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At least 217 records · Page 12

The X-15 3-65 Accident: An Aircraft Systems and Flight Control Perspective

Despite the NASA X-15 program's outstanding success in developing and operating the first manned hypersonic research platform, the program suffered a fatal accident on November 15, 1967, when X-15-3, the only aircraft outfitted with advanced pilot displays and an adaptive flight control system, was lost after entering uncontrolled flight at an altitude of 230,000 feet and a velocity near Mach 5. The pilot, Major Michael J. Adams, was incapacitated by the aircraft accelerations and was killed either during the ensuing breakup or upon ground impact. In light of mitigating risk to current and emerging manned aerospace vehicles, a comprehensive systems level analysis of the accident is presented with a focus on the electrical power, flight control, and instrumentation failures that affected not only the vehicle dynamics but substantially impacted the pilot decisions that led to an inevitable loss of control. Insights based on reconstructed flight data as well as analysis and simulation of the X-15's unique adaptive control system, yield new conclusions about the reasons for the control systems anomalous behavior and the system-level interactions and human-machine interface design oversights that led to the accident.

Accident Investigation↗

$\mathrm{UPDATED}$ $\mathrm{U3SI2}$ thermal creep model and sensitivity analysis of the $\mathrm{U3SI2-SIC}$ accident tolerant $\mathrm{FUEL}$

U 3 Si 2 is a candidate accident tolerant fuel (ATF) replacement for UO 2 . U 3 Si 2 ’s high uranium density and high thermal conductivity are favorable properties in steady-state and accident conditions. Low power performance of this U3Si2-SiC concept fuel is compared to that of UO 2 -Zr4 fuels by implementing models that describe the properties of U 3 Si 2 and SiC-SiC into Idaho National Laboratory's (INL) fuel performance code, BISON. Included in these material models is a thermal creep model for U 3 Si 2 based on compressive creep data. The simulated results are in keeping with community knowledge that the U 3 Si 2 -SiC concept fuel may serve as a replacement for UO 2 -Zr4 fuels during steady-state operation, provided the mSiC layer remains under compression. Through a moderate power history and three 24-month fuel cycles, the mSiC layer remains under compressive stress through a burnup of 80 MWd/kgU. During low power operation, failure of the mSiC layer generally occurs prior to significant thermal creep in U 3 Si 2 . Generally, U 3 Si 2 creep is temperature sensitive and of little importance at the temperatures and stresses simulated during steady operation and during fuel-to-cladding contact. A parameter variation study including 11,520 individual simulations with variations in nominal fuel thermal creep rate, cladding thermal conductivity, cladding irradiation creep and swelling, cladding gap size, and cladding thickness demonstrated that research priorities for this ATF should revolve around reducing cladding thickness as a means to minimize cladding failure. Generally, despite advances in SiC-SiC compliance, the brittle nature of mSiC excludes U 3 Si 2 -SiC for use where fuel cladding contact may occur.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

TRISO Burnup-Dependent Failure Analysis of a HTGR Design-Basis Accident Using BISON

Here, this work assesses the failure behavior of the silicon carbide (SiC) layer in TRIstructural ISOtropic (TRISO) fuel particles with BISON during both steady-state and transient conditions for the MHTGR-350 design by General Atomics. A one-dimensional BISON model for a uranium oxycarbide–bearing TRISO is developed to simulate a power level of 50 mW/particles up to 12.4% fissions per initial metal atom (FIMA). Stress predictions for the materials of interest are presented as a function of burnup, along with the SiC failure probability computed using Weibull statistics under the assumption of realistic SiC quality.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

An analysis of three weather-related aircraft accidents

Two aircraft accidents in 1975, one at John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York City on 24 June and the other at Stapleton International Airport in Denver on 7 August, were examined in detail. A third accident on 23 June 1976 at Philadelphia International Airport is being investigated. Amazingly, there was a spearhead echo just to the north of each accident site. The echoes formed from 5 to 50 min in advance of the accident and moved faster than other echoes in the vicinity. These echoes were photographed by National Weather Service radars, 130-205 km away. At closer ranges, however, one or more circular echoes were depicted by airborne and ground radars. These cells were only 3-5 km in diameter, but they were accompanied by downdrafts of extreme intensity, called downbursts. All accidents occurred as aircraft, either descending or climbing, lost altitude while experiencing strong wind shear inside downburst cells.

Fujita, T. T.↗

Comparative analysis of PA-31-350 Chieftain (N44LV) accident and NASA crash test data

A full scale, controlled crash test to simulate the crash of a Piper PA-31-350 Chieftain airplane is described. Comparisons were performed between the simulated crash and the actual crash in order to assess seat and floor behavior, and to estimate the acceleration levels experienced in the craft at the time of impact. Photographs, acceleration histories, and the tested airplane crash data is used to augment the accident information to better define the crash conditions. Measured impact parameters are presented along with flight path velocity and angle in relation to the impact surface.

Hayduk, R. J.↗

Thermal Design Analysis Supporting a Loss-of-Coolant-Accident Experiment at TREAT

The LOCA-SERTTA experiment vehicle along with the power and flexibility of TREAT allow for the ability to create the temperature profile evolution throughout a LOCA that would be seen in a commercial LWR. Presented in this summary are thermal-hydraulic modeling results for LOCA-SERTTA which are then compared to LOCA simulation results from a commercial LWR.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

PWR Core Analysis for Cycle Extension and Uprates with LEU+ Accident Tolerant Fuel and 80 GWd/Tonne Burnup Limit

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has recently drafted a rule enabling fuel burnup increase in light water reactors up to 80 GWd/t. In conjunction with use of fuel enrichment up to 10%, and accident tolerant fuel (ATF), this is anticipated to facilitate 24-month cycles in PWRs, along with further power uprates. In this paper, PWR core analysis is performed for 20% increased PWR power output along with cycle extension up to 24 months, in combination with use of chromia-doped fuel and chromium-coated clad, considered to be the most near-term ATF concepts. In combination, these lead to challenging conditions with a core average discharge burnup of up to ~74 GWd/t, challenging even the 80 GWd/t burnup limit. Analysis is performed using the 2-step method with POLARIS (within SCALE) used for the lattice calculations and PARCS for the core calculations. Core designs are first baselined for current operating conditions (LEU, 62 GWd/t discharge burnup limit) and then derived that meet cycle constraints on power distribution and the updated lead pin discharge burnup limit while maintaining at least two batches of fuel in the core. Gadolina loadings in fuel pins of up to 8% are used, with enrichment zoning both within the core and, to a limited extent, within assemblies. Here, doped fuel with coated cladding can utilize the same core designs as the reference UOX cores, exhibiting slightly lower burnup due to higher fuel density, which also offsets the slight reactivity penalty from the doping and coating. For the analysis performed here, doped fuel enabled a core with 24-month cycle and 20% uprate to stay within the 80 GWd/t lead pin discharge burnup limit.

LEU+↗

Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the investigation, medico-legal issues, the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team report and training for accident response.

Chandler, Michael↗

The Human Factors of an Early Space Accident: Flight 3-65 of the X-15

The X-15 was a critical research vehicle in the early days of space flight. On November 15, 1967, the X-15-3 suffered an in-flight breakup. This 191st flight of the X-15 and the 65th flight of this third configuration was the only fatal accident of the X-15 program. This paper presents an analysis, from a human factors perspective, of the events that led up to the accident. The analysis is based on the information contained in the report of the Air Force-NASA Accident Investigation Board (AIB) dated January, 1968. The AIBs analysis addressed, primarily, the events that occurred subsequent to the pilots taking direct control of the reaction control system. The analysis described here suggests that all of the events that caused the accident occurred well before the moment when the pilot switched to direct control. Consequently, the analyses and conclusions regarding the causal factors of, and the contributing factors to, the loss of Flight 3-65 presented here differ from those of the AIB based on the same evidence. Although the accident occurred in 1967, the results of the presented analysis are still relevant today. We present our analysis and discuss its implications for the safety of space operations.

accident investigation↗

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Source record↗

Changes in Frequency of the Severity and Type of Aviation Accidents (1987 to 2016)

This document reports the fourth analysis to identify the types of accidents with the greatest impact on the overall safety risk in U.S. civil aviation. The first three analyses examined accidents in 1997-20061, in 2001-20102 and in 2005-20143. The safety risks herein are defined to include four elements: (1) the number of total accidents; (2) the number of fatal accidents; (3) the number of total injuries; (4) the number of fatal injuries. Two of the previous analyses also included the number of incidents, but incident data since 2007 are difficult to separate by flight operation. Other incident details are no longer recorded as well. Due to these changes, the author’s working copy of the incident data has not been updated since 2011 (for incidents through 2010), and the incident data were not included in this analysis. Powerplant and non-powerplant system component failures were the only categories with a greater contribution to the overall safety risk from incidents than from accidents. Accident types, as well as accident rates, have been shown to vary considerably among different flight operations (e.g., large air carriers versus general aviation). For this reason, all analyses were done separately for four types of flight operations (Part 121, Scheduled Part 135, Non- Scheduled Part 135 and Part 91).

Evans, Joni K.↗

The Human Factors of an Early Space Accident: Flight 3-65 of the X-15

The X-15 was a critical research vehicle in the early days of space flight. On November 15, 1967, the X-15-3 suffered an in-flight breakup. This 191st flight of the X-15 and the 65th flight of this third configuration was the only fatal accident of the X-15 program. This paper presents an analysis, from a human factors perspective, of the events that led up to the accident. The analysis is based on the information contained in the report of the Air Force-NASA Accident Investigation Board (AIB) dated January, 1968. The AIBs analysis addressed, primarily, the events that occurred subsequent to the pilot's taking direct control of the reaction control system. The analysis described here suggests that, rather than events following the pilot's switch to direct control, it was the events preceding the switch that led to the accident. Consequently, the analyses and conclusions regarding the causal factors of, and the contributing factors to, the loss of Flight 3-65 presented here differ from those of the AIB based on the same evidence. Although the accident occurred in 1967, the results of the presented analysis are still relevant today. We present our analysis and discuss its implications for the safety of space operations.

X-15↗

State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analysis Project: Sensitivity Analysis Using Dakota

The State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) project has focused on best estimate analyses and uncertainty analysis for postulated accidents at specific nuclear power plants. The consequences of these accidents are estimated using the simulation tools MELCOR and MACCS. To understand which uncertain input variables are important to determining these consequences, analysts have performed sensitivity analyses. The tool used to perform these sensitivity analyses in previous SOARCA work, CompModSA, is no longer supported. Therefore, the current work focuses on migrating these analyses to another tool and evaluating its performance. Dakota, which is a tool developed at Sandia National Laboratories, is used in this work. Sensitivity results are created for three analyses from the SOARCA Surry UA. Though CompModSA and Dakota vary slightly in their algorithms and implementation, their sensitivity results generally agree, which gives confidence in the Dakota approach and increases confidence in the original analyses. It is likely that this methodology is extendable to the rest of SOARCA analyses.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Safety Basis Compliant Flexible Operations [Capstone Project]

Compliant nuclear operations must be weighed against the radiological risk to the worker, public, and the environment. This project set out to look at one facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL or the Laboratory) and compare the risk with the operational restrictions associated with the Technical Safety Requirements (TSRs). The hope was to identify controls that could be reduced or simplified while maintaining compliance with 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. This would result in increasing facility operational flexibility and efficiency. Controls were identified to be simplified or eliminated based on risk. This identification was initially envisioned from the perspective of reanalysis of the accident and hazard analysis consequences. Additionally, it was envisioned that fire testing could show that the consequences of a fire are not as dramatic as analyzed. Specific facility controls were identified that cause operational inefficiencies. Based on data collection, two controls were identified for further evaluation. The first control was combustible loading within the waste storage buildings, and the second control is related to the seismic power cutoff switch. In evaluating the combustible loading control, the thought is that the fire suppression system (FSS) provides adequate protection and the combustible loading controls do not need elevation to a TSR control. The FSS, along with the Fire Protection Program, would provide protection to prevent a fire from impacting large amounts of stored waste material. The seismic switch was more of a challenge. When reviewing the facility operation, it was determined that the facility does not operate anywhere near the established material-at-risk (MAR – radioactive material) limits. By adjusting these limits, a reduced consequence could be achieved and hence, a significant risk reduction achieved. A new operating mode would be used to achieve this reduction. A reduced MAR limit was successfully used as a test case for snow removal during this project. This project expands on that trial case as related to combustible loading and the seismic power cutoff switch TSRs. This will increase the efficiency of operations with reduced TSR controls while reducing overall facility risk. This is a win-win situation for Triad National Security, LLC (Triad) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). Due to schedule and budgetary constraints, not all envisioned work scope was accomplished. However, it is maintained in this report for future efforts.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

Supporting Risk-informed Decision-making During Reactor Accidents

Uncertainty in severe accident evolution and outcome is driven by event bifurcations that represent distinctive challenges to defensive layers and tend to promote the emergence of discrete classes of core damage and accident risk. This discrete set of "attractor" states arise from the complex networks of competing physical phenomena and conditional event cascades occurring as the overall system degrades – a process that yields increasing degrees of freedom and accident progression pathways. Characterization of these event spaces has proven elusive to more traditional data interrogation methods, but proves tractable by application of more advanced data collection and machine learning approaches. Through application of these approaches we demonstrate a conceptual framework that enables real-time/robust, risk-informed decision-making support to improve accident mitigation and encourage “graceful exits” during low probability, extreme events limiting accident consequences. In this analysis, we simulated over 8,000 short-term station blackout (STSBO) accidents with the state-of-the-art integral severe accident code, MELCOR, and demonstrate the potential for ML approaches to predict simulation outcomes. We chose to pair ML tools with interpretable and mechanistic event trees for the considered STSBO accident space to predict the likelihood of future event paths along the tree. In addition to the current state of the system, we use information from recent trajectories of temperature, pressure, and other physical features, combining both the current state and past trajectories to forecast future event paths. Finally, we simulate the random injection of variable amounts of water to quantify the efficacy of available actions at reducing risks along the many branches in the event tree. We identify scenarios and windows of opportunity to mitigate risk as well as scenarios in which such actions are unlikely to alter the accident end-state.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Application of system safety to rail transit systems

Management emphasis on system safety in the rapid transit industry includes the granting and use of funds by the Federal Government according to systematic analysis of safety hazards in advance. Likelihood predictions that those hazards will be activated by exposure of the system to a system failure, a human error, external conditions, or combinations of these aspects determine alternatives to the assumption of risk and recommend corrections before the system is operational. Rigorous safety analyses are projected to assure operational safety for prolonged periods under varied maintenance conditions; these analysis encompass station accident possibilities as well as train-person collisions, car equipment and design, traffic control systems, and tunnel design problems.

Thomas DeW. Styles↗

Designing for auto safety

Safety design features in the motor vehicle and highway construction fields result from systems analysis approach to prevent or lessen death, injury, and property damage results. Systems analysis considers the prevention of crashes, increased survivability in crashes, and prompt medical attention to injuries as well as other postcrash salvage measures. The interface of these system elements with the driver, the vehicle, and the environment shows that action on the vehicle system produces the greatest safety payoff through design modifications. New and amended safety standards developed through hazard analysis technique improved accident statistics in the 70'; these regulations include driver qualifications and countermeasures to identify the chronic drunken driver who is involved in more than two-thirds of all auto deaths.

Elwood T. Driver↗