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At least 217 records · Page 12
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

A Simulated Evaluation of Powder Flowability Through a Partially Obstructed Consumable in Blown Powder Directed Energy Deposition Systems

Abstract In the interest of continued industrialization of metal additive manufacturing in modern production environments, cost is often referenced as a primary deterrent to new adopters. Conventional economic models for additive systems, processes, and supply chains often focus on specific process applications with little generalizability, or they neglect significant costs associated with production such as machine maintenance and consumable part replacement. Compounding the latter issue are substantial knowledge gaps in consumable part wear characterization for additive and other convergent manufacturing systems. In coaxial blown powder directed energy deposition systems, gas atomized metal powder is wasted during material deposition at a rate that is partly dependent on present wear phenomena in a consumable nozzle housed in the cladding head assembly. The price and lead time required to replace the nozzle incentivizes its reuse even when visibly worn. Often this initiates a process quality decline in the form of underbuilt geometry and internal defects due to losses in powder catchment efficiency. While depositing H13 steel using a hybrid manufacturing machine tool equipped with such a deposition system, a unique partial clog with a bridge-like structure formed at the consumable nozzle exit when supporting argon gas flows failed mid-process. To further understand coaxial multi-phase powder flow in the event of support gas failure, a computational fluid dynamics simulation is tailored to relevant process parameters, H13 powder material profile, and machine operator observations collected after the incident. The resulting differences in powder flow compared to control gas flow parameters is presented and discussed. The powder flowability and performance of the clogged nozzle is then assessed by using an optical profilometer to extract the profile of the clog and recreate the clog geometry within the simulation environment. In past work this simulation has been experimentally validated for a 316L steel powder material profile and used specifically for analyzing powder stream geometry and catchment efficiency. After the initial powder flow characterization, the clog is removed, and the nozzle is reprofiled. After removing the obstructing clog, the newly unobstructed nozzle geometry, the original off the shelf nozzle geometry, and additional nozzle profiles exploring different consumable refurbishment strategies are reevaluated in the simulation. Powder catchment efficiency for all variant nozzle geometries and relevant flow variables are compared and discussed, along with potential mitigation strategies for optimizing powder flowability with worn consumables. This work expands on the known morphology of blown powder obstructions and wear defects present in consumable coaxial nozzles while discussing pragmatic simulation driven responses to unanticipated subsystem failure in hybrid manufacturing machining platforms.

DeWitte, Lisa↗
DOE OSTI2016

Safeguards Considerations for Thorium Fuel Cycles

We report that by around 2025, thorium-based fuel cycles are likely to be deployed internationally. States such as China and India are pursuing research, development, and deployment pathways toward a number of commercial-scale thorium fuel cycles, and they are already building test reactors and the associated fuel cycle infrastructure. In the future, the potential exists for these emerging programs to sell, export, and deploy thorium fuel cycle technology in other states. Without technically adequate international safeguards protocols and measures in place, any future potential clandestine misuse of these fuel cycles could go undetected, compromising the deterrent value of these protocols and measures. The development of safeguards approaches for thorium-based fuel cycles is therefore a matter of some urgency. Yet, the focus of the international safeguards community remains mainly on safeguarding conventional 235 U- and 239 Pu-based fuel cycles while the safeguards challenges of thorium-uranium fuel cycles remain largely uninvestigated. This raises the following question: Is the International Atomic Energy Agency and international safeguards system ready for thorium fuel cycles? Furthermore, is the safeguards technology of today sufficiently mature to meet the verification challenges posed by thorium-based fuel cycles? In defining these and other related research questions, the objectives of this paper are to identify key safeguards considerations for thorium-based fuel cycles and to call for an early dialogue between the international safeguards and the nuclear fuel cycle communities to prepare for the potential safeguards challenges associated with these fuel cycles. In this paper, it is concluded that directed research and development programs are required to meet the identified safeguards challenges and to take timely action in preparation for the international deployment of thorium fuel cycles.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Integrating Safety with Science,Technology and Innovation at Los Alamos National Laboratory

The mission of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) is to develop and apply science, technology and engineering solutions to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent; reduce global threats; and solve emerging national security challenges. The most important responsibility is to direct and conduct efforts to meet the mission with an emphasis on safety, security, and quality. In this article, LANL Environmental, Safety, and Health (ESH) trainers discuss how their application and use of a kinetic learning module (learn by doing) with a unique fall arrest system is helping to address one the most common industrial safety challenges: slips and falls. A unique integration of Human Performance Improvement (HPI), Behavior Based Safety (BBS) and elements of the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) combined with an interactive simulator experience is being used to address slip and fall events at Los Alamos.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2012

RLUOB Celebration

Los Alamos National Laboratory's newest facility, the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office Building (RLUOB), is also its first to achieve both the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) status and LEED Gold certification from the U.S. Green Building Council (USGBC). From its robust design to its advanced scientific equipment, RLUOB is essential to the Laboratory's national security mission in support of the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) nuclear weapons program. At more than 200,000 square feet, this building is the only radiological facility within the Department of Energy to have attained LEED Gold, which contributes to NNSA's achievement towards the high performance sustainable building goals outlined in Executive Order 13514, Federal Leadership in Environmental, Energy, and Economic Performance. 'As we celebrate RLUOB being completed almost one year ahead of schedule and having achieved LEED certification at the Gold level, we approach our plutonium mission at Los Alamos and NNSA with a great sense of achievement,' said Don Cook, NNSA's deputy administrator for defense programs. 'RLUOB adds a major component to NNSA's plutonium support capability and RLUOB demonstrates our commitment in helping to deliver President Obama's nuclear security agenda which includes ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent without testing.' The facility contains laboratories for analytical chemistry and materials characterization of special nuclear material, along with space for offices, training and emergency operations. Its multi-functional purpose makes RLUOB a unique project for which LEED certification was sought. 'LEED certification was a huge goal and one we sought from the very beginning of this project,' said Laboratory Director Charlie McMillan. 'It's an important step forward, allowing us to advance national security science in modern, safer, more efficient infrastructure.' The Laboratory's project team and its contractor partners, especially in coordination with Jacobs Engineering, focused on green design and construction in LEED categories, such as sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials and resources, indoor environmental quality and innovation in design. RLUOB's features include: (1) Building envelope design (orientation, materials and insulation) yielded a 20 percent improvement in energy performance; (2) Incorporation of building materials with 24 percent recycled content; (3) Diversion of 72 percent of construction-generated materials through reuse, recycle and salvage; (4) Roofing comprised of 93 percent highly-reflective materials to reduce heat island effects; (5) High efficiency, gas-fired hot water boilers, air-cooled chillers, thermal storage systems and variable frequency drives for compressors, fans and pumps; (6) Energy efficient lighting for interiors, exteriors, process glove boxes and fume hoods; (7) Water efficient fixtures resulting in 30 percent reduction in usage; (8) Low emission paints and carpeting for improved indoor air quality; (9) Landscaping that doesn't require permanent irrigation; (10) Enhanced building system commissioning; and (11) Comprehensive transportation alternatives, including public transportation, bicycle storage and changing rooms, and a refueling station for government vehicles using alternative fuels. 'RLUOB's LEED certification demonstrates tremendous leadership in green building,' says Rick Fedrizzi, president and CEO of USGBC. 'The urgency of our mission has challenged the industry to move faster and reach further than ever before, and RLUOB serves as a prime example of just how much we can accomplish.'

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2012

Nuclear Fuel Cycle & Vulnerabilities [Slides]

The objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection. The safeguards system should be designed to provide credible assurances that there has been no diversion of declared nuclear material and no undeclared nuclear material and activities.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Twenty-Five Year Site Plan, FY2013 - FY2037

Los Alamos National Laboratory (the Laboratory) is the nation's premier national security science laboratory. Its mission is to develop and apply science and technology to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the United States (U.S.) nuclear stockpile; reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism; and solve national problems in defense, energy, and the environment. The fiscal year (FY) 2013-2037 Twenty-Five Year Site Plan (TYSP) is a vital component for planning to meet the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also uses the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory's missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory's core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory's role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns. The Laboratory is aligned with Nuclear Security Enterprise (NSE) modernization activities outlined in the NNSA Strategic Plan (May 2011) which include: (1) ensuring laboratory plutonium space effectively supports pit manufacturing and enterprise-wide special nuclear materials consolidation; (2) constructing the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF); (3) establishing shared user facilities to more cost effectively manage high-value, experimental, computational and production capabilities; and (4) modernizing enduring facilities while reducing the excess facility footprint. Th is TYSP is viewed by the Laboratory as a vital planning tool to develop an effi cient and responsive infrastructure. Long range facility and infrastructure development planning are critical to assure sustainment and modernization. Out-year re-investment is essential for sustaining existing facilities, and will be re-evaluated on an annual basis. At the same time, major modernization projects will require new line-item funding. This document is, in essence, a roadmap that defines a path forward for the Laboratory to modernize, streamline, consolidate, and sustain its infrastructure to meet its national security mission.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2012

2011 Computation Directorate Annual Report [Slides]

From its founding in 1952 until today, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has made significant strategic investments to develop high performance computing (HPC) and its application to national security and basic science. Now, 60 years later, the Computation Directorate and its myriad resources and capabilities have become a key enabler for LLNL programs and an integral part of the effort to support our nation's nuclear deterrent and, more broadly, national security. In addition, the technological innovation HPC makes possible is seen as vital to the nation's economic vitality. LLNL, along with other national laboratories, is working to make supercomputing capabilities and expertise available to industry to boost the nation's global competitiveness.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2012

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2012

2012 SARA Students Technical Report

The Service Academy Research Associates (SARA) program provides an opportunity for Midshipmen and Cadets from US Service Academies to participate in research at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), and Sandia National Laboratory for several weeks during the summer as part of their summer training assignments. During the summer of 2012, three Midshipmen were assigned to work with the XCP Division at LANL for approximately 5-6 weeks. As one of the nation's top national security science laboratories, LANL stretches across 36 square miles, has over 2,100 facilities, and employs over 9,000 individuals including a significant number of students and postdocs. LANL's mission is to 'apply science and technology to: ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the US nuclear deterrent, reduce global threats, and solve other emerging national security challenges.' While LANL officially operates under the US Department of Energy (DoE), fulfilling this mission requires mutual cooperation with the US Department of Defense (DoD) as well. LANL's high concentration of knowledge and experience provides interns a chance to perform research in many disciplines, and its connection with the DoD in both operation and personnel gives SARA students insight to career possibilities both during and after military service. SARA students have plenty of opportunity to enjoy hiking, camping, the Los Alamos YMCA, and many other outdoor activities in New Mexico while staying at the Buffalo Thunder Resort, located 20 miles east of the lab. XCP Division is the Computational Physics division of LANL's Weapons Department. Working with XCP Division requires individuals to be Q cleared by the DoE. This means it is significantly more convenient for SARA students to be assigned to XCP Division than their civilian counterparts as the DoD CNWDI clearance held by SARA students is easily transferred to the lab prior to the students arriving at the start of the summer. SARA students working with XCP Division were given a comprehensive introduction into nuclear engineering and physics, nuclear weapons, and radiation transport and detection via texts and lectures at various classification levels. Students also attended tours of several prominent facilities at LANL including TA-41 Ice House, TA-55 PF-4 plutonium facility, the Nicholas C. Metropolis Center for Modeling and Simulation, also known as the Secure Computing Center (SCC), and the Dual-Axis Radiological Hydro Test (DARHT) facility; in addition, SARA students accompanied by LANL staff traveled to Minot AFB in North Dakota for tours of the 5th Bomb Wing and 91st Missile Wing facilities. Students participated in a week long class on the Monte Carlo N Particle (MCNP) code to supplement their understanding of radiation transport simulations. SARA students were then tasked with using this knowledge to model radiation detectors and use MCNP to compare their models to experimental data and previously accepted models.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2012

Safeguards Issues at Nuclear Reactors and Enrichment Plants [Slides]

The Agency's safeguards technical objective is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of nuclear material from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Reductions without Regret: Details - Avoiding Box Canyons, Roach Motels, and Wrong Turns

The United States is concurrently pursuing the goals of reducing the size of its nuclear weapons force – strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed – and of modernizing the weapons it continues to possess. Many of the existing systems were deployed 30 to 50 years ago, and the modernization process can be expected to extend over the next decade or more. Given the impossibility of predicting the future over the lifetime of systems that could extend to the end of this century, it is essential that dead ends in force development be avoided, and the flexibility and availability of options be retained that allow for: • Scalability downward in the event that further reductions are agreed upon; • Reposturing to respond to changes in threat levels and to new nuclear actors; and • Breakout response in the event that a competitor significantly increases its force size or force capability, In this paper, we examine the current motivations for reductions and modernization; review a number of historical systems and the attendant capabilities that have been eliminated in recent decades; discuss the current path forward for the U.S. nuclear force; provide a view of the evolving deterrence situation and our assessment of the uncertainties involved; and present examples of possibly problematic directions in force development. We close with our thoughts on how to maintain flexibility and the availability of options for which a need might recur in the future.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2013

Reductions Without Regret: Historical Perspectives

This is the first of three papers (in addition to an introductory summary) aimed at providing a framework for evaluating future reductions or modifications of the U.S. nuclear force, first by considering previous instances in which nuclear-force capabilities were eliminated; second by looking forward into at least the foreseeable future at the features of global and regional deterrence (recognizing that new weapon systems currently projected will have expected lifetimes stretching beyond our ability to predict the future); and third by providing examples of past or possible undesirable outcomes in the shaping of the future nuclear force, as well as some closing thoughts for the future. This paper examines the circumstances and consequences of the elimination of The INF-range Pershing II ballistic missile and Gryphon Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM), deployed by NATO under a dual-track strategy to counter Soviet intermediate-range missiles while pursuing negotiations to limit or eliminate all of these missiles. The Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which was actually a family of missiles including SRAM A, SRAM B (never deployed), and SRAM II and SRAM T, these last two cancelled during an over-budget/behind-schedule development phase as part of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992. The nuclear-armed version of the Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile (TLAM/N), first limited to shore-based storage by the PNIs, and finally eliminated in deliberations surrounding the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report. The Missile-X (MX), or Peacekeeper, a heavy MIRVed ICBM, deployed in fixed silos, rather than in an originally proposed mobile mode. Peacekeeper was likely intended as a bargaining chip to facilitate elimination of Russian heavy missiles. The plan failed when START II did not enter into force, and the missiles were eliminated at the end of their intended service life. The Small ICBM (SICBM), or Midgetman, a road-mobile, single-warhead missile for which per-unit costs were climbing when it was eliminated under the PNIs. Although there were liabilities associated with each of these systems, there were also unique capabilities; this paper lays out the pros and cons for each. Further, we articulate the capabilities that were eliminated with these systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

Reductions without Regret: Summary

This paper briefly summarizes the series in which we consider the possibilities for losing, or compromising, key capabilities of the U.S. nuclear force in the face of modernization and reductions. The first of the three papers takes an historical perspective, considering capabilities that were eliminated in past force reductions. The second paper is our attempt to define the needed capabilities looking forward in the context of the current framework for force modernization and the current picture of the evolving challenges of deterrence and assurance. The third paper then provides an example for each of our undesirable outcomes: the creation of roach motels, box canyons, and wrong turns.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

Without Testing: Stockpile Stewardship in the Second Nuclear Age

Stockpile stewardship is a topic dear to my heart. I’ve been fascinated by it, and I’ve lived it—mostly on the technical side but also on the policy side from 2009 to 2010 at Stanford University as a visiting scholar and the inaugural William J. Perry Fellow. At Stanford I worked with Perry, former secretary of defense, and Sig Hecker, former Los Alamos Lab director (1986–1997), looking at nuclear deterrence, nuclear policy, and stockpile stewardship and at where all this was headed.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2014

Development of a Cavity Collapse Model of Cavitation Bubbles in Water in One and Two Dimensions using the Finite Volume FLAG Hydrocode at Atmospheric Pressure and 293K (Final Report)

Los Alamos National Laboratory was established in 1943 as the home of Project Y, The Manhattan Project directed by J. Robert Oppenheimer, with the aim of developing the world’s first atomic bomb. The project was successful and on the 16 th of July 1945 the first atomic bomb was detonated at Trinity Site. This development led to the creation of Little Boy and Fat Man, the two nuclear bombs dropped in Japan to end World War II. Today the laboratory has the responsibility of ensuring that the American nuclear deterrent is safe, secure and reliable. To ensure that this important responsibility is met, the laboratory carries out science in a wide range of areas. Its responsibilities are shared with Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). All are laboratories managed by the Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2015

Los Alamos National Laboratory Ten-Year Site Plan FY 2016

The Los Alamos National Laboratory will continue to face a significant challenge over the next 25 years in balancing near-term needs while transforming the infrastructure to ensure long-term viability. The 2014 Los Alamos National Laboratory Strategic Plan emphasized that infrastructure must be modernized and maintained to fulfill diverse, complex, and evolving missions in a period of fl at or decreasing budgets. The large number of existing facilities will continue to age while safety, security, sustainability and compliance requirements will likely increase. The Laboratory must also continue to act as an environmental steward, reduce environmental risk, and improve sustainability. This plan identifies strategies that will enable the Laboratory to provide a flexible, responsive infrastructure within available resources. At the end of the 25 year period, the Laboratory will have achieved the following: New facilities construction and enduring facilities reinvestment to support critical capabilities; Improved energy efficiency and long-term sustainability practices; Modernized utility infrastructure to support future programmatic needs; Legacy cleanup and long-term environmental stewardship goals; Footprint reduction and nuclear infrastructure consolidation. Even in the face of new and significant pressures, the Laboratory will continue to take substantial steps to streamline operations, modernize the infrastructure, and fulfill its vision of being the premier national security science laboratory. The fiscal year (FY) 2016 Ten-Year Site Plan (TYSP) is consistent with previous TYSPs and incorporates updated information in accordance with National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) guidance. The TYSP is a vital planning component to meet the NNSA commitment to ensure the U.S. has a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent. The Laboratory also uses the TYSP as an integrated planning tool to guide development of an efficient and responsive infrastructure that effectively supports the Laboratory’s missions and workforce. Emphasizing the Laboratory’s core capabilities, this TYSP reflects the Laboratory’s role as a prominent contributor to NNSA missions through its programs and campaigns.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Los Alamos National Laboratory RD 2015 Profile

A vital, multidisciplinary national security science laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory applies science and technology to help solve the nation’s toughest challenges. Outstanding science is the foundation for the past, present, and future. A rich variety of research programs directly and indirectly support the Laboratory’s basic mission: to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the nation’s nuclear deterrent; reduce global threats; and solve emerging national security energy challenges. The Laboratory also works on nuclear nonproliferation and border security, energy and infrastructure security, and measures to counter nuclear and biological terrorist threats.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Evaluating Moving Target Defense with PLADD

This project evaluates the effectiveness of moving target defense (MTD) techniques using a new game we have designed, called PLADD, inspired by the game FlipIt. PLADD extends FlipIt by incorporating what we believe are key MTD concepts. We have analyzed PLADD and proven the existence of a defender strategy that pushes a rational attacker out of the game, demonstrated how limited the strategies available to an attacker are in PLADD, and derived analytic expressions for the expected utility of the game’s players in multiple game variants. We have created an algorithm for finding a defender’s optimal PLADD strategy. We show that in the special case of achieving deterrence in PLADD, MTD is not always cost effective and that its optimal deployment may shift abruptly from not using MTD at all to using it as aggressively as possible. We believe our effort provides basic, fundamental insights into the use of MTD, but conclude that a truly practical analysis requires model selection and calibration based on real scenarios and empirical data. We propose several avenues for further inquiry, including (1) agents with adaptive capabilities more reflective of real world adversaries, (2) the presence of multiple, heterogeneous adversaries, (3) computational game theory-based approaches such as coevolution to allow scaling to the real world beyond the limitations of analytical analysis and classical game theory, (4) mapping the game to real-world scenarios, (5) taking player risk into account when designing a strategy (in addition to expected payoff), (6) improving our understanding of the dynamic nature of MTD-inspired games by using a martingale representation, defensive forecasting, and techniques from signal processing, and (7) using adversarial games to develop inherently resilient cyber systems.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗