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At least 217 records · Page 12

PACKAGING AND TRANSPORTATION OF NEPTUNIUM OXIDE

The Savannah River Site's HB-Line Facility completed a campaign in which fifty (50) cans of neptunium oxide were produced and shipped to the Idaho National Laboratory in the 9975 shipping container. This shipping campaign involved the addition of neptunium oxide to the 9975 Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) as a new content and subsequently a Letter of Amendment to the SARP content table. This paper will address the proper steps which should be taken to add a new content table to a SARP. It will also address the importance of product sampling and understanding the material shipping requirements of a SARP.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Cooperative Conflict Avoidance Sensor Trade Study Report, Version 2

This study develops evaluation criteria for systems and technologies against the Cooperative Conflict Avoidance (CCA) requirements for unmanned flight at and above FL430 as part of Step 1 of the Access-5 program. These evaluation criteria are then applied to both current and future technologies to identify those which might be used to provide an Equivalent Level of Safety (ELOS) for CCA. This document provides the results of this analysis of various systems and technologies intended for evaluation as part of the CCA work package.

Source record↗

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

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Hazard Analysis for Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly

One of the characteristics of an effective safety program is the recognition and control of hazards before mishaps or failures occur. Conducting potentially hazardous tests necessitates a thorough hazard analysis in order to prevent injury to personnel, and to prevent damage to facilities and equipment. The primary purpose of this hazard analysis is to define and address the potential hazards and controls associated with the Building 34 Vacuum Glove Box Assembly, and to provide the applicable team of personnel with the documented results. It is imperative that each member of the team be familiar with the hazards and controls associated with his/her particular tasks, assignments and activities while interfacing with facility test systems, equipment and hardware. In fulfillment of the stated purposes, the goal of this hazard analysis is to identify all hazards that have the potential to harm personnel, damage the facility or its test systems or equipment, test articles, Government or personal property, or the environment. This analysis may also assess the significance and risk, when applicable, of lost test objectives when substantial monetary value is involved. The hazards, causes, controls, verifications, and risk assessment codes have been documented on the hazard analysis work sheets in Appendix A of this document. The preparation and development of this report is in accordance with JPR 1700.1, "JSC Safety and Health Handbook" and JSC 17773 Rev D "Instructions for Preparation of Hazard Analysis for JSC Ground Operations".

Meginnis, Ian↗

Safety analysis report for packaging shielding and nuclear criticality safety courses developed and conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory

The US Department of Energy (DOE) Packaging Certification Program, Office of Packaging and Transportation, is offering Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) Shielding and Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) courses for SARP generalists and analysts. The SARP generalist course is designed for project managers, supervisors, NCS/shielding subject matter experts (SME), and SMEs in non-NCS/shielding technical areas (e.g., structural, thermal, package design) who need to better understand how NCS/shielding analyses fit into the broader body of SARP documentation. The generalist course provides an overview of the regulations and guidelines for the criticality and shielding analyses for a SARP and illustrates how the NCS/shielding chapters integrate with the other parts of the SARP. After course material is presented, students in the generalist course will review an actual SARP document to examine key elements of the shielding and criticality analyses. The analyst course provides detailed instructions on the radioactive material package shielding analyses and NCS evaluation fundamentals needed by analysts/practitioners (i.e., safety analysts and/or technical reviewers) to prepare and/or review technical analyses for the SARP documentation. The analyst course also provides an overview of regulations and guidelines, in addition to detailed in-class exercises associated with package shielding and NCS analyses. Analysis teams will be faced with staged SARP examples in which several important decision processes in the generation of a SARP will be demonstrated and discussed. The courses are offered at Oak Ridge National Laboratory's National Transportation Research Center. (authors)

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Safety Analysis of Chromium-Coated Accident-Tolerant Fuels with Increased Enrichment and Extended Burnup [Slides]

This report documents research and development conducted in support of deployment of accident-tolerant fuels. Specifically, the performance of chromium coating during a beyond design basis accident was investigated. An 18m reference core was considered, and the performance of cases with and without chromium coating compared. An extended cycle length of 24m was then considered with the chromium coating, to determine if the benefit of using the chromium coating was more or less significant than the increased fission product inventory when considering fission product release. The chromium coating model utilized here is a preliminary implementation and further work is recommended on a more detailed model.

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Development of Criticality Safety Validation Guidance for NRC-Regulated Activities

Some guidance documents support validation of criticality safety evaluations for many system types, and some accommodate different regulators or regulatory requirements. While these reports address specific applications, no single document applies to all systems and incorporates both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based validation techniques. Oak Ridge National Laboratory will develop a single reference report for the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that provides modern examples and suggested recommendations for a uniform approach for performing and documenting k eff calculation validations applicable to any system containing fissile material. The project will include a literature review and development of a new, comprehensive NUREG/CR document on nuclear criticality safety validation. The NUREG will address the following experiences from recent reviews: 1. Inappropriate critical experiment selection 2. Insufficient trending analysis 3. Incorrectly calculated 95/95 uncertainties 4. Failure to address how validation applies to safety analysis 5. Lack of goodness-of-fit testing in trending analyses 6. Incorrect use of commercial reactor critical data 7. Failure to meet bias determination methodology prerequisites 8. Inappropriate extrapolation of bias and uncertainty 9. Failure to identify validation analysis gaps and weaknesses 10. Inadequate validation analysis documentation the final report will provide guidance on use of trending analysis results, acceptable confidence levels for normality testing and trending analysis, management of validation analysis gaps and weaknesses, use of sensitivity and uncertainty analysis in validation analysis, and potential impact of correlations among critical experiments used in validation. It will also consolidate existing guidance documents using both traditional and sensitivity/uncertainty-based approaches. This document will support NRC-regulated activities, as well as validation used in criticality safety within other regulatory frameworks.

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Technical Safety Requirements for the Waste Storage Facilities May 2014

This document contains the Technical Safety Requirements (TSR) for the Radioactive and Hazardous Waste Management (RHWM) WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES, which include Area 625 (A625) and the Building 693 (B693) Yard Area of the Decontamination and Waste Treatment Facility (DWTF) at LLNL. The TSRs constitute requirements for safe operation of the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES. These TSRs are derived from the Documented Safety Analyses for the Waste Storage Facilities (DSA) (LLNL 2011). The analysis presented therein concluded that the WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are low-chemical hazard, Hazard Category 2 non-reactor nuclear facilities. The TSRs consist primarily of inventory limits and controls to preserve the underlying assumptions in the hazard and accident analyses. Further, appropriate commitments to safety programs are presented in the administrative controls sections of the TSRs. The WASTE STORAGE FACILITIES are used by RHWM to handle and store hazardous waste, TRANSURANIC (TRU) WASTE, LOW-LEVEL WASTE (LLW), mixed waste, California combined waste, nonhazardous industrial waste, and conditionally accepted waste generated at LLNL as well as small amounts of waste from other DOE facilities, as described in the DSA. In addition, several minor treatments (e.g., size reduction and decontamination) are carried out in these facilities.

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Criticality Safety Analysis Of As-loaded Spent Nuclear Fuel Casks

The final safety analysis report (FSAR) or the safety analysis report (SAR) for a particular spent nuclear fuel (SNF) cask system documents models and calculations used to demonstrate that a system meets the regulatory requirements under all normal, off-normal, and accident conditions of spent fuel storage, and normal and accident conditions of transportation. FSAR/SAR calculations and approved content specifications are intended to be bounding in nature to certify cask systems for a variety of fuel characteristics with simplified SNF loading requirements. Therefore, in general, loaded cask systems possess excess and uncredited criticality margins (i.e., the difference between the licensing basis and the as-loaded calculations). This uncredited margin could be quantified by employing more detailed cask-specific evaluations that credit the actual as-loaded cask inventory, and taking into account full (actinide and fission product) burnup credit. This uncredited criticality margin could be potentially used to offset (1) uncertainties in the safety basis that needs to account for the effects of system aging during extended dry storage prior to transportation, and (2) increases in SNF system reactivity over a repository performance period (e.g., 10,000 years or more) as the system undergoes degradation and internal geometry changes. This paper summarizes an assessment of cask-specific, as-loaded criticality margins for SNF stored at eight reactor sites (215 loaded casks were analyzed) under fully flooded conditions to assess the margins available during transportation after extended storage. It is observed that the calculated k eff margin varies from 0.05 to almost 0.3 Δk eff for the eight selected reactor sites, demonstrating that significant uncredited safety margins are present. In addition, this paper evaluates the sufficiency of this excess margin in applications involving direct disposal of currently loaded SNF casks.

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SAS4A/SASSYS-1 Verification and Validation Plan for the Versatile Test Reactor

Software verification and validation (V&V) hold an important role in the safety analysis for nuclear facilities. Codes and models utilized in calculations that demonstrate the safety basis as part of a license application or authorization must demonstrate an acceptable pedigree with regard to key critical characteristics that are comprised of the functional and performance requirements of the software. This document describes the methodology for verification and validation of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 systems-level liquid-metal safety analysis software in support of DOE authorization of the Versatile Test Reactor (VTR). The overall goal of this V&V effort is to demonstrate the suitability of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 for evaluation of safety performance and characterization of safety margins in VTR. To that end, the V&V methodology will be used to demonstrate the adequacy of the component and physical models of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 for the corresponding VTR design elements. This methodology, which has been derived as a generalized approach to the U.S. NRC’s evaluation model development and assessment process (EMDAP) of Regulatory Guide 1.203, entails four high-level activities: software requirements identification, assessment base development, determination of acceptance, and gap closure. The methodology has been generalized to be suitable for both verification and validation of the software for the VTR project. Several high-level engineering analysis quality assurance measures as well as supporting V&V methodology documentation are also described in this document to help support demonstration of software acceptance. To support initial development of the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 V&V basis, existing verification test problems and systems benchmarks are also identified and briefly described in this document.

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Advanced Test Reactor Experiment Safety Analysis

This presentation contains general information about the Advanced Test Reactor experiment safety analysis program. Accidents and dose consequence are discussed in general terms. Pictures of ATR facilities and experiments are included. In cases where experiments are shown, identification numbers have been removed. Department of Energy limits on dose consequence are provided. These limits are found in many non-CUI documents and a derived from publicly available sources. A summary of the presentation content is as follows: -Define Experiment Safety Analysis -Discuss what we are protecting and the applicable limits -Show how safety analysis fits into the experiment process -Explore the scope of experiment activities and associated accidents -Present how we categorize accidents and establish accident frequencies -Identify how controls are implemented and process improvements

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Licensing of the national repository for LILW waste in Bulgaria - 15609

Radioactive waste arises from the operation and decommissioning of the Bulgarian nuclear power plants and from other sources in research, medical applications and industry. The need for building the National Disposal Facility (NDF) is recognized by the Bulgarian government, and described and justified in the Environment Impact Assessment Decision. The Bulgarian State Enterprise for Radioactive Waste Management (SERAW) is endeavoring to build a near-surface repository for short-lived low and intermediate level radioactive waste (SL-LILW). The European Union finances the establishment of the NDF through the Kozloduy International Decommissioning Support Fund. The Bulgarian government has defined the NDF as a Project of National Importance. At the conclusion of an international tendering process, SERAW awarded the contract for development of the NDF design, including Intermediate Safety Analysis Report (ISAR), to the Consortium of Westinghouse Electric Spain S.A.U, DBE Technology GmbH of Germany, and ENRESA, the Spanish National Waste Management Agency. Two Bulgarian companies also participate in the project as subcontractors;KK-Project and EQE-Bulgaria. The project 'Technical Design and ISAR Preparation for the National Disposal Facility at Bulgaria' is identified within SERAW as 'R-Project 5'. Since obtaining SERAW's approval for the preferred repository design variant, R Project 5 has focused on the development of the Technical Design and on preparation of the ISAR, which demonstrates the safety and suitability of the proposed NDF design. The Consortium submitted to SERAW the Technical Design for revision on March 2013. SERAW's experts immediately started the review of the design. In addition, SERAW invited independent, highly qualified Bulgarian experts and scientists to participate in the review. In November 2013, SERAW approved the Technical Design. The Consortium submitted the Intermediate Safety Analysis Report to SERAW for review following a similar process in July 2014. Both documents were meanwhile handed over to the appropriate Bulgarian licensing authorities. SERAW's goal is to receive a license for construction of the NDF in early 2015. (authors)

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Coupling the System Analysis Module with SAS4A/SASSYS-1

SAS4A/SASSYS-1 is a simulation tool used to perform deterministic analysis of anticipated events as well as design basis and beyond design basis accidents for advanced reactors, with an emphasis on sodium fast reactors. SAS4A/SASSYS-1 has been under development and in active use for nearly forty-five years, and is currently maintained by the U.S. Department of Energy under the Office of Advanced Reactor Technology. Although SAS4A/SASSYS-1 contains a very capable primary and intermediate system modeling component, PRIMAR-4, it also has some shortcomings: outdated data management and code structure makes extension of the PRIMAR-4 module somewhat difficult. The user input format for PRIMAR-4 also limits the number of volumes and segments that can be used to describe a given system. The System Analysis Module (SAM) is a fairly new code development effort being carried out under the U.S. DOE Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program. SAM is being developed with advanced physical models, numerical methods, and software engineering practices; however, it is currently somewhat limited in the system components and phenomena that can be represented. For example, component models for electromagnetic pumps and multi-layer stratified volumes have not yet been developed. Nor is there support for a balance of plant model. Similarly, system-level phenomena such as control-rod driveline expansion and vessel elongation are not represented. This report documents fiscal year 2016 work that was carried out to couple the transient safety analysis capabilities of SAS4A/SASSYS-1 with the system modeling capabilities of SAM under the joint support of the ART and NEAMS programs. The coupling effort was successful and is demonstrated by evaluating an unprotected loss of flow transient for the Advanced Burner Test Reactor (ABTR) design. There are differences between the stand-alone SAS4A/SASSYS-1 simulations and the coupled SAS/SAM simulations, but these are mainly attributed to the limited maturity of the SAM development effort. The severe accident modeling capabilities in SAS4A/SASSYS-1 (sodium boiling, fuel melting and relocation) will continue to play a vital role for a long time. Therefore, the SAS4A/SASSYS-1 modernization effort should remain a high priority task under the ART program to ensure continued participation in domestic and international SFR safety collaborations and design optimizations. On the other hand, SAM provides an advanced system analysis tool, with improved numerical solution schemes, data management, code flexibility, and accuracy. SAM is still in early stages of development and will require continued support from NEAMS to fulfill its potential and to mature into a production tool for advanced reactor safety analysis. The effort to couple SAS4A/SASSYS-1 and SAM is the first step on the integration of these modeling capabilities.

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RELAP-7 User's Guide

The document contains a user's guide on how to run the RELAP-7 code. The RELAP-7 code is the next generation nuclear reactor system safety analysis code being developed at the Idaho National Laboratory. RELAP-7 will become the main reactor systems simulation toolkit for the LWRS (Light Water Reactor Sustainability) program’s RISMC (Risk Informed Safety Margin Characterization) effort and the next generation tool in the RELAP reactor safety/systems analysis application series. RELAP-7 is written with object oriented programming language C++. A number of example problems and their associated input files are presented in this document to guide users to run the RELAP-7 code starting with simple pipe problems to problems with increasing complexity.

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Factors Influencing the Evaluation of Spent Fuel Rail Routes - 19010

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is considering use of rail transport for future shipments of commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from where it currently resides to storage or disposal facilities. Rail carriers transporting in commerce certain quantities of 'rail security sensitive materials,' including SNF, face a regulatory requirement from the U.S. Department of Transportation to perform route risk assessments on an annual basis. In performing these assessments, each affected rail carrier must take into consideration twenty-seven different route factors, and document its rationale for selecting preferred and alternative routes on the basis of the safety and security risk analysis results. The major freight rail carriers operating in the U.S. have invested in the development of a proprietary tool, for rail carrier use only, to assist them in making route selections. This tool utilizes operations data input by each affected rail carrier in conjunction with geographic information systems (GIS) data to represent proximate risk factors, to be integrated and assigned to individual points and segments on the railroad network. Separate safety and security risk values are generated for each rail route under consideration. These values are then placed on an equivalent scoring basis and summed together to allow direct comparison between different route options and to rank order each route in terms of its relative attractiveness. Each affected rail carrier files an annual report for evaluation by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) that documents its route risk assessment approach and analysis results. DOE has developed its own decision-support tool, Stakeholder Tool for Assessing Radioactive Transportation (START), which is capable of generating and analyzing routing options for transporting SNF by rail in addition to other freight modes. To better understand how affected rail carriers are likely to route SNF shipments in accordance with regulatory requirements and those route factors likely to be most influential in impacting DoE's evaluation of alternative SNF rail routes, a study was undertaken by DOE with the following objectives: - Review the shipment routes that have been historically used by rail carriers to move high hazard materials, including SNF; - Identify the physical, operational and proximate characteristics (attributes) associated with the rail segments that comprise these routes; - Evaluate the relationships between these attributes; - Make suggestions for how to streamline the factors used in DoE's rail route evaluations; - Contrast these relationships with how the factors are used by the rail carriers in applying their tool This paper describes the study approach, analysis results, and implications for rail route selection methodology. Differences between this evaluation and railroad industry information about rail route assessments are also discussed. (authors)

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Update On The Development, Testing, And Manufacture Of High Density LEU-Foil Targets For The Production Of Mo-99

This project has the objective to reduce and/or eliminate the use of HEU in commerce. Steps in the process include developing a target testing methodology that is bounding for all Mo-99 target irradiators, establishing a maximum target LEU-foil mass, developing a LEU-foil target qualification document, developing a bounding target failure analysis methodology (failure in reactor containment), optimizing safety vs. economics (goal is to manufacture a safe, but relatively inexpensive target to offset the inherent economic disadvantage of using LEU in place of HEU), and developing target material specifications and manufacturing QC test criteria. The slide presentation is organized under the following topics: Objective, Process Overview, Background, Team Structure, Key Achievements, Experiment and Activity Descriptions, and Conclusions. The High Density Target project has demonstrated: approx. 50 targets irradiated through domestic and international partners; proof of concept for two front end processing methods; fabrication of uranium foils for target manufacture; quality control procedures and steps for manufacture; multiple target assembly techniques; multiple target disassembly devices; welding of targets; thermal, hydraulic, and mechanical modeling; robust target assembly parametric studies; and target qualification analysis for insertion into very high flux environment. The High Density Target project has tested and proven several technologies that will benefit current and future Mo-99 producers.

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TRUPACT-III Program Guidance (Rev. 0)

The purpose of this document is to provide the technical requirements for preparation for use, operation, inspection, and maintenance of a Transuranic Package Transporter Model IIl (TRUPACT-IlI) and directly related components. This document complies with the minimum requirements as specified in the TRUPACT-lII Safety Analysis Report for Packaging (SARP) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Certificate of Compliance (C of C) No. 9305.

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Overall Reactor System Description of Prototype Gen-IV Sodium Cooled Fast Reactor

A fast reactor system has been recognized as one of the most promising options for transmutation of the radioactive wastes discharged from spent nuclear fuel of light water reactors (LWRs). That is owing to the intrinsic features of a fast reactor, i.e., high neutron energy and abundant excessive neutrons in the core. In this context, the Korea Atomic Energy Commission (KAEC) authorized the R and D action plan for the advanced sodium cooled fast reactor (SFR) connected with the pyro-process to provide a consistent direction to long-term R and D activities in December 2008. The long term plan was updated in November 2011 in order to refine the plan and to consider the available budget for SFR. The revised milestones include the completion of a specific design of a prototype Gen IV sodium cooled fast reactor (PGSFR) by 2017, specific design approval by 2020, and construction by 2028. The R and D activities on SFR had been concentrated on the basic and strategic key technology developments before 2012 and went to engineering project for licensing and construction of PGSFR from 2012. The development of PGSFR is now in the first design phase and will go toward to the second design phase in 2016. All the high level design concepts of systems, structures and components (SSCs) are determined and incorporated into the preliminary safety information document (PSID), which includes basic design requirements and descriptions and the results of safety analysis for the representative accident scenarios. The PSID will be a base material for a pre-review of the PGSFR safety. (authors)

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