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205 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2024

The Active Volcanoes of Kamchatka as Suitable Terrestrial Analogs Within the AVENGERS Initiative: An Opportunity for In-Situ Operational Tests for Future Landing Venus Missions

The next decade will see the return to Venus thanks to a number of missions which have been recently selected and proposed for launch. The Roscosmos Venera-D mission, along with the NASA DAVINCI, NASA VERITAS, ESA EnVision, the ISRO Shukrayaan-1, and the CNSA VOICE missions will open a new era for the exploration of the Earth’s hellish twin planet. The next missions to Venus should be able to shed new light on the science questions such as: a) whether the volcanic activity on this planet is locally constrained, or volcanism acts on a global scale, b) the rate of the present-day volcanic activity, and c) the style of volcanism on Venus, whether it is predominantly effusive, or the occurrence of local episodes of pyroclastic volcanism is also possible. In preparation for the future missions to Venus, the Analogs for VENus’ Geologically Recent Surfaces (AVENGERS) initiative will select and analyze a number of active terrestrial volcanoes as suitable analogs for the identification and analysis of active volcanism on Venus. Among the future missions to Venus, the Roscosmos Venera-D is the only one to be equipped with a lander which will analyze the elemental and mineralogical composition of the surface. As the young topographic rises (areas characterized by recent volcano-tectonic activity) on Venus are being proposed as one of the possible terrain types for the Venera-D landing, it is crucial to look for volcanic areas on Earth where to perform operational tests such as surface drilling and in-situ elemental composition analysis. To this regard, we propose here the analysis of the active volcanoes of the Kamchatka Peninsula in Russia as a very suitable analog for the Venera-D mission, as well as for the analysis of surface change detection due to ongoing eruptions. The Kamchatka Peninsula is located on the eastern margin of the Eurasia plate, in proximity of the Kuril-Kamchatka subduction zone. The volcanoes of the Kamchatka Peninsula are among the most active volcanoes of the world, making them a suitable terrestrial analog in the search for active volcanism on Venus. Moreover, the volcanoes of Kamchatka are characterized by pyroclastic activity. Since the previous Soviet Venera and Vega missions landed over areas which elemental composition was most likely consistent with that of tholeiitic basalts, performing operational tests over areas characterized by pyroclastic activity also offers the unique opportunity to provide us the tools to potentially interpret the diverse output given by landing over portions of the surface of Venus possibly characterized by explosive volcanic products. Finally, the frequent eruptions characterizing the volcanoes of the Kamchatka Peninsula make them also a suitable terrestrial analog for the possible detection of ongoing eruptions on Venus by future missions, which can be achieved by comparing two (or more) radar images of the same volcano (and its surroundings) in two (or more) different moments of time.

Planetary Geology↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analysis of degradation products in thermally treated TATB

Delineating the chemical composition of TATB (1,3,5-triamino-2,4,6-trinitrobenzene) residues produced from the exposure to abnormal thermal environments should lead to a better understanding of the decomposition paths. Identifying and quantifying each compound in thermally produced residues, monitors which compounds are degrading or forming along the decomposition route, as well as providing input for the kinetic models of those pathways. Here, in this paper, we report the methodology of isolating, identifying, and where possible, quantifying soluble compounds present in solid residues of thermally treated TATB (330 °C for tens of minutes). Samples were extracted with DMSO, separated using chromatography, and quantified using their absorption at 354 nm. Identification of unknown compounds was accomplished using high resolution mass spectrometry. TATB, F1 (diamino-dinitro-benzofurazan), HO-TATB (2,4,6-triamino-1-hydroxyl-3,5-dinitrobenzene), and T4A (1-chloro-3,5-dinitro-2,4,6-triaminobenzene) were trace compounds detected in the unreacted TATB. Ten more compounds that formed in the residues were structurally identified including F2 (amino-nitro-difurazan). Several more compounds were observed but not completely identified. We propose possible structures for the unknowns. Of the compounds formed, F1 was the most abundant compound reaching 4.5 % by weight of the degraded solid sample. Other degradation compounds were estimated to sum to trace levels, well below 1 %. Most compounds were new, having not been detected and identified in previous studies of production grade and thermally aged TATB. Many compounds only reached detectable concentrations after several min of thermal exposure.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Active Volcanoes of Kamchatka as Suitable Terrestrial Analogs for Future Landing Missions and for Change Detection Analysis on Venus

The next decade will see the return to Venus due to a number of missions which have been recently selected and proposed for launch. The selected missions NASA DAVINCI and VERITAS, Roscosmos Venera-D, and ESA EnVision, along with the proposed missions ISRO Shukrayaan- 1, and CNSA VOICE, will open a new era for the exploration of the Earth’s hellish twin planet. These missions will shed new light on the science questions such as: (a) whether recent volcanic activity is locally constrained, or active volcanism occurs on a global scale; (b) the rate of the present-day volcanic activity; (c) the styles of volcanism on Venus, including possible occurrences of pyroclastic/explosive volcanism; and (d) how does the extreme environment on Venus effect volcanic activity. In preparation for these future missions to Venus, the Analogs for VENus’ GEologically Recent Surfaces (AVENGERS) initiative has the scope to select and analyze a number of active terrestrial volcanoes as suitable analogs for the identification and analysis of active volcanism on Venus. The Roscosmos Venera-D is the only mission, among the currently selected or planned mission, equipped with a lander to analyze the elemental and mineralogical composition of the surface. Therefore, it is crucial to find applicable volcanic areas on Earth to perform operational tests such as surface drilling and in-situ elemental composition analysis. To this regard, we propose the analysis of active volcanoes of the Kamchatka Peninsula, which is in a geodynamic setting (subduction) contrasting to that of the volcanic rises on Venus (hot spot). Thus, Kamchatka may represent a helpful geodynamic endmember to put the expected landing site of the Venera-D mission within the context of the entire variety of volcanic landforms and surface chemistry. The Kamchatka Peninsula is located on the eastern margin of the Eurasian plate, in proximity to the Kuril-Kamchatka subduction zone. The frequent eruptions characterizing the volcanoes of the Kamchatka Peninsula make them a suitable terrestrial analog for the possible detection of ongoing eruptions on Venus by future missions, which can be achieved by comparing a sequence of radar images of the same volcano and its surroundings taken at different times. Moreover, it is possible to collect samples of both unweathered and weathered volcanic deposits, to analyze their near infrared spectra in the laboratory for direct comparison with the spectra to be provided by the future missions to Venus. The chemical analyses of Venusian surface materials from the previous Soviet Venera and Vega missions are consistent with that of tholeiitic basalts. Since the volcanism of the Kamchatka Peninsula is characterized by both basaltic lava flows eruptions and pyroclastic activity, performing operational tests in the Kamchatka Peninsula also offers the unique opportunity to provide us the tools to potentially interpret the diverse output given by both effusive and explosive volcanic products.

Piero D'Incecco↗
DOE OSTI2015

Andra's strategy and approach for operational safety of French underground facility Cigeo - 15127

According to the French Act on radioactive waste of 28 June 2006, Andra shall design a reversible repository. In response to this demand, Andra is developing the industrial project namely 'Cigeo', a reversible geological disposal facility for HLW and ILW located in Meuse/Haute-Marne. The previous safety cases of 2005, 2009 and 2012 give a sound basis to assess Cigeo's safety both for the operational and post-closure periods. Regarding operational safety, in this new stage of the project, the challenging issues for the preparation of the safety case are the following: - To adapt the various regulatory frameworks (nuclear and non-nuclear) to the underground facility - To design the underground facility and handling equipment's to reduce at first risks in the underground facility as such radioactive particles release, gas explosion, fire and co-activity and limit their consequence. - To establish waste acceptance criteria to be fulfilled by waste producers in line with operational safety and design options. The objective of the paper is to present the experience of Andra in operation safety of the underground facility of Cigeo. Operational safety for Cigeo is assessed as much as possible according to the existing French regulations and guidance for nuclear facilities. Indeed, compared to existing nuclear facilities, a geological repository is a specific case due to the existence of underground facilities with particularities such as: - ventilation management in a large scale underground facility, - fire risk management. As an input for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation, Andra defined a fire guidance and a specific reference safety guidance, based on the adaptation of the French nuclear regulatory texts for and when feasible to mines and tunnels regulatory texts and on its own experience gained through safety operational reports since 2005 and their reviews by the Safety Authority. - underground co-activity of nuclear operation with construction works. According to the common 'defense-in depth' principle for nuclear facilities, these guidelines for the industrial design of Cigeo for operation consider the successive levels of defense of: - Preventing the risk and its spreading by design and construction; - Detecting incidents and early fighting by design and operation dispositions (detection and control systems, survey procedure); - Controlling incidents and limiting of their consequences by safeguarding systems, specific procedures. At that stage, design options for Cigeo constitute an adequate response to the operational safety functions and requirements: - Two levels of containment are set up: the first one is ensured by the waste package, the second one is ensured from the surface facility to the disposal vaults by the transfer cask during the transfer of waste packages in the disposal vaults by the disposal vault itself and a nuclear ventilation with HEPA filter; - Favorable options for fire risk prevention and mitigation: transport system minimizing heat load (cable car for the transfer from the surface, electric transfer engines), twin access tunnels to ease fire-fighting and evacuation...; - Permanent complete physical separation of nuclear zone and construction zone (including ventilation systems). In practice, operation safety assessment of Cigeo, designed following the aforesaid reference safety guidelines, follows a common risk analysis (internal aggressions such as auxiliary losses, chemical and toxic risks, fall or collision, fire, human factors and external aggressions such as earthquake, air traffic, flooding) with the following steps: - Identification of the major risks and the design basis scenarios that have to be considered for dimensioning of the installations and the safety devices; - On the basis of these different situations, those who will have to be quantified are identified; one or more representative and envelop situations are chosen in order to evaluate robustness of the installation. Quantitative evaluation of these situations permits to: - identify the consequences on man, environment and installation, and in particular to gain confidence in the maintaining of the safety functions; - identify or define the technic and/or organisational dispositions classified as 'important elements for protection' (IEP); - Situations beyond dimensioning permit to verify the robustness of the installation. They permit, on one hand to identify possible complementary material or organisational dispositions; on the other hand, to define the 'hard core' i.e. structures, systems and components that permit to maintain the confinement function of radioactive substance. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2024

Fireball antinucleosynthesis

The tentative identification of approximately ten relativistic antihelium ( He ¯ ) cosmic-ray events at AMS-02 would, if confirmed, challenge our understanding of the astrophysical synthesis of heavy antinuclei. We propose a novel scenario for the enhanced production of such antinuclei that is triggered by isolated, catastrophic injections of large quantities of energetic Standard Model (SM) antiquarks in our galaxy by physics beyond the Standard Model (BSM). We demonstrate that SM antinucleosynthetic processes that occur in the resulting rapidly expanding, thermalized fireballs of SM plasma can, for a reasonable range of parameters, produce the reported tentative ∼ 2 : 1 ratio of He ¯ 3 to He ¯ 4 events at AMS-02, as well as their relativistic boosts. Moreover, we show that this can be achieved without violating antideuterium or antiproton flux constraints for the appropriate antihelium fluxes. A plausible BSM paradigm for the catastrophic injections is the collision of macroscopic composite dark-matter objects carrying large net antibaryon number. Such a scenario would require these objects to be cosmologically stable, but to destabilize upon collision, promptly releasing a fraction of their mass energy into SM antiparticles within a tiny volume. We show that, in principle, the injection rate needed to attain the necessary antihelium fluxes and the energetic conditions required to seed the fireballs appear possible to obtain in such a paradigm. We leave open the question of constructing a BSM particle physics model to realize this, but we suggest two concrete scenarios as promising targets for further investigation. Published by the American Physical Society 2024

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan

The Pantex Plant Ogallala Aquifer and Perched Groundwater Contingency Plan has been developed in accordance with the requirements identified in the: • Interagency Agreement for the Pantex Superfund Site, Article 8.5 Work to be Performed, • Compliance Plan Provision of Hazardous Waste Permit No. 50284, and • Record of Decision for Groundwater, Soil, and Associated Media, Pantex Plant. A Long‐Term Monitoring System Design has been designed to monitor conditions in the perched groundwater including changes in the perched aquifer as a result of implementing the response actions. Monitoring is required for verifying the effectiveness of perched groundwater response actions (i.e., conditions in the perched aquifer are being affected as intended) and for confirming that the perched aquifer and Ogallala Aquifer characterization as defined in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Investigation Report and the Corrective Measure Studies/Feasibility Study remains accurate. If monitoring results obtained through the monitoring network identify an unexpected condition or deviation, contingent actions will be considered and implemented as necessary to ensure continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and human health and the environment. Potential deviations to expected technology performance may be encountered for each of the four primary response actions that compose the selected remedy for perched groundwater; Playa 1 Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area Pump and Treat System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System (comprised of the Southeast In‐Situ Bioremediation System Original System, Southeast Area In‐Situ Bioremediation System Extension System, Offsite In‐Situ Bioremediation System, Perchlorate/Chromium ISB, Northeast ISB and County Road 8 ISB), and Zone 11 In‐Situ Bioremediation System. Monitoring will also be conducted to determine if there are deviations to the expected characterization, e.g., contaminants not expected as a result of the RCRA Facility Investigation characterization. Deviations to expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer could also be encountered if the response actions in the perched groundwater are not performing as expected, i.e., preventing contaminants from migrating to the Ogallala Aquifer. Currently, Pantex has begun investigation of detections of high explosives above groundwater protection standards in wells on the Texas Tech University property and a plume that is moving to the northeast from that area. Due to those detections, this Plan recognizes the fact that future detections in the Ogallala will be focused on first‐ time detections of analytes. After a remedy is determined, this Plan will require modification to address-deviations and contingent actions. This Plan was developed to identify the contingent actions necessary to mitigate impacts resulting from deviations to site conditions or response action performance. The Plan defines the environmental problem being addressed by the response actions, clarifies the expected conditions and objectives of the response actions, and identifies the potential deviations to the response actions (due to site conditions or technology performance) that could be encountered. The deviations were evaluated to determine the likelihood of occurrence, potential impact, and time to respond to avoid impact. The Plan also identifies the monitoring outlined in the Long‐Term Monitoring System Design Report (Consolidated Nuclear Security, 2024) and Sampling Analysis Plan (PanTeXas Deterrence, 2024) that will be used to detect the deviations. Lastly, the Plan specifies the contingent actions that could be implemented in response to the deviations. Because each response focuses on a discrete portion of the perched aquifer and contaminant plume, each response action has a different set of expected conditions, and therefore differing impacts from deviations to the site and technology expectations. As a result, the contingent actions are identified for each response action and potential deviation including specific constituents, location, and conditions. If deviations are encountered that impact the ability of the response action to meet performance objectives, the contingent actions will be focused on ensuring the response action can meet the performance objective. Contingent actions may be implemented as interim actions (ISMs/removal actions) in accordance with the Record of Decision, Interagency Agreement, and Hazardous Waste Permit‐50284, if warranted by the specific circumstances. For deviations to site characterization expected conditions, the contingent action will focus on determination of the source of the deviation, determination of the appropriate response, and evaluation of additional work to be completed. However, if the deviation to characterization impacts the performance of the response action, the contingent action will again focus on ensuring performance objectives can be met. Early source term removals and cleanup actions have been implemented to protect the Ogallala Aquifer. Because of these actions and based on modeling results, the expected conditions in the Ogallala Aquifer are that constituents of concern will not be detected above the Groundwater Protection Standards (GWPSs) nor will they reach potential points of exposure above the GWPS. The primary deviation of concern for the Ogallala is if constituents are detected in the Ogallala Aquifer near or above GWPSs. If it occurs, this change in expected conditions would require further evaluation of site and contaminant characteristics to determine an appropriate course of action. The evaluation would include additional monitoring, source identification, implementation of interim protective measures (if necessary), and delineation of extent. These evaluations are necessary to determine an appropriate response action for the Ogallala. The primary goal of the Plan is to provide for the continued protection of the Ogallala Aquifer and the health of its consumers. In recognition, this Plan presents a flexible and rational approach for making future decisions associated with confirming the change in perched and Ogallala aquifer conditions and identifying a response (technical activities, changes to response actions, regulatory oversight, and public involvement).

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Single-Nucleon Transfer on Unstable 59 Cu Probes the NiCu Cycle in Astrophysical X-Ray Bursts

Recent models of the rapid proton (𝑟⁢𝑝) capture process indicate that a competition between the 59 Cu⁢(𝑝,𝛾) ⁢60 Zn and 59 Cu⁢(𝑝,𝛼) ⁢56 Ni reactions may result in the formation of a nickel-copper (NiCu) cycle that traps the flux of material between 56 Ni and 60 Zn . Here, in this work, we report the identification of 15 proton-unbound levels in 60 Zn , populated via 59 Cu⁢(𝑑,𝑛) transfer, which govern the rate of the 59 Cu⁢(𝑝,𝛾)⁢ 60 Zn reaction in XRBs. Precise excitation energies for levels in 60 Zn were obtained from observed 𝛾 decays, and spectroscopic factors were determined from angle-integrated cross sections. Incorporating these results into stellar-model calculations, we find that with experimentally constrained uncertainties a NiCu cycle in XRBs is indeed possible, though we limit its branching strength to less than 38%. While modest, such a branching has significant impact on the light curve, motivating further studies of the relevant rates. Our calculations also indicate that a significant NiCu cycle leads to an increase in the amount of odd-𝐴 nuclei in the burst ashes, which may affect Urca cooling processes in neutron star crusts.

direct reactions↗