utilizes air-conditioning systems and electrical storage through the end-users to determine the optimal dynamic pricing profile. The results show that the combined effect of utilizing demand-side air-conditioning systems and distributed storage together can flatten the curve while employing the optimal dynamic pricing profile. An economic study is performed to determine the economic feasibility of 20 different cases with different battery designs and the level of solar penetration. Three metrics were used to evaluate the economic performance of each case: the levelized cost of storage, the levelized cost of energy, and the simple payback period. Most cases had levelized cost of storage values lower than 0.457 $/kWh, which is the lower bound available in the literature. Seven out of 16 cases have a simple payback period shorter than the lifetime of the system (25 years). The case with a 100 MW PV power plant and a battery storage of size 597 MWh, was found to be the most promising case with a simple payback period of 12.71 years for the photovoltaic plant and 19.86 years for the demand-side investments.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Optimal CO 2 storage management considering safety constraints in multi-stakeholder multi-site GCS projects: A Markov game perspective

Geological carbon storage (GCS) projects could involve a diverse array of stakeholders or players from public, private, and regulatory sectors, each with different objectives and responsibilities. Given the complexity, scale, and long-term nature of GCS operations, determining whether individual stakeholders can independently optimize their interests — or whether collaborative coalition agreements are needed — remains a central question for effective GCS project planning and management. To access large, high-quality storage resources, future GCS deployment may increasingly occur in geologically connected sites, where shared geological features such as pressure space and reservoir pore capacity can lead to competitive behavior among stakeholders. In this work, we propose a paradigm based on Markov games to quantitatively investigate how different coalition structures affect the goals of stakeholders. We frame this multi-stakeholder multi-site problem as a multi-agent reinforcement learning problem with safety constraints. Our approach enables agents to learn optimal strategies while complying with safety regulations. We present an example where multiple operators are injecting CO 2 into their respective project areas in a geologically connected basin. To address the high computational cost of repeated simulations of high fidelity models, a previously developed surrogate model based on the Embed-to-Control (E2C) framework is employed. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework in addressing optimal management of CO 2 storage when multiple stakeholders with different objectives and goals are involved.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗

Simulating policy interventions in the interfirm diffusion of low-carbon technologies: An agent-based evolutionary game model

Policy interventions are frequently used by authorities around the world to mitigate carbon emissions. However, economic systems are essentially complex adaptive systems, which often exhibit unexpected responses to exogenous interventions and leave intervenors in a dilemma, even if the interventions are elaborately designed. To explore the behaviors of the diffusion system regarding low-carbon technologies, this study builds an agent-based model (ABM) to simulate enterprises' reactions to multiple policy interventions aimed at spurring low-carbon technology diffusion. The simulated enterprises are in a complex network where they play evolutionary games with their neighbors, which enables the model to possess two critical features of economic systems: adaptiveness and equilibrium. The model reveals a dilemma of policy interventions: intuitively, carbon taxes, asymmetric penalties (only imposed on un-low-carbon enterprises) and subsidies can improve the diffusion, which is consistent with previous research; counter-intuitively, all these policies turn out to be inefficient or even harmful to low-carbon enterprises because of the diffusion system's high adaptiveness. Specifically, when carbon taxes and penalties increase, both the low-carbon and un-low-carbon enterprises end up with the equilibrium of equivalent but lower profits. In contrast, all the enterprises earn equivalent but more profits even though subsidies are only given to the low-carbon enterprises, which implies that the un-low-carbon enterprises (indirectly) grab a portion of the subsidies and accordingly weaken the incentive effect of subsidies. These system behaviors are summarized as "equalizing effect" because the system tends to equalize the impact of both positive and negative interventions among all enterprises even though the policy interventions are asymmetrically imposed on one type of the enterprises. The findings also indicate that policies implemented to enlarge green market sizes can help policymakers bypass the dilemma.

Agent-based modeling↗

A topological proof of chaos for two nonlinear heterogeneous triopoly game models

We rigorously prove the existence of chaotic dynamics for two nonlinear Cournot triopoly game models with heterogeneous players, for which in the existing literature the presence of complex phenomena and strange attractors has been shown via numerical simulations. In the first model that we analyze, costs are linear but the demand function is isoelastic, while, in the second model, the demand function is linear and production costs are quadratic. As concerns the decisional mechanisms adopted by the firms, in both models one firm adopts a myopic adjustment mechanism, considering the marginal profit of the last period; the second firm maximizes its own expected profit under the assumption that the competitors' production levels will not vary with respect to the previous period; the third firm acts adaptively, changing its output proportionally to the difference between its own output in the previous period and the naive expectation value. The topological method we employ in our analysis is the so-called “Stretching Along the Paths” technique, based on the Poincaré-Miranda Theorem and the properties of the cutting surfaces, which allows to prove the existence of a semi-conjugacy between the system under consideration and the Bernoulli shift, so that the former inherits from the latter several crucial chaotic features, among which a positive topological entropy.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗

Nash equilibrium in differential games and the construction of the programmed iteration method

This work is devoted to the study of nonzero-sum differential games. The set of payoffs in a situation of Nash equilibrium is examined. It is shown that the set of payoffs in a situation of Nash equilibrium coincides with the set of values of consistent functions which are fixed points of the program absorption operator. A condition for functions to be consistent is given in terms of the weak invariance of the graph of the functions under a certain differential inclusion. Bibliography: 18 titles.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

A Non-cooperative Game-based Approach to Distributed Beam Scheduling in Millimeter-Wave Networks

We consider the distributed beam scheduling problem in mm-Wave networks where the base stations may belong to different operators and there is no centralized coordination among them. Our goal is to design distributed beam scheduling algorithms such that the network utility, which is defined as a logarithm function of the average throughput of the user equipment, can be maximized. We propose a non-cooperative game-based scheduling approach where the base stations are modeled as players that greedily maximize their own utilities. The Nash Equilibrium (NE) then provides a distributed solution to the network utility maximization problem. By employing the Lyapunov optimization, the asymptotic optimality of the proposed scheduling can be guaranteed. We prove the existence and provide sufficient conditions which guarantee the uniqueness of the NE by establishing an equivalence to the Variational Inequality (VI) problem. We also propose a parallel power adaptation algorithm which is proved to converge to the NE. Numerical results show the superiority of the proposed scheduling over several distributed baseline schemes.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Defense of Cyber Infrastructures Against Cyber-Physical Attacks Using Game-Theoretic Models

The operation of cyber infrastructures relies on both cyber and physical components, which are subject to incidental and intentional degradations of different kinds. Within the context of network and computing infrastructures, we study the strategic interactions between an attacker and a defender using game-theoretic models that take into account both cyber and physical components. The attacker and defender optimize their individual utilities expressed as sums of cost and system terms. First, we consider a Boolean attack-defense model, wherein the cyber and physical sub-infrastructures may be attacked and reinforced as individual units. Second, we consider a component attack-defense model wherein their components may be attacked and defended, and the infrastructure requires minimum numbers of both to function. We show that the Nash equilibrium under uniform costs in both cases is computable in polynomial time, and it provides high-level deterministic conditions for the infrastructure survival. When probabilities of successful attack and defense, and of incidental failures are incorporated into the models, the results favor the attacker but otherwise remain qualitatively similar. This approach has been motivated and validated by our experiences with UltraScience Net infrastructure, which was built to support high-performance network experiments. In conclusion, the analytical results, however, are more general, and we apply them to simplified models of cloud and high-performance computing infrastructures.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

GPLADD: Quantifying Trust in Government and Commercial Systems A Game-Theoretic Approach

Trust in a microelectronics-based system can be characterized as the level of confidence that a system is free of subversive alterations made during system development, or that the development process of a system has not been manipulated by a malicious adversary. Trust in systems has become an increasing concern over the past decade. This report introduces a novel game-theoretic framework, called GPLADD (Graph-based Probabilistic Learning Attacker and Dynamic Defender), for analyzing and quantifying system trustworthiness at the end of the development process, through the analysis of risk of development-time system manipulation. GPLADD represents attacks and attacker-defender contests over time. Here, time is an explicit constraint and allows incorporating the informational asymmetries between the attacker and defender into analysis. GPLADD includes an explicit representation of attack steps via multi-step attack graphs, attacker and defender strategies, and player actions at different times. GPLADD allows quantifying the attack success probability over time and the attacker and defender costs based on their capabilities and strategies. This ability to quantify different attacks provides an input for evaluation of trust in the development process. We demonstrate GPLADD on an example attack and its variants. We develop a method for representing success probability for arbitrary attacks and derive an explicit analytic characterization of success probability for a specific attack. We present a numeric Monte Carlo study of a small set of attacks, quantify attack success probabilities, attacker and defender costs, and illustrate the options the defender has for limiting the attack success and improving trust in the development process.

37 attack↗

Game Theory Approaches for System-level Incentive Design

This report presents a generalized Stackelberg game framework for designing and evaluating financial incentives that enhance power system resilience through strategic deployment of distributed energy resources(DERs) under various contingencies. The proposed approach addresses the challenge of coordinating individual community investment decisions to meet system-wide resilience objectives. The framework is demonstrated in a three-community test system subjected to two transmission contingency scenarios: inter-community line failure (Case 1) and complete main grid disconnection (Case 2). In both cases, three incentive levels are compared: a Base case with no financial incentives, and low and high incentive cases. In Case 1, the Base case (no incentives) results in a total installed DER capacity of 217.2 MW, with no load shedding due to alternative routing, but community costs remain high. Increasing incentives raises DER deployment to 286.9 MW, lowers aggregate community costs by $22M annually, and completely avoids the need for costly new transmission line construction. In Case 2, the Base case results in 24.3 MWh of unserved load; introducing incentives eliminates all load shedding and ensures up to 89 MWh of battery storage is available for emergency reserve. These results demonstrate that targeted incentives can dramatically improve grid resilience and cost-effectiveness. The framework thus offers policymakers and system planners a robust tool to quantify and compare the effectiveness of incentive programs for multi-community transmission networks behavior, system resilience, and economic efficiency.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗