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At least 199 records · Page 11
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2021

Section 106 Recordation, Interpretation, and Documentation for the Demolition of Buildings 9201-5 and 9204-4, Y-12 National Security Complex, Oak Ridge, Tennessee

In 2019 and 2020, Cultural Resource Analysts, Inc. (CRA), began preparing recordation packages for 18 World War II and Cold War Era buildings slated for demolition at the request of Consolidated Nuclear Security, LLC (CNS), on behalf of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The recordations for these 18 buildings, which are located within what is now known as the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, were prepared and submitted in two separate packages. The first report (EC-NP-004) was prepared as a mitigation measure to address adverse effects that will result from the proposed demolition of 16 support and ancillary buildings. The current report is the second of the two packages and addresses the last two of the 18 buildings slated for demolition (9201-5 and 9204-4), which are two of the large process buildings located at Y-12. All 18 of these buildings have previously been determined eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The two buildings, Building 9201-5 and Building 9204-4, are located south of Bear Creek Road and west of the main Y-12 entrance gate. Both buildings were constructed as uranium enrichment facilities in support of the Manhattan Project, a top-secret World War II mission to develop the world’s first nuclear weapons. Building 9201-5, completed in October 1944, is the Alpha-5 process facility and Building 9204-4, completed in Fall 1945, is the Beta-4 process facility. Over the years, these facilities were repurposed for a number of different functions.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
NASA NTRS1988

Hydrogen turbines for space power systems: A simplified axial flow gas turbine model

Hydrogen cooled, turbine powered space weapon systems require a relatively simple, but reasonably accurate hydrogen gas expansion turbine model. Such a simplified turbine model would require little computational time and allow incorporation into system level computer programs while providing reasonably accurate volume/mass estimates. This model would then allow optimization studies to be performed on multiparameter space power systems and provide improved turbine mass and size estimates for the various operating conditions (when compared to empirical and power law approaches). An axial flow gas expansion turbine model was developed for these reasons and is in use as a comparative bench mark in space power system studies at Sandia. The turbine model is based on fluid dynamic, thermodynamic, and material strength considerations, but is considered simplified because it does not account for design details such as boundary layer effects, shock waves, turbulence, stress concentrations, and seal leakage. Although the basic principles presented here apply to any gas or vapor axial flow turbine, hydrogen turbines are discussed because of their immense importance on space burst power platforms.

Hudson, Steven L.↗
DOE OSTI2024

Safeguards Considerations for Salt Fuel Fabrication

Molten salt reactors (MSR) with liquid fuel present a unique safeguards challenge whereby the current verification techniques have not been evaluated for effectiveness and applicability. While MSR operations have been the subject of prior studies, the front-end liquid fuel preparation activities have not been extensively evaluated. Reviewing the existing resources on fuel fabrication and evaluating the range of fuel fabrication process options available will allow safeguards analysts to identify the applicability of existing safeguards practices, identify gaps in capability, and identify opportunities where safeguards may be applied. There is no existing supplier of fuel salt for MSRs. In an extensive review of MSR technology, the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA's) Nuclear Power Technology Development Section acknowledges the gap in existing capabilities for fuel salt fabrication, noting, simply, “if demand exists, supply will appear.” Salt reactor fuel has not been previously produced on an industrial scale in a non-nuclear weapon state. These characteristics of MSR fuel fabrication present high levels of uncertainty, but they also represent an opportunity to mature safeguards techniques alongside liquid fuel preparation technologies.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Benzyl trichloroacetimidates as derivatizing agents for phosphonic acids related to nerve agents by EI-GC-MS during OPCW proficiency test scenarios

Abstract The use of benzyl trichloroacetimidates for the benzylation of phosphonic acid nerve agent markers under neutral, basic, and slightly acidic conditions is presented. The benzyl-derived phosphonic acids were detected and analyzed by Electron Ionization Gas Chromatography–Mass Spectrometry (EI-GC–MS). The phosphonic acids used in this work included ethyl-, cyclohexyl- and pinacolyl methylphosphonic acid, first pass hydrolysis products from the nerve agents ethyl N -2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonothiolate (VX), cyclosarin (GF) and soman (GD) respectively. Optimization of reaction parameters for the benzylation included reaction time and solvent, temperature and the effect of the absence or presence of catalytic acid. The optimized conditions for the derivatization of the phosphonic acids specifically for their benzylation, included neutral as well as catalytic acid (< 5 mol%) and benzyl 2,2,2-trichloroacetimidate in excess coupled to heating the mixture to 60 °C in acetonitrile for 4 h. While the neutral conditions for the method proved to be efficient for the preparation of the p -methoxybenzyl esters of the phosphonic acids, the acid-catalyzed process appeared to provide much lower yields of the products relative to its benzyl counterpart. The method’s efficiency was tested in the successful derivatization and identification of pinacolyl methylphosphonic acid (PMPA) as its benzyl ester when present at a concentration of ~ 5 μg/g in a soil matrix featured in the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) 44th proficiency test (PT). Additionally, the protocol was used in the detection and identification of PMPA when spiked at ~ 10 μg/mL concentration in a fatty acid-rich liquid matrix featured during the 38 th OPCW-PT. The benzyl derivative of PMPA was partially corroborated with the instrument's internal NIST spectral library and the OPCW central analytical database (OCAD v.21_2019) but unambiguously identified through comparison with a synthesized authentic standard. The method’s MDL (LOD) values for the benzyl and the p -methoxybenzyl pinacolyl methylphosphonic acids were determined to be 35 and 63 ng/mL respectively, while the method’s Limit of Quantitation (LOQ) was determined to be 104 and 189 ng/mL respectively in the OPCW-PT soil matrix evaluated.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safeguards Technical Objectives for Thorium Molten Salt Reactor Fuel Cycles

China, Denmark, France, India, Indonesia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, among others, are exploring commercial thorium fuel cycles for domestic power production and/or international export. For any thorium fuel cycle facilities built and/or operated in a non-nuclear weapon State with a comprehensive safeguards agreement, those facilities and any associated nuclear material would be subject to international nuclear safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Thorium fuel cycle facilities offered for the application of safeguards under a voluntary offer agreement by a nuclear weapon State would also be subject to safeguards, if selected by the IAEA. Compared to uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities, thorium fuel cycle facilities are comparatively diverse from an inspection and accounting perspective, differing greatly in material type, form, and design from uranium/plutonium fuel cycle facilities and also from each other. Of these, the most complex thorium fuel cycles – and therefore likely the most challenging to the implementation of international nuclear safeguards – are those that include thorium molten salt reactors. With thorium fuel cycles approaching near-term commercial deployment timelines, it is imperative that the international nuclear safeguards community begins to think about how to adapt existing international nuclear safeguards concepts and approaches to thorium fuel cycles, as well as mitigate any gaps that may exist. This paper focuses on the development of recommended safeguards technical objectives for efficient and effective application of international nuclear safeguards measures (e.g., containment / surveillance, non-destructive assay, destructive assay, environmental sampling) to thorium molten salt reactors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Nevada National Security Site 2019 Waste Management Monitoring Report Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites

Environmental monitoring data are collected at and around the Area 3 and Area 5 Radioactive Waste Management Sites (RWMSs) within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). This report summarizes the 2019 environmental data to provide an overall evaluation of RWMS performance and to support environmental compliance and performance assessment (PA) activities. Some of these data (e.g., radiation exposure, air, and groundwater) are presented in other reports (Mission Support and Test Services, LLC 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Direct radiation monitoring data indicate exposure levels at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are within the range of background levels measured at the NNSS. Slightly elevated exposure levels outside the Area 3 RWMS are attributed to nearby historical aboveground nuclear weapons tests. Air monitoring data at the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs show that tritium concentrations in water vapor and americium and plutonium concentrations in air particles are below Derived Concentration Standards for these radionuclides. Groundwater monitoring data indicate the groundwater in the uppermost aquifer beneath the Area 5 RWMS is not impacted by RWMS operations. Results of groundwater analysis from wells around the Area 5 RWMS are below established investigation levels. Leachate samples collected from the leachate collection systems at the Area 5 mixed low-level waste disposal unit are below established contaminant regulatory limits. During 2019, precipitation at the Area 3 RWMS was 77 percent above average, and precipitation at the Area 5 RWMS was 69 percent above average. Water balance measurements indicate that evapotranspiration from the vegetated weighing lysimeter at the Area 5 RWMS dries the soil and prevents downward percolation of precipitation more effectively than evaporation as measured from the bare-soil weighing lysimeter. Vadose zone monitoring in the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMS soil covers shows no evidence of precipitation percolating through the covers to the waste. Moisture from precipitation did not percolate below 120 centimeters (3.9 feet [ft]) in the vegetated final cover on the U-3ax/bl disposal unit at the Area 3 RWMS during 2019. There was no drainage through 2.4 meters (8 ft) of soil as indicated from the Area 3 drainage lysimeters that received only natural precipitation. At the Area 3 RWMS, which received three times the natural precipitation, 57 percent of the applied precipitation and irrigation drained from the bare-soil drainage lysimeter. All 2019 monitoring data indicate that the Area 3 and Area 5 RWMSs are performing within expectations of the model and parameter assumptions for the facilities’ PAs.

2019↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Role of Nuclear-Conventional Intermingling on State Decision-making and the Risk of Inadvertent Escalation

The questions answered by this report are: What are the implications of nuclear and conventional intermingling on crisis stability and the potential risk of miscalculation?, and Specifically, how might entanglement influence US and competitor decision making during crisis and conflict? In practice, there are three main forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling. First, intermingling between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon systems can occur via the fielding of dual capable delivery systems like missiles or aircraft. Second, intermingling can happen due to the co-location of nuclear and non-nuclear forces and their support structures—for example, the co-location of strategic bombers and general-purpose aircraft, or the co-location of strategic submarines and general-purpose vessels. Third, intermingling can occur via convolving nuclear and conventional military command and control systems, to include ballistic missile early warning and potentially space surveillance systems as well. All three forms of nuclear-conventional intermingling have significantly increased since the end of the Cold War, driven by both technological and doctrinal changes. However, there are important differences in the rationale behind, and also the risks associated with these three different forms of intermingling. The mere existence of dual capable systems is not new— deploying such systems can increase the effectiveness of forces, and it can also provide more flexibility. The major powers have both employed and threatened with dual capable systems for decades, and they have done so without nuclear escalation. Similarly, the major powers co-located nuclear and conventional systems in the Cold War, and they did so for variety of reasons that had nothing to do with complicating the adversary’s risk calculus. The Soviet Union, for example, decided to co-locate its nuclear and conventional forces for economic and administrative reasons. Although today it might be recognized as a useful deterrent tool, it was not their primary intention. Major powers want to convince rivals that the co-location of forces creates a high bar for targeting and raises the risk of nuclear escalation, but they also want to have the flexibility of this not being true in an actual crisis or conflict.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Stockpile Stewardship and Nuclear Testing: A Technical Assessment

Since 1992, the United States has retained confidence in its nuclear weapon stockpile without performing any tests that produce nuclear yield. Instead, it has invested in a stockpile stewardship program (SSP) based on the same approach that was validated through fifty years of experience during the nuclear testing era. As the test moratorium continues and new information becomes available, it is both necessary and appropriate to periodically revisit the question of whether or not nuclear testing should resume. In a recent article by Dr. Mark Schneider, he asserts that the United States should return to nuclear testing to address the issues that negatively affect our country’s nuclear deterrent. A serious, technically informed evaluation of the most significant of the issues Dr. Schneider has raised is provided in this paper. The conclusion of this evaluation is that the strategy of a well-funded SSP coupled with rigorous assessments to identify if there is a specific need for a nuclear test is sound and cost-effective approach. Any decision otherwise needs to take into careful consideration all the classified SSP successes and data pertaining to the particular issues in question.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Knowledge Transfer Program for International Nuclear Safeguards

Nuclear safeguards were first announced in 1945 by the U.S., Canadian and British governments as a means to exchange scientific information about peaceful uses of atomic energy and prevent the use of nuclear material for weapons. International nuclear safeguards, now under the provision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), serves to hold accountable the 140 member countries (States) that have entered into treaties and agreements against the spread of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the IAEA acts as a nuclear materials inspectorate under the global Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, brought about in 1968, that specifies commitments member States make to the world?s non-proliferation regime. The Office of International Nuclear Safeguards (OINS) is part of the National Nuclear Security Administration, a semi-autonomous agency within the U.S. Department of Energy. Within OINS, the Human Capital Development program recognizes the need to build workforce capacity and safeguards expertise. This includes supporting the education and training of younger generations working in international nuclear safeguards. One of the program?s main concerns is core competencies being lost to retirement or attrition and building knowledge retention pipelines from senior to new professionals. One identified core competency is knowledge gained by individuals who have completed IAEA assignments such as missions to member States to conduct safeguards inspections. Such individuals possess unique knowledge, and efforts are being put forth to effectively capture this knowledge within the national laboratories complex. To this end, we report findings from a one-year mentor-mentee knowledge retention program in which an international safeguards subject matter expert imparted knowledge and skills to a willing professional mentee. The knowledge and skills stem from the mentor?s multi-year assignment at the IAEA in Vienna, Austria.

98 - NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation and Uncertainty of Radioxenon Transport with a Mesoscale Model after the February 2013 Underground Test in North Korea

Abstract The transport of radioxenon released from the February 2013 underground nuclear weapons test in North Korea was analyzed at two receptors—one at the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty site Rn58 in Russia (400 km downwind) and a second at Rn38 in Japan (1000 km downwind). Transport was modeled with two ensembles of mesoscale simulations, one generated with varying initial and lateral boundary conditions taken from the Global Forecasting System uncertainty ensemble, and a second created from different parameterizations and surface conditions. The wind variability was similar for the two ensembles and consistent with observations at 925 mb (1 mb = 1 hPa) but not at the surface. Biases in calculated surface winds and the radioxenon concentration in the ensembles were attributed mainly to poor simulation of the sea breeze at both locations and mountain lee affects at Rn38 in Japan. These wind regimes affected the timing of the surface radioxenon plume at Rn58 and its duration at Rn38. Surface wind variability induced by terrain and land–sea contrast (the sea breeze) also had a significant effect on the surface winds and plume dynamics, including blocking of flow approaching elevated terrain near Vladivostok and the west side of Japan. Increased plume uncertainty was seen at night because of surface wind variability. Measured surface chemical variability was larger than found in the first European Tracer Experiment in central Europe. The study found that horizontal model resolution contributes to uncertainty but not as much as vertical resolution, boundary layer parameterizations, and assimilation of surface meteorological data near the receptor.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Comparing Synthetic Routes and Thermal Characteristics of Alternate APO Variants

Low density, high-strength, temperature-resistant foams see widespread application in the aerospace and weapons fields due to their excellent qualities as structural supports. In these demanding environments, the most common formulation is a three-phase syntactic foam containing APOCure-601, BMI, and carbon or glass microballoons. Of these, APOCure-601 and BMI form the polymer resin amino-poly(oxadiazole) bismaleimide (APO-BMI), also known as Legacy APO or S-1,2-Ethyl-APO. In manufacturing this foam, the selective laser sintering (SLS) additive manufacturing technique is quickly gaining prominence, over more traditional injection molding since SLS allows for 3D printing of materials and reduces overall cost and waste production. That said, SLS also requires a narrow window between the melt and cure temperatures for a successful print. SLS printing of APO-BMI is therefore difficult since the compound possesses a broad window between its melting and curing temperatures, and also requires several post-cure steps or complete polymerization. This work explores synthesis optimization and thermal characteristics for variant Apo-BMI structures by observing the effect that alternative heteroatoms in the APO linkages, geometries 0f the BMI groups, and bridge structure identities impart on the resultant material. Synthetic methods for these altered structures were established in batch, with some others further converted to continuous flow chemistry, a method that produces materials in a continuous stream and is highly reproducible and readily scaled. Additionally, each structural change significantly altered the melt and cure properties for each APO variant, which is advantageous for SLS manufacturing.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2022

Verification of Upcoming MCNP Features For Estimating Nuclear Data Sensitivities in Fixed Source Simulations [Abstract]

Predictive simulation codes, like the Monte Carlo N-Particle (MCNP) transport code, are used throughout the nuclear community. These simulations are based on nuclear data. Maximizing the accuracy and precision of nuclear data maximizes the accuracy and precision of the overall simulation. This is imperative to applications that rely on simulations. For example, improving nuclear data for special nuclear material improves simulation accuracy in stockpile stewardship applications, which results in larger safety margins and decreased operational costs. The improvement and validation of nuclear data is completed through integral benchmark experiments. Past benchmarks have primarily been limited to focus on the effective multiplication factor ($\kappa$ eff ); broadening the purview of benchmarks beyond $\kappa$ eff -dependent nuclear data addresses nuclear data deficiencies. Different response types depend on different areas of nuclear data. This dependence is quantified as nuclear data sensitivity: the change in response due to perturbation of a contributing parameter. The larger the nuclear data sensitivity of a response, the more the experiment is influenced by the uncertainties of the nuclear data. The optimization of nuclear data sensitivities in future benchmarks would result in more detailed validation of lesser studied areas of nuclear data. Currently, direct sensitivity capabilities are not easily found for all experiment types and parameters. An MCNP tool to directly estimate the cross section sensitivities of tallied values is under development. Additionally, updates have been made to the perturbation feature of MCNP, which can be used in a less direct approach to estimating sensitivities. This work verifies these features to estimate nuclear data sensitivities in fixed source simulations of a 4.5-kg sphere of alpha- phase weapons-grade plutonium surrounded by differing amounts of copper and polyethylene. Integrated estimates made using MCNP’s tools were found to statistically agree with integrated estimates made from manual perturbation of nuclear data proving the validity of the MCNP tools.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants – Radionuclide Emissions Calendar Year 2020

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO) operates the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) and the North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF). From 1951 through 1992, the NNSS was the continental testing location for U.S. nuclear weapons. Radionuclides in air from NNSS activities have been monitored since the initiation of atmospheric testing. After 1962, testing was limited to underground detonations, which greatly reduced radiation exposure to the public. Since the end of nuclear testing in 1992, radiation monitoring has focused on detecting airborne radionuclides from historically contaminated soils because this sources dominates the potential offsite dose. These radionuclides are derived from re-suspension of soil (primarily by wind) and emission of tritium-contaminated soil moisture through evapotranspiration. Low amounts of legacy-related tritium are also emitted to air at the NLVF, an NNSS support complex in North Las Vegas. To protect the public from harmful levels of manmade radiation, the Clean Air Act, National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), specifically the National Emission Standards for Emissions of Radionuclides Other Than Radon From Department of Energy Facilities (40 CFR 61, Subpart H, 2020) limits the release of radioactivity from a DOE facility to that which would cause 10 millirem per year (mrem/y) effective dose equivalent (EDE) to any member of the public. This limit does not include radiation unrelated to NNSS activities. Unrelated doses could come from naturally occurring radioactive elements, from sources such as medically or commercially used radionuclides, or from sources outside of the United States, such as Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant, which was damaged in 2011. NNSA/NFO demonstrates compliance with the NESHAP limit by reporting environmental measurements of radionuclide air concentrations at critical receptor locations on the NNSS. This alternative was proposed and formerly submitted to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2001 (EPA 2001a) and has been the method used to demonstrate compliance with the 40 CFR 61.92 dose standard since 2005. Six locations on the NNSS have been established to act as critical receptor locations to demonstrate compliance with the NESHAP limit. These locations are closer to radionuclide releases than where the public resides so they act as protective substitutes for public receptor locations. Compliance is demonstrated if the measured annual average concentration is less than the NESHAP Concentration Level (CL) for Environmental Compliance listed in Table 2 of 40 CFR 61, Appendix E. For multiple radionuclides, compliance is demonstrated when the sum of the fractions (determined by dividing each radionuclide’s concentration by its CL and then adding the fractions together) is less than 1.0. The EPAapproved air transport model, called the Clean Air Package 1988 (CAP88-PC) is also used to calculate the effective dose equivalent to the maximally exposed individual from NNSS air emissions. CAP88-PC was also used to calculate the population dose, or the collective EDE (expressed as person-rem [roentgen equivalent man] per year [person-rem/y]) for all individuals combined who reside within 80 kilometers (km) of NNSS emission sources. In 2020, the potential dose from radiological emissions to air from both current and past NNSS activities was well below the 10 mrem/y dose limit. This is demonstrated by both the air sampling data collected at critical receptor air monitoring stations and CAP88-PC modeling. The average concentrations of radioactivity at air critical receptor stations ranged from 0.2% to a maximum of 4.2% of the allowed NESHAP limit. CAP88-PC modeling of all 2020 NNSS radionuclide emissions showed the maximally exposed individual to be in Amargosa Valley and this individual received a potential dose of 0.063 mrem/y. The collective dose was calculated to be 0.29 person-rem/year for the 521,300 people who lived within 80 km of NNSS emission sources.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Scoping Analysis of Pebble-Bed Reactors for the Destruction of the Transuranic Inventory of LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel

With the forecasted increase in the construction and operation of nuclear reactors, there will be a corresponding increase in the quantity of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) that requires long-term storage. In SNF, transuranic isotopes contribute the most to the long-term radiotoxicity of the fuel and pose a proliferation risk. One option that has been explored to address these issues is the removal of the transuranic isotopes from SNF and the conversion of these isotopes into transuranic fuel (TRU fuel). Here, this work sought to determine how effective a micro-modular Pebble-Bed High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Reactor (PB-HTGR); the 10-MW High Temperature Gas-cooled Test Reactor (HTR-10); and a salt-cooled small-modular pebble-bed reactor (PBR), i.e. the generic Fluoride-cooled High-temperature Reactor (gFHR), are at reducing the inventory of transuranic isotopes while still maintaining the intrinsic safety features of the PBR designs, such as negative temperature coefficients of reactivity. Optimized pebble designs utilizing TRU fuel were found for both reactors through the adjustment for the packing fraction of fuel in each pebble. The Axial Zone Equilibrium Modeling (A-ZEM) method was used in this work to help select the optimized pebble design. Once an optimized pebble design was selected and an equilibrium model was produced, the results from the deep burn (DB) HTR-10 and gFHR designs were compared to the results of two models from the literature. While both the DB gFHR and the DB HTR-10 were able to reduce the weapons-usable transuranic inventory, the performance of these reactors did not match that of the small-modular PB-HTGRs in the literature. Therefore, a need was identified for further refinement of the gFHR design using TRU fuel, as the results for this model were more promising than those of the DB HTR-10, which was strongly limited by the high leakage intrinsic to micro-modular PB-HTGRs.

Transuranic fuel↗
DOE OSTI2021

Beyond the List: Bioagent-Agnostic Signatures Could Enable a More Flexible and Resilient Biodefense Posture Than an Approach Based on Priority Agent Lists Alone

As of 2021, the biothreat policy and research communities organize their efforts around lists of priority agents, which elides consideration of novel pathogens and biotoxins. For example, the Select Agents and Toxins list is composed of agents that historic biological warfare programs had weaponized or that have previously caused great harm during natural outbreaks. Similarly, lists of priority agents promulgated by the World Health Organization and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases are composed of previously known pathogens and biotoxins. To fill this gap, we argue that the research/scientific and biodefense/biosecurity communities should categorize agents based on how they impact their hosts to augment current list-based paradigms. Specifically, we propose integrating the results of multi-omics studies to identify bioagent-agnostic signatures (BASs) of disease—namely, patterns of biomarkers that accurately and reproducibly predict the impacts of infection or intoxication without prior knowledge of the causative agent. Here, we highlight three pathways that investigators might exploit as sources of signals to construct BASs and their applicability to this framework. The research community will need to forge robust interdisciplinary teams to surmount substantial experimental, technical, and data analytic challenges that stand in the way of our long-term vision. However, if successful, our functionality-based BAS model could present a means to more effectively surveil for and treat known and novel agents alike.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Multiple monoenergetic gamma radiography (MMGR) with a compact superconducting cyclotron

Smuggling of special nuclear materials and nuclear devices through borders and ports of entry constitutes a major risk to global security. Technologies are needed to reliably screen the flow of commerce for the presence of high-Z materials such as uranium and plutonium. Here, we present an experimental proof-of-concept of a technique that uses inelastic (p,p') nuclear reactions to generate monoenergetic photons, which provide means to measure the areal density and the effective-Z (Z eff ) of an object with an accuracy surpassing that achieved by current methods. We use an ION-12 SC superconducting 12 MeV proton cyclotron to produce 4.4, 6.1, 6.9, and 7.1 MeV photons from a variety of nuclear reactions. Using these photons in a transmission mode, we show that we are able to accurately reconstruct the areal densities and Zeff of a test object. This methodology could enable mobile applications to screen commercial cargoes with high material specificity, providing a means of distinguishing common cargo materials from high-Z materials that include uranium and plutonium.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Heat Loss Correction Factor for Fireball Yield Measurements

Fireball yield calculations are performed using Taylor’s radius equation. However, at early times, the x-ray diffusion process has a significant effect on the size of the fireball, and at late times the shock wave degenerates into an acoustic wave. Thus, earlier research determined that the range of validity for Taylor’s equation was in the scaled time regime of 0.004–0.008 s. So, when performing a yield calculation, the only values that are analyzed are those that lie within that range of validity. While Taylor’s equations offer an approximation of the scaled yield, they also rely on several assumptions. For example, the equations assume that the shock wave is adiabatic, when, in fact, the first light pulse on the nuclear test films, which occurs as the shock wave is forming, suggests that the shock wave is not adiabatic. Furthermore, the amount of heat loss from the shock wave that occurs prior to the scaled time regime of 0.004–0.008 s can change significantly as a function of air density. This may cause the shock wave radius to be smaller relative to the assumed adiabatic shock wave. Therefore, the objective of this project was to determine the correction factor for heat transfer, which should be applied in order to produce a more accurate approximation of the weapon’s yield.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗