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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 217 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2014

Asteroid, Lunar and Planetary Regolith Management A Layered Engineering Defense

During missions on asteroid and lunar and planetary surfaces, space systems and crew health may be degraded by exposure to dust and dirt. Furthermore, for missions outside the Earth‐Moon system, planetary protection must be considered in efforts to minimize forward and backward contamination. This paper presents an end‐to‐end approach to ensure system reliability, crew health, and planetary protection in regolith environments. It also recommends technology investments that would be required to implement this layered engineering defense.

Wagner, Sandra↗
NASA NTRS2014

Analysis and Perspective from the Complex Aerospace Systems Exchange (CASE) 2013

NASA Langley Research Center embedded four rapporteurs at the Complex Aerospace Systems Exchange (CASE) held in August 2013 with the objective to capture the essence of the conference presentations and discussions. CASE was established to provide a discussion forum among chief engineers, program managers, and systems engineers on challenges in the engineering of complex aerospace systems. The meeting consists of invited presentations and panels from industry, academia, and government followed by discussions among attendees. This report presents the major and reoccurring themes captured throughout the meeting and provides analysis and insights to further the CASE mission.

Jones, Kennie H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Implementing an Objectives-Driven, Risk-Informed, and Case-Assured Approach to Safety and Mission Success at NASA

NASA is developing a “Standard for Assurance of Space Flight Safety and Mission Success” that implements an objectives-driven, risk-informed, and case-assured approach to safety and mission success (S&MS) for NASA space flight programs and projects. The standard aligns with the philosophy of risk leadership that has recently been established in NASA policy to assure acceptable levels of flight crew safety and mission success risk. It is consistent with existing NASA risk management requirements and is compatible with NASA program management and systems engineering requirements. The methodology described in the standard is presented in terms of an S&MS assurance framework that is designed to allow substantial flexibility in the specific means by which programs and projects achieve acceptable mission S&MS risk. Such flexibility is necessary to accommodate the increasingly broad range of acquisition strategies employed by NASA, including commercial transportation services, as well as to accommodate the increasingly rapid evolution of space flight-related technologies and practices. A key feature of the S&MS assurance framework is the specification of S&MS success criteria for each life-cycle review (LCR). The S&MS assurance case is structured around these criteria, the satisfaction of which indicates that the program/project is adhering to the S&MS risk posture. This enables the evolving S&MS assurance case to be used as a fundamental program/project submittal at each LCR, where its inherent structure of argument, supported by evidence, directly supports the evaluation of the program/project with respect to the S&MS success criteria, and by extension, the S&MS risk posture. As such, the S&MS assurance case is integral to program/project systems engineering, risk management, and S&MS oversight activities, and provides the principal basis for S&MS risk acceptance by the Decision Authority throughout the program/project life cycle.

Risk Posture↗
NASA NTRS1983

Overview of the Integrated Programs for Aerospace Vehicle Design (IPAD) project

To respond to national needs for improved productivity in engineering design and manufacturing, a NASA supported joint industry/government project is underway denoted Integrated Programs for Aerospace Vehicle Design (IPAD). The objective is to improve engineering productivity through better use of computer technology. It focuses on development of data base management technology and associated software for integrated company wide management of engineering and manufacturing information. Results to date on the IPAD project include an in depth documentation of a representative design process for a large engineering project, the definition and design of computer aided design software needed to support that process, and the release of prototype software to manage engineering information. This paper provides an overview of the IPAD project and summarizes progress to date and future plans.

Venneri, S. L.↗
NASA NTRS1984

CIM's bridge from CADD to CAM: Data management requirements for manufacturing engineering

Manufacturing engineering represents the crossroads of technical data management in a Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) environment. Process planning, numerical control programming and tool design are the key functions which translate information from as engineered to as assembled. In order to transition data from engineering to manufacturing, it is necessary to introduce a series of product interpretations which contain an interim introduction of technical parameters. The current automation of the product definition and the production process places manufacturing engineering in the center of CAD/CAM with the responsibility of communicating design data to the factory floor via a manufacturing model of the data. A close look at data management requirements for manufacturing engineering is necessary in order to establish the overall specifications for CADD output, CAM input, and CIM integration. The functions and issues associated with the orderly evolution of computer aided engineering and manufacturing are examined.

Ford, S. J.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Database Access Manager for the Software Engineering Laboratory (DAMSEL) user's guide

Operating instructions for the Database Access Manager for the Software Engineering Laboratory (DAMSEL) system are presented. Step-by-step instructions for performing various data entry and report generation activities are included. Sample sessions showing the user interface display screens are also included. Instructions for generating reports are accompanied by sample outputs for each of the reports. The document groups the available software functions by the classes of users that may access them.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS1980

IPAD project overview

To respond to national needs for improved productivity in engineering design and manufacturing, a NASA supported joint industry/government project is underway denoted Integrated Programs for Aerospace-Vehicle Design (IPAD). The objective is to improve engineering productivity through better use of computer technology. It focuses on development of technology and associated software for integrated company-wide management of engineering information. The project has been underway since 1976 under the guidance of an Industry Technical Advisory Board (ITAB) composed of representatives of major engineering and computer companies and in close collaboration with the Air Force Integrated Computer-Aided Manufacturing (ICAM) program. Results to date on the IPAD project include an in-depth documentation of a representative design process for a large engineering project, the definition and design of computer-aided design software needed to support that process, and the release of prototype software to integrate selected design functions. Ongoing work concentrates on development of prototype software to manage engineering information, and initial software is nearing release.

Fulton, R. E.↗
NASA NTRS1990

Analytical concepts for health management systems of liquid rocket engines

Substantial improvement in health management systems performance can be realized by implementing advanced analytical methods of processing existing liquid rocket engine sensor data. In this paper, such techniques ranging from time series analysis to multisensor pattern recognition to expert systems to fault isolation models are examined and contrasted. The performance of several of these methods is evaluated using data from test firings of the Space Shuttle main engines.

Williams, Richard↗
NASA NTRS2010

Managing Fault Management Development

As the complexity of space missions grows, development of Fault Management (FM) capabilities is an increasingly common driver for significant cost overruns late in the development cycle. FM issues and the resulting cost overruns are rarely caused by a lack of technology, but rather by a lack of planning and emphasis by project management. A recent NASA FM Workshop brought together FM practitioners from a broad spectrum of institutions, mission types, and functional roles to identify the drivers underlying FM overruns and recommend solutions. They identified a number of areas in which increased program and project management focus can be used to control FM development cost growth. These include up-front planning for FM as a distinct engineering discipline; managing different, conflicting, and changing institutional goals and risk postures; ensuring the necessary resources for a disciplined, coordinated approach to end-to-end fault management engineering; and monitoring FM coordination across all mission systems.

McDougal, John M.↗
NASA NTRS1992

Total Quality Management in Space Shuttle Main Engine manufacturing

The Total Quality Management (TQM) philosophy developed in the Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) is briefly reviewed and the ongoing TQM implementation effort which is being pursued through the continuous improvement (CI) process is discussed. TQM is based on organizational excellence which integrates the new supportive culture with the technical tools necessary to identify, assess, and correct manufacturing processes. Particular attention is given to the prime contractor's change to the organizational excellence management philosophy in SSME manufacturing facilities.

Ding, J.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Spacecraft Line-of-Sight Jitter Management and Mitigation Lessons Learned and Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to on-board internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance (e.g., nano-radian/milli-arcsecond class), vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. The Nation Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The guidance, navigation, and control community of practice will need to leverage collective experiences and document their best practices and lessons learned to address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center sponsored a 2-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to addressing the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. The primary objective was to identify, document, and share lessons learned, best practices, and preferred options for jitter-related analysis and test activities. Representatives from NASA, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper describes the motivation for the workshop and summarize the identified findings and recommendations.

Lessons Learned↗
NASA NTRS2021

Spacecraft Line-Of-Sight Jitter Management and Mitigation Lessons Learned And Engineering Best Practices

Predicting, managing, controlling, and testing spacecraft line-of-sight (LoS) jitter caused by micro-vibrations due to on-board internal disturbance sources is a formidable multidisciplinary engineering task. It is especially challenging for those missions hosting high-performance (e.g., nano-radian/milli-arcsecond class), vibration-sensitive optical sensor payloads with stringent pointing stability requirements. The Nation Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are planning technically aggressive spaceflight missions that include ultra-high-performance optical payloads with delicate, highly vibration-sensitive scientific and observational instruments. The guidance, navigation, and control community of practice will need to leverage collective experiences and document their best practices and lessons learned to address future micro-vibration challenges. To identify lessons learned and best practices the NASA Engineering & Safety Center sponsored a 2-day Spacecraft LoS Jitter Workshop in late 2019. The workshop’s goal was to provide a multidisciplinary forum to elicit deeper understanding of the issues related to addressing the spacecraft LoS jitter/micro-vibration problem. The primary objective was to identify, document, and share lessons learned, best practices, and preferred options for jitter-related analysis and test activities. Representatives from NASA, ESA, along with NASA’s industrial partners, independent consultant subject matter experts, and members of academia participated in the workshop. This paper will describe the motivation for the workshop and summarize the identified findings and recommendations.

Swanson, Davin K.↗
NASA NTRS2019

Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems Engineering

Over-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.

Jones, Harry W.↗